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Confrontation after Border Closure by Rhodesia. - Zambian Efforts to secure Alternative Trade Routes. -U.N. security Council Decisions.

The Rhodesian Government's decision to close the Rhodesian border with Zambia, except for copper exports from that country, and the Zambian Government's subsequent suspension of copper exports through Rhodesia on Jan. 11[see page 25668] led to a prolonged confrontation between the two Governments. Even after the Rhodesian Government had decided on Feb. 3 to reopen the border, the Zambian Government persisted in its refusal to revert to the use of its former trade routes through Rhodesia—including rail communications with Portuguese ports in Mozambique and with South Africa.

Mr. Smith gave a detailed explanation of the Rhodesian reasons for closing the border with Zambia in a broadcast on Jan. 18.

He said *inter alia* that the Zambian Government openly admitted that they were “aiding and abetting” the “international gangsters” who were responsible for “landmine incidents and terrorist incursions”. Turning to Zambian statements that Rhodesia was “demanding the impossible”, he pointed out that President Kaunda had “already had occasion to arrest a large number of Rhodesian terrorists because they were siding with Zambians who were opposed to his Government”, and that “a batch of these prisoners were handed over to the Rhodesian authorities through a mutual agreement”. “However,” he continued, “for some unknown reason the Zambian Government say that they could not be party to any such action now.” After referring to instances when Rhodesia had offered and accorded help to Zambia, Mr. Smith emphasized that Rhodesia had no option but to act against Zambia rather than to “accept that innocent Rhodesian civilians could be murdered”.

Describing Rhodesia's aim as being “to bring the Zambian Government to its senses”, Mr. Smith said that he was still waiting for an answer to his request for “a meeting at ministerial level”. Giving reasons for the decision to exempt copper exports from the Rhodesian embargo, (a)he stated that Zambian copper was “a strategic metal used by the tree world” and it was not Rhodesia's wish “to do anything which would prejudice this situation”; and (b)that copper accounted for more than 90 per cent of Zambia's exports, and Rhodesia did not wish to do anything which would seriously prejudice her economy.

On Jan. 31 Mr. Smith said that he would resist pressure for any escalation of reprisals against Zambia if terrorism continued. Although, he said, “we would all like to avoid” a final confrontation between the Black north and the White south in Africa, “it is no use blinding yourself to the facts of life”; if it was the intention of the Organization of African Unity “to drive the White man and his civilization out of southern Africa”, he asked, what other situation could one possibly arrive at? The security situation, he added, was more serious than had been thought earlier, but the Rhodesian security forces had rectified their mistakes and, were mastering the situation. Mr. Smith dismissed as “mad” any idea that Rhodesia ought to have attacked Zambia (as suggested in certain right-wing quarters in Rhodesia).

It was reported from Lisbon on Jan. 12 that the Portuguese Foreign Ministry had summoned Lieut.-Colonel W. M. Knox, the Rhodesian diplomatic representative in Portugal, to express to him its “profound concern” at the Rhodesian decision to close the Zambian border and to warn Rhodesia against any further escalation of the situation.

After confirming on Jan. 18 that the South African Government had not been consulted on the border closure, Mr. Vorster, the South African Prime Minister, said in a statement on Jan. 19 that, although South Africa had not been a party to the Rhodesian decision, he knew from experience that Rhodesia had not sought this confrontation. Zambia, he said, had done nothing to prevent it or to promote good-neighbourly relations and “must have realized that the granting of passage to, and the harbouring of, terrorists” would sooner or later lead to trouble. South Africa, he emphasized, would continue to treat the matter in accordance with four basic principles, which had repeatedly been stated as follows:

“ (1) We do not interfere in the domestic affairs of other countries.

“ (2) We do not initiate boycotts and we do not reply to sanctions with counter-boycotts.

“ (3) We are unconditionally opposed to terrorism and we shall in terms of our declared policy render assistance within our means to Governments who seek it in their fight against terrorism.

“ (4) Where and when we are directly threatened we shall at all times take all steps to protect the life and property of our people and our territorial integrity.”

Criticism of Mr. Smith's decision to close the Zambian border was expressed in certain quarters in South Africa, including the pro-Government Sunday newspaper *Rapport*, which on Jan. 14 quoted South African politicians as saying that Mr. Smith's action had created new problems in addition to the “terrorist attacks”, and that this was “highly unwelcome”, especially as South Africa's hopes of expanding trade with Zambia could be “wrecked”.

