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# THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF WOMEN'S SUPPORT FOR FUNDAMENTALIST ISLAM

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## INTRODUCTION

THE resurgence of revivalist religious practices, or fundamentalism, in the late twentieth century has been described as a “historical counterattack” mounted by threatened religious traditions seeking to slow the spread of secularization and mitigate the perceived negative effects of modern life.<sup>1</sup> Fundamentalist belief systems typically call for a return to the “golden age” of some society or religion when, almost without exception, men enjoyed considerable social and economic power over women.<sup>2</sup> But fundamentalist movements are not solely backward looking; rather, they also promote political agendas that seek to restore “lost social virtues”<sup>3</sup> to contemporary society, with specific—and unequal—implications for the freedoms and advantages afforded to men and women.

Fundamentalist Islam has attracted substantial outside interest in recent years in part because of the unusually restrictive demands that it places upon women. In addition to beliefs typical of fundamentalist ideologies that favor men over women in employment and education opportunities, fundamentalist Islam further uses these beliefs as the basis for practices such as veiling (use of *hijāb* or *niqāb*), female genital

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<sup>1</sup> Gabriel A. Almond, R. Scott Appleby, and Emmanuel Sivan, *Strong Religion: The Rise of Fundamentalisms around the World* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2003), 20.

<sup>2</sup> Lawrence Kaplan, ed., *Fundamentalism in Comparative Perspective* (Amherst: University of Massachusetts Press, 1992).

<sup>3</sup> Timur Kuran, “Fundamentalisms and the Economy,” in Marty E. Martin and R. Scott Appleby, eds., *Fundamentalisms and the State: Remaking Politics, Economies, and Militance* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1993), 290.

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mutilation, and sometimes even honor killings.<sup>4</sup> Nevertheless, many Muslim women support and identify with the fundamentalist Islamic social and political movements that promote these practices and beliefs and, indeed, often willingly participate in these practices themselves. This article addresses the question of why, in Muslim countries, women adopt fundamentalist value systems that limit their social, political, and economic opportunities and, in the extreme, can even result in their physical harm?<sup>5</sup>

Explaining why women in Muslim countries hold fundamentalist beliefs is necessarily a complex and multifaceted issue. Our analysis focuses upon the economic and social incentives women face when confronted with fundamentalist versus secular ideologies, but we recognize that these are by no means the only—or even, perhaps, the primary—determining factors. Nonetheless, as we show empirically, economic pressures do have large and significant effects on women's belief systems concerning religion, politics, and their own role and status in society. Women with limited economic opportunities—whether due to unemployment, minimal formal education, or poverty—are more likely to take on fundamentalist and traditionalist belief systems that enhance their value as potential marriage partners.

We operationalize fundamentalism as a composite belief system that spans two broad areas: preferences consistent with a traditionalist worldview that systematically favors men over women; and personal piety and support for the confluence of politics and religion consistent with conservative Islamic values.<sup>6</sup> To ascertain the prevalence of such beliefs in the Muslim world, we examine public opinion data from the latest wave of the World Values Survey, which included more than twenty thousand Muslim respondents in eighteen countries.

<sup>4</sup>The Islamic basis for these practices is a source of debate in the Muslim world. For example, the performance of female genital mutilation is not supported by most interpretations of Islamic law but many women in the Muslim world associate this act with adherence to Islam. In 1995, 97 percent of ever-married women aged fifteen to forty-nine in Egypt were circumcised and 96 percent of families surveyed in Indonesia in 2003 reported that their daughters had undergone some form of circumcision by age fourteen. See Kathryn Yount, "Like Mother, Like Daughter? Female Genital Cutting in Minia, Egypt," *Journal of Health and Social Behavior* 43, no. 3 (2002); Sara Corbett, "A Cutting Tradition," *New York Times Magazine*, January 20, 2008.

<sup>5</sup>It is less problematic as to why Muslim men might support social practices that advantage them vis-à-vis women, though this, too, is a research subject in need of further investigation.

<sup>6</sup>This definition of fundamentalism may not conform to some popular or journalistic uses of the term. We believe that our conceptualization is nonetheless valid and analytically useful. Debate over the status, role, and rights of women in Islam is perhaps the most important line of cleavage between those individuals who believe that the holy texts of Islam can be reinterpreted in the context of the present and those who would be considered hard-line literalists; see also Bronwyn Winter, "Fundamental Misunderstandings: Issues in Feminist Approaches to Islamism," *Journal of Women's History* 13, no.1 (2001).

Researchers across the social sciences have described mass support for fundamentalism as a vast sociopolitical movement, particularly among first-generation urban residents.<sup>7</sup> While narrative discussions of this subject are widespread in the women's studies and anthropology literature on comparative fundamentalism, political scientists have paid only scant attention to the topic. Yet understanding the determinants of fundamentalism is highly relevant to understanding world politics, as increasing support for fundamentalism in cultural practice has the potential to translate into increasing support for religiously oriented or authoritarian regimes and institutions.<sup>8</sup> Understanding the *economic* determinants of fundamentalism in particular is important, because economic opportunity—unlike other more idiosyncratic factors that may influence belief systems—can actually be shaped and regulated through government policy.

#### FUNDAMENTALISM AND GENDER NORMS

Fundamentalism refers to any “sociopolitical movement that requires of its members a strict adherence to specified ‘fundamentals’ or doctrines; and that claims for its motivation in doing so a divine, or otherwise transcendently grounded, mandate.”<sup>9</sup> Fundamentalist belief systems are associated with a kind of “principled rigidity”<sup>10</sup> that attempts to “return to the scriptural foundations of the community, excavating and reinterpreting these foundations for application to the contemporary social and political world.”<sup>11</sup> Anthropologists, sociologists, political scientists, and religious scholars have asserted that fundamentalism and support for fundamentalist practices have experienced a resurgence in the late twentieth century and that the motivation for the revival of neotraditionalism in diverse cultures appears to be rooted in similar social, economic, and political processes.<sup>12</sup>

<sup>7</sup> Kaplan (fn. 2), 9.

<sup>8</sup> M. Steven Fish, “Islam and Authoritarianism,” *World Politics* 55 (October 2002); John Esposito, *The Islamic Threat: Myth or Reality?* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999); Jodi Natchwey and Mark Tessler, “Explaining Women’s Support for Political Islam: Contributions from Feminist Theory,” in Mark Tessler, ed., *Area Studies and Social Science: Strategies for Understanding Middle East Politics* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1999).

<sup>9</sup> Santosh C. Saha and Thomas K. Carr, *Religious Fundamentalism in Developing Countries* (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Publishing Group, 2001), 3.

<sup>10</sup> Dale Eickelman and James Piscatori, *Muslim Politics* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1996), 55.

<sup>11</sup> Roxanne L. Euben, *Enemy in the Mirror: Islamic Fundamentalism and the Limits of Modern Rationalism* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1999).

<sup>12</sup> Judy Brink and Joan Mencher, eds., *Mixed Blessings: Gender and Religious Fundamentalism Cross Culturally* (London: Routledge, 1997).

Islamic fundamentalist practices and beliefs vary from place to place but have at their core a type of social conservatism that holds that Muslims must return to some authentically "Islamic" tradition. The standard historical explanation for the rise of fundamentalism is that in the wake of rapid modernization, secularization, and urbanization, traditional rural populations became increasingly disconnected from their more religious past. "Fundamentalists" blamed economic hardships and setbacks on secular and liberal elements of society.<sup>13</sup> With respect to gender norms, newly urbanized populations found it difficult to accept the changing role of women that accompanied modernization, particularly as women began to work in nontraditional areas.<sup>14</sup> Fundamentalists reacted negatively to women's social and economic liberation, particularly the changing nature of male/female relations in urban settings.<sup>15</sup> In elevating traditional Islam (or what is perceived to be traditionally Islamic) to a "sacrosanct status,"<sup>16</sup> fundamentalism can be viewed as an expression of modernity even as it is also a negative response to modernity.<sup>17</sup>

Abou El Fadl argues that one of the most traumatic aspects of Islamic fundamentalism has been its effect on women, as Muslim men seek to increase their feeling of empowerment in a modernizing world.<sup>18</sup> He writes that "puritan movements appropriated women's dignity into a symbol of honor for men" and that the easiest and most effective way to prove one's traditionalist legitimacy is to call for laws that are restrictive of women.<sup>19</sup> Fundamentalists have increasingly focused their attention on issues of morality, particularly as they pertain to the reputation

<sup>13</sup> Martin E. Marty and R. Scott Appleby, eds., *Fundamentalisms Comprehended* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1995), 1.

<sup>14</sup> Feminist scholarship suggests that during periods of rapid social change, gender assumes a paramount position in social discourse since women in developing societies are seen as the main transmitters of social values. Efforts are often made to reimpose traditional behaviors as a remedy for destabilization. See Valentine M. Moghadam, *Modernizing Women: Gender and Social Change in the Middle East* (Cairo: American University in Cairo Press, 1993), 136.

<sup>15</sup> Kaplan (fn. 2), 8. Mernissi adds that fundamentalism can be seen as a "political statement about men undergoing bewildering, compelling changes affecting their economic and sexual identity—changes so profound and numerous that they trigger deep-seated, irrational fears." See Fatima Mernissi, *Beyond the Veil: Male-Female Dynamics in Modern Muslim Society* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1987), ix.

<sup>16</sup> John Esposito, *Women in Muslim Family Law* (Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 1982).

<sup>17</sup> Ira Lapidus, "Islamic Revival and Modernity: The Contemporary Movements and the Historical Paradigms," *Journal of the Economic and Social History of the Orient* 40, no. 4 (1997); Lara Deeb, *An Enchanted Modern: Gender and Public Piety in Shi'i Lebanon* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2006).

<sup>18</sup> Khaled M. Abou El Fadl, *And God Knows the Soldiers: The Authoritative and the Authoritarian in Islamic Discourse* (New York: University Press of America, 2001), 7.

