Dr. Graham's Fourth Report on Negotiations with India and Pakistan on Demilitarization Plans.-Continued Failure to reach Agreement.

Dr. Frank Graham, the U.N. Mediator in Kashmir, submitted his fourth report to the Security Council on Sept 24. He stated that his discussions with members of the Indian and Pakistani Governments in Geneva from Aug. 26 to Sept. 10 had failed to produce any agreement on the character and number of the forces to be left on each side of the cease-fire line after completion of the main programmer of demilitarization, and before the holding of a plebiscite.

Dr. Graham recalled that prior to the Geneva conference he had taken part in a series of discussions in New York from May 29-July 16 with Mr. Rajeshwar Dayal and Professor Ahmed Bokhari (members of the permanent Indian and Pakistani delegations at the U.N.), as a result of which he had submitted a revised version of his 12-point demilitarization plan as a basis for discussions at Ministerial level. The new proposals had laid down (1) that all Pakistani troops, tribesmen, and Pakistani nationals not normally resident in Kashmir should be withdrawn; (2) that the “Azad Kashmir” forces should be reduced to between 3,000 and 6,000 men, and should be placed under the command of neutral officers who would themselves be under the surveillance of the U.N. Mediator; (3) that Indian Army forces, including the Kashmir State forces, should be reduced to between 12,000 and 18,000 men.

At the Geneva conference, Dr. Graham continued, he had submitted a new draft of his proposals on Sept. 2 after joint meetings and separate conversations. In his new proposals he had suggested that 6,000 “Azad Kashmir” forces and 3,500 Gilgit and Northern Scouts should be left on the Pakistani side of the cease-fire line; that 18,000 Indian and State armed forces and 6,000 State militia should be left on the Indian side; and that a demilitarization programmer should be drawn up at a conference of civil and military representatives of the two Governments under U.N. auspices. On the following day, however, both sides had put forward objections to the figures proposed in both drafts of the 12-point plan.

Mr. Gopalaswami Ayyangar, the Indian representative, had maintained that the Indian Government required a minimum force of 28,000 men to fulfil their obligations towards the external and internal security of Kashmir; he had offered, on the complete disbandment and disarmament of the “Azad Kashmir” forces, and as “a farther gesture towards a settlement,” to concede a further reduction of Indian forces by 7,000, but had insisted that it was impossible to reduce this “absolute minimum” figure of 21,000. The Indian Government, he had added, were not prepared to include the State militia in these calculations, as the militia was a special armed police force responsible to the Kashmir Government for the maintenance of law and order, and only temporarily under the Indian Army's operational, control. Furthermore, Mr. Ayyangar had suggested that the local authorities to be set up in the “Azad Kashmir” area on the withdrawal of all Pakistani forces should be charged only with the maintenance of law and order, and that a
civil armed force of 4,000 men for this purpose would be “on the liberal side,” although he had been prepared to concede an appropriate increase for the needs of the Northern areas, or if the U.N. Mediator should show that the strength of the force was inadequate.

On behalf of the Pakistani Government, Sir Muhammad Zafrullxa Khan had expressed the view that, in order that neither side should be able to intimidate the population or influence their votes in the plebiscite, only the minimum forces required for the maintenance of law and order should remain, and that their character must be the same on both sides of the cease-fire line. He considered that Dr. Graham's proposals left too many soldiers in the State, in view of the fact that, before partition, the Maharaja's Government had managed, with only 8,000 troops. He also thought that the ratio proposed was unfair to Pakistan, considering the ratio on the date of the cease-fire (which had been 5:4 according to the Pakistani Government's figures, and 7:6 according to General Covers, the Military Adviser to the U.N. Representative). Subject to these observations, the Pakistani delegation was prepared to accept Dr. Graham's proposals.

Faced with these objections, the report continued, Dr. Graham had sought to obtain agreement on, certain principles based on the requirements of each side of the cease-fire line, which could serve as criteria for fixing the quantum of forces at the proposed conference on demilitarization. He had accordingly submitted on Sept. 4 a new draft proposal under which (1) all Pakistani troops, tribesmen, and Pakistani nationals not normally resident in Kashmir, and the bulk of the Indian forces, should be withdrawn; (2) the “Azad Kashmir” forces should be reduced to the minimum number “required for the maintenance of law and order and of the cease-fire agreement, with due regard to the freedom of the plebiscite”; (3) the Indian and State forces should be reduced to the minimum number “required for the maintenance of law and order and of the cease-fire agreement, with due regard to the security of the State and the freedom of the plebiscite.”

The Indian Government had approved this proposal as “conceived in the right spirit” and containing “the germs of a settlement,” but had emphasized that they could neither accept any equation of their own responsibilities with those of the local authorities on the Pakistani side of the cease-fire line, nor agree that the maintenance of public order in that area by the local authorities should, have anything more than a local character, on the grounds that “constitutionally the defence of the entire State of Jammu and Kashmir is the concern of the Government of India, and they alone are entitled to maintain a military armed force for the purpose.”

The Pakistani Government had suggested that the words “with due regard to the freedom of the plebiscite” and the phrase “with due regard to the security of the State and the freedom of the plebiscite” should be deleted from the proposals, in order to avoid “the recurrence in the Military Sub-Committee of the political controversies which had hold up progress in the main conference itself.” Subject to these observations, and some drafting changes, the Pakistani delegation had been prepared to accept the proposals.

During the New York discussions, the report added, talks had also been held by General Devers with the military advisers of the Indian and Pakistani Representatives. In these discussions the number of combatant forces at the time of the cease-fire (Jan. 1, 1949) had been given as
follows: on the Indian side, according to India, 130,000 troops; on the Pakistani side, according to Pakistan, 81,000 troops. No agreement, however, had been reached on these respective estimates.

In conclusion, Dr. Graham observed that the present positions of the Indian and Pakistani Governments, including their differences over the character and number of the forces to be left on each side of the cease-fire line, were derived from their differing conceptions of their status in Kashmir. For reaching an agreement on a plan of demilitarization, he suggested, it was necessary either (a) to establish the character and number of the forces to be left on each side of the cease-fire line at the end of the period of demilitarization, or (b) to declare that these forces should be determined in accordance with the requirements of each area, and accordingly to establish principles or criteria which would serve as guidance for the representatives of the two Governments at the proposed conference.—(Indian and Pakistani High Commissioners' Offices, London-United Nations Bulletin, New York) (Prev. rep. Kashmir, 12451 B.)