Dr. Gideon Jacobs, chairman of the Witwatersrand General Council of the (Opposition) United Party, suggested on Jan. 15 that Mr. Vorster should use his influence to have a mediator appointed to find a solution to the Zambian- Rhodesian confrontation, which threatened South Africa with the loss of its African markets [worth R293,000,000 or about £160,000,000—including about £35,000,000 or per cent of Zambia's imports—in 1971 compared with South African exports to Britain of just over £400,000,000 and to the United States of £118,000,000].

As regards Rhodesia's relations with Portugal and South Africa, Mr. Smith declared on Jan. 28 that “prior consultation with our neighbours over the closure... would have been a diplomatic blunder on my part and would have caused acute embarrassment to our neighbours”.

Mr. Smith reiterated that the Governments of South Africa and Rhodesia had consistently stated that they would refrain from interfering in the internal affairs of other countries, and added that it was preferable “that we attend to our own affairs, make our own decisions and... accept responsibility for the consequences”. He continued: “Our action against Zambia was given the most careful consideration.... All that we are asking is that they... dissociate themselves from the indiscriminate warfare being waged against innocent Rhodesian civilians from Zambian soil.... We have no aggressive intentions against Zambia. The report emanating from Lusaka that 4,000 South African troops have moved into Rhodesia is entirely untrue....”

The Zambian Government's attitude on the border issue was repeatedly defined by government representatives.

Mr. Elijah Mudenda, the Zambian Foreign Minister, discussing the border closure with Mr. Christopher Diggins, acting U.K. High Commissioner in Lusaka, on Jan. 11 declared that Zambia relied on the British Government to handle the situation in whatever way seemed best to it, in order to relieve the “grave and unjustified difficulties” created for Zambia.

Vice-President Mainza Chona declared on Jan. 12 that Zambia's attitude towards “liberation movements” was the same as that of other U.N. member-States and of the World Council of Churches; to comply with Mr.

Smith's demand to stop freedom fighters going into Rhodesia would mean that Zambia would have to arrest them and then “deport them to the racist for slaughter”.

President Kaunda reaffirmed at the opening of Parliament on Jan. 16 that Zambia would continue to give support to African “liberation movements”, as the liberation of southern Africa was an uncompleted task in the history of decolonization. Zambia would wage economic war against Rhodesia “to the end”. “We shall eat porridge,” he said, “and go to bed by candle-light, but we will never give in.”

President Kaunda said on Jan. 30 that “Britain's refusal to take effective measures against rebellion” in Rhodesia had led to a situation in which six Zambians had been killed and 13 injured by landmines laid in “Rhodesian attacks on Zambia”. On Jan. 31 Dr. Kaunda rejected what he called British attempts to bring him and Mr. Smith together for talks, saying: “We have absolutely nothing in common with Mr. Smith.... For me he became a rebel in November 1965 and until the revolution in Zimbabwe will remain so.”

Mr. Amock Phiri, the Zambian High Commissioner in London, said on Feb. 2: “For Smith to expect Zambia to say it will not identify itself with the freedom fighters is asking for an impossibility. Zambia is prepared to support the freedom fighters regardless of what Smith does.” Denying Mr. Smith's claim that the African freedom struggle was “a Communist threat” to Rhodesia, he said that this struggle was a “fight for recognition and human rights” and did “not mean Communism”. He continued: “My Government can never talk to Inn Smith until the Smith Government is recognized by Africans in Rhodesia,” including Africans in detention. The South African Government, he said, was legitimate, and Zambia therefore had talks with it even though it represented a political philosophy with which Zambia disagreed.

It had earlier been announced in Lusaka on Jan. 17 that President Kaunda had, because of the border closure, indefinitely postponed a visit to India scheduled for Jan. 25 to receive the Nehru Peace Award for “outstanding contributions to peace and non-violence”.

Following the closure of the Rhodesian border, a number of Zambians lost their lives in border incidents.

On Jan. 12 a man was killed and his mother injured by a landmine explosion on the Zambian side of the border near Kazungula (the intersection of the borders of Rhodesia, Botswana, the Caprivi Strip of South West Africa and Zambia). Another person was hurt on the same day by a landmine explosion at Chirundu. Four Zambians were injured in landmine explosions on Jan. 14 in southwestern Zambia.

On Jan. 26 a further three persons were killed and several others injured by an explosion near Kazungula, caused by landmines which the Zambian Government alleged had been laid by Rhodesian troops; one of the injured died on Feb. 3.

