Rhodesian Raids on Targets in Mozambique, Zambia, Botswana and Angola

Following the Rhodesian raids into neighbouring countries described on pages 29441-42, further such raids were carried out by Rhodesian forces between December 1978 and March 1979. On Dec. 11 the Mozambican Ministry of Defence announced that on the previous day Rhodesian aircraft had bombed military barracks near the port of Beira killing 26 persons and wounding 73 others; that two Rhodesian fighter-bombers had been shot down; that napalm had been used in Rhodesian raids on Tete Province; and that other targets inside Mozambique had been bombed between Nov. 29 and Dec. 8.

From Lusaka (Zambia) it was reported that Rhodesian troops had on Dec. 21–22 raided a Zambian Army training school near Kabwe, where about 50 people had been killed. In Rhodesia it was stated that in a raid on a "terrorist" base in Zambia on Dec. 22 Rhodesian troops had "rescued" 31 Black Rhodesian soldiers and civilians captured by the "terrorists".

On Jan. 8 the Government of Botswana stated that a force of 100 Rhodesian soldiers had attacked a Botswana Defence Force camp but had withdrawn after a brief battle, in which no casualties were caused on the Botswana side.

On Feb. 17 Rhodesian aircraft raided ZIPRA camps near Livingstone in Zambia; according to Zambian sources no persons were killed and only two were injured in this raid.

On Feb. 19 Rhodesian aircraft bombed and strafed a storage complex in the Chimoio area in Mozambique.

On Feb. 23 Rhodesian aircraft attacked two ZIPRA camps near Lusaka, one of which Zambians described as a refugee transit camp at Nampundwe and the other as a ZAPU military camp, whereafter Mr Nkomo said that 18 persons had been killed and 122 wounded.

On Feb. 26 Rhodesian aircraft for the first time attacked what in Rhodesia was called "a very large ZIPRA terrorist training camp" at Vila de Boma, south of Luso in Angola (more than 600 miles from Rhodesia's border). According to Rhodesian sources this base had housed at least 3,000 guerrillas trained by Cubans and East Germans. The Angolan Government announced on Feb. 28 that almost 200 persons, including 14 civilians, had been killed and nearly 1,000 injured. (Allegations made by the Angolan Government about the use of South African Mirage aircraft were denied in Pretoria, where it was pointed out that Mirage fighters could not have covered the distance involved.)

On Feb. 28 it was reported that nationalist guerrillas had mistaken two Zambian Air Force fighters for Rhodesian aircraft and had shot them down.
On March 1 "specific buildings" said to house ZANLA forces at a Mozambican army camp at Mutarare (in Tete Province, about 130 miles from the Rhodesian border) were attacked by Rhodesian aircraft.

On March 3 Zambian sources said that five women had been killed and two injured by Rhodesian forces in south-eastern Zambia.

On March 12 Rhodesian aircraft attacked, according to a Rhodesian announcement, an arms depot at Chokwe (or Chocue, formerly Vila Trigo Moraes) and a ZANLA headquarters and barracks at Barragem (in Gaza Province, Mozambique); the Mozambique authorities stated on the next day that 16 people had been killed and seven wounded in these raids.

On March 16 the military high command in Salisbury announced that an air strike had been carried out against a ZANLA arms, ammunition and explosives dump at Dondo (25 miles from Beira and 160 miles from the Rhodesian border).

On March 17 further Rhodesian air strikes were carried out on guerrilla bases in the Chimoio area (about 70 miles inside Mozambique).

President Machel of Mozambique stated on Jan. 6 that the mounting bombing attacks by Rhodesian aircraft were seriously disrupting his country's transportation and distribution system. In a statement issued on the same day the Government of Mozambique listed targets hit in four of the country's 10 provinces since early December 1978, from which it appeared inter alia that coal exports from the country's biggest mine at Moatize had been cut off and life had become dangerous for foreign experts working in central and north-western areas of Mozambique. (On Feb. 1 it was reported that some of the attacks referred to had been made by "enemy agents" belonging to a Rhodesian-backed "Free Africa" group intent upon overthrowing the Machel Government.)

Between January and March 1979 Mr Ian Smith—who was still officially the Prime Minister although he was also one of the four members of the Executive Council set up under the internal agreement—made a number of statements reflecting his anxiety at the worsening situation in Rhodesia.

On Jan. 22 he disclosed that the Government of South Africa had made "a very generous agreement" with the Rhodesian Government to ensure the care of war wounded and other victims, in the event of a collapse of law and order, by the conversion of three disused farms near Louis Trichardt (northern Transvaal) into camps for refugees from Rhodesia.

