

Mr. Wilson's Visit to Rhodesia.

Mr. Harold Wilson's visit to Rhodesia took place from Oct. 25-30 and led to an understanding by both Governments on the establishment of a Royal Commission without, however, any agreement on its terms of reference. In view of this, the British Government accepted a Rhodesian proposal that the people of Rhodesia should be consulted as to whether or not they accepted independence on the basis of the 1961 Constitution, but no agreement was reached on how this should be done. While negotiations were proceeding, the Rhodesian Government on Nov. 5 declared a state of emergency throughout the country. The British Government nevertheless pursued the idea of consultation of the Rhodesian people through the proposed Royal Commission, and Sir Hugh Beadle, the Rhodesian Chief Justice and chairman-designate of the Commission, travelled to London on Nov. 8 for discussions, though he did not have the authority of the Rhodesian Government.

Following an exchange of letters between the Queen and the Rhodesian Government on Nov. 9, and a telephone conversation in the early morning of Nov. 11 between Mr. Wilson and Mr. Ian Smith, a declaration of independence was broadcast by Mr. Smith later on Nov. 11. The Governor of Rhodesia immediately repudiated the Rhodesian Government's action, and Mr. Wilson announced in the House of Commons that Mr. Smith's declaration was an illegal act and listed the counter-measures taken, or to be taken, by the British Government.

These and related developments, including U.N. resolutions enjoining Britain to use force, if necessary, to settle the problem of Rhodesia, are summarized below under cross-headings.

Mr. Wilson and Mr. Bottomley (the Commonwealth Relations Secretary), accompanied by a team of advisers including Mr. A. E. Oram (Parliamentary Secretary, Ministry of Overseas Development), left for Salisbury by air on Oct. 24. They spent the night at the Akrotiri R.A.F. base in Cyprus and landed the next day in Nairobi, where Mr. Wilson had a 65-minute talk with President Kenyatta, who was accompanied by Dr. Mungai (acting Foreign Minister of Kenya), Mr. Njonjo (the Attorney-General), and Mr. Malcolm MacDonald (the British High Commissioner).

On arrival in Salisbury later on Oct. 25 the British Prime Minister was greeted by Mr. Dupont (then Rhodesian Deputy Prime Minister) and Mr. Rudland (Minister of Commerce) in the presence of a few hundred White Rhodesians, who remained silent, and several thousand Africans, who demonstrated for "one man, one vote" and the introduction of a new Constitution.

In a brief statement Mr. Wilson defined his objectives as being:(1) "to break down what we all regard as a deadlock" and "to see what common ground can be established not only in the talks between the British and Rhodesian Governments but also in the wider spheres";(2) "the better to inform myself of the issues, feelings, and problems"; and (3)to "try to avert what I am certain in my own mind would be a tragedy if a certain course were followed." He added that he had not come to make public statements or to appeal "to this or that segment of opinion here."

The same evening Mr. Wilson handed Mr. Smith, in the presence of Sir Humphrey Gibbs, the Governor, the following letter from the Queen written in her own hand:

"I have followed the recent discussions between the British Government and your Government with the closest concern and I am very glad to know that Mr. Wilson will be paying you a visit.

"I earnestly hope that your discussions will succeed in finding a solution to the current difficulties.

"I cherish happy memories of my own visit to Rhodesia.

"I should be glad if you would accept my good wishes and convey them to all my peoples in your country, whose welfare and happiness I have very closely at heart."

Reading the Queen's letter out at a civic banquet on Oct. 26, Mr. Smith called it "a wonderful message from this gracious lady." At the same time he said that, but for Mr. Wilson's arrival, Rhodesians might have been celebrating independence. After comparing Rhodesia's stand on independence with Britain's stand against Hitler, and quoting from King Henry's speech on the eve of the battle of Agincourt (from Shakespeare's *King Henry V*), he said that the important thing was to have a clear conscience and that his Government were "prepared to answer for what we have done and what we are contemplating doing."

Mr. Smith's reply to the Queen, dated Oct. 27 and written in his own hand, was handed to her by Mr.

Wilson on Nov. 2 on the Prime Minister's return to London. It read as follows:

"I am deeply conscious of the great honour that you have done me in sending me your letter of October 24, and this honour is shared by all the people of the country.

"I have been privileged to convey to the people your good wishes and your concern for their welfare and happiness at this critical time in their history.

"I wish to assure Your Majesty that your Rhodesian Government will do all in its power to succeed in finding a solution to the current difficulties.

"We have embarked upon the discussions with Mr. Wilson and the Commonwealth Secretary in a spirit of the utmost sincerity, frankness, and goodwill.

"The Rhodesian people have a special affection for Your Majesty and for Her Majesty the Queen Mother and all members of the Royal Family, which, it is my happy duty to assure Your Majesty, they will always retain."

In preparation for Mr. Wilson's visit, Mr. Smith had issued a statement on Oct. 23 asking those Rhodesians who supported independence on the basis of the 1961 Constitution not to approach the British Prime Minister but to leave it to the Rhodesian Government, and adding that those who were opposed to it should come forward and present their case.

No official communiques were issued on the lengthy discussions which Mr. Wilson and Mr. Bottomley had with the Rhodesian Government on Oct. 26-30. It was stated in the British Press, however, that in addition to Mr. Smith and other Rhodesian Ministers, Mr. Wilson had had talks with, *inter alia*, Mr. Josiah Gondo (Leader of the Opposition) and three other United People's Party members; Dr. Ahrn Palley (the Independent M.P.) and other Independents; leaders of the Coloured community; and Sir Roy Welensky (the former Federal Prime Minister)—all on Oct. 26; with Sir Robert Tredgold (the former Chief Justice of the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland) and Mr. Garfield Todd (the restricted former Prime Minister of Rhodesia)—both on Oct. 27; with the restricted African nationalist leaders, Mr. Joshua Nkomo and the Rev. Sithole, who were specially flown to Salisbury for this purpose, on Oct. 27-29; and with Mr. Winston Field (the former Rhodesian Prime Minister) on Oct. 29.

At a luncheon on Oct. 27 Mr. Wilson addressed Rhodesian businessmen and financiers on the economic consequences of a unilateral declaration of independence, while on Oct. 29 he lunched with officials of the Rhodesian Farmers' Union, the Tobacco Association, and the Tobacco Export Promotion Council.

Mr. Gondo said after his meeting with Mr. Wilson that both the idea of a treaty[see page 21029] and that of a Senate composed of chiefs were "completely unacceptable" to his party, which demanded an immediate constitutional conference leading to majority rule.

In his separate talks with Mr. Nkomo and Mr. Sithole, Mr. Wilson was reported to have made it clear that Britain would not use force to remove Mr. Smith's Government if there was a unilateral declaration of independence, and to have urged the two nationalist leaders to form a cohesive constitutional Opposition. It was only at Iris third meeting with them on Oct. 29 that he saw the two leaders together briefly. During the talks several thousand Africans demonstrated in favour of Mr. Nkomo in the streets of Salisbury.

Mr. Sithole published on Oct. 27 a memorandum, addressed to Mr. Wilson before these talks, which objected to the London discussions which had excluded the African nationalists, attacked the British Government for "weak handling" of the issue of a unilateral declaration, rejected any independence under White minority rule, and demanded a constitutional conference to lead to independence after an election held under a "one man, one vote" franchise.

After a Cabinet meeting on Oct. 28 Mr. Smith said that he rejected the idea of a constitutional conference "with people who reject the Constitution," adding that he refused to sit at a conference table with Mr. Nkomo and Mr. Sithole, who had "not been elected to any position by a democratic vote."

On the same day Mr. Wilson was reported to have warned the Rhodesian Government, at a dinner attended by the entire Rhodesian Cabinet, against the consequences of a unilateral declaration of independence. He was also said to have made it clear that, while Britain had protected Rhodesia from action by the United Nations, she would be unable to do so any longer; that Britain would protect Zambia against any Rhodesian action; and that 48 nations were supporting the U.N. call for strong British action against Rhodesia and were unwilling to sell any oil to any country trading with an independent Rhodesia. Mr. Smith, however, stated subsequently that Mr. Wilson had uttered no threats on this occasion.

The Rhodesian Broadcasting Commission on Oct. 29 refused to allow the British Prime Minister a direct appeal to Rhodesians on television, declaring that it was "quite incredible" that Mr. Wilson should demand the right to put over one point of view, and referring to the cancellation of a proposed appearance by Mr. Smith on B.B.C. television during the latter's visit to London.

Meanwhile Sir Elwyn Jones, the U.K. Attorney-General, who had been summoned by Mr. Wilson to Salisbury on Oct. 26, had discussions on Oct. 28 on the proposed "solemn treaty" with Mr. Lardner-Burke (the Rhodesian Minister of Justice) and Sir Hugh Beadle (the Chief Justice), while Mr. A. E. Oram discussed the question of expanding African education with Dr. Walter Adams, Principal of the University College of Rhodesia. Mr. Bottomley met the British High Commissioners from Malawi, Tanzania, and Zambia on Oct. 29 for a discussion of developments.

When it emerged on Oct. 29 that no common ground had been found between the points of view of the British and the Rhodesian Governments, Mr. Wilson suggested two alternative courses of action to Mr. Smith, viz.:

(i) that the Rhodesian Government should test their belief that the Rhodesian people as a whole wanted independence on the 1961 Constitution by a referendum which would meet Britain's basic point that a solution should be acceptable to the people as a whole; or

(ii) that the two Prime Ministers should jointly recommend to the Queen a Royal Commission to produce an independence Constitution based on that of 1961 acceptable to the people as a whole.

The Rhodesian Government accepted neither of these alternatives, but on Oct. 30 proposed a compromise scheme whereby a joint Royal Commission would be set up, consisting of Sir Hugh Beadle as chairman and one British and one Rhodesian member, with the task of finding out whether the 1961 Constitution, with suitable amendments to be agreed upon by both Governments, was acceptable to the Rhodesian people as a whole.

Mr. Wilson left Rhodesia for London on Oct. 30, while Mr. Bottomley and Sir Elwyn Jones stayed on in Salisbury to work out, with the Rhodesian Ministers, details of the terms of reference of the proposed Royal Commission. *En route* for London, Mr. Wilson made short stops in Zambia for a meeting with President Kaunda; in Lagos the same day (Oct. 30) for a meeting with Sir Abubakar Tafawa Balewa, the Nigerian Federal Prime Minister; and in Accra on Oct. 31 for a meeting with President Nkrumah of Ghana.

In a press statement on his return to London, Mr. Wilson said that the proposed Royal Commission would allow time for careful thought and that, given the time, a settlement could be obtained, although the atmosphere in Rhodesia was "highly charged with emotion and fear which are not conducive to a negotiated settlement." He thought that the Commission would be appointed within a few days and its work completed by the turn of the year. He understood the bitter feelings of the African nationalists in Rhodesia, and it would "take a long time" before they understood better what would happen in the Royal Commission, but there was no going back on the "five principles," and he did not believe that the problem could be solved by force.

In Salisbury, Mr. Smith said on Oct. 31 that it would be possible to know within "a couple of days" if the terms of reference for the Commission could be agreed upon. He called the proposal "the last chance for a negotiated independence"; expressed the hope that it was the "miracle" to which he had referred in the past; but declared that if it failed the Rhodesian Government would have to resort to "the other step." After praising Mr. Wilson for having told the African "extremists" that there would be no "thunderbolt" to come to help them and that he did not believe that Rhodesia was ready "either today or tomorrow" for "one man, one vote," Mr. Smith expressed appreciation of Mr. Wilson's integrity, adding that he had never been misled by the British Prime Minister.

