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## **Continuation of African Nationalist Guerrilla Activities.**

During 1971–72 the Portuguese armed forces in Mozambique, numbering between 60,000 and 70,000 officers and men, more than half of them being Black, continued their operations, under the command of General Kaulza de Arriaga, against African nationalist guerrillas fighting for the establishment of an independent Mozambique.

The principal guerilla organization was the *Frente de Libertacao de Mocambique (Frelimo)*, led by Senhor Samora Moises Machel and Senhor Marcelino dos Santos, with headquarters in Dar-es-Salaam (Tanzania). Two smaller movements which had seceded from *Frelimo* were (a) the Mozambique Revolutionary Committee (*Coremo*), led by a defector from *Frelimo*, Mr. Paulo Gumane, with headquarters in Lusaka (Zambia); and (b) the *Frente Unido do Mocambique (FUMO)*, the formation of which had been announced on June 24, 1971, by Senhor Marcellus Mbule, and which was reported to have been joined by the Rev. Uria Simango, who had been one of *Frelimo's* principal leaders until November 1970. Senhor Mbule claimed that *Frelimo* had been infiltrated by Portuguese secret service agents and also by the (U.S.) Central Intelligence Agency (CIA).

According to a statement made by General Kaulza de Arriaga in Nampula (northern Mozambique) on Sept. 25, 1972, Chinese influence accounted for 90 per cent of *Frelimo's* activity and equipment. He estimated that there were between 20,000 and 30,000 Chinese in Tanzania and Zambia, and that, although many were “genuine technicians” involved in the “Tanzam” railway project, a “very high” number were not, and that many Chinese taught at *Frelimo* instruction centres.

The war was characterized, especially during 1972, by continued *Frelimo* action by guerrillas operating in small groups, laying mines and attacking Portuguese posts but avoiding confrontation with large troop concentrations.

Although the Portuguese authorities repeatedly made claims of having won decisive victories and inflicted heavy losses on the guerrillas, the latter were able during 1972 to extend their activities from the northern districts (south of the border with Tanzania constituted by the Rovuma river) to the Tete district and also to Manica and Sofala (the hinterland of the port of Beira), extending as far south as the area of Guts, about 300 miles west of Brita towards the Rhodesian frontier.

In the Tete district their object was to disrupt the construction of the Caters Bassa dam, which was protected by three rings of Portuguese defence positions. As the guerrillas were unable to penetrate these defences, work on the dam proceeded according to schedule. Nevertheless, explosions caused by mines laid by the guerrillas made roads and railways in the area unsafe.

In one of the first such explosions a goods train was damaged near Catur (between Nova Freixo and Malawi) on Nov. 24, 1971.

In the northern districts of Cabs Delgado and Niassa, *Frelimo* claimed by the end of 1972 that it was caring for 1,000,000 people outside the control of the Portuguese administration, and that the funds which it received from abroad—including grants by the Governments of Denmark, Norway and Sweden—were used to run co-operatives, medical posts and primary schools for 20,000 children.

In connexion with military operations in this area, the Tanzanian Government repeatedly alleged that Portuguese aircraft had penetrated into Tanzania's airspace.

The Government of Tanzania stated on April 14, 1972, that two Portuguese aircraft had been shot down by Tanzanian anti-aircraft guns, one of them on the Tanzanian side of the Rovuma river, after they had raided Tanzania and killed three Tanzanians. The loss of they aircraft was officially admitted in Beira. A government statement issued in Dar-es-Salaam on Jan. 22, 1973, to the effect that nine aircraft from Mozambique had attacked the area around a Tanzanian village was, however, described as "totally unfounded" by General Kaulza de Arriaga.

Mr. John Malecela, the Tanzanian Foreign Minister, on Dec. 6, 1972, drew attention to a press report quoting General Kaulza de Arriaga as declaring that, if his forces were allowed to attack guerrilla bases and supply routes in Tanzania and Zambia, it would be possible to end the war within six months.

To deal with the *Frelimo* threat to the Cabora Bassa dam site, the Portuguese Government concentrated the civil and military power in July 1971 in the hands of Brigadier F. M. Rocha Simoes, who was appointed governor and military commander of the Tete district. Later in 1971 there was an increasing number of incidents in the area.

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An Asian from Salisbury (Rhodesia) was killed near Tote on Sept. 14 when his car was blown up by a landmine. A total of 41 tribal chiefs and headmen were in October reported to have been murdered during the previous few months by *Frelimo* and *Coremo* guerrillas said to operate from Zambia. Two Portuguese Air Force officers were killed by a read mine near Tete, it was reported from Lisbon on Oct. 14, and on Dec. 15, 1971, eight Africans were reported to have been killed by a landmine in the Tete district. Damage to goods trains in the Tete area was caused by explosions on March 19, 1971, late in June 1972 and again on Oct. 30, 1972.

