Studies in International Politics

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The Syrian Involvement in Lebanon Since 1975

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plan was developed which led to the Peace for Galilee operation. The process of preparation for the war gained momentum after Ariel Sharon became defense minister in August 1981: according to him, he began to concern himself with this as soon as he entered office.[28]

The underlying concept of Oranim ("Pines"), the operational plan developed by the IDF, was the destruction of the Palestinian infrastructure in Lebanon, both in the south and in Beirut, leading to the setting up of an independent "legitimate government" under the presidency of Bashir Jemayel, which would maintain peaceful relations with Israel.[29] In the process of working out this plan, there was repeated discussion of the place of Syria in the Israeli concept of the war. There were some in the general staff who thought that first a decisive blow should be struck at the Syrian army as a precondition for achieving the other objectives.[30] The idea that was accepted by Chief of Staff Eitan and Defense Minister Sharon, however, was that one should concentrate one's energies on destroying the Palestinian military infrastructure and postpone the unavoidable clash with Syria for as long as possible. "We did not promise that the Syrians would stay out of the fighting," wrote Eitan in his book.[31] "We could not say that to the government. The assumption was that they would probably intervene." The concept which developed was that any confrontation with Syria was to be postponed for as long as possible and restricted to the minimum: "To the degree," wrote Eitan, "that the confrontation with Syria could be postponed or completely avoided, the more political time we would have and the more objectives we would be able to achieve."[32] It would seem that underlying this concept, which guided the IDF's actions in the Peace for Galilee operation, was the assumption that the destruction of the Palestinian infrastructure would enjoy a wide political consensus in Israel and the approval of public opinion, as well as American support, whereas a general military confrontation with Syria would lead to the imposition of a cease-fire by the superpowers before Israel's other objectives in the war had been achieved and would be a cause of controversy in Israel.

The Israeli Government's Decision: June 5, 1982

On June 5, 1982, the Israeli government met and decided to launch the Peace for Galilee operation. The declared objectives of the operation were more modest and less explicit than those of Oranim, even if a careful comparison of the two reveals that the difference was not really significant—at least according to some interpretations.[33] The Peace for Galilee operation was intended "to take every settlement in Galilee out of the firing range of the terrorists, their command and their bases

concentrated in Lebanon." "In implementing this decision," it was said, "the Syrian army is not to be attacked unless it attacks our forces"; "the State of Israel continues to aspire to the signing of a peace treaty with an independent Lebanon which would preserve its territorial integrity."[34]

There are conflicting ideas about the nature and objectives of the operational plans presented to the Israeli government by the chief of staff and approved by the government. According to one interpretation, what the chief of staff presented to the government was the Oranim plan. That is what Eitan himself maintained: "On the evening of Saturday, June 5, 1982, in the home of the prime minister in Jerusalem, the 'big plan' was presented to the government. The government approved it. This plan specifically included one feature which later became a point of contention and argument: the capture of a section of the Beirut-Damascus highway. On the map which was presented to the ministers, the arrows clearly indicated the intention: they reached the Beirut-Damascus highway."[35] "In the government's decision and in the directives of the general staff to the commanders, there was never any definition in kilometers of the extent of the action—neither thirty nor forty-five, no less and no more."[36]

According to another version, however, the Israeli government did not approve the full Oranim plan on June 5, but a more limited plan for the conquest of southern Lebanon alone. Yehoshua Saguy, head of military intelligence at the time of the operation, commented in a newspaper interview on the above statements of Eitan: "Nothing was said to the government about a plan in stages and nothing was said about linking up with the Christians, but *only the conquest of southern Lebanon* was spoken about, without entering into a war with the Syrians.... How can it be that a plan was discussed whose main point was to link up with the Syrians [this must mean the Christians] if the operation was specifically limited to forty-eight hours?" asked Saguy angrily; "and how could this be, when Menahem Begin, when discussing the number of casualties the IDF could expect, asked that the number of casualties should not exceed that of the Litani operation?" Saguy acknowledged: "I knew of the larger plan which aimed at reaching the Beirut-Damascus highway and at linking up with the Christians, but at the government meeting, I understood that this was not the intention, and I thought there was a government in Israel and that it made the decisions."[37]

