

Lecture 3

Fiscal policy in the canonical HANK model

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Fiscal and Monetary Policy with Heterogeneous Agents Minicourse

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This lecture

We just introduced the canonical HANK model.

Now: Focus on fiscal policy!

- Hold monetary policy at $r_t = r$ constant
- Focus on **first order** shocks to fiscal policy: $d\mathbf{G} = \{dG_t\}$, $d\mathbf{T} = \{dT_t\}$ such that

$$\sum_{t=0}^{\infty} (1+r)^{-t} (dG_t - dT_t) = 0$$

- Main reference for this lecture is [Auclert et al. \(2024\)](#)

Government budget arithmetic in sequence space

- Writing $d\mathbf{B} = \{dB_t\}$, government budget constraint is

$$d\mathbf{T} = d\mathbf{G} + ((1+r)\mathbf{L} - \mathbf{I})d\mathbf{B} \quad (1)$$

where $\mathbf{L}$ is lag operator.

- Let $\mathbf{F}$ be forward operator, which satisfies $\mathbf{F}\mathbf{L} = \mathbf{I}$. We have also

$$d\mathbf{B} = \underbrace{\frac{-1}{1+r} \sum_{k \geq 0} \left(\frac{1}{1+r} \right)^k \mathbf{F}^{k+1}}_{\equiv \mathbf{K}} (d\mathbf{G} - d\mathbf{T}) \quad (2)$$

- We can specify $d\mathbf{G}$, $d\mathbf{B}$ and get $d\mathbf{T}$ from (1).
- Alternatively, we can specify $d\mathbf{T}$, $d\mathbf{G}$ and then get $d\mathbf{B}$ from (2). Will be useful.

- 1 The intertemporal Keynesian cross
- 2 Intertemporal MPCs in models and data
- 3 Fiscal policy in general equilibrium
- 4 Solving the model using blocks and DAGs
- 5 Takeaway

The intertemporal Keynesian cross

The aggregate consumption function

- Recall household "block": mapping sequences $\{r_t^p, Z_t\}$ into $\{C_t, A_t\}$
- With constant $r_t^p = r$, this means that date- t consumption can be written as

$$C_t = C_t(Z_0, Z_1, Z_2, \dots) = C_t(\{Z_s\})$$

- We call this the intertemporal consumption function
- Similarly, there is an intertemporal asset function $A_t = \mathcal{A}_t(\{Z_s\})$
- Since in equilibrium we also have $Z_t = Y_t - T_t$, market clearing writes

$$Y_t = G_t + C_t(\{Y_s - T_s\}) \quad \mathcal{A}_t(\{Y_s - T_s\}) = B_t$$

$$Y_t = G_t + \mathcal{C}_t(\{Y_s - T_s\})$$

- Given shocks $\{dG_t, dT_t\}$, must have

$$dY_t = dG_t + \sum_{s=0}^{\infty} \frac{\partial \mathcal{C}_t}{\partial Z_s} \cdot (dY_s - dT_s) \quad (3)$$

→ Response dY_t **entirely** characterized by the **Jacobian** of the $\mathcal{C}$ function:

$$M_{t,s} \equiv \frac{\partial \mathcal{C}_t}{\partial Z_s} \quad \left(= \mathcal{J}_{t,s}^{\mathcal{C},Z} \right)$$

We call these **intertemporal MPCs**

- $M_{t,s}$ = how much of an income change at date s is spent at date t
- Note: All income is spent at some point, so $\sum_{t=0}^{\infty} (1+r)^{s-t} M_{t,s} = 1$

Visualizing intertemporal MPCs

$$\mathbf{M} = \begin{pmatrix} M_{0,0} & M_{0,1} & M_{0,2} & M_{0,3} & \cdots \\ M_{1,0} & M_{1,1} & M_{1,2} & M_{1,3} & \cdots \\ M_{2,0} & M_{2,1} & M_{2,2} & M_{2,3} & \cdots \\ M_{3,0} & M_{3,1} & M_{3,2} & M_{3,3} & \cdots \\ \vdots & \vdots & \vdots & \vdots & \ddots \end{pmatrix}$$

First column: response to income increase at $s = 0$

Second column: response to income increase at $s = 1$...

Intertemporal budget constraint implies $\mathbf{q}'\mathbf{M} = \mathbf{q}'$; $\mathbf{q} \equiv (1, (1+r)^{-1}, (1+r)^{-2}, \dots)'$

The intertemporal Keynesian cross

- Rewrite equation (3) in vector / matrix notation:

$$d\mathbf{Y} = d\mathbf{G} - \mathbf{M}d\mathbf{T} + \mathbf{M}d\mathbf{Y} \quad (4)$$

- This is an **intertemporal Keynesian cross**
 - entire complexity of model is in $\mathbf{M}$
 - with $\mathbf{M}$ from data, could get $d\mathbf{Y}$ without model!
("sufficient statistic", though hard to measure in entirety...)