<sup>19</sup> Conservatives often cite *surat al-nisa'* of the Koran, which says, "Men shall take full care of women with the bounties which God has bestowed more abundantly on the former than on the latter," as a justification for their attitudes and actions toward women.

and chastity of women—an issue closely related to a man’s status or honor. Euben argues, in fact, that Islamic fundamentalists have become “obsessed” with the topic of women’s behavior and dress, while other scholars have described fundamentalist men as being intimidated by female autonomy and viewing their exercise of power over women as one of the few remaining areas in which they can wield control and authority.<sup>20</sup>

#### ECONOMIC CIRCUMSTANCES AND SUPPORT FOR FUNDAMENTALISM

Why, then, do Muslim women accede to fundamentalist belief systems that make them subordinate to men? We contend that among Muslim women financial insecurity is a key determinant of the propensity to adopt fundamentalist beliefs and preferences. To the extent that opportunities for economic security via employment in the job market are limited, women may look to the alternative of a favorable marriage in what is known as the “marriage market.” For women, fundamentalist views that perpetuate patriarchy and that are associated with conservatism, religiosity, and piety are traits valued in the marriage market and society writ large. Economic pressure can, in this manner, create incentives for a woman to support preferences that limit her social options and employment prospects so that she may seek material security through marriage.

Muslim women have a choice of whether or not to adopt and identify with fundamentalist belief systems—that is, their orientation toward or away from fundamentalism is not predetermined or externally imposed. Hardacre—a contributor to the American Academy of Arts and Sciences’ five-volume Fundamentalism Project—writes that women “freely and knowingly decide to relinquish power and autonomy in favor of men.”<sup>21</sup> Mahmood similarly emphasizes that Muslim women are active agents in the rise of fundamentalist values rather than victims of “false consciousness,” and Brink and Mencher note that women often choose fundamentalism to seek advantage or benefit.<sup>22</sup> Adherence to funda-

<sup>20</sup> Euben (fn. 11), 192; John Stratton Hawley, ed., *Fundamentalism and Gender* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1994); Haideh Moghissi, *Feminism and Islamic Fundamentalism* (London: Zed Books, 1999).

<sup>21</sup> Helen Hardacre, “The Impact of Fundamentalisms on Women, the Family, and Interpersonal Relations,” in Martin E. Marty and R. Scott Appleby, eds., *Fundamentalisms and Society: Reclaiming the Sciences, the Family, and Education* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1993).

<sup>22</sup> Saba Mahmood, *Politics of Piety: The Islamic Revival and the Feminist Subject* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2005); Brink and Mencher (fn. 12).

mentalist values is not an immutable or inborn trait. This is true even if we believe that women do not choose these beliefs out of explicitly strategic motives but rather take them on through a process of imitating other women around them who seem economically successful.

#### ALTERNATIVE EXPLANATIONS FOR FUNDAMENTALISM AMONG WOMEN

Numerous explanations have been proposed for why some Muslim women adopt fundamentalist belief systems (or various components of such belief systems), while others do not. For example, Hardacre lists (1) fear of dislocation, often associated with anticolonialist sentiment, (2) inability to earn sufficient wages independent of a male breadwinner, (3) lack of education and exposure to outside contacts, (4) concern over male reprisal for nonconformity and disobedience, (5) fear of divine disapproval, and (6) difficulty making choices about things that they were raised to believe would be inevitable.<sup>23</sup> Scholars including Mernissi and Piscatori have also emphasized the cultural and political aspects of the rise of fundamentalism.<sup>24</sup>

Recent work by political scientists has focused on the broader institutional and economic bases for gender differences in support for patriarchal norms and conservative policy outcomes. Iversen and Rosenbluth contend that the acceptance of patriarchal norms is tied to patterns in the sexual division of labor, with societies based on labor-intensive agriculture (or other modes of production that emphasize male "brawn") tending to advantage men over women.<sup>25</sup> This is also consistent with the finding that the economic insecurity associated with higher divorce rates leads women in advanced democracies to support left-leaning politicians.<sup>26</sup>

The theory and the evidence we present support the position that the beliefs and ideological orientation of women in the Muslim world often have economic determinants.<sup>27</sup> Nevertheless, evidence in support

<sup>23</sup> Hardacre (fn. 21).

<sup>24</sup> Mernissi (fn. 15); James Piscatori, "Accounting for Islamic Fundamentalisms," in Marty E. Martin and R. Scott Appleby, eds., *Accounting for Fundamentalisms: The Dynamic Character of Movements* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1994).

<sup>25</sup> Torben Iversen and Frances Rosenbluth, "Gender Socialization: How Bargaining Power Shapes Social Norms and Political Attitudes," Working Paper, no. 2008-0064 (Cambridge: Weatherhead Center for International Affairs, Harvard University, 2005).

<sup>26</sup> Lena Edlund and Rohini Pande, "Why Have Women Become Left-Wing? The Political Gender Gap and the Decline in Marriage," *Quarterly Journal of Economics* 117, no. 3 (2002); Lena Edlund, Laila Haider, and Rohini Pande, "Unmarried Parenthood and Redistributive Politics," *Journal of the European Economic Association* 3, no. 1 (2005).

<sup>27</sup> Indeed, the general notion that economic factors shape individuals' political attitudes—and even their vote choices—is not a matter of much dispute. See Helmut Norpoth, Michael S. Lewis-Beck, and Jean-Dominique Lafay, eds., *Economics and Politics: The Calculus of Support* (Ann Arbor: University of

of an economic motivation for some—or even many—women to hold fundamentalist beliefs does not necessarily preclude other women from holding fundamentalist beliefs for completely noneconomic reasons. And for the most part, the various alternative explanations are complementary rather than competing.

#### DOES POVERTY CAUSE FUNDAMENTALISM?

It has long been suggested that poverty breeds fundamentalist beliefs and that poor Muslims constitute the demographic group most affected by this phenomenon. Relative deprivation and hopelessness are cited as sources of frustration for many Muslims, particularly young men. The Israeli politician Shimon Peres, in his vision of “the new Middle East,” argued that fundamentalism is a protest against poverty.<sup>28</sup> Others have made the case that poverty provides fertile ground for fundamentalist belief systems.<sup>29</sup> The causal mechanism is thought to be that poor economic circumstances “may create attitudes and grievances among particular groups in the population, inclining them favorably to fundamentalist arguments, themes, and practices.”<sup>30</sup>

There are, however, striking counterexamples. Thus, citizens of cash-starved Bangladesh enjoy a reputation for their secular outlook, whereas oil-rich Saudis are much more likely to be considered fundamentalist in their outlook toward religion. Economic booms do not inoculate against rising fundamentalism, nor do busts ensure the opposite. And although standards of living continued to rise across the Muslim world during the twentieth century, support for fundamentalism also increased.

In addition, research into fundamentalist self-identification at the individual level has shown that it cuts across socioeconomic lines. Mahmood writes that during her fieldwork studying the Islamist movement in Egypt, “women from a variety of socioeconomic backgrounds” supported Islamism, in contrast to the conventional wisdom that Islamist support came only from among the poor.<sup>31</sup> Moghadam also stresses that fundamentalist preferences among women are not a function of

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Michigan Press, 1991); Helmut Norpoth, “Presidents and the Prospective Voter,” *Journal of Politics* 58 (August 1996); Michael B. MacKuen, Robert S. Erikson, and James A. Stimson, “Peasants or Bankers? The American Electorate and the U.S. Economy,” *American Political Science Review* 86 (September 1992); and Christopher Anderson, *Blaming the Government: Citizens and the Economy in Five European Democracies* (Armonk, N.Y.: M. E. Sharpe, 1995).

<sup>28</sup> Shimon Peres, interview with *Middle East Quarterly* 2 (March 1995).

<sup>29</sup> Gilles Kepel, *The Prophet and the Pharaoh: Muslim Extremism in Egypt* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1985); Sherifa Zuhur, *Revealing Reveiling: Islamist Gender Ideology in Modern Egypt* (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1992).

<sup>30</sup> Almond, Appleby, and Sivan (fn. 1), 130.

<sup>31</sup> Mahmood (fn. 22), 2.

class.<sup>32</sup> Egyptian sociologist Ibrahim has shown that Islamic extremists tend to be well-educated, upwardly mobile young men, not the stereotypical slum dweller.<sup>33</sup> Members of the Muslim Brotherhood across the Islamic world are very often doctors, lawyers, and engineers.<sup>34</sup> It is also relevant that most current knowledge about support for fundamentalism deals specifically with the preferences and beliefs of Muslim men, while Muslim women may face a very different set of constraints and incentives when choosing among belief systems.

#### ECONOMIC OPPORTUNITY AND FINANCIAL SECURITY

We propose an alternative mechanism through which unfavorable economic circumstances may lead women to embrace fundamentalist beliefs. The basic avenues to material security for women in the Muslim world are gainful employment, marriage to a gainfully employed spouse, or some combination of the two.<sup>35</sup> When economic opportunities are available and market conditions favorable, women may profitably elect to seek employment opportunities outside of the home. Under less favorable economic circumstances, however, marriage can serve as a substitute for paid employment in the workforce.

For women, personal piety and support for conservative, traditionalist gender norms have value in the marriage market and increase their marriageability. Marriage in Muslim-majority countries, particularly among the nonelite, is viewed as a contract between two parties and is likely to be the single most important economic arrangement that a woman enters into in her entire life.<sup>36</sup> Selection of marriage partners is therefore a critical concern. The contemporary Muslim view is that family is the fundamental unit of society and that the mother has a key role in the socialization of children, particularly in raising committed Muslims and transmitting cultural values.<sup>37</sup> A woman's status is thus mainly determined by her ability to be a good wife and

<sup>32</sup> Moghadam (fn. 14).