Together with Sir Elwyn Jones, Mr. Bottomley left Salisbury on Oct. 31, carrying with him a document outlining the areas of agreement and disagreement on the terms of reference for the proposed Royal Commission. On his return flight he visited President Nyerere of Tanzania in Dar-es-Salaam, President Kenyatta of Kenya in Nairobi (both on Oct. 31), and Dr. Obote (Prime Minister of Uganda) in Entebbe (on Nov. 1) to acquaint them with developments. Mr. Bottomley and Sir Elwyn returned to London on Nov. 2. While in Dar-es-Salaam Mr. Bottomley said that Mr. Wilson's mission had averted a unilateral declaration of independence by Mr. Smith, but in Entebbe he also stated that his soundings of Rhodesia's White population had revealed that they were "enthusiastic for a unilateral declaration," that the difference between the two Governments was "fundamental," and that "we cannot be sure what will happen."

During Mr. Wilson's talks in Rhodesia, the British Council of Churches, meeting in Aberdeen, approved on Oct. 26, by 60 votes to five, a statement on the problem of Rhodesia issued by the Council's joint international department and the Conference of British Missionary Societies. At the same time the Archbishop of Canterbury (Dr. Ramsey) stated that in certain circumstances Christians would have to approve of the use of force.

The Council's resolution accepted that Britain, as the Imperial Power since the granting of the Charter to the British South Africa (Company in 1889, shared responsibility for the present "tragic situation," and it

supported the British Government's stand in requiring acceptance of the five essential principles before recommending to Parliament that independence should be granted to Rhodesia. The resolution recommended the following alternative courses of action:

(1) In the event of a unilateral declaration of independence by the Rhodesian Government, the British Government should, in full consultation with the United Nations, take such measures, including economic ones, as might be required, and thereafter "negotiate the phased introduction of fully representative government."

(2) In the absence of an immediate declaration of independence, and with the ensuing continued uncertainty and deterioration of race relations, the British Government should (a) maintain its offer of financial assistance for "a massive and dynamic programme of education and training"; (b) seek to convene a constitutional conference representative of the whole Rhodesian people, which should define a short and stated period of time, at the end of which elections should be held under a new Constitution and on the basis of universal adult franchise; and (c) press for the release of the African political leaders—while continuing to prevent intimidation and violence, by whomsoever practised.

If the Rhodesian Government failed to co-operate, the British Government should be ready to resume responsibility for government in Rhodesia in order to ensure the implementation of the above measures. To facilitate the transition for White Rhodesians, the British Government should consider further proposals, such as a guarantee by Britain and other Commonwealth States of the human rights provisions of the new Rhodesian Constitution, and an indication of Britain's willingness to help the Government of Rhodesia to provide compensation for the property of those Rhodesians who might decide to emigrate to another Commonwealth country.

The Council rejected by 54 votes to 13 an amendment to the above resolution by the Duchess of Hamilton, asking that no choice should be made in Britain or in Rhodesia which would precipitate divisive reaction, sharpen the conflict of loyalty, or increase the danger of strife. Representatives of the Church of Scotland made it clear on Oct. 27 that they opposed the Council's resolution, and the Salvation Army representatives recorded their abstention from the vote on it.

The Archbishop of Canterbury, speaking during the debate "with a terrible sense of responsibility," said that, if the British Government thought it practicable to use force for the protection of the rights of the majority of the Rhodesian people, than "as Christians we have to say that it will be right to use force" to that end, just as it had been necessary to use force to fulfil Britain's obligations to Poland. Dr. Ramsey believed that, if the Prime Minister and the Government thought it necessary to use force for the perpetuation of Britain's obligations in Rhodesia, "a great body of Christian opinion in Britain" would support them.

The next day (Oct. 27) the Archbishop sent the Prime Minister the following private and personal message, the text of which was released on Nov. 4:

"The British Council of Churches, meeting in Aberdeen at the moment of your visit to Rhodesia, ardently supports you in your efforts towards reconciliation and a new constitutional settlement. We hope your discussions may be continued and enlarged in harmony with H.M. Government's five principles, and without undue delay in applying them. If, notwithstanding all efforts, there should come a breakdown, and if you and your Government should judge it necessary to use force to sustain our country's obligations, I am sure a great body of Christian opinion would support you."

There was widespread and conflicting reaction to the Archbishop's remarks on the possible use of force in Rhodesia.

The Rhodesian Minister of Information, Mr. P. K. van der Byl, issued a statement in London on Oct. 27 saying *inter alia*: "I know that the majority of people of all races in Rhodesia and also a very large section of the people of Britain will have been dismayed by the Archbishop of Canterbury's advocacy of Christian support for the use of armed force against Rhodesia.... Dr. Ramsey must realize that threats of force from an influential quarter stimulate political violence which can cause untold suffering to innocent people."

The Anglican Bishop of Mashonaland, the Right Rev. Cecil Alderson, had stated in a letter written earlier, and not published until Oct. 27, that the use of force in Rhodesia could cause "undying hatred between Britain and thousands of her sons and daughters and would have appalling consequences for Rhodesia and the whole of Southern Africa." The Bishop of Matabeleland, Dr. Kenneth Skelton, on the other hand, stated on Oct. 27 that force might be the lesser of two evils, and pointed out that the resolution of the Council of Churches did not advocate the use of force.

The Archbishop of Canterbury was congratulated on his stand by a number of Labour and Liberal Members of the U.K. Parliament, but Sir Gerald Nabarro (the former M.P. and prospective Conservative candidate

for Worcestershire South) sent Dr. Ramsey a message condemning his remarks as a "cardinal blunder in advocating employment of force and shooting down of Britons in Rhodesia."

Mr. Ian Smith, the Rhodesian Prime Minister, said on Oct. 28: "I suppose I must be grateful for the worthy gentleman's remarks. I gather we lost a bit of ground when we restricted Mr. Garfield Todd[see page 21028]. Now we have more than made up for lost ground."

Mr. Wilson, referring to Dr. Ramsey's message in the House of Commons on Nov. 4, reaffirmed that "the Government do not believe[that] this is a constitutional problem that can be settled by the use of military force."

The leaders of the principal Commonwealth countries in Africa expressed their opposition to a unilateral declaration of independence by the Rhodesian Government in varying ways on a number of occasions.

Zambia. President Kaunda pointed out in Lusaka on Oct. 23 that Britain had fought "bloody wars" in British Guiana, Kenya, and Cyprus, and was taming effective military action in Aden; he therefore believed that Britain "could undertake military action without firing a shot... and this is what I should like to see in Rhodesia." He offered Zambia as a base for British troops for a "police action," so that Mr. Smith would be "made to understand that no minority Government anywhere on earth can continue indefinitely," and advocated the earliest possible holding of a constitutional conference to map out the "road to majority rule as quickly as possible."

Mr. Kapwepwe, Zambia's Foreign Minister, said in London on Oct. 28 that, if Rhodesia were given independence without "one man, one vote," Zambia might leave the Commonwealth and withdraw her sterling balances from London. Of Mr. Wilson's visit to Salisbury he said: "Never in the history of colonies have we read of a British Prime Minister bowing down so low to a colonial Prime Minister." He firmly rejected the 1961 Constitution as a basis for a settlement in Rhodesia, adding that Britain should call in the help of the United Nations and, in the event of a unilateral declaration of independence, use force and not merely economic sanctions.

President Kaunda said in a broadcast on Nov. 7 that he did not see how Zambia could continue to recognize Rhodesia after a unilateral declaration of independence. Although he felt that Mr. Smith would continue to deal with Zambia (which bought about £40,000,000 worth of Rhodesian goods per annum), he thought that "when he feels strong enough to do without our market, then he will strike at us." Dr. Kaunda added: "This is perhaps the right time to remind the Smith regime that Zambia is not an easy country for them to handle."

Malawi. Support for the proposed Royal Commission was expressed on Nov. 3 by Dr. Banda, who said that it was "neither realistic nor reasonable" to expect the British Government to send any army to Rhodesia. He added: "We must press Britain to persuade Smith to go to the conference table with Africans—Nkomo and Sithole, even Garfield Todd."

Speaking in the National Assembly on Nov. 9, Dr. Banda again called it "childish and inhuman" to expect British troops to be sent to Rhodesia. He warned the Organization of African Unity that it could only survive if it was "realistic and practical" and realized that the Rhodesian Army and Air Force were the strongest on the continent after South Africa's. Dr. Banda continued:

"If the Rhodesian Army was pushed, it could conquer the whole of East and Central Africa in a week. The Rhodesian Air Force could reduce to ashes all the capitals of East and Central Africa in 24 hours. I have told Nkrumah and Balewa that no African army could rescue us. I am not deceived by parade armies. It is one thing to impress colleagues, but quite another thing on the battlefield. The Ghanaian Air Force is only a paper air force...."

As regards economic sanctions, Dr. Banda said that they had not succeeded against South Africa and would be of no use against Rhodesia unless the major Powers applied them. The Malawi parliament subsequently unanimously approved Dr. Banda's policy statement.

Nigeria. After his meeting with Mr. Wilson in Lagos, the Nigerian Federal Prime Minister, Sir Abubakar Tafawa Balewa, issued a statement commending the proposal for a joint Royal Commission as something that should be given a chance.

Ghana. A Ghanaian Government statement, released on Oct. 31 —the day when Mr. Wilson stopped over in Accra for a talk with President Nkrumah—denounced the proposed Royal Commission as "a betrayal of the four million unrepresented Africans of the Colony" and "merely a device to sidetrack an issue which cannot be left unsolved any longer without it becoming a danger to world peace." If Britain refused to act in accordance with the principle of "one man, one vote," the statement said, "the African States would have no alternative but to take whatever steps would be necessary in support of the four million Africans who form the majority in Rhodesia."

After his talks with Mr. Wilson, President Nkrumah said that he had told the British Prime Minister that, in view of the trend of the negotiations, he considered it necessary "for the African States to start making practical plans as to how they can deal militarily, if necessary, with the situation." He added that, if Britain made the Crown titular sovereign of a racial independent State of Rhodesia, then Ghana "would no longer be able to recognize the British Crown as head of the Commonwealth."

Uganda. Dr. Obote, speaking to Mr. Bottomley on Nov. 1, expressed concern that Britain appeared to have shifted her position on Rhodesia and urged that Britain should not rule out the use of force if the Rhodesian Government seized independence unilaterally.

Tanzania. President Nyerere declared on Oct. 29 that in the event of a unilateral seizure of independence by Mr. Smith's Government, Tanzania would support the Zimbabwe African People's Union (ZAPU) led by Mr. Nkomo. A group of 150 leading Europeans in Tanzania on Oct. 25 appealed to the White Rhodesians to "reject proposals for an unlawful declaration of independence" and urged them "to make one cause with all the people of Rhodesia in the common struggle to develop your country as all races are working to develop Tanzania."

At the United Nations, the Trusteeship Council on Nov. 1 adopted by 79 votes to eight, with 17 abstentions, 12 countries absent, and Britain not participating, a resolution recommending the General Assembly to call upon Britain to "employ all necessary measures, including military force, to put into effect a request that the administering Power effect immediately (a) the release of all prisoners, political detainees, and restrictees; (b) the repeal of all repressive and discriminatory legislation; and (c) the removal of all restrictions on African political activity, and the establishment of full democratic freedom and equality of political rights."