Mr. Alexander Grey Zulu, the Zambian Minister of Defence, said on Feb. 4 that a Zambian soldier had been seriously injured in another explosion near Chirundu on Feb. 2. On March 1 Mr. Zulu accused the Rhodesians of “kidnapping” Zambians during military incursions from Rhodesia and then training them in sabotage and subversion; he gave a warning that such “acts of aggression” could lead all southern Africa to racial conflict.

The Zambian radio announced on Jan. 16 that in connexion with mines “laid by Rhodesian troops and their accomplices in South Africa” a number of people had been arrested.

The Rhodesian Government categorically denied on Jan. 14 that it was in any way responsible for landmine explosions in Zambia, which, it pointed out, had occurred in areas of terrorist activity.

On Jan. 19 it accused Zambia of three “acts of aggression” by Zambian Army personnel firing at Rhodesian security forces and on the same day Zambian troops and police were reported to have fired on a South African police motor-boat on the Zambezi river near Chirundu without causing any casualties. On Feb. 9 a White Rhodesian angler was reportedly killed by machine-gun fire (“almost certainly by the Zambian Amy”,

it was stated in Salisbury) from the Zambian bank of the Zambezi.

Mr. Smith's Government announced its decision to reopen the three posts on Rhodesia's border with Zambia at Victoria Falls, Kariba and Chirundu by issuing the following statement on Feb. 3: "As a result of messages which have been received, the Rhodesian Government is satisfied that their objectives in closing the border with Zambia have now been achieved. Accordingly, the border will be reopened from 6 a.m. tomorrow."

The Zambian Government, however, declared on the following day that it intended to keep its own border posts closed "for the time being".

President Kaunda said that the Rhodesian decision to reopen the three border posts was "a trick"; that his decision to close the border with "rebellious" Rhodesia was "irrevocable and final"; and that Zambia would continue its efforts to find alternative trade routes. He denied that he had given any undertaking to Mr. Smith or that Zambia had been in touch with Mr. Smith directly or indirectly, and described as "blatant lies" the implication that Mr. Smith's objective in closing the border had been achieved. The future of Zambia, he said, was too important to be dependent on Mr. Smith. He described Britain's efforts to persuade Rhodesia to reopen the frontier as "shameful", and alleged that the British Government had tried to dissuade Zambia from building an oil pipeline through Tanzania because the Rhodesian route would soon be available again.

In Rhodesia, Mr. Smith's announcement was sharply criticized by the right-wing United Front as "bowing to the dictates of foreign Powers and international big business by reopening the border", whereas the multiracial Centre Party's leader, Mr. Pat Bashford, said that Mr. Smith had had no option but to open the border, as his policy was obviously not working.

The African National Council [which opposed the Anglo- Rhodesian settlement terms of 1971—see page 25224] said on Feb. 6 that it was "a monstrous blunder" to believe that relations between Rhodesia and Zambia could return to normal.

The British High Commission in Lusaka denied on Feb. 6 that Rhodesia had received any assurances on the border issue from Zambia through Mr. Richard Wood, the U.K. Minister for Overseas Development, who had visited Zambia during the previous week[see below].

Despite President Kaunda's denials, Mr. Smith claimed on Feb. 8 that he had, through an intermediary, received a formal message from the Zambian Government assuring him that it would do all it could to prevent terrorist raids into Rhodesia. He added that *The Times of Zambia* might have been correct in saying that the Zambian message had been relayed to London by Mr. Wood.

Mr. Smith said that, as the Rhodesian Government had achieved its aim, after a first "inadequate" message from Zambia had been followed by "a more comprehensive message containing what Rhodesia wanted", the border closure had been "a complete success" and it had been "the logical thing" to reopen the border after receipt of the second message, which was "on the files of the Rhodesian Government" and would one day be published. He expressed his strong conviction that the border would remain open and that things would "return to normality as they were before".

At the same time Mr. Smith said: "We could not possibly expect Zambia to take action against people operating from soil other than Zambian soil". He expected nevertheless that Zambia's undertaking would in the long run also have an effect on the position on Rhodesia's north-eastern border. He confirmed that his Government had, through its intermediary, sent a message to Zambia stating that, if the Zambian Government did not honour its undertaking, "Rhodesia reserved the right to take necessary action".