<sup>33</sup> Saad Eddin Ibrahim, "Anatomy of Egypt's Militant Islamic Groups: Methodological Note and Preliminary Findings," *International Journal of Middle East Studies* 12 (December 1980).

<sup>34</sup> It is not clear whether individual extremists or fundamentalist group leaders who are subject to academic study are representative of the broader distribution of individuals with these beliefs. Ethan Bueno de Mesquita makes the compelling case that there exists a wide distribution of individuals in extremist groups, yet those selected for study may be the individuals of highest "quality" with regard to education and ability. See Bueno de Mesquita, "The Quality of Terror," *American Journal of Political Science* 49, no. 3 (2005).

<sup>35</sup> In the wealthiest of the Gulf oil states, it is possible to live off of state largesse and family wealth although the vast majority of women are married, employed, or both.

<sup>36</sup> Homa Hoodfar, *Between Marriage and the Market: Intimate Politics and Survival in Cairo* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1997).

<sup>37</sup> Mahmood (fn. 22), 100.

mother.<sup>38</sup> One observer of Egyptian family life writes that potential partners need to have the right set of qualifications; and women particularly must reflect well upon the public reputation of the families involved, since Muslim males are preoccupied with “family name and reputation.”<sup>39</sup> Anthropologists report that fundamentalist women, in general, are dedicated to the “maintenance and valorization of patriarchal social structures” and that they consider a mother’s most important task to be the supervision of her children’s moral education against the influence of secular society.<sup>40</sup>

A common feature across the contemporary Muslim world is the premium placed on conformity to conservative norms and perceived piousness for women seeking marriage. In Egypt these views pervade all levels of society, from female inhabitants of Cairo’s cemetery-slums known as the City of the Dead<sup>41</sup> to women in the middle and upper social classes.<sup>42</sup> In Cairo’s urban quarters some young men see the search for a “moral” marriage partner as a more daunting challenge than finding an apartment in the city’s highly competitive market for affordable real estate.<sup>43</sup> White reports from her fieldwork in a working-class neighborhood of Istanbul that “for a prospective bride, it was crucial that there be no hint of indiscretion . . . any gossip to the contrary, even as innocent as word of having been seen chatting in the street with an unrelated man, would make it difficult for her to find a husband.”<sup>44</sup> The importance of piety also appears in the literature on marriage practices outside of the Muslim Middle East. Harris writes that in Tajikistan any stain on a woman’s reputation may make it impossible for her to marry well.<sup>45</sup> In Uzbekistan conservative gender roles are the norm and family

<sup>38</sup>Hoda Rashad, Magued Osman, and Farzaneh Roudi-Fahimi, *Marriage in the Arab World* (Washington, D.C.: Population Reference Bureau, 2005).

<sup>39</sup>Andrea Rugh, *Family in Contemporary Egypt* (Cairo: American University in Cairo Press, 1985), 108–9. As one Muslim male commented, “The fact is that men who have reservations about [female] circumcision would marry circumcised women, but those who see circumcision as necessary for women would not marry uncircumcised women.” (The term “female circumcision” is a euphemism for the practice more commonly known as female genital mutilation.) Conservative beliefs are seen as a necessary trait for many marriages and an acceptable trait for the rest. See Hoodfar (fn. 36), 261.

<sup>40</sup>Almond, Appleby, and Sivan (fn. 1), 11–12.

<sup>41</sup>Helen Watson, *Women in the City of the Dead* (London: C. Hurst and Co., 1992).

<sup>42</sup>This observation is based on conversations with dozens of Egyptian women during nine months of field research conducted in 2005 by Lisa Blaydes; see also Diane Singerman, *Avenues of Participation: Family, Politics, and Networks in Urban Quarters of Cairo* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1995); and Zuhur (fn. 29).

<sup>43</sup>Salwa Ismail, *Political Life in Cairo’s New Quarters: Encountering the Everyday State* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2006), 110.

<sup>44</sup>Jenny B. White, *Islamist Mobilization in Turkey: A Study in Vernacular Politics* (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 2002), 89.

<sup>45</sup>Colette Harris, *Control and Subversion: Gender Relations in Tajikistan* (London: Pluto Press, 2004), 78.

honor depends on controlling a woman's sexuality.<sup>46</sup> In Kazakhstan a woman who is kidnapped by a potential suitor is typically subjected to intense social pressure to marry that individual; the alternative, to return home unmarried, would make her a "less desirable marriage partner" in the future.<sup>47</sup> Even Muslim women in the Balkans—a relatively secular Muslim area—are nevertheless expected to be "pure" prior to marriage; according to one scholar, Muslim women retain "their dignity and honor only by obeying Muslim precepts."<sup>48</sup>

At the same time, the ability of women to obtain certain well-paying jobs is also contingent upon their preferences—but in precisely the opposite manner. External signals of piety that might help women in the marriage market may actually hurt them on the job market. Barsoum writes that higher education is not a sufficient condition to get a good job in Egypt; employers also serve as gatekeepers weeding out those individuals who do not display the progressive attitudes required for prized positions with multinational companies.<sup>49</sup> Veiled women in Egypt have been subject to job discrimination in prestigious fields such as televised media, advertising, hospitality, and other segments of the tourism market, and foreign companies often have an unwritten policy of not hiring veiled women.<sup>50</sup> Wickham relates an incident in Egypt where a recruiter for a foreign-owned hotel chain said a woman wearing a headscarf would not know how to relate to the hotel's up-market customers or be capable of handling their needs.<sup>51</sup> Similar incidents have been described in Turkey and Lebanon.<sup>52</sup> This phenomenon is also observed in cases of less prestigious employment. In highly patriarchal Muslim West Africa, Muslim Hausa women who hope to remarry after

<sup>46</sup> Marianne Kamp, "Between Women and the State: Mahalla Committees and Social Welfare in Uzbekistan," in Pauline Jones Luong, ed., *The Transformation of Central Asia: States and Societies from Soviet Rule to Independence* (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 2004), 45.

<sup>47</sup> Cynthia Werner, "Women, Marriage, and the Nation-State: The Rise of Nonconsensual Bride Kidnapping in Post-Soviet Kazakhstan," in Luong (fn. 46), 74.

<sup>48</sup> Swanee Hunt, "Muslim Women in the Bosnian Crucible," *Sex Roles* 51 (September 2004); H. T. Norris, *Islam in the Balkans: Religion and Society between Europe and the Arab World* (London: Hurst and Company, 1993); and Azra Zalihić-Kaurin, "The Muslim Woman," in Alexandra Stiglmeier, ed., *Mass Rape: The War against Women in Bosnia-Herzegovina* (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1994), 172–73.

<sup>49</sup> Ghada Barsoum, *The Employment Crisis of Female Graduates in Egypt: An Ethnographic Account*, Cairo Papers in Society Science 25, no. 3 (Cairo: American University in Cairo Press, 2002). While many conservative women are able to seek employment in the state sector, these jobs are generally much less desirable and lucrative than private sector employment.

<sup>50</sup> *Daily Star Egypt*, November 22, 2006; Mervat F. Hatem, "Economic and Political Liberalization in Egypt and the Demise of State Feminism," *International Journal of Middle East Studies* 24 (May 1992).

<sup>51</sup> Carrie Rosefsky Wickham, *Mobilizing Islam: Religion, Activism, and Political Change in Egypt* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2002), 54.

<sup>52</sup> White (fn. 44); Deeb (fn. 17).

being widowed or divorced are expected to observe norms of female seclusion, a practice associated with religious commitment. But according to Callaway, there is an economic trade-off: women who choose not to go into seclusion have higher incomes, as they can engage in informal economic activity outside of the home.<sup>53</sup>

Women in many Muslim-majority countries are therefore in a double bind. On the one hand, those who give secular signals to actors in the employment market are disadvantaged in the marriage market. But those who give conservative signals to potential spouses in the marriage market may be disadvantaging themselves in the market for high-paying jobs.<sup>54</sup> Women—particularly those without good job prospects—suffer from high levels of anxiety as a result of economic uncertainty and may view marriage as the only source of financial security.<sup>55</sup> This has led some to argue that women's conservatism and adherence to puritanical Islam has a material basis. Hoodfar comments that "women's adherence to traditional ideology serves their interests, given their possibilities and justifies financial dependence on their husbands."<sup>56</sup>

#### IDENTIFYING AND PREDICTING BELIEF SYSTEMS

To determine precisely how economic factors influence the degree to which Muslim women adopt fundamentalist belief systems, we analyze cross-national public opinion data collected over the past decade as part of the World Values Survey (wvs).<sup>57</sup> Our study spans the eighteen wvs countries with the largest Muslim populations, representing nearly 70 percent of the world's Muslims.<sup>58</sup> No country excluded from our analy-

<sup>53</sup> Barbara Callaway, *Muslim Hausa Women in Nigeria* (Syracuse, N.Y.: Syracuse University Press, 1987).

<sup>54</sup> See David Siddhartha Patel for a thorough discussion of signaling piety. David Siddhartha Patel, "Concealing to Reveal: The Changing Informational Role of Islamic Dress" (Paper presented at the annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, Philadelphia, August 31–September 3, 2006).

<sup>55</sup> Rahma Bourqia, "Women, Uncertainty, and Reproduction in Morocco," in Carla Makhoul Obermeyer, ed., *Family, Gender, and Population in the Middle East: Policies in Context* (Cairo: American University in Cairo Press, 1995).

<sup>56</sup> Hoodfar (fn. 36), 135.

<sup>57</sup> Ronald Inglehart, Miguel Basañez, Jaime Diez-Medrano, Loek Halman, and Ruud Luijkx, eds., *Human Beliefs and Values: A Cross-cultural Sourcebook Based on the 1999–2002 Values Surveys* (Mexico City: Siglo XXI, 2004); and <http://www.worldvaluessurvey.org>. For more on the design and scope of other cross-national public opinion studies, see Anthony Heath, Stephen Fisher, and Shawna Smith, "The Globalization of Public Opinion Research," *Annual Review of Political Science* 8 (2005). Survey research based upon the principle of random sampling is widely recognized as an effective and reliable scientific instrument for the collection of opinion data in political science. Henry E. Brady, "Contributions of Survey Research to Political Science," *PS: Political Science and Politics* 33 (March 2000).