The resolution also asked Britain to suspend the 1961 Constitution and to "call immediately a constitutional conference in which representatives of all political parties will take part, with a view to making new constitutional arrangements on the basis of universal adult suffrage and the fixing of the earliest possible date for independence." It drew the attention of the security Council to "the explosive situation in Rhodesia which threatens international peace and security" and "solemnly" warned the Rhodesian authorities and Britain that the U.N. would "oppose any declaration of independence which is not based on universal adult suffrage."

The resolution was approved by the General Assembly on Nov. 5, the voting being 82 to nine (Australia, Belgium, Canada, Luxemburg, Netherlands, New Zealand, Portugal, South Africa, and the United States), with 18 abstentions (Austria, Brazil, Costa Rica, Denmark, Ecuador, El Salvador, Finland, France, Guatemala, Honduras, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Mexico, Norway, Panama, Spain, and Sweden), seven countries absent (Bolivia, Cambodia, Gambia, Malta, Nepal, Nicaragua, and Paraguay), and the United Kingdom again not participating.

Lord Caradon (U.K.), expressing regret at the introduction of the resolution, said that he did not question the motives of those who advocated the use of force; he did not think, however, that they realized the consequences of such action, as a chain-reaction might result of which no one could foresee the end. He thought it wrong to adopt such a resolution at a time when Britain was trying to put into effect the previous U.N. resolution warning Rhodesia of the consequences of a unilateral declaration of independence[see page 21031].

A separate vote taken on the clause advocating "all necessary measures, including military force," resulted in 72 countries voting in favour, 25 against, and 10 abstaining.

The British Prime Minister reported to the House of Commons on Nov. 1 on his visit to Salisbury and on the stage reached in the discussions with the Rhodesian Government.

Mr. Wilson said *inter alia*, with reference to his London talks with Mr. Smith: "Although we failed to reach agreement on the means of giving effect to every one of the five principles, I will particularly draw the House's attention to our insistence that guaranteed and unimpeded progress to majority rule should not be frustrated by the freedom of an independent Rhodesia to amend the 1961 Constitution in a retrogressive sense. In this connexion the House will be aware of a singular feature in that Constitution, in that while certain constitutional safeguards are entrenched, other provisions—including even the numbers of members of Parliament to be elected on the 'A' roll and 'B' roll respectively—are not entrenched and, on a two-thirds parliamentary majority, could be altered in such a way as completely to frustrate the spirit of the Constitution and the prospects of orderly progress to majority rule.

"Equally, in the London talks, there was no agreement at all on the means of giving effect to the overriding fifth principle that the British Government and the British Parliament must be satisfied that the terms for independence are acceptable to the Rhodesian people as a whole."

After explaining that his visit to Rhodesia had been made in response to Mr. Smith's urgent letter of Oct. 20 [see page 21029]"regarded by many as an ultimatum"—the Prime Minister said that he had no doubt that a unilateral declaration of independence would have followed the British Government's rejection of Mr. Smith's demand made in that letter. He stated that in Salisbury he had had 9 1/2 hours of talks "with Mr. Smith alone, or with his colleagues, and in one case with the whole Cabinet," and 29 hours "in separate meetings with other leaders of opinion," during which he had had serious talks with altogether 126 "leading and representative Rhodesians." In these talks he had been frank with the African nationalists "in disabusing them of illusions that the Royal Air Force would come to their aid," or that majority rule "can or should come today or tomorrow," and he had reiterated that the time required in Rhodesia could be measured "only by achievement." He had also urged them to unite and to stand for election, thus making a reality of a multi-racial Parliament.

Turning to his discussions with the Rhodesian Government, Mr. Wilson said that it had soon become clear that the idea of the proposed treaty to safeguard entrenched clauses in the Constitution played "no real part in Rhodesian thinking." As on Oct. 29 no progress appeared to have been made, and there were even signs of "imminent action" by the Rhodesian Government, he [Mr. Wilson] had proposed either a referendum or a Royal Commission [see above], in the hope that the latter would "hold a running and informal constitutional conference." This, he said, had led to the Rhodesian Government's counter-proposal—an "ingenious combination of our own proposals"—of a Royal Commission which was "to receive from the two Governments an agreed draft independence arrangement, based on the 1961 Constitution with such amendments as we might consider necessary; and that the Commission should then proceed to ascertain whether such a document was or was not acceptable to the Rhodesian people as a whole."

The Prime Minister made it clear, however, that the British Government reserved its position on two main points: (1) their right to revert to the original, wider concept of the Commission's powers and duties, especially if the Commission failed; (2) and, preferably, an interim report by the Commission to the two Governments on the methods which they recommended for consulting Rhodesian opinion as a whole, and, if these were accepted by the two Governments, supervision by the Commission of the consultation process. He continued: "I believe that, subject to these reservations, we now have a way in which, given good will and ordinary plain common sense, it is possible to settle the problem on a basis acceptable to the Rhodesian people, to Parliament, and I believe to world opinion. Procedurally, at least, there is nothing to prevent an agreed settlement, and we have provided for the realization of the fifth principle."

Nevertheless, Mr. Wilson pointed out, there was still "one outstanding difficulty," namely: "We have still to agree—as we would have had under a treaty, or on any other basis—on the content of the document which, after approval by the two Governments, the Commission would put to the peoples of Rhodesia." Moreover, there were "important differences," which he outlined as follows: "The principal issues include the doctrine of the so-called blocking third or blocking quarter for amendments to the Constitution of clauses which are not entrenched, and provision of effective safeguards for the specially entrenched clauses.

"The Rhodesian Government proposal to augment the elected African members for this purpose by a number of hereditary chiefs who are, of course, paid by the Rhodesian Government, simply will not do. I have seen the chiefs. They cannot by the widest stretch of imagination be said to be capable of representing the African population as a whole.

"Equally I am sure the House would feel that we cannot leave without safeguards a situation which would permit, among other things, an independent Rhodesian Parliament, without check or constitutional hindrance to reduce, as they would have power to do, the 'B' roll seats from 15 to one or to increase to 100 the 'A' roll seats, and thus postpone for many more years the achievement of majority rule."

Mr. Wilson concluded: "We have still to reach agreement. With the necessary good will, I do not see why we should not. I simply cannot believe, now we have got so far, that the Rhodesian Government, or anyone else in their senses, could reject an agreed, and constitutional means of resolving this problem and embark on the dangerous lunacy of an illegal declaration, with all that would follow.

"The way is open, given the will, and now only those—and there are those—who want a U.D.I. for its own sake, or those who in their hearts reject the ultimate purpose of the 1961 Constitution, and of the five principles on which Mr. Smith and I have agreed to base all our discussions, could now contemplate illegal and unconstitutional action.

"I hope the House will concede that I have done everything in a man's power to avert the tragic and dangerous development which only 10 days ago was imminent, and cannot even now be said to have been removed, and to carry through the consultations that were necessary as a preliminary to any long-term solution.

"I hope Members will agree that as a result of those 10 days we can say that the door is wide open to an acceptable, agreed, and constitutional solution, that we can agree that there is no case for—indeed that we in Britain and the rest of the world could not now understand, still less condone—an attempt to solve Rhodesian problems by illegal and unconstitutional means.

"And I hope they will agree that we have reached this situation without any retreat whatever from the principles which all parties in this House have proclaimed, without and surrender of that position of trust which we hold, and must hold, for the peoples —for all the peoples—of Rhodesia. For that is a trust which we cannot morally escape or seek to evade; it is inescapably ours until we hand over to an independent Rhodesia not only our powers and our responsibilities but also our trusteeship, and hand them over on terms and on conditions which will ensure that in letter and in spirit the principles which have inspired that trusteeship will endure."

After Mr. Heath (Leader of the Opposition) had welcomed the fact that the Prime Minister had been "successful in creating with Mr. Smith a new piece of machinery under which these problems can be further examined," and had wished it "every success in its deliberations," Mr. Wilson answered a number of questions.

In reply to **Mr. Grimond** (the Liberal leader), **Mr. Wilson** said that the document to be submitted to the Commission would "certainly give effect to the five principles," and that, while in theory either side might reserve its position or even "disregard the findings" of the Commission, "in practice it would mean that we would accept the report."

Replying to **Mr. Michael Foot** (Lab.), **Mr. Wilson** confirmed that it was "extremely important that there must be freedom of the leaders of all sections of opinion in Rhodesia... to make their views known to the Commission" and "to ensure that their supporters are equally free to make their views known." He added that Mr. Smith had said that, if he could get a satisfactory assurance from the leaders in question, and others in detention, that they would now revert to purely constitutional means of political activity without intimidation—of which there was a great deal in Rhodesia, on both sides—he would be prepared to release them from detention or restriction.

Mr. Emlyn Hooson (L.) asked whether the Prime Minister was "fully satisfied that Mr. Smith has no intention of making a unilateral declaration of independence until the Royal Commission has reported," and whether the Rhodesian Government had "absolutely accepted the idea of the Royal Commission."

Mr. Wilson replied: "We worked very hard, all of us, representatives of both Governments, to try and find a means for an agreed settlement. I believe we negotiated in good faith. Although even on Thursday night [Oct. 30] or Friday morning it looked as though it was going to break down, and there was ominous evidence that U.D.I. was in prospect within a day or two, we did agree on Friday night on the procedure by which African opinion could be consulted. I am not in any doubt at all that Mr. Smith, in accepting that procedure, intended that procedure to be carried right through to the end in the hope of reaching an agreement.

"I have referred to the fact that we have not agreed to the document to be submitted. I did say quite frankly that the threat of U.D.I. has not entirely receded.

"I hope now that we have got so far, and covered so much of the ground, and reached agreement on the vital fifth principle, that, the pressures which there are in Rhodesia for a U.D.I. notwithstanding, the views of those who seem to have a death wish upon them rather than get an agreed settlement will not prevail over Mr. Smith and his colleagues. I am still very hopeful that Mr. Smith will feel we have an adequate procedure, whatever our differences on the content of the document."

Answering **Mr. G. C. Jackson** (Lab.), the Prime Minister stated that he had "pressed upon Mr. Smith" and "stressed many times" that "an educational programme for training Africans in various aspects of administration" and for other technical training was "vital to the future of Rhodesia upon a multi-racial basis."

Mr. Smith stated in a broadcast on Nov. 2 that the proposed Royal Commission was the only chance of a solution to the dispute between Britain and Rhodesia, and added that it should begin its work immediately. Saying that the Rhodesian Government was ever conscious "and that is putting it mildly"—of the danger of allowing things to drift, Mr. Smith declared that, as the British Cabinet was meeting on that day, he hoped to have a reply by the following day. He continued: "It would be wrong of me not to caution Rhodesians that, in spite of the general air of optimism which developed over the weekend, a wrong decision from the British Government over this question could cause all these hopes to crash to the ground." Recalling that Mr. Wilson had stated at the end of his Salisbury visit that "the door is wide open for agreement," Mr.

Smith said: "I wonder if it is his intention to slam it closed again. If so, then the end of the road could be nearer than we think...."

"The ball is in Mr. Wilson's court," Mr. Smith went on. "At Government level the differences are as wide apart and irreconcilable as ever. There remains one possible chance—this Royal Commission, a high-level, independent, impartial body, free from political pressure."