In a television programme transmitted by the British Broadcasting Corporation on Feb. 3, Mr Smith indicated that he might retire from politics if in return the Government set up under the internal agreement obtained international recognition, but that such a proposal had not been put to him.

On Feb. 22 he announced in Salisbury that he would not retire from politics until the new Government to be set up after the elections had gained international recognition, and that he
himself would contest a seat in the elections. He added that, although the transitional Government would try to get more than 50 per cent of the country's 2,800,000 voters to the poll, the worsening war situation might make it impossible to get more than 20 per cent to take part in the elections.

(The Rev. Ndabaningi Sithole, one of the four co-members of the Executive Council, said on the same day that the sooner Mr Smith left the better it would be for the country, as "the very physical presence of Mr Smith in the new Government reduces the possibility of getting recognition and settling the problem").

After Mr Smith had repeated his resignation offer and also his decision to stand as a candidate in the April elections, Dr Owen said in a speech on March 9 that Mr Smith's decision to fight the elections was "a shattering blow to those who believed that by compromising with him… they would nevertheless be finally freed from any association with him or his regime in April and could negotiate directly with his fellow Zimbabweans".

It was announced on March 5 that Lt.-Col. Henry B. Everard had been sworn in as acting President of the Republic vice Mr Jack Pithey, who had succeeded Lt.-Col. Everard in that post in November 1978 [see page 29442].

Dr Elliott Gabellah resigned on March 5 as vice-president of Mr Sithole's African National Council (also referred to as ZANU-Sithole), stating that he no longer approved of that organization's policy; on the following day he also resigned, at the transitional Government's request, from his post as joint Minister of Foreign Affairs, Immigration, Information and Tourism; and on March 9 Mr Kesiwe Malindi was sworn in as his successor in the Ministerial Council.

Earlier, on March 3, two ZANU-Sithole members had lost their appeal against death sentences imposed upon them for murdering five Africans in October 1978 [see page 29442] and Mr Hector Macdonald, the Chief Justice, dismissing their appeal, had disclosed that the two ZANU men had been supplied with arms and a car by the then joint Minister of Defence, Mr John Kadzviti, of whom it was revealed that he had been dismissed during the trial and that he had since then left the country (reportedly for Malawi).

Lt.-Gen. Andrew L. C. ("Sandy") McLean (46) was on March 8 appointed Commander of the Army to replace Lt.Gen. John Hickman, who had been dismissed on March 6 after he had had a disagreement with Col. Ronald Reid-Daly, the commander of the (anti-insurgency) Selous Scouts.

It was disclosed in Salisbury on Feb. 8 that two Black tribesmen condemned to death by military courts had been hanged in Salisbury prison on Dec. 19, 1978, and that two others convicted by civil courts of recruiting or helping Black nationalist guerrillas had also been hanged during the previous three weeks, despite an unofficial promise made by the transitional Government not to execute prisoners convicted of "war crimes [see page 29174]. Nine other men condemned to death by military courts were said to be in detention at Chikurubi prison, 12 miles from Salisbury.
Eight acts on the removal of racial discrimination in Rhodesia were gazetted on Feb. 2, 1979, thus rendering illegal any such discrimination in the ownership of commercial farming land and in schools, hospitals, residential areas and public places.

The relevant bills, introduced in the House of Assembly on Dec. 9, 1978, and finally passed by it on Jan. 9–16, 1979, included the Land Tenure Repeal Bill, which repealed the Land Tenure Act of 1969 [see 23810], and a Tribal Trust Lands Bill under which the tribal trust lands would remain in existence after the repeal of the Land Tenure Act, but with the proviso that the powers hitherto held by the Minister of the Interior would be transferred to a Tribal Trust Lands Board chaired by a former High Court judge, magistrate, advocate or attorney and with its membership including two chiefs nominated by the Council of Chiefs. The Land Tenure Repeal Bill nullified existing restrictive title conditions limiting land ownership or occupation on the grounds of race, tribe or colour.

Under a Medical Services Bill no person was to be refused training at any government hospital on race grounds.

In connexion with the removal of racial discrimination in education Mr Rowan Cronje’, joint Minister of Education, said on Jan. 19 that free and compulsory education for all Rhodesian children would "not be possible for 20 years or more". In effect there was no legal obligation for children of any race to attend school, and White parents were officially warned on Feb. 2 that less gifted children could not in future be placed in schools "at the expense of hundreds of gifted Black children clamouring for school places". However, the admission of Black children to previously segregated schools for Whites—which began on Feb. 5—was subject to stringent conditions, with the parents of such children having to occupy homes which they owned or leased in strictly-zoned areas, and with the children having to be proficient in English and within a two-year age range with their classmates, while school fees for formerly White schools were raised by about 100 per cent to $ Rh 108 (about £100) a year.

