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Mutual Security Treaty with the United States, - Further Coastal Clashes with Communist Forces, - Loss of Nationalist Destroyer. - Seizure of Soviet and Polish Vessels.

The signing of a mutual security treaty between the United States and the Chinese Nationalist Government in Formosa was announced in Washington on Dec. 1, the following statement being issued:

“The treaty will follow the general pattern of other security pacts which the United States has Western Pacific. The treaty will recognize the common interest of the parties in the security of Taiwan (Formosa) and the Pescadores, and of the western Pacific islands under the jurisdiction of the United States. It will provide for inclusion by agreement of other territories under the jurisdiction of the parties. It is directed against threats to the security of the treaty area from armed attack, and provides for continuing consultation regarding any such threat or attack.

“This treaty will forge another link in the system of collective security established by the various collective defence treaties already concluded between the U.S.A and other countries in the Pacific area. Together these arrangements provide the essential framework for the defence by the free-peoples of the Western Pacific against Communist aggression. Like the other treaties, this treaty between the United States and the Republic of China will be defensive in character. It will reaffirm the dedication of the parties to the purposes and principles of the U.N. charter.”

Mr. Dulles, the U.S. Secretary of State, answered questions about the implications of the treaty at a press conference on the same day.

Asked if an attack on Formosa by the Chinese Communists would be followed by a state of war with the U.S.A., Mr. Dulles replied that “that would be the probable result.” As regards a possible Communist invasion of Quemoy and other offshore island, Mr. Dulles drew attention to President Eisenhower's statement (see 13785 A) that the position would have to be considered in the first instance by the U.S. military authorities, after which the president would make the final decision. Asked how the treaty changed the *status quo* in the Formosa area, Mr. Dulles replied that as far as treaty relationships were concerned, Formosa and the Pescadores would now be placed in the same category as South Korea, the Philippines, Australia, and New Zealand. Replying to another question, Mr. Dulles said that the U.S.A. would not automatically include in the treaty's protective area any part of mainland China which might be invaded and held by the Chinese Nationalists.

President Eisenhower sent a special message to the U.S. Senate on Jan. 6 asking it to give “early and favorable consideration” to the mutual defence treaty, which was designed to “deter any attempt by the Chinese Communist regime to bring its aggressive military ambitions to bear against the treaty area.

The following statement on the treaty was made to the British House of Commons on Dec. 8 by the Foreign Secretary, Sir Anthony Eden:

“H.M. Government have been kept generally informed in recent weeks of the U.S. Government's intentions in this matter. H.M. Government are satisfied that the treaty is in fact purely defensive and that its object is to place relations between the U.S. Government and the National Chinese on such a basis as will result in closer degree of consultation. No special representations have been made to the U.S. Government. Our views were

made clear in the course of our consultations with them about the situation in the Far East.” In reply to questions Sir Anthony made it clear that Britain was in no sense a party to the treaty.

A denunciation of the treaty coupled with a warning that the U.S. Government would be responsible for “all the grave consequences” if it did not withdraw its armed forces from Formosa and other Nationalist held islands, was issued on Dec. 8 by Mr. Chou En-lai, Prime Minister of the Chinese people's Republic.

After condemning the treaty as “a warlike provocation against the People's Republic of China,” Mr. Chou declared: “By this treaty the U.S. Government attempts to legalize its armed seizure of Taiwan (Formosa) and, with Taiwan as a base, to extend its aggression against China and prepare a new war. The liberation of Taiwan and the liquidation of the traitorous Chiang Kai-shek regime is a matter which falls entirely within the scope of China's sovereignty and no interference by any foreign country will be tolerated ... The Chiang Kai-shek regime has no authority whatsoever to conclude any treaty with any country. The ‘mutual security treaty’ between the U.S.A and Chiang Kai-shek has no legal basis whatever, and is null and void ...”

The soviet Government issued a statement on Dec. 15 condemning the treaty as “an interference in the internal affairs of China”; supporting “the demands of the Chinese people's Republic for the withdrawal of American troops from Formosa and the Pescadores”; and expressing its “understanding” of “the determination of the Chinese people to liberate Formosa and the Pescadores, which are an integral part of Chinese territory.”