Contending that the suggestions put forward by his Government met the five principles put forward by the British Government, Mr. Smith said: "In any case the fifth principle has proved to be the final and most formidable obstacle because, whatever the two Governments may agree to beforehand, Principle Five says that this must be acceptable to the people of Rhodesia as a whole." The Royal Commission was a means of overcoming the difficult fifth principle. "The original idea came from Mr. Wilson; afterwards certain modifications produced by the Rhodesian Government were mutually accepted. The contribution made by the Rhodesian Government was to change the Commission's terms of reference from something vague and indefinable to a concrete proposition which should at the outset be acceptable to the Rhodesian Government."

Referring to the convention that Britain did not legislate for Rhodesia except at the request of the Rhodesian Government, Mr. Smith said: "This surely reinforces my argument that, unless the terms of reference given to the Royal Commission are acceptable to the Rhodesian Government, then the whole exercise will be useless and a complete waste of time." If the British Government still disagreed on the terms of reference, then "to avoid another deadlock they should be prepared to allow the Royal Commission to put the Rhodesian Government's case to the people of Rhodesia as a whole. If the people of Rhodesia as a whole are prepared to accept these terms and conditions, is this not a perfect example of democracy in action...?"

In conclusion Mr. Smith said: "The only way to reconcile the position is to allow the Royal Commission to get on with its work, and I sincerely hope Mr. Wilson and his colleagues are not going to try to do the work, or even part of the work, on behalf of the Commission before allowing the Commission to commence."

A statement by the Rhodesian Ministry of Information on Nov. 3 said that the task to be entrusted to the proposed Royal Commission—as set out in a unilateral statement issued by the Rhodesian Government early on Oct. 30—was only to decide whether or not the 1961 Constitution, with adjustments to make the country independent, was acceptable to the Rhodesian people as a whole; the Commission could not come into existence at all unless the British Government accepted the terms of reference proposed for it by the Rhodesian Government.

Mr. Wilson made a further statement in the House of Commons on Nov. 3, in which he reported on the outcome of the discussions with the Rhodesian Government by the Commonwealth Relations Secretary and the Attorney-General and, in view of failure to agree with the Rhodesian Government, proposed a referendum by the people of Rhodesia on their Government's constitutional proposals. The principal points of Mr. Wilson's statement were as follows:

"It is now clear that there is no prospect... of agreement being reached on the amendments which should be made to the 1961 Constitution, as a basis for use by the Royal Commission. In these circumstances we have had to consider our position. This we have done with a deep sense of the responsibility lying upon us for ensuring that this House, before there is any question of its being asked to take a decision about independence, should have before it an authoritative statement of the views of the Rhodesian people as a whole on particular proposals for independence.

"Mr. Smith considers that independence on the basis of the 1961 Constitution is acceptable to the Rhodesian people. Neither we nor our predecessors have been able to accept this as a fact without the most rigorous proof being forthcoming.... The British Government have decided—and I have so informed Mr. Smith—that we are now prepared to agree, subject to certain conditions I shall outline, that the Rhodesian Government's constitutional proposals should be put to the test of acceptability to the people of Rhodesia as a whole.

"But if this is to be done it must be known that we ourselves disagree with these proposals for the reasons I stated on Monday [Nov. 1]. Indeed Mr. Smith himself recognized in his broadcast on Monday night that we disagree with them.

"Second, we continue to hold the view that the Royal Commission, before canvassing the views of the Rhodesian people as a whole, should submit, for approval by both Governments, a unanimous interim report on how they would propose to determine acceptability. If the Royal Commission's suggestions for

this purpose were approved, they should themselves supervise whatever procedures were adopted in order to implement their findings.

"Third, when the Royal Commission have completed the process of ascertaining the opinion of the people of Rhodesia as a whole, they will submit a final report, which we have agreed must be unanimous. The British Government cannot of course be expected to commit themselves in advance to accept that report, particularly as in any case the eventual decision rests with Parliament alone.

"But I must also inform the House that we have made it clear to the Rhodesian Government—and I do not want there to be any misunderstanding about this here, in Rhodesia, or anywhere else—that if, in the event, the Royal Commission's findings showed that the Rhodesian Government's proposal was unacceptable to the people of Rhodesia as a whole, the British Government reserve their freedom of action as to the future course to be followed. We would feel free to pursue other means of dealing with the problem such as reviving our earlier suggestion of a Royal Commission with the substantive task of devising a new Constitution for Rhodesia, or our proposal that the issue should be remitted to a constitutional conference.

"I greatly hope, and I am sure the House will share this hope, that after the efforts that have been made in these past few weeks to secure a solution fulfilling all the requirements of honour and of justice, that what I have said will enable us to go ahead with the Royal Commission, on the principle of which we agreed last week, and that the Royal Commission can get down to its vitally important work without delay.

"If what I have said is unacceptable to the Rhodesian Government — though I am sure the whole House would find it difficult to believe that this could not be acceptable to them—I have one last alternative proposition, which I have put to Mr. Smith, as a fall-back on which agreement could still be reached. We should still be willing, as an alternative, to agree that the Rhodesian Government's constitutional proposals should be submitted to the test of a referendum of the whole of the Rhodesian people, provided that it was conducted without restriction on free political activity by all sections of the community, was subject to adequate impartial supervision, and that it incorporated stringent safeguards against intimidation from any quarter."

The Prime Minister's statement was followed by a brief debate.

Mr. Heath spoke of the "deepest disappointment" felt by the whole House at the failure to reach agreement on a draft document to be presented to the Commission, and asked for details of the Rhodesian proposals which might be put to the people by the Royal Commission.

Mr. Wilson replied that the Rhodesian Government's proposition was "basically the 1961 Constitution with certain consequential amendments" necessary for proceeding to independence, that it also included an extension in the number of voters on the "B" roll, and that this was "the only difference we have." In reply to **Mr. Grimond**, the **Prime Minister** said that, if the Rhodesian people as a whole accepted Mr. Smith's case, then "we still reserve our position on the course of action to be taken."

Sir Alec Douglas-Home confirmed that the Conservative Government had in 1964 not been satisfied that there were sufficient safeguards against retrogression in the position of the Africans, or that the proposals for ascertaining the will of the people were sufficient or sufficiently defined.

Sir Harry Legge-Bourke (C.) asked whether the Prime Minister visualized that supervision of a referendum should be by the United Nations, which he considered to be "a great danger" by "giving the U.N. power which they do not really have and which the Trusteeship Council is abusing." **Mr. Wilson**, while expressing disagreement with the last remark, emphasized that the appropriate authority for supervising a referendum was the British Government, on terms acceptable to Parliament.

Answering **Mr. Patrick Wall** (C.), the **Prime Minister** said that there were between the two Governments "political differences" which, he feared, represented "something much deeper than simple political prejudice." In reply to Mr. Heath, Mr. Wilson defined "acceptability" as meaning "acceptable not only to the present electorate but to a very much larger number of Rhodesians who are at present disenfranchised." The Rhodesian Minister of Finance, Mr. Wrathall, announced on Nov. 3 the imposition of import control to come into force at midnight that day. Explaining the Government's decision, Mr. Wrathall referred to "abnormally high indenting" for goods, saying that this had created a contingent liability for payments and necessitated "timely and precautionary action to limit the strain on our reserves and to restore the situation."

A state of emergency throughout Rhodesia for three months was proclaimed by the Governor (Sir Humphrey Gibbs) on November 5.

In a statement announcing the proclamation, Mr. Lardner-Burke, the Minister of Justice and Law and Order, explained that this step had been taken because of "a threat to security" which was "posed by numerous trained saboteurs sponsored by both proscribed African nationalist organizations who have either already returned to this country... or are poised in territories to the north of us." The statement mentioned

that "many more" men were "presently undergoing training in sabotage in countries hostile to us"; that "caches of arms, ammunition, and explosives" existed in those countries; and that intimidation was "assuming larger proportions." It also referred to "subversive activities by restrictees" and to "incidents of arson, violence, intimidation, and other subversive activities taking place in this country."

Under the regulations of the Emergency Powers Act, the Police Commissioner was empowered to appoint police officers to be in charge of specified areas, with powers to control the movements of individuals, seize private vehicles, and prohibit the possession and distribution of newspapers, magazines, pamphlets, and other printed matter in such areas. Furthermore, a "protecting authority" had power to "issue orders for regulation, control, restriction, or prohibition of the printing or publication of any book, newspaper, or other form of printed matter within an area or any portion of an area." The regulations also provided for the restriction of persons considered likely to disturb the public peace or to interfere with public services; made it an offence to spread rumours or reports relating to public safety or liable to cause alarm; conferred wide powers of search; and denied bail to persons arrested under the regulations.

Mr. Smith stated the same day that the declaration of a state of emergency was in no way connected with a unilateral declaration of independence.

As from Nov. 5 the Rhodesian Broadcasting Corporation ceased broadcasting the B.B.C. news bulletins and also those of the South African Broadcasting Corporation.

Following a number of meetings of the Rhodesian Cabinet, Mr. Smith on Nov. 6 replied to Mr. Wilson's proposals on the task of the Royal Commission and the alternative of a referendum, asking again what grounds might exist for the British Government not to accept Rhodesia's claim once the Royal Commission had found that the majority of the population of Rhodesia accepted independence under the 1961 Constitution.

In regard to Mr. Wilson's proposals, Mr. Smith said in particular:

"You say in the fourth paragraph of your letter: 'I can now tell you that the British Government agree that the Rhodesian Government's own constitutional proposals should now be put to the test of acceptability to the people of Rhodesia as a whole.' You then go on to hedge this acceptance with such conditions as to make it difficult to believe that it can be seriously intended, as I now show.

"(a) You wish to be free to state publicly that you disagree with the proposals. This you have done, but you also require that the Royal Commission, in the process of canvassing opinion in Rhodesia, should make this clearly known. In other words, the Commission would become a forum for argument and dispute on the merits of the relative proposals. It would then find itself the centre of a maelstrom. Undoubtedly, advocacy of the British Government's proposals (which would in effect be part of the submission of the Commission) would become a potent and distracting factor.

"Its effect would simply be to convert it into a constitutional conference, and in dealing with emergent and in some cases primitive people through an interpreter the confusion of thought ceased could provide no significant answer at all.

"(b) You require that the commissioners should submit a unanimous interim report on how they would propose to determine acceptability. This shows a singular lack of confidence in the Commission, which, if it is to be entrusted with the task, is surely competent to fulfil it. You have expressed your supreme confidence in the chairman of the Commission and it seems strange you should now question his ability to guide the Commission in its fundamental approach.

"(c) You require the final report of the Commission to be unanimous. I accept that you made this point in discussion, but I remind you you did not obtain my agreement. If a Commission is unable to agree on an unanimous report it is customary to have a majority and minority report. It would be wrong to demand of such a Commission unanimity of thought before it had even set about its task.

"(d) You then go on to reserve your position and indicate you cannot be expected to commit your Government in advance to accept the report of the Commission and that in any case the eventual decision rests with the British Parliament alone, yet in paragraph three of your letter you condemn the proposal.

"Thus, at the very outset it appears that there is no likelihood (whether or not the Commission's report is unanimous) of your accepting its conclusions and advocating its acceptance by Parliament unless the proposals and conclusions are entirely satisfactory to your Government and accord with your inclinations, irrespective of the wishes of Rhodesians. We for our part do not and would not have reserved our position had the Commission been allowed to function as we envisaged.