A 147-onstitution, published in Salisbury on Jan. 2, 1979, and approved at its third reading in the House of Assembly on Jan. 20, contained both provisions agreed upon in the internal settlement agreement of March 3, 1978 [see page 28945] and provisions later decided upon by the interim Government. [see also pages29174 and 29444]

The new Constitution accordingly provided for a 100-member House of Assembly in which 28 seats would be reserved for Whites for up to 10 years and for a 30-member Senate in which 10 seats would be held by Whites and 20 by Blacks, of whom 10 would be tribal chiefs. For the first election the 72 Black seats in the House of Assembly would be allotted in relation to the votes cast for the contesting parties, but subsequent elections would be held on a constituency basis. Of the 28 White seats 20 would be filled by direct vote of Whites and the remaining eight by election by the 92 directly-elected members of the House of Assembly from a list of 16 candidates nominated (for the first election) by the 50 White members of the existing Parliament, and in subsequent elections from among 16 candidates nominated by the 28 White members of the House. The minimum voting age was lowered to 18 years, and the normal life of Parliament was to be five years.
The new Constitution also provided for an independent judiciary, an ombudsman charged with protecting the rights of citizens, and certain entrenched safeguards including a bill of rights (providing for freedom of speech and assembly, for protection from discrimination and for any seizure of personal property to be by court order only and with compensation being payable). Further provisions included non-political security forces, security of civil service posts and pensions, permission to hold dual citizenship and the retention for at least a number of years of White leadership in the military, police, judiciary and civil services (by stringent qualifications for those holding leading offices or sitting on commissions which controlled appointments). Entrenched sections of the Constitution could be changed only with the affirmative vote of 72 members of the House of Assembly, and amendments to non-entrenched provisions would require the affirmative vote of two-thirds of the 100 House of Assembly members. Any amending bill would also need the assent of at least 20 Senate members, but if this was not obtained the amending bill could be submitted again six months later without requiring Senate approval.

In addition the Constitution provided that the first Black majority Government would be a "national unity" administration in which Whites would hold at least a quarter of the seats and the first Black Prime Minister would appoint ministers to the Cabinet in proportion to the number of seats won by each party in the majority rule legislature, which was to be elected on April 20, 1979.

Under the new Constitution the name of the country was to be Zimbabwe/Rhodesia (although this provision was strongly criticized by a spokesman for two of the three Black members of the transitional Executive Council-Bishop Abel Muzorewa and the Rev. Ndabaningi Sithole).

As decided by the Executive Council on Nov. 16, 1978 [see page 29443], the new Constitution was submitted to the White electorate in a referendum held on Jan. 30, 1979.

Mr Smith strongly campaigned for a "yes" vote, saying on the eve of the referendum: "If we reject this it will destroy our credibility with our friends in the free world who have put so much effort into trying to help us, and it will be a devastating blow to those Blacks who worked with us to produce the Constitution. It will set us back so irretrievably that any subsequent agreement can only be infinitely worse." If Rhodesia implemented its internal agreement for majority rule, he claimed, that would make it "obligatory" for the US President to lift sanctions (which would be "tantamount to recognition") [For US attitude see page 29439]; the Conservative Party in Britain had "likewise committed themselves to supporting us in what we are doing"; and "even the Labour Government" had "stated that they believe [that] the House of Commons will be under an obligation to recognize this Constitution" [see also page 29178].

Of the three Black members of Rhodesia's Executive Council Bishop Muzorewa and the Rev. Ndabaningi Sithole both pleaded that the White voters should vote "yes".

Bishop Muzorewa told Whites on Jan. 13 that by voting "yes" they would retain some powers but that a rejection of the Constitution would result in the eventual loss of all power by Whites. At the same time he asked his own followers not to be worried about the concessions granted to Whites under the new Constitution, adding: "When we have political power in our hands..."
everything, even the things that are bothering you in the Constitution now, will be added on to us."

The Bishop also released a manifesto of the United African National Council (UANC) on its policies, expressing its belief in the free-enterprise system and the maintenance of the existing economic infrastructure, calling for peace in Rhodesia, and appealing to neighbouring Black states to accept the sovereignty of the Government which would emerge after the proposed general elections in April 1979.