Connecting to the standard Keynesian cross...

- Standard IS-LM theory postulates $C_t = \mathcal{C}(Y_t - T_t)$ plus market clearing, so

$$\mathcal{C}(Y_t - T_t) + G_t = Y_t$$

Differentiate around steady state with constant Y, T, G :

$$dY_t = dG_t - mpc \cdot dT_t + mpc \cdot dY_t$$

where $mpc = \mathcal{C}'(Y - T)$. This is the static Keynesian cross.

- The intertemporal Keynesian cross is a vector-valued version of this
- HANK models tend to revive & microfound IS-LM logic

Solving the intertemporal Keynesian cross

- How can we solve (4)? Rewrite as

$$(\mathbf{I} - \mathbf{M}) d\mathbf{Y} = d\mathbf{G} - \mathbf{M}d\mathbf{T} \quad (5)$$

- Standard Keynesian cross solution:

$$dY_t = (1 + mpc + mpc^2 + \dots) (dG_t - mpc \cdot dT_t) = \frac{dG_t - mpc \cdot dT_t}{1 - mpc}$$

Can we do the same, inverting $(\mathbf{I} - \mathbf{M})$? **Need to be careful!**

- Why? Multiply both sides of (5) by: $\mathbf{q} \equiv (1, (1+r)^{-1}, (1+r)^{-2}, \dots)'$

$$\mathbf{q}' (\mathbf{I} - \mathbf{M}) d\mathbf{Y} = 0 \quad \mathbf{q}' d\mathbf{G} - \mathbf{q}' \mathbf{M} d\mathbf{T} = \mathbf{q}' d\mathbf{G} - \mathbf{q}' d\mathbf{T} = 0$$

both left and right hand side have **zero NPV** !

- Intuition: present value of mpc is 1, dY is 0/0... What to do?

Solving in the asset market

- Consider instead the asset market clearing condition:

$$\mathcal{A}_t(\{Y_s - T_s\}) = B_t \quad \forall t$$

- By Walras's law, equivalent to goods market clearing. Linearize:

$$\mathbf{A}(d\mathbf{Y} - d\mathbf{T}) = d\mathbf{B} \tag{6}$$

This doesn't have the same obvious problem as (5)!

- Assuming that $\mathbf{A}$ is invertible (can check using a “winding number criterion”), using $d\mathbf{B} = \mathbf{K}(d\mathbf{G} - d\mathbf{T})$ in (2) and similarly $\mathbf{A} = \mathbf{K}(\mathbf{I} - \mathbf{M})$, we have:

$$\begin{aligned} d\mathbf{Y} &= d\mathbf{T} + \mathbf{A}^{-1}\mathbf{K}(d\mathbf{G} - d\mathbf{T}) \\ &= \mathbf{A}^{-1}\mathbf{K}((\mathbf{I} - \mathbf{M})d\mathbf{T} + d\mathbf{G} - d\mathbf{T}) \\ &= \mathbf{A}^{-1}\mathbf{K}(d\mathbf{G} - \mathbf{M}d\mathbf{T}) \end{aligned}$$

- That is: $\mathcal{M} \equiv \mathbf{A}^{-1}\mathbf{K}$ is the left inverse of $\mathbf{I} - \mathbf{M}$ we need to solve (5)!

The balanced budget multiplier

- Suppose $d\mathbf{G} = d\mathbf{T}$ (balanced budget) and $\mathbf{A}$ is invertible
- **Result:** We always have $d\mathbf{Y} = d\mathbf{G}$!
- Irrespective of **all** household heterogeneity, holds for any path of spending
- IS-LM antecedents: **Gelting (1941)**, **Haavelmo (1945)**
- Proof is immediate: $d\mathbf{Y} = d\mathbf{G}$ is unique solution to

$$d\mathbf{Y} = (\mathbf{I} - \mathbf{M}) \cdot d\mathbf{G} + \mathbf{M} \cdot d\mathbf{Y}$$

Deficit financed fiscal policy

- With deficit financing $d\mathbf{G} \neq d\mathbf{T}$ we have, using $\mathcal{M}(\mathbf{I} - \mathbf{M}) \equiv \mathbf{I}$,

$$d\mathbf{Y} = d\mathbf{G} + \underbrace{\mathcal{M} \cdot \mathbf{M} \cdot (d\mathbf{G} - d\mathbf{T})}_{d\mathbf{C}} \quad (7)$$


Consumption $d\mathbf{C}$ depends on **primary deficits** $d\mathbf{G} - d\mathbf{T}$

- Interaction term: Deficits matter precisely when $\mathbf{M}$ is “large” (in practice “large” will mean very different from RA model)
- **Next:**
 - iMPCs $\mathbf{M}$ in models and data
 - Implications for deficit-financed fiscal policy

Intertemporal MPCs in models and data

Intertemporal MPCs in baseline model

- Use calibration with $A/Y = 1$. Get $\mathbf{M}$ quickly using fake-news algorithm:



- What about other models?