Portuguese announcements of military successes in the anti-guerrilla campaign were made from time to time.

The Portuguese High Command announced on Dec. 26, 1971, that it had destroyed *Frelimo*'s centre in the Tete district, and on Jan. 3, 1972, the High Command claimed that the security situation round the dam site had "greatly improved", as 303 "search and destroy" operations towards the end of 1971 had resulted in 70 insurgents being killed and 10 captured, while 1,500 civilians were "liberated" from guerrilla control. Portuguese losses were given as 13 killed and 17 seriously wounded.

On April 3, 1972, the Portuguese High Command reported that a guerrilla offensive against the Caters Bassa site had been defeated, more than 1,040 insurgents having boon killed, 209 captured and 20 *Frelimo* leaders arrested.

Early' in 1973 the Portuguese reported a now offensive, by special commando and parachute groups flown in by helicopter, against some 2,000 guerrillas in the Tete district; some of the 150 guerrillas said to have been killed had been" flushed "out of Rhodesia by' Rhodesian security forces, and it was officially stated that *Frelimo*'s main operational base had been seized. On the other hand it was reported from Lisbon on Jan. 27 that in an attack on two villages the guerrillas had for the first time used 122-mm rockets of Soviet origin.

*Frelimo*, on its part, repeatedly claimed to have inflicted heavy losses on the Portuguese armed forces.

Its head office in Dar-es-Salaam stated on Oct. 29, 1972, that *Frelimo* had opened a new front near the Rhodesian border, more than 21 Portuguese soldiers having been killed, and that in the offensive begun in Manica and Sofala on July 25 seven lorries with equipment for the Cabora Bassa dam had been destroyed.

In a report on nine years of fighting issued in Algiers on Sept. 24, 1972, *Frelimo* claimed that “despite bombing by Portuguese aircraft, the use of chemical defoliants and incursions by spies and ground troops” one-quarter of Mozambique was under *Frelimo* control.

For the year 1971 the Portuguese High Command, in a report on Dec. 26, 1971, gave the figure of “terrorists” killed in Mozambique as 544, with 181 guerrilla camps having been destroyed.

For the year 1972, its report of Jan. 27, 1973, gave the following figures: 1,428 *Frelimo* members (claimed to equal 18 per cent of their total) had been killed or captured or had surrendered; the Portuguese armed forces had lost 54 men killed or severely wounded—bringing the total for eight years’ fighting to 644 casualties out of about 60,000 officers and men; 969 civilians had been killed by *Frelimo*; some 12,000 civilians previously under rebel control had been “liberated” by the Army; 715 “terrorist refuges” had been destroyed and 914 weapons captured; and by the end of 1972 more than a million civilians (out of Mozambique's total population of 8,200,000) had been moved into *aldeamentos*.

*These aldeamentos* were “strategic hamlets”. in which the Portuguese authorities resettled African villagers in order to prevent them from giving support to guerrillas. More than 500 such settlements had been established by August 1972, and in the Tete district alone there were more than 120, with another 85 scheduled for completion in 1972. These new settlements were superior to the traditional small villages, as they had proper, though simple, sanitation, as well as hospitals or clinics, and schools. Their purpose, however, was primarily military, the inhabitants forming their own militia and not being allowed to return to their former villages.

As a result of the guerrilla activities and the establishment of *aldeamentos* in the Tete district, thousands of villagers had by August 1972 fled to the neighbouring countries of Rhodesia, Malawi and Zambia; some 4,000 were in refugee camps in Malawi, many of them claiming to be *Frelimo* supporters.

According to Senhor J. E. de Menezes Rosa, the Portuguese Ambassador to South Africa, *Frelimo* operations frustrated by the Portuguese during the period January–November 1972 included (a) an” attempt to infiltrate a U.N. mission”; (b) an attempt in September to” introduce” Senhor Samora Machel, with some Tanzanian officers, into Mozambique; and (c) numerous attacks, among them an attempt “to attack the Tete air bases with rockets” and “an attack on the Mutarara–Moatize railway”.

Under a decree of July 27, 1972, the political police (the DSG, formerly PIDE) were given powers to decide whether a person accused of “acting against the nation's territorial integrity” should be detained in an *aldeamento* or be placed under house arrest.

Following a visit to Lisbon by Mr. Ian Smith, the Rhodesian Prime Minister, on Oct. 14–15, 1972, when he had talks with Dr. Caetano, the Portuguese Prime Minister, the latter said of the situation in Mozambique in a broadcast on Nov. 15: “In foreign countries the campaign against Cabora Bassa has reached hysterical heights. And in Mozambique it is above all in the district of Tete, where the work is being carried out, that the furies of the guerrillas have been concentrated. Accustomed as we are to this type of war, this does not perturb us and we have maintained our domination of the situation: Cabora Bassa continues. But some of our neighbours with less experience do not conceal their fears and in this way play the game of the enemy. They have been told more than once that there is no reason for their great apprehension.”