I shall not attempt to decide between the various interpretations, and I shall not analyze the various significances of the government decision of June 5, but shall restrict myself to its Syrian aspect. On the face of it, the declaration stressed that the Israeli government had no wish to enter into a confrontation with the Syrian army, and there was a clear separation between the matter of "dealing" with the Syrian army and the other

aims of the war. But the formulation of the aims of the Peace for Galilee operation arouses surprise whenever it touches on the Syrian army: how was one supposed to strike at the Palestinian bases and at their headquarters "in Lebanon"—and thus also their headquarters in Beirut—without clashes between the IDF and the Syrian army? How was one to realize the aspiration of an independent Lebanon and the signing of a peace treaty between Israel and Lebanon as long as the Syrian army was there and as long as Syria was the dominant influence in Lebanese politics? What was the point of saying that the Syrian army was not to be attacked unless it attacked Israeli forces, if from the beginning the "arrows" pointed to the Beirut-Damascus highway and, moreover, an action was required in the areas of deployment of the Syrian army where part of the Palestinian infrastructure was to be found? It would appear that the decisionmakers in Israel, and certainly the defense minister and chief of staff, were perfectly aware that a military confrontation with Syria was unavoidable, but, conceptually speaking, the Syrian army in Lebanon continued to be a secondary and not a principal concern, and a confrontation with it was regarded as an inescapable necessity for the achievement of the objectives of the war and not an objective in itself: "There was never any question of whether the Syrians would be involved in the campaign," said Sharon in a newspaper interview of June 18, 1984, "but of how to ensure that their involvement would remain a military action within Lebanon, or, in other words, a limited action, and not turn into a general war with Syria, in which we were not interested and in which we are still not interested."[38]

The Syrians, after the event, claimed that the formulation of the government decision of June 5 was intended to provide the IDF with legitimation for an attack on the Syrian army, for if the Syrian army in Lebanon reacted and returned fire on the Israeli sources of fire, "then it was permissible for Israel to attack those forces wherever they were—them and all their concentrations on the soil of Lebanon. In such a case, Israel would be regarded as 'defending itself' against Syrian aggression."[39]

Notes

1. See Ch. 4.
2. *Israeli Invasion of Lebanon*, p. 175.
3. Ibid., p. 174.
4. Mustafa Tlass's book considers in detail every single encounter, its development and its consequences. General David Ivri, former Israeli deputy chief of staff and commander of the air force, believes that Tlass had free access to the

Syrian record of aerial operations, and that most of the details are taken directly from there. See David Ivri, "The Peace for Galilee Operation in Syria's Perspective" (Hebrew), *Ma'arachot* 299 (July-August 1985), pp. 35-40.
5. See the statement of Prime Minister Begin in the Knesset, June 4, 1981; see also the interview with the former chief of military intelligence, Yehoshua Saguy, *Ma'ariv*, September 13, 1985.
6. The statement of the Israeli prime minister in the Knesset, *Ma'ariv*, June 6, 1981.
7. Radio Beirut, April 24, 1981, citing the newspaper *Tishrin* (according to Itim 841/021, April 26, 1981).
8. Schiff and Yaari, p. 23.
9. *Israeli Invasion of Lebanon*, p. 65.
10. According to the Syrians the French Room was captured on April 11, but according to the Christians this occurred only on the April 25. Whatever the case, the shooting down of the Syrian helicopters did not change the course of the battle for Mount Sannine and Zahle as a whole.
11. Interview of Menahem Begin on radio and television, *Ma'ariv*, April 29, 1981.
12. *Ma'ariv*, May 3, 1981.
13. Radio Damascus, April 28, 1981 (Itim 841/024, April 29, 1981).
14. Ibid.
15. Radio Damascus, May 5, 1981 (Itim 845/005, May 6, 1981).
16. See in this connection Rabinovich, *War for Lebanon*, pp. 104-108.
17. Eitan, p. 189.
18. See Yishai Cordova, "From the Missile Crisis to War" (Hebrew), *Ma'arachot* 285 (December 1988), p. 26.
19. Rabinovich, *War for Lebanon*, p. 108.
20. See Eitan, p. 106, and Schiff and Yaari, p. 26.
21. Ibid.
22. The Syrian media repeatedly and boastfully declared that the missiles would not be removed from the Bekaa. "Begin may be assured," wrote the commentator of the newspaper *Al-Baath*, "that despite all his hostile declarations, the Syrian missiles will remain on the soil of Lebanon as long as Israel exists, and in the future we shall spare no effort to strengthen them" (Syrian news agency, July 7, 1981, according to Itim 841/007, July 8, 1981).
23. Radio Damascus, July 4, 1981 (according to Itim 841/004, July 5, 1981).
24. In an interview with a French journalist, Abu Iyyad said: "If Syria or Jordan declared war on Israel and accepted the consequences, the situation would be different. We are working in that direction." He claimed that the Palestinians in southern Lebanon were capable of waging a war against Israel which could lead to such a development (*Le Matin*, March 2, 1982, according to Zvi Lanier, "The PLO's Conception of the 'Armed Struggle' in the Face of the Peace for Galilee Operation," Hebrew, *Ma'arachot* 284, September 1982).
25. Pakradouni, p. 241.
26. Alexander Haig, *Caveat: Realism, Reagan, and Foreign Policy* (New York: Macmillan, 1984), p. 331.
27. Ibid.

