

## **Continued Libyan involvement-Factional divisions-Situation in south Effects of famine**

*Allegations of continued Libyan presence in Chad (December 1984-June 1985).*

*Formation of Front démocratique tchadien (March 21, 1985).*

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During the period from December 1984 to September 1985, the government of President Hissène Habré consolidated and extended its authority through central and southern Chad. It was unable to do so in the north, however, which remained the power base of the Libyan-backed *Gouvernement de l'unité nationale tchadienne* (GUNT), based in Bardai and led by Mr Goukouni Oueddei.

Numerous reports from Chadian, US and French sources asserted that Libyan troops remained in northern Chad in violation of the mutual withdrawal agreement concluded between Libya and France in September 1984 [see page 33311]. Col. Moamer al Kadhafi, the Libyan leader, consistently denied that any Libyan military personnel were in the country, but these denials were treated with considerable scepticism by observers. Libyan forces continued to occupy the disputed territory of the Aouzou strip on the border between the two countries [see page 32104 and map on page 31677].

The anti-Habré opposition remained divided, with several new groups emerging who were opposed both to the government and to the GUNT.

The country as a whole continued to suffer from drought and famine, the effects of which were exacerbated by the continuing fighting, lack of centralized control and a wholly inadequate transport and distribution network. Aid workers in eastern Chad in particular reported large numbers of deaths, and many more were feared to have died in inaccessible areas away from roads or population centres.

*Allegations of continued Libyan involvement in Chad*

Following repeated assertions by the Chadian government that the Libyans were maintaining and reinforcing their military presence in the country, M Claude Cheysson, the then French Foreign Minister, stated to the National Assembly (lower house of the French parliament) on Dec. 5 that the Libyans had failed to implement the withdrawal agreement "in full", and that some 3,000 Libyan troops remained in Chad. He added, however, that

they had kept a promise not to advance beyond the 16th parallel (which ran about 400 km north of Ndjamená, the capital, along a line passing midway between Biltine and the northern town of Fada-see map on page 31677).

Col. Kadhafi, in an interview published in the Italian daily *Il Messaggero* on Dec. 6, claimed that such reports consisted of “American lies” which were aimed at “destroying the dialogue between Libya and France”. When questioned as to reports that photographs taken by US satellites had confirmed the presence of troop concentrations in the north of the country, Col. Kadhafi maintained that these were in fact composed of anti-government Chadian rebel soldiers.

Sources close to President Mitterrand were quoted on Dec. 9 as saying that the French government would be unlikely to take any military action to dislodge the Libyans, and that it was prepared to tolerate their continued presence. Speaking at the 11th Franco-African summit in Burundi on Dec. 11 [see page 33514], President Mitterrand stressed that France was not committed to the provision of military aid to Chad since the two countries had no bilateral defence agreement, although he added that he was opposed to any partition of the country. The following day he referred to the 16th parallel as “a theoretical line that has become practical for the purpose of preventing infiltration”.

In a television interview on Dec. 17, President Mitterrand referred to reports of atrocities being committed by government troops during fighting in southern Chad [see page 33310], and added: “The Catholic people of the south have told me of their fears. French people who are considered allies of the government are now so unpopular that their lives are in danger and I have taken special measures to protect them.” He indicated that this factor ruled out any possibility of French troops returning to Chad to assist the government.

The Libyan authorities proposed in mid-December the creation of a commission consisting of French, Libyan, Greek and, possibly, Syrian military observers, which would travel to Chad to ascertain the truth of Libyan assertions that all their troops had left the country. The proposal was accepted by Capt. Gouara Lassou, the Chadian Foreign Minister. Mr Oueddei, however, declared himself unwilling to accept French troops in areas controlled by the GUNT. French and Greek teams subsequently travelled to Tripoli, the Libyan capital, although they did not proceed to Chad. The French team was reported still to be in Tripoli in April 1985.

President Habré stated on March 24 that his government had evidence that Libyan troop strength in northern Chad had increased to about 7,000, and that they were in the course of constructing an airfield.

Western intelligence sources were quoted in mid-April as confirming that a major airfield, capable of handling transport and bomber aircraft, was nearing completion at Ouadi-Doum, north of Faya-Largeau. The Chadian government was reported at this time to be receiving intelligence information from both US and French advisers in Ndjamená.