Mr. Smith said in Salisbury on Dec. 4, 1972, that Dr. Caetano had admitted that the “terrorist situation” had deteriorated because of the concentration of guerrilla efforts to disrupt the Cabora Bassa work. However, Mr. Smith said that the Portuguese believed that they would “put it right in time”, and that he went “along with this”. There was, he added, no truth in reports that Rhodesian security chiefs were not happy about the situation in Mozambique; he had confidence in Portuguese ability to “handle the terrorists”, but at the same time Rhodesia was prepared to send troops to help the Portuguese in Mozambique. Incursions into Rhodesia could “break out at any minute”, and the position was, he claimed, “far more serious” than the man in the

street thought it to be.

The Mozambique situation was also discussed during defence talks held in Salisbury on Oct. 26–29, 1972, between Mr. Jack Howman, the Rhodesian Minister of Defence, Lieut.-General George Wells, Rhodesian Chief of General Staff, Mr. P. W. Botha, South African Minister of Defence, and Admiral Hugo H. Bierman, Commandant General of the South African Defence Forces.

Mr. Botha said on Dec. 5, 1972, that South African military assistance would be “given freely on request”, but that for the time being this was not necessary as Rhodesia and Portugal, with which South Africa's relationship was “excellent”, were “doing fine work in combating terrorism” and were “certainly holding their own”.

In connexion with an attack by Portuguese commando units early in February 1973 on “a major guerrilla base” near the railway line linking Rhodesia to the port of Beira, it was reported from *Frelimo* headquarters in Dar-es-Salaam on Feb. 5 that the railway line would henceforth be a primary target for attack, because it was not necessary to consider Zambia's interest in the line since it was no longer used for Zambian copper exports as a result of the closure of the Zambia- Rhodesia border by Mr. Smith.

The fighting in the Tete district led to disputes between Portugal and Zambia.

The Portuguese authorities protested on Aug. 20, 1972, against alleged Zambian action in “clearing her frontiers for African rebel thrusts against Angola and Mozambique”—following an official Zambian announcement that villages along the borders would be evacuated “because of Portuguese air and ground raids”.

The Zambian Defence Ministry claimed on Dec. 26, 1972, that two Zambian soldiers had been captured by Portuguese forces along the Mozambique border two days earlier.

The Portuguese armed forces' activities also caused a worsening of relations between the Governments of Portugal and Malawi.

Following incursions into Malawi by Portuguese troops pursuing guerrillas and allegedly killing several Malawi villagers, the Portuguese Ambassador in Zomba was withdrawn at his own request late in November 1972.

The conduct of the war in Mozambique by the Portuguese forces was criticized by a number of churchmen, especially after the withdrawal of the White Fathers in May 1971.

Details of alleged “massacres” reported by members of the Order of the White Fathers were published in Tanzania and other countries in September 1971.

Father Da Costa, a missionary of the Combonian Order, supplied after his departure from Mozambique in October 1972—according to *Le Monde* of Nov. 3, 1972—a list of 110 men, women and children who, he alleged, had been killed in reprisals against the civilian population in a number of villages in the Tete district between May 1971 and May 1972 during the forcible resettlement of Africans in *aldeamentos* after the destruction by the Army of their villages in the area where *Frelimo* guerrillas were active. Other missionaries alleged that 200 Africans who had left their aldeamento had later been found dead in their huts destroyed by the Army, and that in another *aldeamento* the population had been “liquidated” after an explosion.

A number of churchmen were arrested for alleged political offences.

The arrest of Pastor Zedequias Manganhela (60), president of the synodal council of the Presbyterian Church of Mozambique, as well as of the council's vice-president and several other leading members, was announced

in Switzerland in July 1972. Many more Presbyterians—according to *The Star* (Johannesburg) more than 1,800—were subsequently arrested for alleged “political offences”. On Dec. 12, 1972, it was reported (and confirmed by the Portuguese authorities on Dec. 17) that Pastor Manganhela had “under the pressure of interrogation” taken his own life in prison in the night of Dec. 10–11.

The release of 37 arrested Presbyterians on Dec. 29 was announced in Geneva on Dec. 31, 1972.

Two Roman Catholic priests, Fathers Joaquim Teles Sampaio and Fernando Marques Mendes, who had been arrested in January 1972, were on Jan. 26, 1973, sentenced by a military court in Lourenco Marques respectively to 20 and five months’ imprisonment for having “endangered the security of the State” by denouncing alleged atrocities by Portuguese troops. (Le Monde - Neue Zurcher Zeitung - Times - Daily Telegraph Guardian - Financial Times - Cape Times)

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