Representative-agent model

Last lecture we derived consumption function for RA model when $\beta(1+r) = 1$

$$C_t = (1 - \beta) \sum_{s \geq 0} \beta^s Z_s + ra_{-1}$$

In particular


$$M_{t,s} = \frac{\partial C_t}{\partial Z_s} = (1 - \beta) \beta^s$$

Thus iMPC matrix is given by

$$\mathbf{M}^{RA} = \begin{pmatrix} 1 - \beta & (1 - \beta)\beta & (1 - \beta)\beta^2 & \dots \\ 1 - \beta & (1 - \beta)\beta & (1 - \beta)\beta^2 & \dots \\ 1 - \beta & (1 - \beta)\beta & (1 - \beta)\beta^2 & \dots \\ \vdots & \vdots & \vdots & \ddots \end{pmatrix} = \frac{\mathbf{1}\mathbf{q}'}{\mathbf{1}'\mathbf{q}}$$

Easy to verify that $\mathbf{q}'\mathbf{M} = \mathbf{q}'$, and also that $\mathbf{M}\mathbf{w} = \mathbf{0}$ for any zero NPV $\mathbf{w}$

Representative-agent model iMPCs



- Low and flat pattern, as in the PIH


Two agent model

- $1 - \mu$ share of agents behave like RA agent, μ are hand to mouth
 $\Rightarrow \mathbf{M}$ matrix is simple linear combination

$$\mathbf{M}^{TA} = (1 - \mu)\mathbf{M}^{RA} + \mu\mathbf{I}$$


- Only strong **contemporaneous** spending effect

iMPCs in TA model



- Spiky tents, reflecting division into savers and spenders


Comparing first columns in all three models



- Substantial delayed C response in HA, supported by several recent studies: e.g. Fagereng et al. (2021), Colarieti et al. (2024), Eichenbaum et al. (2026)
- Others find noisy zero for M_{10} , e.g. Boehm et al. (2025)


Fiscal policy in general equilibrium

A deficit-financed tax cut



- Parameterize a tax shock: $d\tilde{T}_t = \rho_T d\tilde{T}_{t-1} + \epsilon_t$, with debt $dB_t = \rho dB_{t-1} + d\tilde{T}_t$
- (Note actual $dT_t \neq d\tilde{T}_t$ since need to raise taxes to bring B_t back)

General equilibrium effects in HA, TA, and RA



- Sustained boom in HA, RA is Ricardian
- Temporary boom in TA that turns to bust. Why?

Fiscal policy in the RA model

- Let's solve the IKC for the RA model
- Calculate:

$$\begin{aligned}d\mathbf{C} &= \mathcal{M} \cdot \mathbf{M} \cdot (d\mathbf{G} - d\mathbf{T}) \\ &= \mathcal{M} \cdot (1 - \beta) \mathbf{1}\mathbf{q}' (d\mathbf{G} - d\mathbf{T})\end{aligned}$$

But government budget balance implies $\mathbf{q}' (d\mathbf{G} - d\mathbf{T}) = 0$! So:

$$d\mathbf{Y} = d\mathbf{G}$$

- Can of course prove this directly, too (eg **Woodford 2011**)
- **Deficits are irrelevant in RA!**

Fiscal policy in TA model

- In Keynesian cross:

$$\left(\mathbf{I} - \mathbf{M}^{TA}\right) d\mathbf{Y} = d\mathbf{G} - \mathbf{M}^{TA}d\mathbf{T} \quad \Leftrightarrow \quad \left(\mathbf{I} - \mathbf{M}^{RA}\right) d\mathbf{Y} = \frac{1}{1 - \mu} [d\mathbf{G} - \mu d\mathbf{T}] - \mathbf{M}^{RA}d\mathbf{T}$$

This equation has same form as for RA, hence:

$$d\mathbf{Y} = \frac{1}{1 - \mu} [d\mathbf{G} - \mu d\mathbf{T}]$$

- cf classic Keynesian cross: spending multiplier $1/(1 - \mu)$ and transfer multiplier $\mu/(1 - \mu)$. So: μ is “effective” MPC, ignoring RA
- Can also write:

$$d\mathbf{Y} = d\mathbf{G} + \frac{\mu}{1 - \mu} \underbrace{[d\mathbf{G} - d\mathbf{T}]}_{\text{primary deficit}}$$

- Only **current** deficit matters. Transfer multiplier is initially $\in \frac{1}{1 - \mu}$, but effect flips sign as soon as taxes rise. Cumulative multiplier is 1: $\mathbf{q}' d\mathbf{Y} = \mathbf{q}' d\mathbf{G}$.