political and military action, and cause squabbles and divisions among them. Even after expelling Arafat and his followers at the end of 1983, the Syrian regime did not succeed in preventing him from continuing on his separate way, together with Jordan and Egypt, and similarly it was not able to raise up a significant pro-Syrian alternative leader who would be acceptable to broad circles of Palestinians, to the Arab world, as well as to the international community. Moreover, in the course of 1985 members of Arafat's Fatah organization began to return to Lebanon and rebuild their destroyed infrastructure, and the Syrians found it increasingly difficult to stop this process.

Syria's Struggle against the Israeli-Lebanese Agreement

The election of Amin Jemayel as president of Lebanon did not bring any immediate alleviation of Syria's difficulties in that country, for, despite his essential reluctance to become involved with Israel, in his first year of office he chose to pursue an American orientation, and on December 28, 1982 he began discussions with Israel under the sponsorship of the United States, which were held alternatively in Khaldeh, Kiryat Shemona, and later Netanya (the latter two are in Israel). After about five months of negotiations, on May 17 an agreement was signed between Israel and Lebanon, a compromise that reflected both Israel's desire for peace and security and a Lebanese reluctance owing to heavy pressures both from home and abroad. The main points of the agreement were:[36]

1. *Security arrangements.* Each side agreed to refrain from terrorist actions and from maintaining a terrorist infrastructure on its territory. In southern Lebanon a security area was demarcated in which the Lebanese army and police would operate, and in which the Lebanese army would maintain two brigades: a "territorial brigade" close to the Israeli border, and another, regular brigade to the north of that area (the structure of these brigades and the weapons they would use were specified in an appendix to the agreement). The forces of Major Haddad and the "civil guards" which Israel had established in southern Lebanon were to be incorporated into the Lebanese army; the future status of Major Haddad himself was left undecided.

2. *Peace and normalization.* The agreement specified a "termination of hostilities" between Israel and Lebanon, but did not speak of a situation of peace. Nothing was said about normalization, but it was agreed to establish a joint liaison committee which, after the withdrawal of the IDF, would control the movement of goods, products, and people between the two countries. There was no agreement about the setting up of

embassies and the exchange of ambassadors, but only about "liaison offices" which were to be optional for each side (Israel set up a liaison office in Lebanon, whereas the Lebanese refrained from setting up a similar office in Israel).

3. *Israeli withdrawal.* It was agreed that all the Israeli forces would withdraw from Lebanon within eight to twelve weeks of the time the agreement came into force, within the general context of the Lebanese intention that all "foreign forces" should withdraw from Lebanon.