The Chadian government issued an official complaint to the UN security Council on June 26, alleging that Libyan troops were in illegal occupation of parts of northern Chad.

The complaint accused Libya of being responsible for a previously unreported incident three weeks before when explosive devices had been discovered in a room where President Habre's Cabinet was due to meet. Libya responded on June 27 by denying that it was in occupation of any Chadian territory, and asserting that the Chadian appeal to the security Council was made following instructions from the US government. The complaint was heard on June 30, when the Libyan representative repeated the denial of a military presence and insisted that

Libya did not recognize the Habre government, adding that it regarded the Lagos accord of June 1979, which had set up the original GUNT [see 30064 A], as the only valid basis for the formation of a Chadian government.

#### Alleged arrest of CDR leader-Formation of FDT

A spokesman in Paris for the *Conseil démocratique révolutionnaire* (CDR-which had participated in the formation of the GUNT-based *Conseil national de la libération*, or CNL, in August 1984—see page 33309—but which had subsequently suffered from internal divisions-*ibid.*) claimed on Nov. 22 that 19 CDR officials, including Mr Acheikh Ibn Oumar, the movement's leader, had recently been placed under arrest in Fada in northern Chad by Libyan troops after being flown to Chad from Tripoli.

According to the spokesman, five of those detained were subsequently released, while Mr Oumar had disappeared. (A CDR spokesman had earlier claimed that Mr Oumar had been expelled from the GUNT by Mr Oueddei after criticizing the extent of Libyan involvement in GUNT affairs-see page 33310.)

*Le Monde* of July 3, 1985, quoted a CDR spokesman in Europe as calling for direct negotiations between the Habre government and opposition factions and as claiming that the GUNT had been “betrayed” by the Libyans.

The formation of a new organization, the Front démocratique tchadien (FDT), was announced in Paris on March 21.

The front was led by Mr Djibril Negue Djogo, and consisted of four groups as follows: (i) the Comité permanent, which had been the effective political authority in southern Chad during 1979–82 under the chairmanship of Lt.-Col. Wadal Abdelkader Kamougue [see pages 31163; 31679; 32104]; (ii) the *Groupe de démocrates et patriotes*, which had attended the Brazzaville (Congo) reconciliation conference in October 1984 [see pages 33311-12]; (iii) the *Groupe de démocrates indépendants*; and (iv) the *Unité pour la démocratie et la paix*, which had taken part in the Ouagadougou (Burkina) conference in August 1984 which resulted in the formation of the *Rallye des forces patriotiques du Tchad* (RFP), opposed to both Mr Habré and Mr Oueddei [see pages 33309-10].

The FDT's initial statement accused both the Habré government and the GUNT of intransigence, and added that it “adopts the people's struggle being carried out by the anti-government commandos (known as “Codos”—groups of fighters who were loosely attached to the *Armée nationale de la libération*, set up in October 1982-see pages 32104-05] in the south [see below] and by the fighters in the central and eastern central areas of the country”. (Sporadic clashes had been reported in this area, notably around Abéché and Biltine, in December and March-see map on page 31677.)

In an interview broadcast by the Gabon-based Africa No 1 radio station on June 14, Lt.-Col. Kamougue admitted that there were “problems” within the GUNT and that differences of opinion existed between himself and Mr Oueddei, but denied reports that he was no longer GUNT vice-president.

#### Developments in southern Chad

Sporadic clashes between the anti-government Codos and the government's Forces armées nationales tchadiennes (FANT) continued during late 1984 and early 1985. The guerrillas were reported to be particularly active in the vicinities of Beinamar, Baibokoum, Maro and Danamadji [see map].

President Habré went on a tour of the southern provinces on March 9–16, stopping in towns to address public

meetings and hold private consultations with local administrators and traditional chiefs, during which he was reportedly informed of atrocities which had been committed by both sides during the fighting.

He repeatedly appealed to those who had joined the Codos to lay down their arms and give their support to the government, and he offered to hold talks at any time, in any location and without preconditions on ways of achieving national unity. He also invited all Chadians in exile to return to the country, promising that if they did so their safety would be guaranteed by the government. At several stages in his tour, public reconciliation meetings were held with local leaders of the Codos. In an interview with Radio France International (RFI) on March 24 President Habre claimed that over 3,300 Codos had rallied to the government. The tour was widely seen as successful in reasserting government authority in the south, and observers noted that security surrounding the President had been progressively relaxed as the tour continued. A further tour, concentrating on Tandjilé and Mayo Kebi provinces, was staged in mid-April.