Solving the model using blocks and DAGs

- We just solved a GE heterogeneous agent model using “blocks”
- We can do this much more generally
- The SSJ toolbox exploits this systematically
 - See [Auclert et al. \(2021\)](#) for details

Defining blocks and models

Block: mapping from sequences of *inputs* to sequences of *outputs*.

For the IKC model:


- Household block: $\mathbf{Z} \rightarrow \mathbf{C}, \mathbf{A}$
- Fiscal policy block: $\mathbf{B}, \mathbf{G}, \mathbf{Y} \rightarrow \mathbf{T}, \mathbf{Z}$
- Goods market clearing block: $\mathbf{Y}, \mathbf{C}, \mathbf{G} \rightarrow \mathbf{H} \equiv \mathbf{C} + \mathbf{G} - \mathbf{Y}$

Model: combination of blocks

- some inputs are exogenous **shocks**, e.g. $\mathbf{B}, \mathbf{G}$
- some inputs are endogenous **unknowns**, e.g. $\mathbf{Y}$
- some outputs are **targets** that must be zero in GE, e.g. $\mathbf{H}$ [$\#targets = \#unknowns$]

Many macro models can be written this way. Will help us solve them efficiently!


Require that models have no cycles $\rightarrow$ draw as directed acyclic graphs (DAGs).



- Model is composite mapping: $(Y, B, G) \rightarrow H$.
- GE response of Y to shocks satisfies $H = 0$.


Side note: DAGs are not unique

- Can use asset market rather than goods market clearing



- This is usually how we solve the model in practice

Solving for output response to shocks



- Imagine we change the path of government spending **G**. How is **Y** affected?
- We need to find **Y** such that


$$\mathbf{H}(\mathbf{Y}, \mathbf{G}) = \mathbf{0}$$

- First order shock $d\mathbf{G} \Rightarrow$ use implicit function theorem:

$$d\mathbf{Y} = -(\mathbf{H}_{\mathbf{Y}})^{-1} \cdot \mathbf{H}_{\mathbf{G}} \cdot d\mathbf{G}$$

All we need is **H**'s Jacobians $\mathbf{H}_{\mathbf{Y}}$ and $\mathbf{H}_{\mathbf{G}}$...

How do we get the Jacobians?



First step is to compute **individual blocks' Jacobians**, e.g. $\mathcal{J}^{Z,Y}$, $\mathcal{J}^{C,Z}$, $\mathcal{J}^{H,Y}$, $\mathcal{J}^{H,G}$

- If block is analytical, its derivative is analytical too
 - e.g. $\mathcal{J}^{Z,Y} = \mathbf{I}$ or $\mathcal{J}^{H,G} = \mathbf{I}$
- If block has heterogeneous agents, solve Jacobian numerically
 - e.g. solve $\mathcal{J}^{C,Z}$ using fake news algorithm

Then “chain” the Jacobians together:

$$\mathbf{H}_Y = \mathcal{J}^{H,Y} + \mathcal{J}^{H,C} \cdot \mathcal{J}^{C,Z} \cdot \mathcal{J}^{Z,Y} \quad \mathbf{H}_G = \mathcal{J}^{H,G} + \mathcal{J}^{H,C} \cdot \mathcal{J}^{C,Z} \cdot \mathcal{J}^{Z,G}$$

On the computer: Sequence-Space Jacobian workflow

Workflow in our Sequence-Space Jacobian (SSJ) toolbox:

1. Define individual blocks: SimpleBlock, HetBlock, etc
 - More complex SolvedBlock to solve out recursions, e.g. an Euler equation
2. Combine the blocks into a model
3. Set steady state parameters and solve the model at the steady state.
4. Solve for the responses of the model directly, code handles all Jacobians.
 - e.g. solve_impulse_linear automatically computes $d\mathbf{Y} = -(\mathbf{H}_Y)^{-1} \cdot \mathbf{H}_G \cdot d\mathbf{G}$
 - but can also compute $\mathbf{H}_Y$, $\mathbf{H}_G$ individually, or even $\mathcal{J}^{C,Z}$, $\mathcal{J}^{Z,Y}$ etc
 - we'll see this is helpful to inspect the model's mechanics!

Takeaway

- Fiscal policy in HANK is very different from RANK and TANK
- Why? Large **off-diagonal iMPCs**: households spend down past savings
- Consequence: deficit financing has persistent effects on output
 - Both initial **and** cumulative fiscal multipliers are large

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