"The proposals contained in paragraph five of your message regarding a Royal Commission to make recommendations for a new Constitution for Rhodesia are not acceptable to me and this was clearly indicated to you when you were in Salisbury. Similarly, your suggestion in paragraph six that the

Rhodesian Government proposals be submitted to the test of a referendum of the whole people of Rhodesia is quite outside the scope of the proposals made by the Rhodesian Government. Such a suggestion at this stage would be a negation of the understandings reached with you.

"The conditions you have imposed in your letter are clearly designed to reinstate your original proposals which we rejected, and to defeat the whole object of our counter-proposals with which you concurred. I therefore regret to tell you that the only conclusion to be derived from your letter is that it is tantamount to, and can only be interpreted as, a rejection of the proposals agreed with you in Salisbury.

"I also regret to say that the impression you left with us of a determined effort to resolve our constitutional problems has been utterly dissipated. It would seem you have now finally closed the door which you claimed publicly to have opened."

In a further attempt to enable the proposed Royal Commission to start its work, Mr. Wilson suggested that its chairman-designate, Sir Hugh Beadle (the Rhodesian Chief Justice), should come to London for discussions, and that the two Prime Ministers might thereafter meet again, possibly in Malta. Mr. Wilson's reply, sent to Mr. Smith on Nov. 7, was worded as follows:

"Thank you for your message of yesterday. It creates a difficult situation.

"The purpose of our present exchanges is to try to get a Royal Commission set up. No doors are being closed by me. You will recall that when I originally put forward the idea of a Royal Commission with wide terms of reference, you made an alternative proposal for a Commission with a narrower task.

"In the light of certain safeguards, which I was clear at the time that you were prepared to accept, I agreed to a Royal Commission being set up upon the basis you wished.

"Subsequently, it became clear that we could not agree upon the content of the proposals which the Royal Commission should canvass and even on this point, as I explained in my statement in Parliament last Wednesday[nov. 3], I was prepared to meet you by agreeing that the question to be put to the people of Rhodesia as a whole should be the acceptability of your proposals alone.

"But one of the conditions which would be required for this purpose would be that it should be publicly known that we did not agree with the proposals to be canvassed by the Royal Commission.

"Our position has now been made clear by my statement in Parliament; and it is now for the Commission to ascertain, on this basis, what the people of Rhodesia as a whole really want. provided that they are free — and the need for this has been high-lighted by the declaration of a state of emergency in Rhodesia — to express their views without intimidation from any quarter.

"I am more concerned about what you say on the unanimous nature of the Commission's work. I made it clear at our final meeting in Salisbury that the Commission would need to proceed on the basis of unanimity; and you agreed that this would be essential if their work was to carry conviction.

"Indeed, it was only your acceptance of the principle of unanimity that made it possible for me to entertain your proposal of a Royal Commission with narrower terms of reference.

"Now I turn to the question of an interim report. I would be prepared to consider how far we could perhaps distinguish between an interim report on procedure and a final report on substance.

"One idea which we might consider so far as the interim report is concerned is that it might be made clear to the Commission that if, at any time, any one of their members felt that they needed to refer back to the two Governments for further guidance, or if the Commission as a whole, while unanimous on their recommendation as to the method to be used, felt that they should first report back to the two Governments, they should be free to do so. There might be other ways of tackling this problem.

"But as regards the Commission's final report recording their view as to the acceptability or otherwise of the 1961 Constitution as a basis for independence, clearly this report must be unanimous if it is to do what we both require of it.

"I must repeat that the rights of the U.K. Parliament, with whom alone it rests to take the ultimate decision about the terms on which Rhodesia should proceed to independence, must be fully reserved.

"I made this very clear in my statement in the House of Commons on Nov. 3; and you will see from the exchanges recorded in Hansard that this was regarded by the House as a whole as being of the greatest importance.

"Indeed, I do not believe that Parliament would accept the Royal Commission procedure on any other basis, although, as I said in my earlier message, the Commission's report would obviously carry the greatest weight and there would have to be very compelling reasons for either of us to reject it...."

"I am bound to tell you also that public and parliamentary opinion in the United Kingdom has been profoundly affected by the fact that, even since my last message, your Government has, abruptly and without warning, declared a state of emergency.

"The U.K. Government and Parliament will now need to understand more clearly precisely how a Royal Commission would and indeed could operate in the circumstances of restriction on freedom of expression which the state of emergency is creating in Rhodesia. I feel therefore that we must have an objective and first-hand opinion on this question.

"We have already agreed that the Chief Justice of Rhodesia, Sir Hugh Beadle, should be the chairman of the Royal Commission; and we have both expressed our full confidence in him.

"Since both you and I discussed with him in Salisbury how the Commission might work and since I understand that you have had further conversations with him since my departure, I suggest that he should now come to London to discuss with my colleagues and myself how the Royal Commission will work in the light of your announcement on Friday[nov. 5].

"I should like at the same time to explore further with him the other issues of procedure which I have mentioned in this letter, including the suggestion which I have outlined for dealing with the question of an interim report.

"I believe that after my further discussion with Sir Hugh Beadle it might be useful if you and I met again, preferably at some convenient meeting place, such as Malta. We could then decide not only the outstanding questions involved in getting the Royal Commission to work but also the action to be taken after they have presented their final report, consistently with my own explicit undertaking to Parliament."

Mr. Heath, who on Nov. 6 had asked that the records of the talks in Salisbury should be published immediately so that the people of both countries could judge for themselves what had been agreed, was invited by Mr. Wilson on Nov. 7 to read the minutes of those talks. It was, however, reaffirmed officially that the minutes would not be published without Mr. Smith's express agreement, except in the case of a unilateral declaration of independence by the Rhodesian Government.

Mr. Smith replied to Mr. Wilson on Nov. 8, ignoring both his proposals and concluding that the stage had again been reached where the two opposing views could not be reconciled. His letter ran as follows:

"Thank you for your message received yesterday evening.

"In paragraph four you claim that I agreed that the Commission would have to be unanimous in its report. I am quite clear on this point, and I am supported in this by all of my colleagues who were at the meeting, that while you did say that, in your opinion, the Commission's findings would have to be unanimous in order to carry conviction, we did not agree to accept unanimity.

"Your last message, to my mind, merely confirms, in different language, the attitudes which you adopted in your message of Nov. 3. I have analysed your latest message very carefully and have compared it with your message of Nov. 3 and my reply of Nov. 6, and it is clear that you have taken the matter no further forward.

"Even if we were to agree on the procedure and substance of its work, you have again made it abundantly clear that you are not prepared to accept in advance the decision of the Royal Commission, that you are not prepared to agree that the Commission should be free to submit a majority report, and that you are not prepared to commit your Government to advocating its acceptance in Parliament. These three points are fundamental.

"I regret to say, therefore, that the only conclusion must be that we are back in the position we reached at the end of our talks in London, when we both agreed that the views of our respective Governments were irreconcilable."

At the same time Mr. Smith told reporters that there would not be much point in meeting Mr. Wilson in Malta. In regard to Sir Hugh Beadle, he announced that the latter was flying to London "entirely on his own initiative," adding that he would have thought that, as the Royal Commission had not yet been agreed, the British Government would have awaited his reply before inviting Sir Hugh, and that he had made his views known to the Chief Justice.

The House of Commons, which the British Cabinet had on Nov. 4 decided not to prorogue the next day (as had been intended), so that it should be ready to act in the case of any sudden unilateral step by the Rhodesian Government, began its new session on Nov. 9, the Debate on the Queen's Speech including several references to the Rhodesian question.

Mr. Heath confirmed that the whole House was united against any movement for a unilateral declaration of independence, and suggested that a senior Minister might be permanently in Salisbury to carry on "the difficult and delicate negotiations."

Mr. Wilson spoke of Sir Hugh Beadle as being known "not only for his sagacity, judgment, and humanity, but also as a man with the courage of a lion" (adding: "It will be needed in tilts situation"), with whom he intended to have full discussions. He said that he was hoping that Mr. Smith would then find it possible to agree to a further meeting.

Following Sir Hugh Beadle's arrival in London, talks between the Prime Minister and the Rhodesian Chief Justice took place on Nov. 9-10, their scope being revealed by Mr. Wilson in the House of Commons on Nov. 11[see below].

An exchange of messages between the Queen and the Rhodesian Government was published from 10 Downing Street late on Nov. 10. A letter from the Rhodesian Cabinet, dated Nov. 9, read as follows: "Your Majesty—At this time, when your Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom and your Majesty's Government in Rhodesia are finding it impossible to agree on the course of government which may be best for all the peoples of Rhodesia, we, your Ministers, wish respectfully to convey to your Majesty, both on behalf of all peoples in our country and on our own behalf, our constant loyalty to your Majesty.

"The Crown, in the person of the Sovereign, is dear to all the peoples of Rhodesia, and your Majesty will know how completely that devotion has been shown on many occasions in the past.

"It will be to our lasting sorrow should we find ourselves excluded from the Commonwealth, but nothing can break the ties of common heritage and kinship which we share with so many of its older members.

"May we therefore assure your Majesty that whatever happens there will still be found among all Rhodesians that same loyalty and devotion to the Crown which have guided and sustained us since our country was founded."

The Rhodesian Ministers and Parliamentary Secretaries who signed the letter were: Ian Smith, Clifford Dupont, A. Dunlop, D. W. Lardner-Burke, W. J. Harper, J. H. Howman, Lord Montrose, Ian F. McLean, B. H. Mussett, A. P. Smith, Lance B. Smith, I. B. Dillon, P. van der Byl, P. van Heerden, J. J. Wrathall, and G. W. Rudland.

The Queen's reply, sent by Mr. Bottomley to the Governor of Rhodesia, was worded as follows:

"I have it in command from the Queen to request you to convey this reply to a message to Her Majesty signed by all the Ministers in the Government of Southern Rhodesia, which was delivered in London today.

"Her Majesty acknowledges with gratitude the assurance of loyalty to the Crown expressed by the Prime Minister of Rhodesia and other Ministers.

"She is confident that all her Rhodesian people, on whose behalf the message speaks, will demonstrate their loyalty by continuing to act in a constitutional manner."

A letter sent to Mr. Smith by Mr. Wilson on Nov. 9 remained unpublished, but Mr. Smith referred to it as "one of those messages you can take whichever way you want." On the same day he declared: "I think the time has come when the only honest course open to us is to inform our people of the truth. If we allow the position to continue we are being deceitful and misleading the people of Rhodesia." Later he announced that he had decided to recall the Rhodesian Parliament, and late that night the Governor signed a proclamation recalling Parliament for Nov. 25.

A verbal message from Mr. Wilson was delivered to Mr. Smith by the British High Commissioner, Mr. J. B. Johnston, late on Nov. 10, and at 6 a.m. the following morning Mr. Wilson telephoned Mr. Smith in a last effort to avert a unilateral declaration of independence[see below].