The agreement was very far from what Israel wanted, and, at first glance, it had a number of advantages from the Syrian point of view: a specific timetable for an Israeli withdrawal from Lebanon, a proposal for the disbandment of Haddad's forces, very few signs of normalization, and an avoidance of the term "peace treaty." Instead the phrase "termination of hostilities" was used—a formula which the Syrians themselves had not rejected out of hand at the time of their diplomatic negotiations with the United States in the summer of 1975. Despite all this, however, the Syrians violently rejected the agreement, because it had come into being as a result of the Peace for Galilee operation and because it had been arrived at without their participation and could have harmed their influence in Lebanon and increased U.S. and Israeli influence there. Moreover, from the Syrian point of view the agreement constituted a dangerous breach in the wall of isolation with which Syria had tried to surround the Israeli-Egyptian peace, and a hard blow to Syria and its struggle against Egypt and the peace treaty. Assad and Foreign Minister Khaddam constantly said even before the signing of the document that Lebanon had no right to agree to a termination of hostilities "as the problem of the dispute is comprehensive," and they expressed vigorous opposition to the setting up of a liaison office, to the free passage of people and goods, and to all signs of normalization between Lebanon and Israel[37]—signs which constituted a danger of "the continuation of Camp David in Lebanon," and which could lead to the geographical encirclement of Syria.[38]

The Syrians, as usual, accompanied their opposition with various political, military, and propagandist pressures on the Lebanese government. On the eve of the signing of the agreement, the Syrian media warned the Lebanese government that "the acceptance of the agreement would ignite a fire of relentless civil war which would grind the unity of Lebanon to powder and destroy its existence as a state, as a people, and as a territory. If the agreement is authorized, Lebanon can expect difficult days, a dark future, and dangers lying in wait for anyone who had played a part in the acceptance of this shameful deal."[39] On the political level, on July 23 Syria set up the Front of National Salvation— a front of opposition to Amin Jemayel—with the participation of Walid

Jumblatt, Suleiman Franjieh, and Rashid Karami: three longtime rivals who had fought one another in the past.[40] On the military level, pressures were exerted on the Lebanese regime and the Lebanese Forces by means of the Druze militias of the Progressive Socialist Party (or People's Army) which, with the help of the pro-Syrian Palestinian organizations of Abu Mussa, Ahmed Jibril, and Sa'ika, launched an offensive against the Lebanese regime in Mount Lebanon.

The Mountain War and the IDF Withdrawal from the Shuf

Most of the burden of fighting the Lebanese Forces and the Amin Jemayel regime was carried by the Druze. The sectarian strife between the Druze and the Maronite Christians dates back to the nineteenth century. As a result of political and social changes which had taken place in Lebanon and the entire area in consequence of Napoleon's invasion, the weakening of the Ottoman Empire, and the invasion of Syria by the army of Ibrahim Pasha, son of Mohammed Ali, the traditional feudal order in Mount Lebanon broke down and new boundaries of partition were created between the two large communities which lived there, namely, the Maronite Christians and the Druze. In the years 1840-1861 there was a fierce struggle between the Maronites, who were a rising force (owing to their numbers and the support of the Western powers), and the Druze, who had been weakened by Ibrahim Pasha and by the collapse of the feudal order.[41] The struggle was mainly concentrated, then as now, in the areas of mixed population to the south of the Beirut-Damascus highway. Although the Druze constituted a minority, they were excellent fighters and were able to unite their ranks in time of trouble. They were able without difficulty to subdue the Maronites in the south of Mount Lebanon who, then as now, did not receive any real assistance from their brethren in the north of Mount Lebanon. The Druze, on the other hand, were helped by the Shiites, by the Sunnis, by the Bedouin, by Druze reinforcements from the Hauran, and by the quiet encouragement of the Ottoman regime. In the fighting, the Druze won a military victory which was accompanied by massacres of the Christian population (1860), but the struggle ended with their political defeat: the massacres led to the intervention of the Western powers, and a French force landed in Beirut in August 1860. As a result of this intervention, a semi-independent autonomous area guaranteed by the great powers was created in Mount Lebanon, with certain characteristics which have survived until today: namely, a Christian ruler and basic Christian dominance, an administrative system with a fixed intercommunity composition, and, for the Druze, the loss of the position of superiority

which they had enjoyed until then. The Druze did not readily accept their new situation, and, under the leadership of the Jumblatt family (which also in the nineteenth century held a key position in the community), from the time Lebanon attained its independence they were the chief element which sought to uproot the existing political structure.