Although fighting was thought to have died down in the south from March onwards, an RFI report on April 9 cited sources in Bangui (the capital of the Central African Republic-CAR) as claiming that summary executions of alleged supporters of the Codos were still taking place in Moyen Chari province. Two days later, the Agence France-Presse agency reported that FANT and CAR government forces were co-operating in a counterinsurgency drive against guerrilla strongpoints along Chad's southern border [see page 33641].

Other reports from the area at this time quoted local farmers as claiming that FANT troops had stolen millet supplies, and that food aid consignments were being withheld from areas where the Codos were active. The French government announced in June that it would provide additional financial aid to enable President Habre to fulfil earlier promises that guerrillas who rallied to the government would receive regular wages.

#### Reconciliation efforts by Mali and Morocco

In April and June 1985, the heads of state of Mali and Morocco respectively made unsuccessful efforts to effect a degree of reconciliation between President Habré and Mr Oueddei.

According to France Inter radio, President Moussa Traore of Mali held separate meetings in Bamako (the Malian capital) on April 1 with both President Habre and Mr Oueddei. It remained unclear as to whether the two rival leaders had met, although this was thought unlikely in the light of the failure of earlier attempts to convene direct talks between them [see pages 33311-12]. Neither side disclosed the content of their discussions with President Traore, who had met with M Guy Penne, President Mitterrand's special adviser on African affairs, on March 31.

A delegation led by President Habré visited Morocco on June 15–17 for talks with King Hassan on the situation in Chad and on economic co-operation between the two countries. It was subsequently reported that Mr Oueddei was in Morocco at the time of President Habré's visit. (The Moroccan government had earlier been involved in French attempts to secure a withdrawal of Libyan troops from Chad, following the conclusion of the Moroccan-Libyan treaty of federation-see page 33310; 33246 A.) A GUNT communiqué issued in Paris on June 18 ruled out the possibility of a meeting between Mr Oueddei and President Habre, and added that any head of state who met with the latter would compromise his chances of acting as mediator.

In other foreign contacts, President Habré maintained close relations with the CAR and also with Zaïre, concluding a military co-operation agreement with President Mobutu on July 9. (Zaïrean troops had entered Chad at the request of the Habré government in mid-1983-see 32591 A.) Mr Oueddei made at least two visits

(in March and July respectively) to Libya during the first seven months of 1985, and also met with Capt. Thomas Sankara, the head of state of Burkina, in July.

#### Meetings of opposition factions-Formation of CSR

Opposition leaders held two meetings in July and August in Congo and Benin in an attempt to develop a unified stance towards the Habre government.

The Brazzaville meeting in mid-July (held under the aegis of President Sassou-Nguesso, whose mandate for achieving a reconciliation of all Chadian factions was extended by the 21st assembly of the Organization of African Unity Heads of State and Government on July involved Mr Oueddei and Mr Adoum Yacoub (both representing the GUNT), Lt.-Col. Kamougue, Mr Djogo (leader of the newly formed FDT-see above), Mr Mohamat Abba Saïd (deputy chairman of the CNL-(see page 33309), and Mr Rakhis Manani (the “CDR number two”, who had replaced Mr Oumar as GUNT Minister of National Defence and War Veterans in August 1984-see page 33310). A communiqué issued on July 23 announced that the talks had resulted in an agreement to form a united front opposed to the Habré regime.