In a 20-minute broadcast made at 1.15 p.m. (11.15 a.m. G.M.T.) on Nov, 11, Mr. Smith announced his Government's unilateral declaration of independence for Rhodesia in the following terms:

"Your Government has issued the following proclamation, which I will read to you:

‘Whereas in the course of human affairs history has shown that it may become necessary for a people to resolve the political affiliations which have connected them with another people and to assume among other nations the separate and equal status to which they are entitled,

‘And whereas in such event a respect for the opinions of mankind requires them to declare to other nations the causes which impel them to assume full responsibility for their own affairs,

‘Now therefore, we, the Government of Rhodesia, do hereby declare:

‘That it is an indisputable and accepted historic fact that since 1923 the Government of Rhodesia have exercised the powers of self-government and have been responsible for the progress, development, and welfare of their people,

‘That the people of Rhodesia, having demonstrated their loyalty to the Crown and to their kith and kin in the United Kingdom and elsewhere throughout two world wars, and having been prepared to shed their

blood and give of their substance in what they believed to be a mutual interest of freedom-loving people, now see all that they have cherished about to be shattered on the rocks of expediency,

'That the people of Rhodesia have witnessed a process which is destructive of those very precepts upon which civilization in a primitive country has been built, they have seen the principles of Western democracy and responsible government and moral standards crumble elsewhere, nevertheless they have remained steadfast,

'That the people of Rhodesia fully support the request of their Government for sovereign independence and have witnessed the consistent refusal of the Government of the United Kingdom to accede to their entreaties,

'That the Government of the United Kingdom have thus demonstrated that they are not prepared to grant sovereign independence to Rhodesia on terms acceptable to the people of Rhodesia, thereby persisting in maintaining an unwarrantable jurisdiction over Rhodesia, obstructing laws and treaties with other States in the conduct of affairs with other nations, and refusing assent to necessary laws for the public good, all this to the detriment of the future peace, prosperity, and good government of Rhodesia,

'That the Government of Rhodesia have for a long period patiently and in good faith negotiated with the Government of the United Kingdom for the removal of the remaining limitations placed upon them and for the grant of sovereign independence,

'That in the belief that procrastination and delay strike at and injure the very life of the nation, the Government of Rhodesia consider it essential that Rhodesia should obtain without delay sovereign independence the justice of which is beyond question,

'Now therefore we, the Government of Rhodesia, in humble submission to Almighty God, who controls the destiny of nations, conscious that the people of Rhodesia have always shown unswerving loyalty and devotion to H.M. the Queen and earnestly praying that we the people of Rhodesia will not be hindered in our determination to continue exercising our undoubted right to demonstrate the same loyalty and devotion in seeking to promote the common good so that the dignity and freedom of all men may be assured,

'Do by thus proclamation adopt, enact, and give to the people of Rhodesia the Constitution annexed hereto. 'God save the Queen.'

"Now if I may, I would like to say a few words to you. Today, now that the final stalemate in negotiations has become evident, the end of the road has been reached.

"It has become abundantly clear that it is the policy of the British Government to play us along with no real intention of arriving at a solution which we could possibly accept. Indeed, in the latest verbal and confidential message delivered to me last night, we find that on the main principle which is in dispute the two Governments have moved further apart.

"I promised the people of this country' that I would continue to negotiate to the bitter end and that I would leave no stone unturned in my endeavours to secure an honourable and mutually accepted settlement.

"It now fails to me to tell you that negotiations have come to an end. No one could deny that we have striven with might and main and at times bent over backwards to bridge the gap which divides us from the British Government. My Ministers and I have not arrived at this decision without the deepest heart-searching. We have sat for days in ceaseless conference trying to find any possible way of achieving negotiated independence, as we undertook to the country we would do.

"But I would be failing in my duty to all of you who live in Rhodesia if I was to permit this country to drift in the present paralyzing state of uncertainty, The bitter lesson of the Federation is constantly in the forefront of my mind. In that case matters were permitted to drift and plans for action were formulated too late to prevent the destruction of this noble concept of racial harmony.

"However, Rhodesia has not rejected the possibility of racial harmony in Africa. The responsibility for the break-up of the Federation was Great Britain's alone. Their experiment failed and they are now trying to foist the same dogma on to Rhodesia.

"We are determined that the same will never be allowed to happen here. Let no one believe that this action today marks a radical departure from the principles by which we have lived, or be under any misconception that now the Constitution will be torn up and that the protection of the rights of all peoples which are enshrined in that Constitution will be abrogated and disregarded.

"Neither let it be thought that this event marks a diminution in the opportunities which our African people have to advance and prosper in Rhodesia. Far from this being the case, it is our intention, in consultation with the chiefs, to bring them into the Government and administration as the acknowledged leaders of the African people on a basis acceptable to them.

"It is our firm intention to abide by the Constitution. Indeed, we have never asked for anything other than independence on the basis of the present Constitution, and only such amendments are included as are necessary to adapt it to that of an independent country.

"With regard to the position of Members of Parliament, judges, civil servants, and members of the armed forces, as well as the police, provision has been made for all of them to carry on their duties, and all are deemed to have complied with the requirements of the new Constitution. They will continue to carry on their normal work. All present laws shall continue to operate and the courts will enforce them in the normal manner.

"We are doing no more than assuming the rights which various British Ministers have in the past indicated were ours. And in fact this Constitution was the one which would carry us to independence.

"Let no one be persuaded that this action marks a change in our attitude towards our neighbours in Africa, to whom we have ceaselessly extended the hand of friendship and to whom we have nothing but goodwill and the best of intentions. We have never sought, nor will we ever seek, to interfere or in any way attempt to influence their policy and their internal affairs. All we ask in return is their goodwill in permitting us to look after what are, after all, our own private and domestic matters.

"I wish to make it quite clear, as indeed I have on many occasions in the past, that we in this country have no quarrels whatsoever with the people of Great Britain. The differences of opinion which we have are entirely with successive British Governments. The people of Britain are the kith and kin of many Rhodesians and the people with whom we have the closest affinity both in our way of life and in our conception of justice and civilization.

"How can anyone suggest that we would harbour hostile sentiments against those with whom we fought shoulder to shoulder against the common enemy in two world wars? Our admiration and friendship for the people of Great Britain is real and enduring.

"Let there be no doubt that we in this country stand second to none in our loyalty to the Queen. And whatever else other countries may have done, or may do, it is our intention that the Union Jack will continue to fly in Rhodesia and the National Anthem continue to be sung.

"Most of you, I know, have longed for this day, but a few on the other hand have had reservations. However, I would say to you that there can be no future for this great and splendid country of ours if we are to remain drifting in this constitutional twilight.

"To those who believe that it would be in our own interests to continue as we are, I would point out that the British Prime Minister implied in his speech to Parliament on his return from Rhodesia that, should the result of the Royal Commission go against Rhodesia, the British Government reserved the right to call a conference, which further implied the changing of our Constitution as a result.

"It would appear that if this is the British Government's real intention, we shall not be allowed to go on as we are—even if there had been a Royal Commission. There can be no solution to our racial problems while African nationalists believe that provided they stirred up sufficient trouble they will be able to blackmail the British Government into bringing about a miracle on their behalf by handing the country over to irresponsible rule.

"There can be no happiness in this country while the absurd situation continues to exist where people such as ourselves, who have ruled ourselves with an impeccable record for over 40 years, are denied what is freely granted to other countries, who have ruled themselves in some cases for no longer than a year. There can never be long-term prosperity, which is so necessary for the nurturing of our endeavours to improve the standard of living and increase the happiness and better the lot of all our people, whilst the present uncertainty exists.

"No businessman could ever seriously contemplate massive long-term investment in a country in which chaos and confusion will always be future possibilities. Whatever the short-term economic disadvantages may be, in the long term steady economic progress could never be achieved unless we are masters in our own house.

"To those of you who fear the short-term effect of economic sanctions, I would say that, whilst we in no way minimize the possible hardship and inconvenience they may bring about, none the less we are firmly convinced that in the long run, because of our natural resources and the enterprise of our people, there will be brought about a prosperous and better future for everyone.

"Week after week, we have seen businessmen passing through here on their way to South Africa who with few exceptions say that, while this state of uncertainty continues, they will not even contemplate a serious investigation of the possibility of investment. However, they also say that once we have solved our

constitutional difficulties and are independent, then they will be very interested in undertaking serious investigation and inquiries with a view to investing.

"That some economic retributions will be visited upon us, there is no doubt. Those who seek to damage us do not have any great concern for the principles to which they endlessly pay lip service, for if they really believed in these principles, which they ceaselessly proclaim, then they could not possibly deny the many disasters which have been brought about by the premature withdrawal of European influence from countries in Africa and Asia, who were nowhere ready for it.

"There is no doubt that the talk of threats and sanctions is no more than appeasement to the United Nations, the Afro-Asian bloc, and certain members of the Commonwealth, and undoubtedly some action will be taken. But I cannot conceive of a rational world uniting in an endeavour to destroy the economy of this country knowing, as they undoubtedly do, that in many cases the hardest hit will be the very people on whose behalf they would like to believe they are invoking these sanctions. We for our part will never do anything in the nature of taking revenge on any neighbouring African State for what other countries may do to us.

"But it is none the less inevitable that if our economy should contract as a result of such actions taken by others, then what jobs were available would have to be reserved for our own Africans, thus bringing hardship not only on our own people but also to those people from adjoining territories who work here. If, as some have predicted, there are repercussions elsewhere in Africa, I would warn those people who contemplate taking action that it will be their actions and not ours that have precipitated these events.

"Whatever the consequences may be and whatever difficulties may present themselves, we are a people who in the past have survived and prevailed in circumstances of the utmost adversity. The mantle of the pioneers has fallen on our shoulders, and we will, I am sure, be able to face any difficulties which may occur, fortified by the same strength and courage which distinguished our fore-fathers in days gone by.

"I do not believe many of the extreme consequences which have been forecast by various would-be Cassandras, both here and abroad, will come to pass. But whatever may befall, I have the profoundest confidence and belief in the determination of our people to stand united and to prevail in the face of any adversity.

"The safety of our homes and the freedom of our people alike depend on the conduct of each one of us at this critical time. In the lives of most nations there comes a moment when a stand has to be made for principles, whatever the consequences. This moment has come to Rhodesia. I pray—and I hope other Rhodesians will also pray today—that our Government will be given the wisdom and the strength to bring Rhodesia safely through.

"I call upon all of you in this historic hour to support me and my Government in the struggle in which we are engaged. I believe that we are a courageous people and history has cast us in a heroic role. To us has been given the privilege of being the first Western nation in the last two decades to have the determination and fortitude to say: So far and no further. We may be a small country, but we are a determined people who have been called upon to play a role of world-wide significance.

"We Rhodesians have rejected the doctrinaire philosophy of appeasement and surrender. The decision which we have taken today is a refusal by Rhodesians to sell their birthright. And, even if we were to surrender, does anyone believe that Rhodesia would be the last target of the Communists in the Afro-Asian bloc ?

"We have struck a blow for the preservation of justice, civilization, and Christianity—and in the spirit of this belief we have thus assumed our sovereign independence.

"God bless you all." [The commencement of the Rhodesian unilateral declaration of independence --

"Whereas in the course of human affairs there are certain similarities to the wording of the U.S. Declaration of Independence of 1776]

(1)The new Constitution annexed to Mr. Smith's declaration and published the same day, while in general following the lines of the 1961 Constitution, contained the following major new provisions:

The 1961 section on the Governor was replaced by a new one providing for the appointment of an "Officer Administering the Government," who would also be C.-in-C. of the Armed Forces, and who would be either a Governor-General appointed by the Queen on the sole advice of the Ministers of the Government of Rhodesia, or, if the Queen did not make such an appointment within 14 days of the advice being tendered to her by the Prime Minister of Rhodesia, "a Regent appointed by the members of the Executive Council presided over by the Prime Minister or in such other manner as may be prescribed by the law of the Legislature." Pending the appointment by the Queen of the first Officer Administering the Government, the members of the Executive Council were empowered to appoint an Acting Officer, who in general

would hold the same powers as the Governor under the 1961 Constitution, except that of reserving Bills for the Queen's consent.