However, the Mountain War in its modern version of 1982-1983 did not occur because of the political demands of the Druze, but because, as in the last century, of the upsetting of the status quo in mixed areas to the Druze' disadvantage: "I gave instructions," wrote then-Israeli Chief of Staff Eitan, "for the Christians to be allowed to return to the places they had fled from at the time of the civil war—to Jezzine, to the Shuf Mountains, to Deir-el-Kammar and to other places. They had to be supplied with weapons so that they would be able to defend themselves."[42] This authorization, given on Saturday, June 12, 1982, laid the foundation of the Mountain War, because it upset the fragile status quo which existed in the mixed areas in Mount Lebanon, in the regions of Aley and the Shuf, and which essentially had not been disturbed even by the civil war of 1975-1976. This status quo was based on the dominance and control of the Druze in the Shuf, on taking care that the civil war would not reach the Shuf, on a fragile coexistence between the Druze and Christian populations (sometimes in the same village, sometimes in neighboring villages), and on the protection of the Christian population by the Druze militias (except in places close to demarcation lines such as the town of Aley, and except in case of sporadic outbursts of anger against the Christians by the Druze, as after the assassination of Kamal Jumblatt).[43]

At the time of the Lebanese War, Israel made a mistake when, because of the Christian orientation of its policy, it allowed the Lebanese Forces to enter the mixed areas where until then they had not had a foothold.[44] A decisive step in this direction was taken at the beginning of July, a short time after the IDF reached the Beirut-Damascus highway, when Israel permitted two hundred members of the Lebanese Forces to enter the military barracks next to the small town of Beit-el-Din in the heart of the Shuf, which was a place of symbolic and historical significance (it was the former seat of the Emirs of Mount Lebanon), and to disperse the Lebanese battalion (consisting mainly of Druze) which was stationed there. Following this step, the members of the Lebanese Forces and the Phalange broke through into the concentrations of Christian population in the mixed areas, and especially in Aley. They set up army camps and branches of the Phalange Party in the Shuf, armed the Christian population, unified the new areas under a single military command, and began regular security activities such as setting up roadblocks and arresting "hostile elements."

The Consequences of Peace for Galilee in Syria's View

Of all the parties involved, Syria was the one which benefited most from the Lebanese War. Despite its difficult initial situation of military inferiority, political isolation, domestic problems, and political troubles in Lebanon, Syria succeeded impressively in responding to the challenges with which it was confronted by Israel. In the final analysis, it emerged as the real victor of the Lebanese War in that it strengthened its position in Lebanon.

The Syrians can boast of a number of achievements owing to the Lebanese War and the developments which followed:

1. A new precedent was created of an IDF withdrawal from territories it had conquered under the pressure of terror and rebellion and without any political arrangements whatsoever. This was in marked contrast to the results of previous wars, when Israel made gains in return for its withdrawals from Sinai and from parts of the Golan Heights.

2. A precedent was created in Lebanon of an Arab state, in response to Syrian pressures, unilaterally abrogating an agreement which it had signed with Israel under American sponsorship. This meant that the Syrians were able to boast of an achievement which they were not able to gain through their struggle against the Israeli-Egyptian Peace Treaty.

3. The multinational force, including American units, was expelled from Lebanon as a result of indirect military pressures which were applied at Syrian instigation. This meant the end of the Christians' traditional aspiration to be assisted by the West in order to counterbalance Syrian influence. As a result, their dependence on Syria increased.

4. Syria succeeded in gaining dominance over most of the Palestinians in Lebanon, placing them under tight Syrian control, and bringing about the expulsion of Arafat and his followers from the country. This meant that Syria was able to achieve one of the main goals it had aimed at since its invasion of Lebanon in 1976.

5. The Syrians were able to increase their influence with the Lebanese factions. Syrian influence grew in the Christian camp; the dependence of the Lebanese president and government on Syria increased; and Syrian influence strengthened among the Druze as well as the Amal movement. Lebanese figures who were identified as collaborators with Israel or Israeli sympathizers were removed from office or assassinated (Bashir Jemayel was murdered; Kamel al-Assad, speaker of the National Assembly, was replaced with a pro-Syrian speaker, and so on). The possibility had now been created of achieving Lebanese internal political arrangements with Syrian sponsorship.