The Nationalist-held Tachen Islands (off the Cheking coast, about 200 miles north of Formosa) were heavily raided by Communist aircraft from Nov. 1-4 1954, and on Jan 10, 1955. The attack on the latter date was carried out by over 60 bombers and fighter bombers (two of which were claimed by the Nationalists to have been shot down), causing considerable damage and a number of civilian casualties. During the last three months of 1954 the Nationalist Air Force carried out attacks from time to time on Communist batteries, supply dumps. etc., on the Chekiang and Fukien coasts, whilst intermittent artillery duels continued between Nationalist batteries on Quemoy Island and Communist batteries on the Chinese mainland. On Nov 14 the Chinese Nationalist destroyer escort *Tai ping* (1,400 tons) was sunk by four communist torpedo-boats near the Tachen Islands, about 40 of her crew of 200 being lost. The *Tai ping*, the largest Nationalist warship so far sunk by the Communists, was one of six destroyer-escorts handed over to China by the United States after the Second world war.

A strong protest at the seizure of a soviet tanker by the Chinese Nationalists was made by the Soviet Government on June 24, 1954 to the U.S. Government whilst similar protests were made by Poland in October and November regarding the seizure of two polish merchant ships by the nationalist authorities.

The Soviet Note said that the Soviet tanker *Tuapse*, with a cargo of paraffin oil, had been stopped on the high seas south of Formosa on June 23 by “a naval vessel of destroyer type” and had been compelled to change course under threat of armed action, the subsequent fate of the vessel and its crew being unknown. After declaring that it was “obvious that the seizure of a Soviet tanker in waters controlled by the U.S. Navy could only be carried out by naval forces of the United States,” the note demanded for immediate return of the *Tuapse* and her crew, the punishment of “the American officials involved,” and measures to prevent “a repetition of such notions, which flagrantly violate the freedom of shipping on the high seas.” The U.S. Government's reply, presented on June 26, rejected “as completely without foundation the allegation that U.S. naval forces seized or otherwise interfered with the Soviet tanker in question.”

The Chinese Nationalist Government announced on June 26 that the *Tuapse* had been stopped by a Nationalist warship while bound for the “Communist bandit” port of Shanghai, and had been brought into a Formosan harbour. The seizure of the vessel was justified on the ground that she was attempting to ship oil to Communist China in defiance of the Nationalist blockade.

The Nationalist Government further announced on Oct. 15 that it had confiscated the 8000-ton Polish tanker,

Praca and would probably confiscate the 5,000-ton Polish freighter *Prezydent Gottwald*. [The former vessel had been seized earlier in October, and the latter in May, while carrying cargo to or from Communist China.] It was stated in Washington on Oct. 17 that the U.S. State Department had requested the Department of Justice to allow 23 Polish scamen from the *Praca* and the *Prezydent Gottwald* to enter the U.S.A. as political refugees at their own request.

The Polish Government presented Notes to the U.S.A. on Oct. 12, Oct. 26, and Nov. 20 protesting at the "forcible detention" of the *Praca* and *Prezydent gottwald* by the Chinese Nationalist, and declaring that these vessels had been the victims of "piratical assault committed by units of the Chiang Kai-shek clique subordinated to the United States." After declaring that the crew of the *Prezydent Gottwald* had for the last six months "been imprisoned and denied the right to return to their homeland and families," the Note of Nov. 20 protested at "the recruitment, by the help of moral pressure and terror, of a group of Polish sailors and their transportation to the U.S.A. for the purpose of using them as obedient tools in anti-Polish propaganda." The Note demanded the return of both vessels, with their views and cargoes, and the punishment of those, responsible for their detention.

The U.S. Government, in its reply (Dec. 8), dissociated itself completely from the seizure of the two Polish ships, and from the decision of the 23 sailors to seek asylum in the United States. It suggested that the Polish Government should enter into direct diplomatic negotiations with the Chinese Nationalist Government on this matter, through diplomatic channels.

The Soviet Government, on Aug. 4, 1954, drew the U.S. Government's attention to the fact that American planes had on several occasions flown over Soviet ships in the Formosan area at a "provocatively" low level, and asked that such "impermissible" practices should cease. The U.S. reply, delivered on Nov. 20, said that the incidents mentioned apparently referred to "the identification by U.S. naval aircraft of commercial vessels operating on the high seas around the island of Formosa." It denied that such identification procedure was in any way illegal or a violation of international law, and said that it was made in order to detect the presence of ships which might be hostile to the U.S. Seventh Fleet.—(New York Times - New York Herald Tribune - Times)

(Prev. rep. Formosa, 13785 A.)

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