(2)The Constitution removed: the power of the British Parliament to legislate for Rhodesia and repudiated the Crown's power, in terms of the Colonial Laws Validity Act, to issue Orders in Council under U.K. legislation; the Crown's power of disallowance; limitations on the conduct of foreign affairs and the use of defence forces; appeals to the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council; and the possible determination of *habeas corpus* applications in English courts.

(3)It introduced the concept of allegiance to the "Constitution of Rhodesia," and contained provisions to validate the seizure of independence and its adoption.

(4)It allowed the amendment, by a majority of two-thirds of the total membership of Parliament (with the necessity of a further two-thirds majority at a subsequent sitting of Parliament praying the Officer Administering the Government to assent to such a Bill), of the following provisions previously subject to approval either by separate referenda of the four races or by the Queen on British ministerial advice: the franchise qualifications; sections dealing with Judicial independence; the Declaration of Rights; the Constitutional Council; safeguards for laws dealing with racial ownership of land; and the procedure of constitutional amendment.

(5)The Officer Administering the Government was empowered to amend, modify, or adapt any provision of the new Constitution "to such extent as may appear to him necessary or expedient" during a period of six months, but with powers to extend this period.

(6)New appointments to the Bench, while still subject to consultation with the Chief Justice, no longer required his assent.

(7)Parliament was empowered to pass Acts of indemnity in cases where individual rights had been infringed by Executive action.

(8)The new Administration would take over the existing rights, assets, and liabilities of the previous Government.

(9)Transitional provisions included the stipulation that existing holders of public office, judges, and members of the Legislative Assembly should continue in office. Should such a person, on being requested by the Prime Minister, a Minister, or a person assigned by Ministers, refuse to state forthwith that he accepted the 1965 Constitution and take an oath that he would respect it and uphold it, his office would be deemed to have become vacant before the coming into operation of the new Constitution, and he would not be entitled to any compensation.

The declaration of independence was followed by the announcement of further measures under which Mr. Smith's regime assumed wide powers, including censorship of the Press, radio, and television; the power to impose rationing; cancellation of import licences; the introduction of export control; prohibition of the purchase of foreign securities; and the virtual prevention of emigration by restricting emigrants' allowances to £100 (the same as the holiday travel allowance, which was reduced from £300).

In a statement on "the need for stern discipline," Mr. Wrathall (the Minister of Finance) said: "We trust that normal trading and financial relations will continue. But we must be prepared to meet a situation in which sanctions of an aggressive character may be taken against Rhodesia. If the need should arise, we must be ready to endure a situation of real hardship for some time ahead."

He added that there would be no prohibition on the remittance of profits, interest, and dividends abroad, and that Rhodesia intended to honour all her obligations and to maintain the value of the Rhodesian pound. Under the emergency powers a civil servant who absented himself from his employment or refused to carry out his duties became liable to a fine of up to £500 and/or imprisonment for up to two years.

Mr. Leo Baron, Mr. Nkomo's lawyer, who had previously been restricted[see 20874 A], was arrested the same day[nov. 11].

Sir Roy Welensky (the former Federal Prime Minister) the same evening made the following statement in support of Mr. Smith, the gist of which he had already foreshadowed in an interview on Oct. 22:

"Although, as everybody knows, I have been against a unilateral declaration, I think it is now the duty of every responsible Rhodesian to support the revolutionary Government. We cannot afford to throw the country into a state of chaos. We must abide by the forces of law and order, whether the Government is a *de facto* or a *de jure* Government."

Immediately after the declaration of independence, the Governor (Sir Humphrey Gibbs) issued a proclamation stating that he had informed Mr. Smith and his colleagues that they no longer held office; calling on all citizens to refrain from all acts calculated to further the objects of the illegal authorities; and

adding that it was the duty of everyone, including the judiciary, the police, and the armed services, to maintain law and order and to continue normal working. The proclamation, however, was not broadcast in Rhodesia, nor was it, as the result of censorship, published in the Rhodesian Press.

Immediately after Mr. Smith's declaration became known in London, the Government's Defence and Overseas Policy Committee met, and Mr. Wilson drafted the statement which he made to the House of Commons the same afternoon (Nov. 11). In it he gave details of a telephone conversation he had had with Mr. Smith at 6 a.m. that day, in which Mr. Smith gave no indication that the decision to declare independence had already been made. Mr. Wilson's statement also listed the measures which had already been taken, or were about to be taken, by the British Government in consequence of the illegal action of the Rhodesian Government. He spoke as follows:

"The House will have heard with deep sadness of the illegal declaration of independence by men who, until that declaration, constituted the Government of Rhodesia.... Before informing the House of the consequences which follow this act, I think they would wish me to say something of the discussions which have taken place between the two Governments since my last report to the House on Tuesday.

"On Tuesday [Nov. 9], and again yesterday, my colleagues and I had a series of meetings with Sir Hugh Beadle, then—and now—the Chief Justice of Rhodesia. In his capacity as chairman-designate of the Royal Commission he discussed with us every aspect of the working of that Commission which could affect the issues still in dispute between the two Governments.

"He returned overnight, authorized to explain to Mr. Smith and his colleagues the precise position of H.M. Government on all these questions, including the effect on the working of the Royal Commission of the state of emergency, and the steps which would have to be taken to ensure that the Royal Commission would still be in a position, in spite of that state of emergency, to request meetings and to see anyone they needed to see to obtain the views of the Rhodesian people as a whole on the basis of a free expression of opinion without restriction or intimidation on any question.

"Yesterday afternoon I sent a detailed message to Mr. Smith explaining the position on the outstanding items, but adding that Sir Hugh Beadle would give further clarification on every point, including the problem of the unanimity report which I have referred to in this House.

"On the last outstanding point which held up agreement—the extent to which each Government would give an assurance in advance that it would accept a unanimous report of the Commission—we made a proposal to the Rhodesian Government which would fully meet every demand they had made.

"We asked the following question: If the U.K. Government undertook to commend to Parliament, whose sovereign rights must be reserved, a unanimous report by the Royal Commission to the effect that the 1961 Constitution was acceptable to the people of Rhodesia as a whole as a basis for independence, would the Rhodesian Government give a corresponding undertaking that if the Royal Commission submitted a unanimous report to the effect that the 1961 Constitution was not acceptable to the people of Rhodesia as a whole as a basis for independence, they would abandon their claim in this respect, and would agree that the Royal Commission should then proceed to devise a new Constitution for Rhodesia to give effect to the principles announced by the U.K. Government in their statement on Oct. 9, 1965—these were the five principles—and which would be acceptable to the people as a whole as a basis for independence

"We further proposed that should there not be a unanimous but a majority report both Governments would reserve their position.

"What was proposed in that message to Mr. Smith, which he was in a position to report to his Cabinet at eight o'clock last night, met every requirement to which he had referred in the messages, formal and informal, which were received from him. Evidence was accumulating that in spite of this the then Rhodesian Government were hell-bent on illegal and self-destroying action.

"Throughout the small hours of this morning I was in touch with Salisbury and through H.M. High Commissioner I arranged an early morning telephone call with Mr. Smith which took place several hours before the illegal declaration.

"I began by saying there were no outstanding points between us, and that I was prepared to send a senior Minister to Salisbury empowered to sign on behalf of the British Government an agreed minute recording the basis on which the Royal Commission could be set up this week and start its work.

"I went through all the grounds in this conversation—every single item in dispute between the two Governments affecting the establishment of the Royal Commission. I spelt out yet again our attitude on them. I have proved beyond any possible reasonable doubt that every point they had made was fully dealt with on terms that must be satisfactory to them. Every point was discussed in the telephone conversation.

By the end of the conversation Mr. Smith had no further queries, no further points to raise. There was no suggestion that anything was still in doubt.

"After this Mr. Smith went on to say that the position of the two Governments was irreconcilable. When I heard this I said that if anyone could now say that this position was so irreconcilable as to justify illegal action I thought they wanted their head examined or they must have the death wish on them.

"Mr. Smith, who gave me no indication that the decision to take illegal action had already been taken, went on to say that his Government were then in the midst of discussing this and it would not be right if he did not tell me that the feeling seemed to be that this thing had gone too far....

"He went on—and it was almost a friendly conversation—to say that his Cabinet and he regretted that this had happened at this stage because 'you find yourself—he was referring to me—in a position that has gone too far not because of actions on your part.' I am glad to feel that he at any rate agrees with the claim I made in the House that I have done everything any man can do to avert this disaster. The action they were taking was not because of any action on my part.

"I am bound to tell the House that I was speaking in the early hours of this morning to a confused and unhappy man. He has been in these last weeks under intolerable pressure from his colleagues and from unreasoning extremists of the Rhodesian Front. But it must not be forgotten that it was Mr. Smith who called the Rhodesian Front into existence.

"I ended the telephone conversation with a heavy heart, feeling that reason had fled the scene and that emotions, unreasoning racialist emotions at that, had taken command, regardless of the conclusions for Rhodesia, Africa, and the world.

"The Government conceive it as their duty to publish all the exchanges which they and the previous Government have had with the Rhodesian Government over these past months and longer. When they are published I will call the House to witness that this Government and its predecessor have done everything in our power to avert this disaster.

"Even as this day dawned, less than four hours before this illegal declaration, we had agreed a method of settling the differences between the two Governments and provided for the immediate dispatch of a senior Minister to proceed to Salisbury empowered to sign an agreed minute creating the conditions in which the Royal Commission could be appointed this very week. I still find it incredible that this action should have taken place this morning.

"As I have previously warned the House, the differences have not been differences of legal drafting or normal political interchange but have represented a deep difference of philosophy, a gulf we now know could never have been bridged because it was a gulf covering all the differences between different worlds and different centuries.

"At every point when agreement was near we were told our position was irreconcilable, because there were men in the Rhodesian Cabinet determined at all costs that agreement should not be reached. I challenged Mr. Smith today, as I did at our last meeting in Salisbury, with this fact and, to his credit, he did honestly admit it in our telephone conversation this morning...."

Mr. Wilson then outlined the immediate consequences of the Rhodesian Government's declaration as follows:

"The British Government condemns the declaration of independence by the former Government of Rhodesia as an illegal act and one ineffective in law. This is an act of rebellion against the Crown and against the Constitution as by law established. Actions taken to give effect to it will be treasonable.

"The Governor, in pursuance of the authority vested in him by Her Majesty, has today informed the Prime Minister and other Ministers of the Rhodesian Government that they cease to hold office. They are now private persons and can exercise no legal authority in Rhodesia.

"The British Government wish to make it clear that it is the duty of British subjects—including all subjects of Rhodesia—to remain loyal to the Queen and the law of the land, and to recognize the continuing authority and responsibility for Rhodesia of the Government of the United Kingdom.

"The British Government are in close touch with all other Commonwealth countries about the consequences of this illegal act and the measures we should take.

"We shall have no dealings with the rebel regime. The British High Commissioner is being withdrawn, and the Rhodesian High Commissioner in London has been asked to leave.

"Exports of arms, including spares, have, of course, been stopped.

"All British aid will cease.