The result of the referendum, as officially announced on Jan. 31, was that in a 71.5 per cent poll a total of 67,838 votes were cast, of which 57,269 or 84.4 per cent were "yes" votes; there were 9,805 "no" votes and 764 spoilt papers.

The British Government, however, rejected the referendum exercise in a Foreign and Commonwealth Office statement on Jan. 31.

The statement said that the referendum was "no measure of the acceptability of the regime's constitutional proposals to the people of Rhodesia as a whole"; that the "external parties" were banned and the press and radio censored; that Mr Callaghan had said on Jan. 17 that elections held in such circumstances were "not likely to bring about a peaceful solution"; and that "in the British and US view the best prospects for ending the bloodshed and of achieving a return to legality and a peaceful settlement in Rhodesia" lay "in an attempt to find wider agreement involving both sides in the present conflict and incorporating such essential features of the Anglo-American proposals as a ceasefire and a neutral administration for the conduct of free and fair elections under UN supervision".

In connexion with the elections scheduled for April 20, 1979, the Executive Council on Feb. 7 sent formal messages to the British and US Governments inviting them to monitor these elections.

Mr William Edmondson, the US ambassador in South Africa, however, refused to accept the message transmitted to him by Rhodesia's diplomatic representative for onward transmission to the US Secretary of State, and he stated on Feb. 8 that it was "normal practice to return official communications from regimes with which we do not have official relations".

The UN Security Council adopted, on March 8, by 12 votes to none with three abstentions (France, the United Kingdom and the United States) a resolution, introduced by non-aligned countries, declaring the proposed Rhodesian elections null and void, calling on all states not to send any observers to these elections and to discourage organizations within their countries from doing so, and requesting the special sanctions committee of the Security Council to consider new measures for strengthening and extending sanctions against Rhodesia. (This resolution had replaced an earlier and more intransigent African-sponsored draft.)

In the British House of Commons Mr Callaghan rejected, on March 15, a Conservative call for sending an all-party parliamentary delegation to Rhodesia during the forthcoming elections, saying that such a move would be "totally misunderstood" by the rest of Africa. He added,
however, that the Government would "facilitate" a visit by members of Parliament who wished to observe the poll, and he pointed out that the US Congress was not sending a congressional delegation but only observers from outside Congress.

In a statement issued simultaneously in London and Washington on March 17 Dr Owen and Mr Vance declared that, as the conflict in Rhodesia continued to grow, it would lead to polarization and a weakened economic potential of the Zimbabwe which would some day gain independence, and that there was also "a growing opportunity for Soviet and Cuban involvement and influence"; there were, however, elements on which progress towards peace might still be built—the facts that the Salisbury parties had accepted the principles of multiracial government and elections and that the external forces had accepted the principles of elections, non-racial government and UN peacekeeping. The statement continued: "We therefore believe that both sides should take a first and significant step: to accept the principle of UN-supervised elections in Rhodesia... as the only way to avoid protracted and damaging war." Negotiations to that end, the statement said, should preferably begin before the April 20 elections, or at least the principle of UN-supervised elections should be accepted by all the parties before that date.

The statement was, however, rejected by all but one of the four members of Rhodesia's Executive Council.

Mr Sithole said on March 18 that any all-party talks before the April elections would be "disastrous" and that Mr Owen was merely trying to delay the election; while he agreed with the concept of all-party talks he considered the timing to be wrong. Bishop Muzorewa similarly accused Dr Owen of "gimmickry". Chief Jeremiah Chirau, however, welcomed the suggestion and said that he favoured an immediate all-party conference. (His party, the Zimbabwe United People's Organization–ZUPO–had on March 14 called for the release of all political detainees, the abolition of the "auxiliary forces" recruited by Mr Sithole and Bishop Muzorewa, the prevention of intimidation and the lifting of the ban on the internal wings of Mr Mugabe's ZANU and of ZAPU.)

In a radio and television appeal on March 17 Lt.-Gen. Walls announced that any "terrorist" willing to leave the Patriotic Front would be unconditionally accepted by the Government, would be allowed to keep his weapons, would be transferred to the transitional Government's auxiliary forces and could choose his own area of operation. Some 1,500,000 leaflets carrying this appeal in three languages were subsequently scattered over the countryside by air force aircraft.-(Daily Telegraph - Financial Times - Guardian - International Herald Tribune - Cape Times - BBC Summary of World Broadcasts -Hansard - US International Communication Agency)(Prev. rep. 29437 A)