<sup>58</sup> A complete list of these countries, and the sample sizes for each, are given in Appendix 1. We exclude wvs countries with fewer than 150 Muslim respondents to ensure that each country has a sufficient sample size to be able to make meaningful estimates of country-level fundamentalism at a later point in the analysis.

sis contains more than 2 percent of the world's Muslim population. We restrict our analysis to those individuals who identify themselves as Muslim to the wvs. This produces a data set containing a very large total of 22,376 individual respondents.

We have hypothesized that Muslim women who are able to earn sufficient income outside of marriage will be less likely to support fundamentalist values. Testing this hypothesis first requires identifying women whose beliefs and preferences are consistent with a fundamentalist Islamic worldview. We accomplish this using a statistical technique called latent class analysis, which takes a sequence of questions from the wvs data set and locates a cluster of Muslim respondents who report consistently "fundamentalist" attitudes.<sup>59</sup>

If we are correct that a lack of economic opportunity creates incentives for women to prioritize marriage over paid employment and that in order to facilitate marriage, women may choose to adopt fundamentalist beliefs, then we would expect fundamentalism to be more prevalent among married women than among unmarried women. Likewise, if women are able to support themselves by working, adopting fundamentalist values will not confer any additional advantage, and we should observe that women with jobs are less fundamentalist than those without. Each of these are precisely what our analysis reveals.

As higher levels of formal education are expected to provide greater potential employment opportunities, and hence enhanced income potential, we also predict an association between education and more Western attitudes toward women's role in society. However, women in higher socioeconomic classes may hold fundamentalist beliefs, and it has been noted that some of the strongest support for the Islamist movement is found among extremely well educated women, such as doctors and university educators, who may see opportunities for prestigious employment in providing high-level services to other women in single-sex environments or in serving in a leadership capacity for the mass Islamist movement.<sup>60</sup> This is consistent with the observation that the highest levels of society of some Arab countries have seen an increasing polarization of beliefs between hard-core secularists and

<sup>59</sup>The technique of latent class analysis was first set forth by Paul F. Lazarsfeld, "The Logical and Mathematical Foundations of Latent Structure Analysis," in Samuel A. Stouffer, ed., *Measurement and Prediction* (New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1950). A wide range of variations and extensions of that original model have subsequently been developed; see Jacques A. Hagenars and Allan L. McCutcheon, eds., *Applied Latent Class Analysis* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002). A study similar to ours in both spirit and execution is Kazuo Yamaguchi, "Multinomial Logit Latent-Class Regression Models: An Analysis of the Predictors of Gender-Role Attitudes among Japanese Women," *American Journal of Sociology* 105 (May 2000).

<sup>60</sup>Moghadam (fn. 14), 148.

extreme traditionalists.<sup>61</sup> Thus it is possible that even though the *overall* trend is for the prevalence of fundamentalist beliefs to decrease with education, this trend will reverse slightly for women at the very highest levels of education. And in fact we find evidence of this effect, as discussed below. An alternative possibility is that employed and highly educated women who are interested in marriage adopt conservative beliefs to offset the secular signal sent by those sources of self-sufficiency. But if this were true, then we would observe no (or even, the opposite) effect of employment and education on belief system, which is not what our empirical findings indicate.

#### MEASURING FUNDAMENTALISM USING PUBLIC OPINION DATA

Fundamentalist Islamic belief systems are, by definition, multifaceted. To characterize fundamentalists, we examine responses to sixteen WVS questions addressing preferences regarding gender roles and opportunities, as well as regarding personal religiosity and the role of religion in government. How an individual answers these questions reveals his or her underlying belief system—which may or may not be fundamentalist. While there exist many variations on the definition of fundamentalism, the large majority of these definitions overlap in ways that our operationalization captures. The sixteen questions, listed in Appendix 2, are not based on the experience of a particular country but rather are relevant across the Islamic world.

Notions of gender equality are typically associated with industrialized, Western nations, but these ideas are increasingly becoming globalized. While some individuals believe in equality between the sexes, others favor traditionalist ideals, often transmitted via religious channels and associated with the people who claim the right to speak in the name of puritanical Islam. This division is captured well by questions such as whether men should have more of a right than women to a job or a university education, whether women must have children, or whether polygamy is acceptable.

Questions about personal religious practices such as frequency of attendance at religious services and belief in God measure another component of fundamentalism, as do questions related to support for the confluence of religion and politics. Fundamentalist Islamic groups have long argued that governments of Muslim countries should implement Islamic law. While some of these groups have recently shifted their argument to encourage laws in an Islamic “framework,” the intent is

<sup>61</sup> Nadine El Sayed, “Extreme Differences,” *Egypt Today* (June 2007)

clear: a joining of religion and state. The World Values Survey asks, for example, whether respondents believe that politicians must believe in God, whether religious leaders should influence politics, and whether Islamic law should be implemented. As with opinions favoring traditionalist gender roles, religiosity and political religiosity are necessary, but not sufficient, conditions for being considered fundamentalist.<sup>62</sup>

#### LATENT CLASS ANALYSIS

Groups of individuals with similar belief systems provide roughly similar sets of survey responses across our questions of interest. Latent class models utilize information about the frequency with which different patterns of survey responses were given and the similarities and differences between these response patterns to partition the survey sample into subgroups of like-minded individuals. The model does so by assuming, first, that the sample comprises a mixture of different types of people, with different probabilities of giving each response to each survey question, depending upon their underlying beliefs; and second, that conditional on belonging to each belief system group, individuals' survey responses are statistically independent. The categorical variable labeling these underlying clusters is unobserved (latent) and is inferred from the observed data.<sup>63</sup>

The latent class model identifies the natural groupings (the "classes") in the data and estimates the most probable class membership for each respondent. The model does not determine the actual number of such latent groups, though it can guide the analyst in making a theoretically and empirically sound assessment. In fitting the latent class model, our goal is to estimate the simplest model that isolates and identifies those individuals with a "fundamentalist" belief system. As we demonstrate in the next section, a model with four latent classes—one of which represents "fundamentalists"—accomplishes this task well.

Latent class models also allow for the inclusion of covariates to predict latent class membership.<sup>64</sup> These variables represent a second source of information in addition to the survey responses about each individual's

<sup>62</sup> To be clear, while this article deals with belief systems in Islamic societies, we make no claims regarding whether certain beliefs are aspects of a "right" or "true" Islam.

<sup>63</sup> Latent class models require no assumptions about respondents assigning utility to their responses, nor about any sort of utility maximization when selecting among outcomes. This contrasts with the statistical methods of ideal point estimation, which are also used to estimate latent characteristics of individuals based upon their observed behaviors, but which do require certain rationality assumptions. See, for example, Joshua Clinton, Simon Jackman, and Douglas Rivers, "The Statistical Analysis of Roll Call Data," *American Political Science Review* 98 (May 2004).

<sup>64</sup> C. Mitchell Dayton and George B. Macready, "Concomitant-Variable Latent-Class Models," *Journal of the American Statistical Association* 83, no. 401 (1988); Karen Bandeen-Roche, Diana L. Miglioretti, Scott L. Zeger, and Paul J. Rathouz, "Latent Variable Regression for Multiple Discrete Outcomes," *Journal of the American Statistical Association* 92, no. 440 (1997).

ideological orientation. In this latent class “regression” model, the probability of membership in each latent class is predicted by the covariates; in turn, membership in each latent class is used to explain the observed pattern of responses across the sixteen survey questions.

#### MODEL SETUP AND ESTIMATION

Let  $X_i$  denote the vector of covariates for the  $i$ th respondent, where  $i=1, \dots, N$ . Also assume the latent variable—that is, the variable that labels the belief system clusters—contains  $R$  unordered categories. Because the categories of this variable are exhaustive, the probabilities that an individual belongs to each of the  $R$  categories must sum to one. We therefore employ a multinomial logit link function to map from  $X_i$  to each of these  $R$  prior probabilities:

$$p_r(X_i; \beta) = \frac{e^{X_i \beta_r}}{\sum_{q=1}^R e^{X_i \beta_q}}. \quad (1)$$

The coefficient vectors  $\beta_r$  are estimated in the model, with  $\beta_r = 0$  (corresponding to an arbitrarily selected “reference” class) fixed by definition. The sign and magnitude of the coefficients in each  $\beta_1$  determine the relative probability that a respondent will belong to class  $r$  with respect to class 1.

The model simultaneously estimates the probabilities that an individual belonging to each latent class will give each response to each question. Denote these class-conditional response probabilities as  $\pi_{jkr}$ , where  $j=1, \dots, J$  indexes questions and each question has  $k=1, \dots, K_j$  discrete outcomes. Estimated values of  $\pi_{jkr}$  provide a profile of the “type” of respondent in each latent class.<sup>65</sup>

Recalling the latent class model’s assumption of conditional independence, the probability of observing individual  $i$ ’s response pattern if they belong to class  $r$  is

$$f(Y_i; \pi_r) = \prod_{j=1}^J \prod_{k=1}^{K_j} (\pi_{jkr})^{Y_{ijk}}. \quad (2)$$

where  $Y_{ijk}$  represents the observed survey responses.  $Y_{ijk}=1$  if respondent  $i$  gives the  $k$ th response to the  $j$ th question, and  $Y_{ijk}=0$  otherwise.

<sup>65</sup> If any survey item does a poor job of “discriminating” between the latent classes—either because the classes do not differentiate on that item or because the item does not contain that much variation to begin with—it will be apparent in the estimated values of  $\pi_{jkr}$ . Using survey questions with low variance does not impede the estimation or interpretation of the latent class model in any way.