" Rhodesia is being—indeed, has been—removed from the sterling area. Special exchange control restrictions will be applied. The export of U.K. capital to Rhodesia will not be allowed. Rhodesia will no longer be allowed access to the London capital market.

"Our Export Credit Guarantee Department will give no further cover for exports to Rhodesia. The Ottawa Agreement, 1932, which governs our trading arrangements with Rhodesia, is suspended. Rhodesia will be suspended forthwith from the Commonwealth preference area and her goods will no longer receive preferential treatment on entering the United Kingdom.

"There will be a ban on further purchases of tobacco from Southern Rhodesia. We propose to suspend the Commonwealth Sugar Agreement in its relation to Rhodesia and to ban further purchases of Rhodesian sugar.

"We shall not recognize passports issued or renewed by the illegal Southern Rhodesian regime. A further statement is to be made on citizenship questions.

"We shall bring before Parliament on Monday a general enabling Bill to deal with this situation. It will first of all declare that Rhodesia remains part of H.M. dominions and that the Government and Parliament of the United Kingdom continue to have responsibility for it. It will go on to give power to make Orders in Council to enable us to carry through the policy I have stated.

"There will be a Government statement tomorrow giving mere details of the action we would propose if Parliament agrees to this Bill.

"Lord Caradon, British permanent representative at the United Nations, is asking the President of the security Council to call an early meeting to consider the situation." When he was interrupted by Opposition cries of "Why" Mr. Wilson replied: "Why? Because if we do not, somebody else will—and it is the duty of H.M. Government to keep control of this situation. And for that reason the Foreign Secretary will be leaving for New York this evening.

"It is the duty of everyone owing allegiance to the Crown, in Rhodesia or elsewhere, to refrain from all acts which would assist the illegal regime to continue in Rhodesia in their rebellion against the Crown.

"Members of the Armed Forces and the police in Southern Rhodesia should refrain from taking up arms in support of the illegal regime, and from doing anything which would help them to pursue their unlawful courses.

"Public servants in Rhodesia should not do any work for the illegal regime which would tend to farther the success of the rebellion...."

Giving expression to the "deep sense of tragedy" felt by himself and his colleagues, Mr. Wilson concluded:

"It is a tragedy affecting a great people, including many thousands who have made their homes there and who are plunged into a maelstrom not of their own making, and of millions more who are denied the inalienable human right of self-expression and self-determination.

"Heaven knows what crimes will be committed against the concept of the rule of law and of human freedom for which this House has always stood. This progressive unfolding of the regulations signed under the state of emergency—and there are more to come—is an ominous warning.

"The illegal regime which now claims power and authority in Rhodesia marked its usurpation of authority with a proclamation which borrowed, for the purposes of small and frightened men, the words of one of the historic documents of human freedom[i.e. the American Declaration of Independence of 1776], even to the point of appropriating the reference to 'a respect for the opinions of mankind.'

"I would repeat to them, and to the Rhodesian people as a whole, the words I used in my farewell statement on leaving Salisbury, which also quoted those words. I said this: 'When nearly two centuries ago the American States declared their independence from a British Government which, to say the least, was remote, oppressive, and unimaginative, they insisted that their actions be inspired by a proper respect for the opinions of mankind.' Nor, I said, were they alone in the world.

"Could anyone say either of those things would be true of a Rhodesia which chose illegally to claim its independence ?

"It would be unworthy of this Government, of any British Government, as it would be unworthy of this House, to allow this challenge, offensive as it is to all our cherished traditions and to the wider aspirations of the whole of mankind, to go unanswered. We did not seek this challenge. The House will concede that we did everything in our power to avoid it. But now it has been made, then, with whatever sadness, we shall face this challenge with resolution and determination. Whatever measures the Government, with the support of this House, judge to be needed to restore Rhodesia to the rule of law and to an allegiance to the Crown, those measures will be taken.

"I am confident we shall have not only the support of this House, not only the support of the nations of the world, but we shall have the clear and decisive verdict of history."

The Government's repudiation of the unilateral declaration of independence by Mr. Ian Smith and his colleagues was strongly supported by the Conservative and Liberal leaders.

Mr. Heath emphasized how deeply the Opposition "deplored" the unilateral declaration of independence, had been "distressed" at the news, and shared "the feeling of tragedy of the present situation," and declared that he did not wish to say anything which could add to its dangers. He asked whether the Governor in Rhodesia had, in addition to dismissing the Ministers, also suspended the 1961 Constitution (as had been reported from Salisbury); whether the Foreign Secretary would continue to maintain at the United Nations the position that Rhodesia was a British responsibility; and what was the purpose of each of the actions proposed to be taken by the British Government—each of which the Opposition would wish to examine "on its merits" and as regards "the extent to which it is essential in this critical situation."

Mr. Heath concluded: "Is the Prime Minister aware of the importance at this time, in every action which is taken and in every word which is spoken, of maintaining our own national unity, and thus helping to maintain the unity of the Commonwealth itself, to which we hope that at some future date a Rhodesia, independent, will be able to return"

Mr. Wilson agreed that it was "paramount" to preserve national unity "in dealing with this tragedy." He said that there was no confirmation that the Rhodesian Constitution was suspended, the Governor having no power to do so, as the Constitution had been conferred on Rhodesia by an Act of the British Parliament. Certain amendments of the Constitution might be required in the present situation to protect the rights of the Crown in Rhodesia, but this could only be done by an Act of Parliament. Mr. Wilson said: "While we could take power to suspend the Constitution, I want to make it clear that it is not possible to take away the Constitution... and replace it by a new one except by separate and specific legislation passed by this Parliament. Indeed, the first purpose of the enabling Bill will not be to enable us to create a new Constitution for Rhodesia."

The Prime Minister confirmed that there would be no change in the position to be taken up at the U.N. that Rhodesia was a British responsibility. He added: "It is more of a British responsibility today than it was yesterday, because now the responsibility lies directly on this country and this House.... But the extent to which what has happened in Rhodesia will create a difficult situation in Africa and the Commonwealth makes it a matter of world concern, and those who deny this are burying their heads in the sand. It is only by our being able to prove to the U.N. that we are ourselves taking our responsibilities... that we can stop other people from engaging on perhaps dangerous courses of action which we should all regret."

Mr. Wilson agreed that it was "absolutely right and fair" that all the measures to be taken should be examined on their merits. He continued: "Our purpose is not punitive. We do not approach this tragic situation in a mood of recrimination. Our purpose is to restore a situation in Rhodesia in which there can be untrammelled loyalty and allegiance to the Crown and in which there can be, within whatever rules this House lays down, a free Government of Rhodesia acting in the interests of the people of Rhodesia as a whole.

"There may be different views about how that can be brought about in this difficult situation. There may be different views about the severity with which measures should be applied, how quickly, to reach that situation. There will be no difference in the House, I am sure, about the fact that it is our duty, and that we have as a House to perform that duty, by discussing the basis on which we can restore the rule of law, legal government, and freedom in Rhodesia."

Mr. Grimond expressed "deep regret at this deplorable and illegal act by the late Government of Rhodesia" and support for the Governor and for the measures proposed by the Government. He asked whether it was intended "to take any specific steps about oil supplies" and whether other nations were to be asked to support Britain in her economic steps.

Mr. Wilson, in reply, paid tribute to Sir Humphrey Gibbs, whom he called "one of the greatest of Rhodesians." He said that when leaving Salisbury he had felt "a very special touch of sadness" in leaving the Governor, who "was in tears when we left," as he apparently knew what was coming. The Prime Minister continued:

"We have no proposals to make on oil supplies. The solution of this problem is not one to be dealt with by military intervention—unless, of course, our troops are asked for to preserve law and order and to avert a tragic action, subversion, murder, and so on. But we do not contemplate, as I have made very clear, any national action—and may I say any international action—for the purpose of coercing even the illegal Government of Rhodesia into a constitutional posture.

"We intend to inform the United Nations of our responsibilities and of the measures which we are taking, and we shall ask for the support of other countries in those economic measures, because it is obvious that some of them could be frustrated if there were no general support for them.... I think that the problem will be to avert excessive action by the United Nations. As for the economic sanctions, I think that it will be right for us to concentrate on trying to get other nations to follow our lead rather than seeing them get too far ahead of us."

In reply to a question by **Mr. J. B. Hynd** (Lab.), **Mr. Wilson** explained that Sir Humphrey Gibbs was "the Governor of Rhodesia acting in the name of the Queen" and that the British Government would not recognize any orders which he might be forced to sign conferring power to any private persons, "whoever they may be." As regards the "cruel dilemma" facing civil servants in Rhodesia, he thought that the Governor would have stated that it was the duty of public servants to carry on with their jobs, and that judges and police should help to maintain law and order, adding: "But they must be the judges of any possible action they might be asked to take which would be illegal in itself or illegal in helping what has happened."

Mr. Taverne (Lab.) asked whether provision would be made to pay compensation to public servants who found themselves unable to support the rebellion. **Mr. Wilson**, while discounting "a general blanket offer of compensation," admitted that the British Government had a responsibility to any public servant who suffered financially from the exercise of his discretion or conscience.

Mr. Biggs-Davison (C.) asked the Prime Minister whether "in spite of the personal feelings we all may have at present, it is ultimately along the lines of conciliation rather than coercion that a solution in the interests of all Her Majesty's subjects in Rhodesia, African more than European, must be found."

Mr. Wilson replied: "I agree. Our aim must be first to make this illegal act impossible, and then create among the great mass of the Rhodesian people the conditions in which we can have an orderly Government there. But if by conciliation the hon. member means appeasement of those who have committed this illegal, unnecessary, and irrational act, then it is not my definition of conciliation."

Replying to **Mr. Snow** (Lab.), **Mr. Wilson** stated that the Government had no reason to suppose that the South African or Portuguese Governments had encouraged the Rhodesian Government in its course or lent financial or other support to the action that had been taken.

The situation created by the Rhodesian declaration was described as follows in *The Times* of Nov. 12: "Every member of Mr. Wilson's Cabinet knows after yesterday's meeting that, in a situation unprecedented in Imperial or Commonwealth history, Britain now carries executive responsibility for Rhodesia without any power to govern the country. This realization explains the scope and the limitations of British action. As one authoritative voice put it, the British Government are now in the position of a Rhodesian Government in exile.

"Nothing decisive can therefore be done against the rebel regime. The Government's hope must be that Rhodesian opinion will change; and one assumption is that economic difficulties and galloping inflation will have an important effect on Rhodesian opinion. When that change occurs it is thought that at least some of the Rhodesian leaders, Mr. Smith perhaps among them, may want to escape from the consequences of their unilateral action.

"Mr. Heath is extremely anxious that the crisis should be handled in such a way that Britain is not split. Mr. Wilson and the Government are sensitive to this point. They know that many families in Britain will be worried about their relatives. For this reason, it is clear that care is being taken to ensure that British citizens will be able to get passports from a British Consular office in Salisbury.

"Not only British citizens who went to Rhodesia after the two wars but Rhodesians of British origin will be provided with British passports if they wish; and some Africans will also be able to apply."

International reactions to Rhodesia's unilateral declaration of independence, the further counter-measures taken by Britain, and developments in Rhodesia and neighbouring countries will be described in subsequent articles.—(Times - Daily Telegraph - Guardian - Rhodesian Information Department, Salisbury and London - U.N. Information Centre, London - Cape Times)(Prev. rep. Rhodesia, 21023 A.)