Meanwhile, however, the Zambian Government had on Feb. 6, in addition to keeping the border closed to traffic between Rhodesia and Zambia, suspended all direct dialling telex and telephone links with Rhodesia.

As a result all calls had to be placed through Post Office switchboards so that they were easily liable to monitoring by the authorities. On the other hand, the border was not closed to goods traffic in transit to and from Zaire.

President Kaunda declared on Jan. 20 that Rhodesia's blockade was "a blessing in disguise", as it gave Zambia "a golden opportunity to correct a false start". Zambia was now encouraged, he said, to disengage herself from trade links with southern Africa and to change her whole economic outlook, which was "still based largely on her British colonial past". Zambia, he concluded, was "looking for trade routes which are both permanent and stable", and "if there isn't majority rule in the countries through which they pass, they don't qualify".

The three principal routes for Zambia's external trade which might serve as alternatives to the rail and road communications through Rhodesia were:

(a) the Benguela Railway (owned by the U.K. company of Tanganyika Concessions), running from the copperbelt through Zaire and Angola to the Atlantic port of Lobito;

(b) a tarred road from Lusaka to the Malawi border, continued by a "reasonable" road to the rail-head at Salima, whence goods could be taken by rail to the ports of Nacala or Beira in Mozambique;

(c) the road from the copperbelt to the Tanzanian port of Dar-es-Salaam, with the possible use of that section of the "Tanzam" railway already completed between Makambako and Dar-es-Salaam.

While the Benguela Railway normally took about 13,000 tons of Zambia's copper exports to Lobito every month, the railway authority was in mid-January reported to have agreed to increase this quantity to up to 30,000 tons by using new rolling-stock acquired as part of an expansion project at the "Cubal Variant" near Lobito, and further to 40,000 tons as soon as rolling-stock from the line to Rhodesia was made available.

On the railway line between Makambako and Dar-es-Salaam, the rolling-stock available was reported to be able to carry about 60,000 tons of copper a month. On Jan. 15 it was announced that the Tanzania-Zambia road services would be able to carry 33,000 tons of copper to the Tanzanian coast each month. Mr. Job Lusinde, the Tanzanian Minister of Communications and Transport, announced on Jan. 23 that Zambia and Tanzania had decided to use the completed 750-kilometre (470-mile) stretch of the "Tanzam" railway line for copper exports. [Hitherto about 16,000 tons of copper had been exported from Zambia via Tanzania every month.]

Of Zambia's total monthly copper exports of 56,000 tons, between 23,000 and 27,000 tons had been transported through Rhodesia, and even if Zambia's monthly copper exports were to rise to 75,000 tons per month by 1976, it was expected that by then the Benguela Railway could carry 40,000 tons and the road and rail route through Tanzania 44,000 tons per month. The principal difficulties of the latter route were transshipment from road to rail at Makambako and congestion at the port of Dar-es-Salaam. It appeared that the extra cost involved in using these alternative routes would be covered by the rise in the world market price of copper (from £424 per ton of cash wirebars in November 1972 to £489 late in January 1973).

On Feb. 21 it was reported that the Zambian Government and the copper companies had decided to send about 30,000 tons of copper wirebars a month via Zaire and the Benguela Railway, 20,000 tons a month via Dar-es-Salaam, and an additional 10,000 tons a month by road to the Kenyan port of Mombasa.

On Feb. 20 Mr. Phiri, the Zambian Ambassador in London, asked the Commonwealth Sanctions Committee (concerned with sanctions against Rhodesia) to assist in organizing an international airlift for Zambian imports and also in the supply of trucks, trains, transport experts and financial aid.

Airlifts had already been used from South Africa, and some shipping had been diverted to carry goods, in

particular chemicals, by sea from Cape Town to Lobito for onward transmission to Zambia via the Benguela Railway.

In Lisbon it was disclosed on Feb. 23 that arrangements had been completed for a total of 200,000 tons of import and export goods to be transported through Malawi and Mozambique to and from Zambia.

Support for Zambia was expressed in many Black African countries, and offers of aid were made from various quarters. The confrontation between Zambia and Rhodesia was also discussed on Feb. 4–5 at a meeting between Presidents Nyerere (Tanzania), Kaunda (Zambia) and Mobutu (Zaire) at Arusha, in northern Tanzania.