Beyond all these, however, the military-strategic achievement stands out. The Syrians were able to demonstrate that it is possible to face the

IDF in unfavorable conditions, lacking any assistance from other Arab actors, without it leading to a total military defeat. From the Syrian viewpoint, the Syrian army in Lebanon succeeded in holding on in the face of superior Israeli forces in the Bekaa, in blocking the advance of superior Israeli forces in the Shuf, and, together with the Palestinians, in holding down large Israeli forces in the long siege of Beirut. The Syrian air force and air defenses, to be sure, suffered a severe and painful blow, but they were able to rehabilitate themselves after the war with the help of the Soviet Union. Moreover, the new military-strategic situation which was created after the Lebanese War left the Syrian army in a better position than before in relation to Israel. There was substance to the boast of the Syrian media that "Syria today is in a good military situation … better than it was in 1982,"[72] for the process of driving the Syrian army in Lebanon toward the north, its expulsion from Beirut, and its concentration in the Bekaa freed it from having to focus on the difficult tasks of policing and mediation between the rival Lebanese factions and improved its operational capacity in any possible future confrontation with Israel. The destruction of the surface-to-air missiles revealed to the Syrians (and to the Soviets) Israeli methods of action outside the context of a total military confrontation and led to an improvement in the Syrian anti-aircraft defensive capacity and to the introduction of more up-to-date long-range missiles (SA-5). The blows which the Syrian army received in the war only served as a catalyst for the improvement of its readiness and capabilities, and accelerated Syrian efforts to reach "strategic parity" with Israel. After the Peace for Galilee operation, the Syrian army grew by three divisions and qualitative and organizational improvements were made, and it is hard to imagine that this development would have been so rapid without the Lebanese War.

Israel, on the other hand, in contrast to its former policies in Lebanon, for three years deployed a massive military force there, but succeeded by that means in only partially achieving the aims of the war. The military and political infrastructure of the Palestinian organizations in southern Lebanon and West Beirut was for the most part destroyed, and the Palestinians lost their last autonomous foothold in the Middle East; the towns and settlements of the Galilee were assured a period of quiet; the Syrian missile deployment in the Bekaa (whose destruction was not one of the aims of the war) was destroyed; and Israeli freedom of flight in the skies of Lebanon was renewed. These achievements, however, were partial and short-lived, for the presence of the Palestinians in Lebanon was not eliminated and is now in the process of being rapidly restored and reconstructed; the Syrian missiles have been returned to the area of the Syrian-Lebanese border and the Lebanese territory, and Israeli freedom of flight over Lebanon is again subject to restriction; Israel did not

succeed in setting up a strong and friendly Christian regime in Beirut, and it lost some of its political assets in Lebanon. Moreover, the price which Israel paid was high and out of all proportion to the advantages which were gained, and these could have been achieved equally well by a military action limited in scope (to the area up to the Awwali River) and in time. The war exacted from Israel a high price in dead and wounded, caused a deep internal division in the Israeli public, held down the IDF in Lebanon for three years and harmed its military capability, contributed to the worsening of Israel's economic problems, drew the attention of world opinion to the "Palestinian problem," led to the release of large numbers of imprisoned terrorists, embroiled Israel in a conflict with the Shiite community, harmed Israel's image in the West, and helped to make the peace with Egypt into a "cold peace."

After Israel's withdrawal, the Syrians launched a political initiative in Lebanon which was intended to translate achievements into permanent political assets in the sphere of Lebanese internal politics. After a few months of vigorous preparatory work, particularly by Khaddam (now vice-president), on December 28, 1985 the Tripartite Agreement was signed in Damascus. This was a specific program for ending the Lebanese civil war, radically changing the Lebanese political and social system, and bestowing legitimacy on the Syrian involvement in Lebanon. Parties to this agreement were the leaders of the three major militias: Berri of Amal, Eli Hobeika of the Lebanese Forces, and Walid Jumblatt of the Druze Socialist Progressive Party. With the signing of this agreement, it seemed that the Syrians were on the way to imposing a Syrian order on Lebanon and to overcoming the chronic difficulties they had encountered during their ten years of involvement in the Lebanese crisis.

