Greece, is rejected by Greek analysts as being without basis in international law or state practice. It is interesting, however, as a bold attempt to solve the problem of delimitation systematically, and as illustrating the difficulties thereby raised.

IV. RELATED QUESTIONS

Militarization of the Islands

The militarization of the East Aegean islands took place only after the Turkish landings in Cyprus in 1974. Both before this and afterwards there were statements by Turkish leaders that could have justified apprehension on the part of those responsible for Greek defence, and accusations that Greece was preparing the islands as the base for offensive action have been made frequently in the Turkish press. Greek offensive preparations were given as the reason for setting up the Turkish Fourth Army ('The Army of the Aegean') in 1975. Yet it is noteworthy that the militarization, which Turkey holds to be in breach of the treaties of Lausanne and Paris, has never appeared on the published agenda of bilateral talks, nor has it been brought before the International Court.

From the standpoint of international treaties, the islands can be divided into three groups: Lemnos and Samothrace came under the demilitarization clause of Article 4, Point 3, of the Treaty of Lausanne, which also ordered the demilitarization of the Turkish islands of Lagoussai, Imbros (Gökçeada) and Tenedos (Bozcaada). In 1936 the Treaty of Lausanne was replaced by the Treaty of Montreux, to which both Greece and Turkey are signatories. Although Turkey insists that the original demilitarization clauses remain legally applicable, Greek sources argue that they lapsed with the change of treaty and that the abolition was explicitly recognized. The Turkish Foreign Minister at that time is on record as saying: '. . . the provisions regarding the island of Lemnos and Samothrace, belonging to our neighbour, friendly Greece, islands which were demilitarized according to the Convention of Lausanne in 1923, are also abrogated by the Treaty of Montreux'.

Lesbos, Chios, Samos and Ikaria were also subjected to militarization restrictions under the Treaty of Lausanne, but with a modified formula. Article 13 of the Treaty provided that they 'should not be used for the establishment of any naval base and the construction of fortifications'. It also stipulated that the stationing of military forces there 'should be confined to persons locally recruited for their military service and to a force of gendarmerie proportionate to the total strength of the Greek security forces'. Since, during the preparation of the treaty in 1923, a Turkish proposal for complete demilitarization was rejected, it would seem that some form of local defence for this group has always been permitted.

The Dodecanese Islands were ordered to be disarmed by Article 14 of the Treaty of Paris (1947). But this provision does not apply to members of the internal security forces. Since 1974 advantage has been taken of this exclusion to increase the strength of the gendarmerie in the islands to a point at which it is barely distinguishable from a regular Army force. Greece argues that Turkey has no legal right to protest at Greek military measures in the Dodecanese since Turkey is not a party to the Treaty of Paris, and that, according to a principle of international law, a treaty creates rights and obligations only among signatories (pacta tertiis nec nocent pro-se). She also contends that the demilitarization of the Dodecanese cannot deprive her of her natural right to defend the islands if their security is threatened.

The military situation presents the commentator with something of a challenge if he is not to seem to underplay its importance. On the one hand the stationing of Greek forces in the islands, with the Turkish Fourth Army only a few miles away across the water, creates a wasteful and dangerous military confrontation, the implications of which are discussed in Chapter IV. On the other hand, the legal arguments advanced by both sides remain largely academic so long as they have not been submitted to the International Court of Justice, and very little would be achieved here by attempting to pass judgment on them.
In April 1978 the author asked the Turkish Prime Minister, Mr Ecevit, if the demilitarization of the islands and a corresponding redeployment of the Fourth Army could profitably be made the subject of a joint declaration of intent by both sides as a step to improve the atmosphere following his recent return to the premiership. Mr Ecevit answered that such a point would be unnecessary since (1) Greece was committed to disarm the islands by existing treaties, and (2) progress on other questions, i.e. the Cyprus and general Aegean questions, would lead to the solution of the problem as a matter of course.

Minorities

Allegations of discrimination against ethnic minorities have played a smaller part in the recent troubled period of Greek–Turkish relations than the larger questions of the Aegean and of Cyprus. But any general settlement will need to include the removal not merely of discrimination but also of any suspicion of discrimination, if the minorities question is not to be material for future discord.

The criterion of the minorities' identity is basically religious, and follows from the text of the Treaty of Lausanne and the minutes of the Lausanne Conference relating to the exchange of populations. It is therefore technically inaccurate to call them 'national' minorities, though they are generally referred to as such.

The Greek Orthodox minority remaining in Turkey is largely confined to Istanbul and now numbers only 10,000 compared with 110,000 in 1934 (the first year for which impartial figures exist). In contrast, the Muslim minority in Western Thrace numbers 130,000, compared with 106,000 in 1934.

It is felt in Greece that these figures speak for themselves. But Turkey could point out that the increase in the number of Muslims in Thrace is considerably less than would be expected from the minority's high birth-rate, and that large numbers of Muslims have, in fact, emigrated. Such emigration (illegally at 120 a month according to 1975 figures) is not necessarily or simply the result of discrimination, however.

Ethnic and religious affiliations may also have contributed to the exodus of Greeks from Turkey. But there have also been harsh political factors behind this exodus. The good relations which had existed between the communities in the Atatürk years were mared in 1942, when Turkey imposed a capital tax, aimed nominally at those who had made profits from war conditions – the farmers (mainly Muslims) and the merchants (mainly Orthodox Christians, Jews and Armenians). For a majority of those in the latter category, assessments were made arbitrarily by 'special commissions'. Payments were required in 15 days, no appeals were allowed, and thousands of defaulters were arrested and deported or sent to labour camps. Although this measure, which had been encouraged by xenophobic pro-Axis elements in the Turkish press, was rescinded and remissions made in 1943, the injury to many victims was irreparable.

A second historic factor behind the exodus was the Istanbul riots of 6–7 September 1955, organized by anti-Greek factions under the Menderes Government in the context of the tripartite talks on Cyprus in London. A third factor was the expulsion in 1965 of virtually all Greek nationals (as distinct from the 'minority') after Turkey denounced the Agreement of Establishment, Commerce and Navigation which had been signed in Ankara in 1930 as part of the Atatürk–Venizelos Pact. This was said to be justified by 'new circumstances' in the form of Greek popular support for union of Cyprus with Greece. In the same year strict financial and administrative control was imposed on Greek cultural foundations.

The difficulties of the Turkish minority in western Thrace arise principally from the land question. Though forming only about 35% of the population, the Turks, who live largely by agriculture, once held about 60% of the land in the area. The Greek authorities have reduced the latter figure to 20%, and this has inevitably produced social and economic problems.

Chief among the measures used to achieve this reduction has been the grant of long-term loans at very low interest rates to Greek families who come to settle in the area from other parts of Greece. The loans have been used to acquire Turkish land at what, it must be emphasized, are quite generous prices. Turkish land has also been requisitioned in some areas for defence purposes.