Given observed  $X_i$  and  $Y_i$ , we estimate the parameters  $\beta_r$  and  $\pi_{jkr}$  by maximum likelihood.<sup>66</sup> The log-likelihood function of the latent class regression model is

$$\ln L = \sum_{i=1}^N \ln \sum_{r=1}^R p_r(X_i; \beta) f(Y_i; \pi_r). \tag{3}$$

The estimated  $\hat{\pi}_{jkr}$  and  $\hat{\beta}_r$  can then be used to calculate the probabilities (again, summing to one) that individuals belong to each class. Because the  $\hat{\pi}_{jkr}$  are estimates of question response probabilities *conditional on* class  $r$ , we apply Bayes' formula to calculate

$$\hat{\Pr}(r | X_i, Y_i) = \frac{p_r(X_i; \hat{\beta}) f(Y_i; \hat{\pi}_r)}{\sum_{q=1}^R p_q(X_i; \hat{\beta}) f(Y_i; \hat{\pi}_q)}. \tag{4}$$

These posterior probabilities utilize all information—both covariates and survey responses—known about each person in the survey. Taking the average value of the posteriors  $\hat{\Pr}(r | X_i, Y_i)$  across all survey respondents gives the share of the survey sample in each latent class.

### INDIVIDUAL-LEVEL ANALYSIS

We apply the latent class model to the selected WVS items for all Muslim respondents in the eighteen countries under analysis. In pooling respondents across countries, we are explicitly imposing a universal standard of fundamentalism.

A latent class model with four classes provides an accurate and useful fit to the data. Two classes produce an overly crude partition along liberal-conservative lines. Adding a third class distinguishes the secular grouping more clearly but leads to a poor classification of conservatives. The four-class model accomplishes our objective of isolating a fundamentalist subgroup, which consists of roughly 33 percent of the survey sample.<sup>67</sup> It also estimates that approximately 13 percent of the sample

<sup>66</sup> To fit the model, we utilize the statistical package *poLCA* implemented in R version 2.7.1. Drew A. Linzer and Jeffrey Lewis, "poLCA: Polytomous variable Latent Class Analysis," R package version 1.1 (2007); <http://userwww.service.emory.edu/~dlinzer/poLCA/>; R Development Core Team, *R: A Language and Environment for Statistical Computing* (Vienna: R Foundation for Statistical Computing, 2008); <http://www.R-project.org>.

<sup>67</sup> It does *not* follow that one-third of all Muslims in the world are fundamentalist. This is because while the survey sample is random within each country, the pooled sample is not a random sample of

can be considered secular.<sup>68</sup> When a fifth class is added to the model, almost none of the individuals identified as fundamentalist in the four-class model are reclassified, indicating that the four-class model is the most parsimonious.

#### LATENT CLASS MODEL SPECIFICATION

We include a series of covariates in the latent class model to predict membership in the “fundamentalist” class of survey respondents. Each of these variables is also taken from the WVS data set.<sup>69</sup> The first test variable is the employment status of the individual respondent. We predict that women who work will be less likely to report fundamentalist attitudes. We also include a covariate for marital status, with the expectation that married women are more likely than unmarried women to hold fundamentalist beliefs. Of course, many women throughout the Muslim world are both employed *and* married; these women constitute approximately 20 percent of the sample. But over half of the women in the sample are married and either out of work or housewives, and it is among this group that we expect fundamentalism to be most prevalent.

We also test the effect of a respondent’s level of education, as greater amounts of education are expected to be associated with lower levels of fundamentalism. To give the model sufficient flexibility to capture a possible upward trend back toward fundamentalism at the very highest levels of education, we also add a squared term for education to the model.

Finally, including a covariate for the respondent’s social class allows us to test the effect of poverty. Social class is self-reported by the survey respondent. The conventional belief is that women who identify with a lower social class will be more fundamentalist than women of a higher social class. Yet some part of this effect could potentially be attributable to respondents in lower social classes having lower levels of formal education. Our hypothesis is that the effects of employment, marriage,

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Muslims worldwide. Countries such as India and Indonesia are undersampled, while others such as Azerbaijan, Jordan, and Turkey are oversampled.

<sup>68</sup> It is possible that the secular group is so small because of the choice of countries surveyed. It is also possible that Muslim respondents who hold secular beliefs are not identifying themselves as Muslims on the survey. To investigate this possibility, we fit a four-class model to the 2,541 respondents who report no religious affiliation. A subgroup of 22 percent constitutes a secular class similar to what was found among self-identified Muslims; a further 20 percent are still more secular. Even if all of these respondents were actually Muslim, that would only be 1,070 individuals—less than 5 percent of the total number of self-identified Muslims in the sample.

<sup>69</sup> The covariates are WVS items X001, X025, X028, and X045. Education and social class fall into ordered categories with eight and five responses, respectively. Employment status is a nominal variable with eight categories; we recode the variable as 1 if the individual is unemployed or a housewife, 0 otherwise.

and education will be stronger predictors of belief systems than social class, once all variables are included in the model.

When fitting the latent class model, we employ interaction terms between sex and each of the other covariates, to reflect our expectation that the effect of these covariates is different for men and women. Estimates of the coefficients on these covariates are given in Table 1.<sup>70</sup> For ease of interpretation, we report coefficients for men and women separately, rather than the coefficients on the interaction terms. Results from additional models controlling for respondent age are not reported, as that variable turns out to have nearly zero effect on predicting belief system grouping.

#### SUBGROUP CHARACTERISTICS

The four groupings identified by the latent class model provide considerable insight into the belief systems of Muslims worldwide (see Appendix 1). The primary division is between a class we term "secular-liberal" and the other three classes. Individuals in the secular-liberal class tend both to eschew traditional notions of gender roles and to exhibit generally lower levels of religiosity. They pray relatively infrequently, object strongly to the veil, and oppose the implementation of Islamic law. Unlike those in the conservative subgroups, these individuals are divided on questions of whether having children is necessary for a woman and if, when jobs are scarce, men should be advantaged over women. While many of these individuals would not be described as completely "secular" or "liberal" by Western standards, they represent the secular-liberal trend in the Islamic world.

At the other end of the spectrum, the "fundamentalist" grouping combines traditionalist gender norms with high levels of personal and political religiosity. Individuals in this category believe overwhelmingly that women should be religious, veiled, obey their husbands, and have children. They take comfort in religion, believe that religion and God are very important in their lives, and think politicians must believe in God as well. They also favor implementing Islamic law and believe that men make better political leaders than women.

<sup>70</sup> Because respondents with missing observations on the dependent variables can be included when estimating the latent class model, it is possible to estimate the model across the entire eighteen-country sample for all sixteen dependent variables, even though the full battery of questions was not asked in every country. For how the latent class model accommodates missing values, see Drew A. Linzer and Jeffrey Lewis, "poLCA: An R Package for Polytomous Variable Latent Class Analysis," *Journal of Statistical Software* (2008). We do not include country dummy variables among the covariates, as doing so would imply that respondents who gave the same survey responses and had the same covariates, but resided in different countries, would have different probabilities of belonging to each latent belief system cluster. This would imply that "fundamentalism" had different meanings in different countries, an operationalization we wish to avoid.

TABLE 1  
LATENT CLASS REGRESSION ANALYSIS OF ECONOMIC DETERMINANTS OF  
BELIEF SYSTEMS AMONG MUSLIM WOMEN AND MEN<sup>a</sup>

	<i>Muslim Women</i>			<i>Muslim Men</i>		
	<i>Fund.</i>	<i>Trad.</i>	<i>Relig.</i>	<i>Fund.</i>	<i>Trad.</i>	<i>Relig.</i>
Constant	2.941 (0.242)	2.312 (0.248)	2.007 (0.230)	5.251 (0.246)	3.333 (0.264)	2.934 (0.290)
Unemployed	0.903 (0.103)	0.704 (0.103)	0.806 (0.089)	-0.694 (0.105)	-0.648 (0.117)	-0.974 (0.147)
Married	-0.239 (0.110)	-0.203 (0.110)	-0.750 (0.089)	-0.617 (0.080)	-0.454 (0.089)	-1.107 (0.099)
Education (low to high)	-1.327 (0.096)	-0.656 (0.099)	-0.481 (0.087)	-1.354 (0.091)	-0.801 (0.098)	-1.050 (0.109)
Education <sup>2</sup>	0.110 (0.010)	0.031 (0.011)	0.035 (0.009)	0.108 (0.009)	0.054 (0.010)	0.089 (0.011)
Class (low to high)	0.091 (0.050)	0.062 (0.051)	0.202 (0.046)	-0.088 (0.042)	0.026 (0.046)	0.198 (0.054)
<i>Latent Class Shares</i>						
Fundamentalist	0.332		Observations	19710		
Traditional	0.260		Parameters	276		
Religious	0.275		Residual d.f.	19434		
Secular-Liberal	0.133		Log-likelihood	-230596.8		

SOURCE: World Values Survey.

<sup>a</sup>Results from latent class regression analysis with four classes and sixteen survey questions. Estimated multinomial logit coefficients  $\beta_r$  describe the tendency of respondents with various characteristics to belong to the specified latent class, calculated with respect to the secular-liberal class, as in equation 1. Standard errors are in parentheses. The four sets of estimated class-conditional response probabilities,  $\hat{\pi}_{jkr}$ , appear in Appendix 2.

The two intermediate subgroups are more conservative than the secular subgroup but also differ from the fundamentalists in specific ways. The first of these classes consists of individuals who are similar to the fundamentalists on issues of traditional gender roles but are not as religious as the fundamentalists; nor do they believe that religion should be as involved in politics. We term this cluster of individuals the “traditional” class. The other intermediate class, by contrast, consists of individuals who are very much religious and supportive of religious practices such as veiling and the implementation of Islamic law. However, this group is nearly indistinguishable from the secular-liberal class on issues of traditional gender roles, including opportunities for employment and education, whether men make better political leaders, whether wives must obey their husbands, and whether polygamy is acceptable. We term this final cluster of individuals the “religious” class.