The Syrians, however, who in their own opinion had benefited from the heavy price which Israel was forced to pay for the Lebanese War, had to learn once again that victory in war is an expendable asset, for the advantages gained in the war did not necessarily lead to political gains in Lebanese internal politics and Israel's position relatively improved after the withdrawal from Lebanon. The Tripartite Agreement came to an end after a fairly short time when, on January 15, 1986, Hobeika was ousted by a coalition of opponents of the agreement in the Christian camp which included President Amin Jemayel and Samir Ja'ja. Thus, about half a year after the withdrawal of the IDF, the Syrians once again suffered a defeat in Lebanon and lost much of the prestige which they had gained since 1982. In this way the Syrians returned, in Lebanese internal politics, to their starting point before the Peace for Galilee operation, just at the time when a far-reaching political success had seemed to be within their grasp.

Notes

1. On September 8, Israeli warplanes attacked and destroyed a ground-to-air missile battery in the central sector of Lebanon; on September 12, the air force destroyed Syrian SA-9 ground-to-air missiles in the Bekaa; and on September 13, in response to repeated breaches of the cease-fire, the air force attacked Syrian targets and targets of the Palestinian organizations, of the Palestine Liberation Army, and of a Libyan unit in the Bekaa and in the region of Shtura and Zahle. The Syrians were duly impressed and the situation in the Bekaa calmed down.

2. Cf. Schiff and Yaari, p. 285.

3. Radio Damascus, citing *Al-Baath*, August 24, 1982 (Itim 845/023, August 26, 1982).

4. Radio Damascus, August 25, 1982 (Itim 845/023, August 26, 1982).

5. Radio Damascus, August 26, 1982 (Itim 845/023, August 26, 1982).

6. Randal, pp. 3-4.

7. Ibid., p. 151.

8. Schiff and Yaari, p. 308.

9. As mentioned, at the end of the IDF's stay in Lebanon and after its withdrawal, the party, with Syrian inspiration, carried out suicide attacks against the IDF and collaborators with it.

10. Radio Damascus, August 31, 1982 (Itim 845/001, September 1, 1982).

11. Asher Susser, *The PLO after the Lebanese War* (Hebrew) (Tel Aviv: Dayan Center, Tel Aviv University; Hakibbutz Hameuhad, 1985), p. 69. The Abu Nidal group claimed responsibility for the assassination in an announcement from its office in Damascus. Abu Iyyad accused Syria specifically of being the instigator of the assassinations of PLO figures in Europe by the Abu Nidal organization (*Monday Morning*, Beirut, October 11-15, 1981).

12. For instance, most of the kidnappings and murders took place in areas under the control of the Syrian army, some of them near to Syrian roadblocks. In some cases the assassinations were accompanied by a campaign of delegitimation in the Syrian media. Thus, Kamal Jumblatt was called an "Israeli agent" and a "communist agent," and Bashir Jemayel was called a "Zionist agent."

13. The Lebanese succeeded in capturing the murderers of Mohammed Umrane, who admitted that Syrian intelligence had sent them. The Syrians' demand that they be handed over to them was refused (*Al-Khawadess*, Beirut, July 20, 1973).

14. The case of Salim al-Lozi is instructive. Already in the days of Jidid, his journal *Al-Khawadess* had investigated the reasons for the fall of the Golan Heights, and as a result Syrian intelligence began to watch him (al-Lozi wrote in his newspaper that the Lebanese chief of staff at that time used to ask the head of the *deuxième bureau*—security services—every morning, "Have they killed him?" and the head of the *deuxième bureau* would answer, "Not yet"). In March 1973 there was an explosion at the printing presses of *Al-Khawadess*, and a member of the leadership of the Syrian Baath Party in Lebanon and some of his assistants were arrested and admitted responsibility; on the night of July 13, 1973, al-Lozi's bodyguards removed two suspicious automobiles which had been parked at night outside his house, one of which was Syrian (after this, al-Lozi