Dr. Njoroge Mungai, the Kenyan Minister of Foreign Affairs, in a statement issued on Jan. 12 approving of the Zambian decision to cease sending copper exports through Rhodesia, offered the use of the port of Mombasa for Zambia's trade, if a way could be found to link this port with the Tanzanian-Zambian communications system. Mombasa was reported to have a spare handling capacity of 40,000 tons a month as the result of a decline in Uganda's imports. Kenyan Ministers discussed this possibility in Nairobi on Jan. 18 with a Zambian delegation led by Mr. Ackson Soko, the Minister of Commerce and Industry.

The Tanzanian Government on Jan. 13 offered Zambia the unlimited use of the ports of Dar-es-Salaam and Mtwara, while reserving the port of Tanga for its own needs. On Jan. 15 it was disclosed in Dar-es-Salaam that Tanzania, would permit the entry of all South African goods destined for Zambia, thus making an exception to the embargo imposed by Tanzania on South African goods in 1963[see above].

President Amin of Uganda called on Jan. 13 on “all African countries” to “unite and subscribe a fraction of their armed forces” to help Zambia in her confrontation with Rhodesia.

The Zambian delegation led by Mr. Soko had talks with President Banda of Malawi in Blantyre on Jan. 15 on the possible use of Malawi's railway network and its connexion with the ports of Nacala and Beira in Mozambique. As a result the Government of Malawi decided on Jan. 16 to give priority to rail traffic for goods from Zambia destined for Beira.

Major Mohammed Nigam, a member of the Libyan Revolutionary Command Council, said during a visit to Lusaka on Jan. 27 that he had offered Zambia Libyan military and other aid.

M. Ngunza Karl-I-Bond, the Zairese Commissioner for Foreign Affairs, said in Lusaka on Jan. 30 that his country's Army of 20,000 men had been placed at Zambia's disposal because of the Rhodesian border closure. [The Government-owned *Zambian Daily Mail* stated on the same day that, if Rhodesia continued to rely on South African police to defend its border, there was nothing to stop Zambia from receiving similar support from its friends—but that South Africa should remove its force from Rhodesia and let the White Rhodesians “face the consequence of their foolishness”. The newspaper added: “The African people of Rhodesia are not fighting the White people of South Africa.”

Dr. Robert Ouko, Minister for Common Market and Economic Affairs of the East African Community (EAO), said during a visit to Maseru (Lesotho) on Feb. 2 that the EAC had promised “any and all” facilities which Zambia might require to minimize difficulties caused by the border closure, and would put its harbours and available parts of its railway system at Zambia's disposal.

The Zambian Budget, presented to Parliament on Jan. 26, included provisions for the reduction of imports and a restriction of demand following increases in income tax and customs duties.

The Zambian Ministry of Trade and Industry announced on Feb. 8 that the total value of imports during 1973 would be restricted to \$553,000,000 (about £230,000,000), and that all non-quota import licences had been withdrawn from Feb. 1, though special arrangements were being made to ensure the unrestricted importation

of mining equipment and medical supplies. Earlier, the Zambian central bank had announced on Jan. 15 that it had relaxed its ban on exchange control permits for South African goods, provided that these goods reached Zambia.

Following his visit to Zambia on Jan. 30–31, Mr. Wood said in Kenya on Feb. 2 that Britain would “do her best to help Zambia from a development point of view”.

After Mr. Mark Shona, special representative of President Kaunda, had visited London on Feb. 20, an agreement was signed in Lusaka on Feb. 28 by Mr. Diggines, acting British High Commissioner, and Mr. John Mwanakatwe, the Zambian Minister of Finance, involving an undertaking by the British Government to pay over £100,000, being an instalment due under a contract signed in connexion with the building of an underground power station on the Zambian side of the Kariba dam by the U.K. firm of Mitchell Construction, which on Jan. 31 was reported to have run into “insurmountable difficulties”.

Upon a request made by Zambia on Jan. 24, the U.N. security Council met in urgent session on Jan. 29 to consider the situation created by Rhodesia's closing of the border and economic blockade of Zambia, and by alleged support for Rhodesia by “4,000 South African soldiers”. [The presence of South African troops along the Zambian border was denied by the South African representative at the U.N. on Jan. 26.]

Mr. Paul Lusaka (Zambia), proposing a 12-point programme for dealing with the “extremely dangerous situation”, asked the Council to “condemn the fascist Government of South Africa for the presence of South African forces in the British colony of Southern Rhodesia”; to demand “the immediate withdrawal” of these forces and call upon Britain to ensure that this was done; and also to call on Britain to convene immediately a constitutional conference “representative of all the people of Zimbabwe” to determine their political future. Mr. Lusaka criticized the British Government for not having used force against the Smith regime, and accused Rhodesia of seeking to undermine Zambia's economy and of threatening, together with South Africa, the security of Zambia. He demanded reinforced sanctions against trade with Rhodesia and asked for U.N. assistance in obtaining alternative trading routes for Zambia.