The fact that four identifiable clusters of belief systems are present in the WVS data highlights the diversity of Muslim attitudes around the world—especially among those individuals who might typically be clumped together under a broad “conservative” label. Clearly, there is a significant proportion of Muslims who support traditional gender roles but are not especially interested in political Islam. There are also many Muslims who are otherwise highly religious but who nevertheless remain relatively supportive of Western notions of gender equality. It is interesting to note that individuals in this latter group are disproportionately female, as we show below.

#### EXPLAINING FUNDAMENTALIST BELIEF SYSTEMS

Taken together, the effects of sex, education, employment status, marital status, and social class predict the probability with which an individual is likely to belong to each of the four identified belief system groups. To interpret the substantive effect of these variables on the belief systems of Muslim women, we calculate predicted prior probabilities for hypothetical values of the covariates using equation 1 and the coefficient estimates in Table 1.

We begin with the effects of employment and marriage. As predicted, Muslim women who are married and unemployed are the most likely to hold fundamentalist beliefs—at all levels of education and in any social class (Table 2). Taken by themselves, nonemployment and marriage each increases the probability that a woman will belong to the fundamentalist group by anywhere from 1 to 5 percent. Taken together, women with an elementary-level education who are *both* married and housewives are a total of 8 percent more likely to hold fundamentalist beliefs than those who are unmarried and employed. For women with a secondary education, the difference is 6 percent.<sup>71</sup>

The effect of greater education on reducing the propensity of Muslim women to hold a fundamentalist belief system is especially dramatic (Figure 1). At the lowest levels of education, almost no women hold secular beliefs, while over one-third have attitudes that we characterize as fundamentalist. As education increases, there is a rapid decline in levels of fundamentalism, reaching a minimum once a woman has achieved a secondary education and then increasing slightly for more highly educated women. At the minimum, however, achieving a secondary

<sup>71</sup> It is possible that fundamentalist women who marry are simply less inclined than secular women to seek work subsequently. However, this provides no explanation for why women are or are not fundamentalist to begin with and in particular yields no testable predictions about the effects of education, socioeconomic class, or (as we investigate in the following section) aggregate poverty and wage inequality.

TABLE 2  
EFFECT OF NONEMPLOYMENT AND MARRIAGE ON PREVALENCE OF  
FUNDAMENTALIST BELIEF SYSTEMS AMONG MUSLIM WOMEN<sup>a</sup>

<i>For Muslim women who are . . .</i>			<i>. . . and unemployed/housewives:</i>
<i>Marital Status</i>	<i>Education Level</i>	<i>Social Class</i>	<i>Percentage More Likely to Be "Fundamentalist"</i>
married	elementary	low	5.0
married	secondary	low	4.5
married	elementary	high	4.1
unmarried	elementary	low	3.7
married	secondary	high	3.4
unmarried	secondary	low	3.0
unmarried	elementary	high	2.9
unmarried	secondary	high	2.1
<i>For Muslim women who are . . .</i>			<i>. . . and married:</i>
<i>Employment Status</i>	<i>Education Level</i>	<i>Social Class</i>	<i>Percentage More Likely to Be "Fundamentalist"</i>
unemployed	elementary	high	5.0
unemployed	elementary	low	4.1
employed	elementary	high	3.9
unemployed	secondary	high	3.4
employed	elementary	low	2.8
unemployed	secondary	low	2.8
employed	secondary	high	2.0
employed	secondary	low	1.2

<sup>a</sup> Fundamentalist belief systems are more prevalent among Muslim women who are not employed (top) and/or married (bottom). Percentages are based upon estimates reported in Table 1.

school education *reduces by more than half* the predicted level of fundamentalism among women, compared with having only an elementary level (or less) of formal education. Figure 1 shows the effect of education on fundamentalism for Muslim women who are married and housewives—the most fundamentalist group—but the effect is consistent regardless of marital or employment status. Note that as women become more educated, their support for traditionalist notions of gender roles decreases, even though they may still retain a strong sense of religiosity. Decreasing probabilities of belonging to the fundamentalist or traditional groups at higher levels of education are offset by increasing probabilities of belonging to either the secular-liberal or the religious group.

An economic explanation for the effect of education is that having at least a high school education creates opportunities for women to gain




FIGURE 1  
ESTIMATED PROBABILITIES THAT MUSLIM WOMEN AT VARIOUS LEVELS OF  
EDUCATION HOLD EACH OF THE FOUR IDENTIFIED BELIEF SYSTEMS<sup>a</sup>

<sup>a</sup> Probabilities are calculated for middle-class, married women lacking full-time employment, from results in Table 1.

employment in the formal rather than in the informal or agricultural sectors, where wages are low and often serve only as a supplement to a primary income. A possible alternative explanation is that education lowers women's propensity to hold fundamentalist beliefs because the education system is *itself* secular and encourages more moderate thinking. We therefore reestimate the model only for respondents in Iran aged forty and younger—a cohort in which, following the 1979 revolution, women received explicitly Islamic education. The effect of education on fundamentalism in Iran follows the same downward trend as in Figure 1, except without the uptick at the highest education levels.<sup>72</sup>

<sup>72</sup> Unfortunately, other countries such as Afghanistan under the Taliban and Sudan (since 1989) that also promote fundamentalist Islamic religious education were not in the WVS.

The substantive effect of social class on holding fundamentalist beliefs, while in the expected direction, is nevertheless quite small. Muslim women in the lowest social class are never more than 3 percent more likely than women in the upper middle class to fall into the fundamentalist belief system group, across all different levels of education, marital status, and employment.<sup>73</sup> Thus, in summary, poorly educated, unemployed, married, and low-social-class Muslim women are those most likely to hold fundamentalist beliefs.

One of the potentially most important aspects of these findings relates to the preferences and values of female university graduates—likely leaders of any nascent feminist movement in the Muslim world. Karam proposes that there exist three types of feminists in the Islamic world: secular feminists, Islamist feminists, and Muslim feminists.<sup>74</sup> Secular feminists support Western norms of gender equality and are represented in our data by the secular-liberal class. Islamist feminists argue that Islam promotes a patriarchal structure but that patriarchy is not necessarily oppressive for women;<sup>75</sup> they tend to refer to religious texts for support of their agenda.<sup>76</sup> This group is perhaps best represented in the data by the uptick in support for fundamentalism that is apparent among highly educated women.<sup>77</sup> Muslim feminists are, by contrast, women who hold a strong personal religious conviction and promote a reinterpretation of Islamic texts in ways that promote equality between the sexes. The key difference between Muslim feminists and Islamist feminists, therefore, is that Muslim feminists are willing to contextualize religious injunctions in order to allow for the possibility of textual reinterpretation. Our findings indicate that as women become more educated, they shed some of their support for gender inequity in favor of a combination of personal religiosity and a worldview of gender equality. Well-educated women who fall into the religious class that we describe map most closely on to this analytic category of Muslim feminist.

<sup>73</sup> Women in the highest, upper class constitute just 2 percent of the survey sample.

<sup>74</sup> Azza M. Karam, *Women, Islamisms and the State: Contemporary Feminisms in Egypt* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1998), 12.

<sup>75</sup> Islamist feminists have their roots in the activism of Zeinab al-Ghazali—founder of the Muslim Women's Association and affiliate of the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood.

<sup>76</sup> Moghadam questions whether Islamic feminism, as characterized by Karam, even exists or if this term is an oxymoron. See Valentine M. Moghadam, "Islamic Feminism and Its Discontents: Toward a Resolution of the Debate," *Signs: Journal of Women in Culture and Society* 27 (Summer 2002); and Karam (fn. 74).

<sup>77</sup> The emergence of a small but influential class of highly educated, fundamentalist women is an important area for future research. Since their fundamentalist orientation is not likely due to poor job prospects, other motivations, including but not limited to antiauthoritarian or antiglobalization sentiment, should be investigated. See Leila Hessini, "Wearing the Hijab in Contemporary Morocco: Choice and Identity," in Fatma Muge Gocek and Shiva Salaghi, eds., *Reconstructing Gender in the Middle East* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1994).

Among those women who are likely to be future leaders in the Islamic world—those with at least a university education—religious feminists clearly outnumber both Islamist feminists and secular feminists.

It is worth noting some key similarities and differences between the belief systems of Muslim women and Muslim men. The main difference is that men are considerably more likely than women to belong to the fundamentalist class—by as much as 30 percent for employed, unmarried men in a low social class. Also unlike women, men who are employed are *more* likely to hold fundamentalist beliefs. Yet for both men and women, the effect of education is consistent: men with greater education are more prone to hold liberal attitudes regarding religion and the role of women in society.

### CROSS-NATIONAL ANALYSIS

A measure of the value, to women, of participating in the labor force is the size of a country's wage gap between male and female earnings. Michael Ross has recently shown that economies based largely on oil production tend to crowd out more export-oriented industrial sectors that traditionally pay women more competitive wages.<sup>78</sup> The result is that fewer women enter the workforce, with negative consequences for the power and status of women in these countries. Consider, however, the choices Muslim women themselves then face. When, for whatever reason, male-female wage inequality increases, our expectation is that women seeking financial security will have greater incentives to direct their efforts away from the job market and toward marriage instead. As a result, we should observe that fundamentalist belief systems are more prevalent among women in countries with higher levels of male-female wage inequality. To test this hypothesis, we aggregate our individual-level results at the country level. This also reveals the geographic distribution of social, religious, and political belief systems across the Muslim world.