At the meeting in Cotonou (the capital of Benin) on Aug. 21–30 a wider range of factions was represented by (i) Mr Oueddei; (ii) Lt.-Col. Kamougue representing the *Mouvement populaire et révolutionnaire du Tchad* (which had participated in the 1984 Brazzaville talks); (iii) Mr Abdel Kader Yassin representing *Frolinat originel*, one of the Lagos accord signatories (*Frolinat originel* having subsequently split, its leader, Dr Abba Sidick, leaving the GUNT in April 1981-see page 31161-and later joining President Habré's *Union nationale pour l'indépendance et la révolution* in 1984-see page 33009); (iv) Mr Hadjaro Senoussi representing *Frolinat fondamental* (a member of the *Front d'action commune*-FAC-which had assisted Mr Oueddei's *Forces armées populaires* against Mr Habré's *Forces armées du nord* in March 1980-see page 30693; Mr Senoussi was then Minister of Reconstruction and Land Management in President Oueddei's Cabinet, but was dismissed on grounds of “rebellion” in April 1980-see page 30694); (v) Mr Saïd representing the *Première armée* (a GUNT group which had taken part in the 1984 Brazzaville meeting); (vi) Dr Facho Balaam, who was leader of the *Union nationale démocratique* (which signed the 1979 Lagos accord and the August 1984 agreement establishing the CNL) but who also participated in the Ouagadougou meetings later in August and became “interim co-ordinator” of the RFP [see page 33309]; (vi) Mr Moussa Medela Mahamat (a former member of the Council of State set up in April 1982-see page 31679) who was now representing the *Forces armées occidentales* (FAO, a Lagos accord signatory which had also taken part in the formation of the CNL); and (vii) Mr Aboubakar Mahamat Abderaman representing the *Mouvement populaire pour la libération du Tchad* (MPLT) which had been grouped with the FAO at the 1984 Brazzaville meeting. Mr Abderaman had represented the MPLT in the FAC, but was subsequently reported to have been dismissed from its leadership after attempting to steal its funds in August 1980 [see page 30693].

Following the meeting, it was announced that a 65-member *Conseil suprême de la révolution (CSR)*, in which all the factions attending the meeting would be represented, was to be established at Bardai under the presidency of Mr Oueddei. At the closing session of the talks, Mr Oueddei declared that the GUNT was “more than ever prepared to open genuine reconciliation talks with our countrymen in Ndjamená”.

The meeting had included a series of discussions with a Libyan delegation led by Col. Messaoud, who was described in *Le Monde* of Sept. 3 as the “architect of Libyan policy in Chad”. During the discussions the Chadian delegates had presented to the Libyans a report criticizing certain alleged aspects of Libyan activity in Chad, including interference in the internal affairs of the GUNT, the placing of restrictions on the free movement

of GUNT members in Libya, and the establishment “without prior agreement, of a Libyan-style administration in the liberated zone [of northern Chad]”. [For earlier allegations on this subject, see page 33008.]

The Chadian government claimed on Sept. 7 that fierce fighting had erupted on Sept. 4 between Libyan troops and GUNT members in Faya-Largeau, with several hundred people being killed or wounded. The claim was denied by the Libyan authorities and by a GUNT spokesman in Paris.

#### Drought and famine-Economic situation

With famine conditions prevailing through much of central and eastern Chad, there emerged several reports during 1985 of large numbers of people starving to death, particularly in the areas around Abeche and the Sudanese border.

The UN Office for Emergency Operations in Africa stated in March that babies and small children were dying in refugee camps established by aid agencies in the area, while officials of the World Food Programme estimated in April that between 1,500,000 and 2,000,000 Chadians were facing starvation. Large numbers of people had abandoned their villages and set up makeshift camps around Ndjamena, while at least 120,000 were reported to have crossed into Sudan.

The continuing drought had by mid-1985 reduced the total area of Lake Chad by two-thirds, while the Chari river was in danger of drying up, thereby posing a threat to the transportation of relief supplies by ferry from Cameroon. A road bridge across the river was scheduled for completion by the end of the year.

Several aid agencies complained during April that the Nigerian authorities were deliberately preventing aid supplies for Chad from being unloaded at the port of Apapa. The accusation was denied on April 17 by a Nigerian spokesman, who added, however, that some agencies involved in the transportation of supplies to Chad across Nigeria were “in flagrant violation of Nigerian sovereignty”.

The Cabinet on Dec. 28, 1984, approved a budget providing for total expenditure of 39,847 million francs of the Communauté financière africaine (CFA), with revenue estimated at CFAF 15,034 million (US \$ 1.00=CFAF 484.975 as at Jan. 2, 1985). It agreed to reduce diplomatic representation abroad in an effort to reduce expenditure. For some time, soldiers and civil servants had been receiving half-pay. Chad's trade deficit for 1984 amounted to CFAF 13,000 million.-(Le Monde-West Africa- Africa Now-BBC Summary of World Broadcasts- Africa Research Bulletin- Africa Economic Digest-International Herald Tribune-Guardian-Times) (*Prev. rep. 33308 A*)