Sir Colin Crowe (Britain) said that Britain had been in touch with both Zambia and Rhodesia in the hope of restoring peaceful conditions, and that Zambia had been assured that H.M. Government wanted to be helpful and to see an early reopening of the border and a return to normal. He warned Council members against any action which might impede a long-term political solution in Rhodesia.

The security Council decided on Feb. 2 to send to Zambia a four-member mission to assess the situation and Zambia's needs for the maintenance of the normal flow of traffic by alternative road, rail, air and sea routes. The Council also adopted two draft resolutions presented by its African and Asian members.

The first, approved by 13 votes, with Britain and the United States abstaining, condemned all acts of harassment against Zambia by the Smith regime; demanded the “immediate and total withdrawal of South African forces from Southern Rhodesia”; and called on Britain to see that this was done.

The second, passed by 14 votes, with the Soviet Union abstaining, commended Zambia on its decision to sever all economic relations with Southern Rhodesia, in accordance with the Council's embargo, and requested Zambia's neighbours to accord all possible co-operation to the security Council's mission.

The Council's mission, led by Mr. Chaidir Anwar Sani (Indonesia) and comprising also representatives of Austria, Peru and the Sudan, as well as six experts, visited Zambia on Feb. 12—16.

Mr. Mudenda, the Zambian Foreign Minister, explained to the mission in Lusaka on Feb. 12 that, although the Smith regime had revoked its closure order of Jan. 9, Zambia was keeping its border with Rhodesia closed because the railway line through that country would be unreliable until there was majority rule, as Mr. Smith

could close it at any time. Zambia, the Minister added, wished to comply fully with the Council's long-standing embargo against Rhodesia; the "liberation struggle" against the illegal Smith regime was being carried out by fighters based in Rhodesia; and mines planted in Zambian border areas by Rhodesian units had so far killed eight persons and seriously injured at least 14.

The mission visited various border areas in Zambia, met President Kaunda on Feb. 15, and flew to Dar-es-Salaam on Feb. 16 and thereafter to Nairobi before returning to New York on Feb. 22. In its report, subsequently submitted to the security Council, the mission estimated that Zambia would need foreign aid amounting to \$250,000,000 to develop its alternative trade routes.

At a further special meeting on March 10, the security Council adopted both a political and an economic resolution on aid for Zambia.

In its political resolution, adopted by 13 votes to none, with Britain and the U.S.A. abstaining, the Council declared that self-determination and independence for the people of Rhodesia was the only solution for the "grave situation" caused by Rhodesia's closure of its border with Zambia; condemned South Africa for failing to remove its forces from Rhodesia; and called on Britain (*a*) to convene a constitutional conference which would enable Rhodesia's inhabitants to exercise self-determination and achieve independence, and (*b*) to ensure that Rhodesia released all political prisoners.

The economic resolution, adopted unanimously, (*a*) called on all countries, the United Nations and its specialized agencies to give Zambia "immediate technical, financial and material aid" to enable her to maintain normal traffic and to set up alternative trade routes, and (*b*) requested the U.N. Secretary-General to organize an immediate aid programme enabling Zambia "to carry out her policy of economic independence from the racist regime of Southern Rhodesia".

The resolutions reflected a compromise between the views of some of the African Council members and several of its permanent members.

An African proposal to set up a special U.N. voluntary fund in aid of Zambia was not supported by the United States and the Soviet Union. An original draft resolution calling for a widening of sanctions against Rhodesia was amended after Britain had stated that it was more important to make existing sanctions more effective. In regard to the political resolution, the British delegation pointed out that it called upon the British Government "to take action of various kinds which it is unrealistic to suppose we could perform".

Mr. Mudenda predicted in Lusaka on March 11 that the economic resolution would have the result that technical assistance would be given to Zambia "from all over the world" and that it would bring about the downfall of Mr. Smith.—(Times - Daily Telegraph - Guardian - Financial Times - Economist - Le Monde - Neue Zurcher Zeitung - South African Embassy Information Department, London - Cape Times - U.N. Information Centre, London)(Prev. rep. 25666 A)

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