### GEOGRAPHIC PATTERNS OF MUSLIM BELIEF SYSTEMS

We assign each respondent to one of the four ideological groupings according to his or her modal posterior latent class membership probability.<sup>79</sup> We then tabulate the proportion of each country's overall, male,

<sup>78</sup>Michael Ross, "Oil, Islam and Women," *American Political Science Review* 102 (February 2008).

<sup>79</sup>This assignment rule minimizes the probability of misclassification; see Christopher M. Bishop, *Neural Networks for Pattern Recognition* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995), 1; R. O. Duda and P. E. Hart, *Pattern Classification and Scene Analysis* (New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1973).

and female Muslim population in each group (Figure 2). Geographic patterns are immediately apparent. Fundamentalist belief systems are most prevalent in Middle Eastern and North and West African countries, in particular, in the four Arab countries in the sample: Egypt, Jordan, Morocco, and Algeria. Secularism, by contrast, is confined nearly entirely to Southeastern Europe, India, and the former USSR. Again, it is clear that each country's fundamentalist types are far more likely to be male.

#### EXPLAINING CROSS-NATIONAL VARIATION

We model the country-level estimates of the prevalence of fundamentalism among women as a function of each country's male-female wage gap. We also control for the effect of wealth, as measured by per capita GDP. Because the proportion fundamentalist is bounded by 0 and 1, we transform it by taking the log-odds before fitting the model.

The results of this regression are given in Table 3. Because the dependent variable is estimated in a preliminary analysis, we report Efron small-sample robust standard errors.<sup>80</sup> Wage-gap data are drawn from the United Nations *Human Development Report* for the years in which the WVS was fielded in each of the study countries.<sup>81</sup> The wage gap in each country is calculated as female estimated earned income (PPP U.S.\$) divided by male estimated earned income, so that 1 denotes perfect equality and 0 denotes complete inequality. We obtain our measure of per capita GDP (PPP constant 2000 international \$) from the World Bank *World Development Indicators* database,<sup>82</sup> also for the years in which each country's WVS was administered.

The effect of the male-female wage gap on a country's level of fundamentalism among women is pronounced. Indeed, on a percentage basis, the effect is nearly one-to-one at low levels of wealth (Figure 3). Even with only seventeen observations, and using robust standard error estimates, the effect is significantly greater than zero. The wealth

<sup>80</sup> These standard error estimates account for heteroskedasticity in the dependent variable and are more conservative than normal OLS standard error estimates. Jeffrey B. Lewis and Drew A. Linzer, "Estimating Regression Models in Which the Dependent Variable Is Based on Estimates," *Political Analysis* 13, no. 4 (2005).

<sup>81</sup> United Nations, *Human Development Report* (New York: United Nations Development Programme, 1999, 2002, 2003, 2004, and 2005). When data are missing, these data are taken from the closest available year. WVS study years are Algeria 2002; Azerbaijan 1996 (missing, use 1997); Bangladesh 2002; Bosnia-Herzegovina 2001 (missing, use 2003); Egypt 2000; India 2001; Indonesia 2001; Iran 2000; Jordan 2001; Macedonia 2001 (missing, use 2002); Montenegro 2001 (not available); Morocco 2001; Nigeria 2000; Pakistan 2001; Singapore 2002; Tanzania 2001; Turkey 2000; Uganda 2001.

<sup>82</sup> World Bank, *World Development Indicators Online*, <http://www.worldbank.org/data/wdi2005> (accessed March 6, 2006).




FIGURE 2  
ESTIMATED PROPORTION OF EACH COUNTRY'S MUSLIM POPULATION (•)  
THAT BELONGS TO EACH OF FOUR BELIEF SYSTEM GROUPINGS, AS WELL AS  
PROPORTIONS OF MALES (M) AND FEMALES (F)<sup>a</sup>

<sup>a</sup> Countries in each figure are sorted by overall population share.

effect, while not as large as the wage-gap effect, is still substantial and also achieves statistical significance. The highest predicted level of fundamentalism among Muslim women is in countries that are the poorest while at the same time having the greatest male-female wage gap.

These observational data alone cannot rule out the possibility of endogeneity bias, to the extent that fundamentalist ideas regarding gender

TABLE 3  
REGRESSION OF ESTIMATED PERCENTAGE OF MUSLIM WOMEN IN EACH  
COUNTRY WITH A "FUNDAMENTALIST" BELIEF SYSTEM ON COUNTRY WEALTH  
AND MALE-FEMALE WAGE INEQUALITY<sup>a</sup>

<i>Variable</i>	<i>Coefficient</i>	<i>SE</i>	<i>t</i>	<i>p</i>
Constant	5.373	3.056	1.758	0.101
Wage parity	-5.166	1.770	-2.919	0.011
Per capita GDP (log)	-1.333	0.643	-2.072	0.057

<sup>a</sup> Linear regression model; dependent variable is the estimated percentage of Muslim women in each country with a "fundamentalist" belief system (calculated from Table 1), log-odds transformed.  $N=17$ ;  $R^2=0.441$ ;  $\hat{\sigma}=0.78$ . The two independent variables are correlated at  $-0.405$ . Montenegro is omitted for lack of wage and GDP data.

norms cause wage inequality and poor economic growth, rather than the reverse. Yet, although this alternative hypothesis may be plausible in today's globalized economy where the ability to tap into female human capital could attract investors, it is not at all clear to have been true when the Islamist movement began developing broad popular support in the 1960s and 1970s and many societies held similarly unequal attitudes toward gender roles. Consider, from a broader perspective, the changing attitudes toward gender outside of the Islamic world over time. At the turn of the twentieth century, norms of gender equality were just beginning to become internationalized with most societies holding beliefs that systematically favored men over women. In fact, Islam's favorable attitudes toward women's property rights may have even advantaged Muslim women economically over women in other societies at that time. However, countries such as those in the West whose economies offered women greater employment opportunities were less likely to hold on to these norms of gender inequality over time. The Muslim world was not particularly disadvantaged economically when it entered the twentieth century. But Islamic inheritance laws and other economic and political institutions hindered growth,<sup>83</sup> and ultimately the Islamic world came to be known as more retrograde with regard to internationalized gender equality norms than other parts of the world.

There is also no reason why the mechanisms we have set forth need necessarily to be limited to explaining features of contemporary Muslim society. As a historical example of how economic forces eroded women's adherence to a strongly patriarchal custom, consider that in

<sup>83</sup> Timur Kuran, "Why the Middle East Is Economically Underdeveloped: Historical Mechanisms of Institutional Stagnation," *Journal of Economic Perspectives* 18 (Summer 2004).

Percentage  
of women  
fundamentalist




FIGURE 3  
PREDICTED PROPORTION OF WOMEN, BY COUNTRY, WHO ARE  
“FUNDAMENTALIST” AT VARYING LEVELS OF WAGE INEQUALITY AND PER  
CAPITA GDP<sup>a</sup>

<sup>a</sup> A wage parity of 1 indicates perfect equality between male and female income. Individual countries are denoted by circles, with vertical lines indicating the positioning of each; lines are dotted below the best-fit surface. Based upon results in Table 3.

nineteenth-century China, foot binding—the forced and unnatural bending of a female child’s feet—was associated with female chastity and subordination and was the essential criterion for any girl’s marriageability, despite the fact that up to 10 percent of girls did not survive the treatment.<sup>84</sup> As China became increasingly industrialized, two economic factors contributed to the decline of the practice. First,

<sup>84</sup> Gerry Mackie, “Ending Footbinding and Infibulation: A Convention Account,” *American Sociological Review* 61 (December 2006).

industrialization slowly created a market for female labor that offered women an outside alternative to making a favorable marriage.<sup>85</sup> Second, the value of home spinning and weaving (the primary economic activity of women with bound feet) declined with the proliferation of machine-manufactured textiles.<sup>86</sup> In both scenarios the change in the economic environment resulted in a change in women's incentives to work and hence in a change in their decisions about whether or not to follow what had previously been a widely practiced tradition.

### CONCLUSIONS AND IMPLICATIONS

In 2004 the Egyptian National Population Center conducted a survey of women aged fifteen to forty-nine and found that nearly 86 percent of those surveyed thought that husbands were justified in beating their wives under certain circumstances. In fact, 70 percent believed that husbands had the right to beat wives who refused to have sex and 63 percent said a beating was justified if a woman was found talking to another man—both acts considered in Egypt to be a sign of weak religious devotion.<sup>87</sup> What would lead women to support practices such as these that are so explicitly antiwoman? This study provides empirical evidence—at both the individual and the cross-national levels of analysis—consistent with a mechanism linking a lack of economic opportunity to support for fundamentalist belief systems among Muslim women worldwide. We do not claim that economic considerations are the only relevant factors. Rather, we demonstrate that among the many forces that may impel Muslim women to adopt a fundamentalist value system, a significant one is the quest for financial security.

Women with unfavorable economic prospects have more to gain on the marriage market by adopting fundamentalist beliefs than they do on the employment market by adopting secular—or even just nontraditionalist—beliefs. We have shown in particular that women with lower levels of formal education have a much greater tendency to view the world from a traditionalist or fundamentalist perspective; and women who are married and lack outside employment are the most fundamentalist of all. At the national level, countries that are poorer and provide fewer economic opportunities for independent women contain more women (on a percentage basis) who hold fundamentalist beliefs.

<sup>85</sup> Susan Greenhalgh, "Bound Feet, Hobbled Lives: Women in Old China," *Frontiers* 2 (Spring 1977).

<sup>86</sup> Hill Gates, "Footloose in Fujian: Economic Correlates of Footbinding," *Comparative Studies in Society and History* 43, no. 1 (2001).

<sup>87</sup> *Al-Abram Weekly*, November 1–7, 2007.

An important goal of this article has been to consider some of the economic motivations of Muslim women in a strategic context.<sup>88</sup> This approach stands in stark contrast to the usual treatment of the Islamic world, which some seem to believe is dominated by immutable cultural, historical, and religious forces. Our intent has not been to target Islam as a religion with particular gender practices; rather it has been to try to explain the differences in attitudes that we observe across the Muslim world. We are interested in determining when Western norms regarding gender are adopted and by whom.

What are the implications of these findings? Consider three broad areas. First, if we care about women's rights in family protection, employment, and education in and of themselves, then these findings suggest that increasing economic opportunities for women in the Muslim world will lead to a decrease in fundamentalism. Second, Natchwey and Tessler have argued that support for political Islam tends to be associated with cultural factors, like personal religiosity and attitudes toward gender equality.<sup>89</sup> While Islamists in government are still a relatively rare phenomenon, the recent victory of Hamas in Palestine and the electoral successes of the Muslim Brothers in Egypt and the Islamic parties in Turkey suggest that political Islam is becoming an increasingly important political phenomenon. Third, Fish posits that the inferior status of women in Muslim countries accounts for at least part of the link between Islam and authoritarianism.<sup>90</sup> From a normative perspective, if gender attitudes are a determinant of democratic capacity, then these findings shed light on the possibility for the development of more democratic government in the Islamic world.

Finally, this study has shown that there exists tremendous variation in ideological beliefs both within the Islamic world and among individual Muslims. This suggests that interpretations of Islam are mutable. While fundamentalist attitudes toward women are widespread, being Muslim does not mean that one need adopt particular beliefs with regard to the sexes. Binder has argued that the potential exists for Islamic liberalism, and this article has suggested one way that this liberal tradition may be activated.<sup>91</sup>

<sup>88</sup>The strategic basis for male support for fundamentalism is just beginning to be explored and offers another potentially fruitful area for research. See, for example, Daniel Arce and Todd Sandler, "An Evolutionary Game Approach to Fundamentalism and Conflict," *Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics* 159 (March 2003).

<sup>89</sup>Natchwey and Tessler (fn. 8).

<sup>90</sup>Fish (fn. 8).

<sup>91</sup>Leonard Binder, *Islamic Liberalism: A Critique of Development Ideologies* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1988).

## APPENDIX 1

This appendix presents the countries in the study and the total number of individuals interviewed in each country by the wvs, tabulated by sex and Muslim religion. †Respondents in Algeria were not asked their religion. ‡Respondents in Pakistan were asked their sectarian affiliation (Sunni or Shia) rather than religion; with 97 percent of the Pakistani population Muslim, we assumed all respondents were Muslim.

<i>Country</i>	<i>wvs Total</i>	<i>Muslim Total</i>	<i>Muslim Only</i>		<i>Percentage Muslim in Country</i>	<i>Percentage of Respondents in Sample</i>
			<i>Male</i>	<i>Female</i>		
Algeria†	1282	1282	650	632	100.0	5.7
Azerbaijan	2002	1821	893	928	91.0	8.1
Bangladesh	1499	1378	761	617	91.9	6.2
Bosnia- Herzegovina	1200	485	235	250	40.4	2.2
Egypt	3000	2830	1446	1384	94.3	12.6
India	2002	217	119	98	10.8	1.0
Indonesia	1000	929	467	462	92.9	4.2
Iran	2532	2457	1324	1133	97.0	11.0
Jordan	1223	1168	569	599	95.5	5.2
Macedonia	1055	266	155	111	25.2	1.2
Montenegro	1055	221	109	112	20.9	1.0
Morocco	2263	1012	496	516	44.7	4.5
Nigeria	2022	640	338	302	31.7	2.9
Pakistan‡	2000	2000	1041	959	100.0	8.9
Singapore	1512	574	272	302	38.0	2.6
Tanzania	1157	466	272	194	40.3	2.1
Turkey	4607	4460	2221	2239	96.8	19.9
Uganda	1002	170	94	76	17.0	0.8
Total	32413	22376	11462	10914	69.0	100.0

APPENDIX 2

Sixteen World Values Survey questions are used in this study. wvs item numbers are given in brackets. The table contains the overall percentage of respondents giving each answer and the percentage tabulated by latent class, with cells containing estimated probabilities that a member of each class gives each response ( $\hat{\pi}_{jkr}$ ).

		<i>Secular-</i>				
		<i>Total</i>	<i>Liberal</i>	<i>Fund.</i>	<i>Trad.</i>	<i>Relig.</i>
How important is religion in your life? [A006]	very important	0.814	0.209	0.945	0.847	0.906
	somewhat important	0.142	0.497	0.048	0.145	0.091
	not very important	0.035	0.234	0.004	0.008	0.003
	not at all	0.009	0.060	0.003	0.001	0.000
When jobs are scarce, men should have more right to a job than women. [C001]	agree	0.673	0.447	0.899	0.736	0.467
	disagree	0.223	0.432	0.045	0.142	0.379
	neither	0.104	0.120	0.056	0.122	0.155
Do you think that a woman has to have children in order to be fulfilled or is this not necessary? [D019]	not necessary	0.198	0.401	0.113	0.142	0.213
	needs children	0.802	0.599	0.887	0.858	0.787
On the whole, men make better political leaders than women do. [D059]	agree strongly	0.345	0.205	0.692	0.144	0.193
	agree	0.328	0.318	0.201	0.617	0.219
	disagree	0.235	0.325	0.077	0.226	0.384
	disagree strongly	0.092	0.152	0.030	0.013	0.203
A university education is more important for a boy than for a girl. [D060]	agree strongly	0.147	0.093	0.329	0.053	0.042
	agree	0.173	0.133	0.193	0.296	0.053
	disagree	0.368	0.375	0.245	0.511	0.386
	disagree strongly	0.311	0.399	0.233	0.141	0.519
Is wearing a veil in public places an important trait for a woman? [D067]	very important	0.491	0.035	0.708	0.289	0.529
	important	0.185	0.073	0.152	0.287	0.173
	somewhat important	0.098	0.161	0.048	0.140	0.113
	not very important	0.088	0.168	0.043	0.133	0.079
	not at all important	0.139	0.564	0.049	0.151	0.105

APPENDIX 2, *cont.*

		<i>Total</i>	<i>Secular-</i>			<i>Relig.</i>
			<i>Liberal</i>	<i>Fund.</i>	<i>Trad.</i>	
Is being religious an important trait for a woman? [D070]	very important	0.773	0.077	0.936	0.680	0.868
	important	0.150	0.331	0.043	0.282	0.107
	somewhat important	0.043	0.273	0.014	0.031	0.020
	not very important	0.021	0.181	0.007	0.007	0.004
	not at all important	0.014	0.138	0.000	0.000	0.002
To what extent do you agree or disagree that it is acceptable for a man to have more than one wife? [D076]	agree strongly	0.069	0.032	0.155	0.013	0.017
	agree	0.106	0.054	0.153	0.128	0.040
	neither	0.140	0.185	0.108	0.231	0.082
	disagree	0.449	0.592	0.429	0.506	0.389
	disagree strongly	0.237	0.137	0.156	0.122	0.472
To what extent do you agree or disagree that a wife must always obey her husband? [D077]	agree strongly	0.376	0.135	0.685	0.223	0.191
	agree	0.329	0.274	0.202	0.611	0.266
	neither	0.139	0.286	0.061	0.102	0.219
	disagree	0.114	0.250	0.041	0.059	0.210
	disagree strongly	0.043	0.055	0.011	0.005	0.114
How important is God in your life? [F063]	not at all (0) – (9)	0.155	0.563	0.092	0.124	0.057
	very important (10)	0.845	0.437	0.908	0.876	0.943
Do you find that you get comfort and strength from religion? [F064]	no	0.038	0.252	0.006	0.005	0.011
	yes	0.962	0.748	0.994	0.995	0.989
How often do you pray to God outside of religious services? [F066]	every day	0.566	0.178	0.615	0.570	0.628
	once a week or more	0.155	0.175	0.119	0.201	0.143
	once a week	0.080	0.115	0.074	0.086	0.061
	once a month or more	0.063	0.088	0.051	0.069	0.063
	several times a year	0.054	0.198	0.040	0.032	0.044
	less often	0.039	0.118	0.033	0.030	0.035
	never	0.044	0.127	0.069	0.012	0.027
Politicians who do not believe in God are unfit for public office. [F102]	agree strongly	0.521	0.123	0.731	0.293	0.677
	agree	0.226	0.106	0.135	0.463	0.143
	neither	0.076	0.220	0.031	0.085	0.069
	disagree	0.115	0.319	0.056	0.141	0.062
	disagree strongly	0.062	0.232	0.047	0.018	0.049

APPENDIX 2, *cont.*

			<i>Secular-</i>				
		<i>Total</i>	<i>Liberal</i>	<i>Fund.</i>	<i>Trad.</i>	<i>Relig.</i>	
Religious leaders should not influence how people vote in elections. [F103]	agree strongly	0.317	0.444	0.400	0.067	0.401	
	agree	0.381	0.350	0.248	0.628	0.304	
	neither	0.116	0.090	0.095	0.171	0.115	
	disagree	0.132	0.062	0.169	0.125	0.126	
	disagree strongly	0.053	0.054	0.088	0.009	0.054	
Religious leaders should not influence government decisions. [F105]	agree strongly	0.290	0.446	0.400	0.030	0.413	
	agree	0.399	0.329	0.236	0.679	0.244	
	neither	0.137	0.132	0.141	0.160	0.145	
	disagree	0.135	0.049	0.155	0.122	0.162	
	disagree strongly	0.039	0.043	0.069	0.009	0.037	
Which of these traits should a good government have? It should implement only the laws of the shari'a. [F111]	agree strongly	0.387	0.031	0.572	0.138	0.330	
	agree	0.290	0.033	0.226	0.443	0.299	
	neither	0.180	0.369	0.098	0.240	0.242	
	disagree	0.091	0.379	0.064	0.128	0.074	
	disagree strongly	0.052	0.189	0.040	0.051	0.054	