

ERLING SKANCKE

erling.skancke@gmail.com, (650) 532-4460, stanford.edu/~eskancke, www.linkedin.com/in/eskancke

EDUCATION

PhD in Economics, Stanford University June 2022 (expected)
Thesis: Essays on Matching with Interviews, Advisors: Alvin E. Roth (primary), B. Douglas Bernheim

Master in Economic Theory and Econometrics, University of Oslo 2009-2014
Visiting student at the University of Mannheim 2013-2014

PUBLICATIONS

Explaining a Potential Interview Match for Graduate Medical Education with I. Wapnir, I. Ashlagi, A.E. Roth, A. Vohra, and M.L. Melcher, *Forthcoming in Journal of Graduate Medical Education*

Competitiveness and regulation of Norwegian banks, 2013, Ulltveit-Moe, K.H., Vale, B., Grindaker, M.H. and Skancke, E., *Norges Bank Staff Memo (No. 18/2013)*.

RESEARCH

Welfare and Strategic Externalities in Matching Markets with Interviews - Job Market Paper (link)

- Build a game-theoretic model to study the welfare and strategic effects of firms' interview decisions on workers and other firms.
- Show analytically that both firms and workers may be worse off by increased interview activity, leading to inefficient equilibria.
- Design a root-finding algorithm to solve for the welfare-maximizing symmetric equilibrium. Prove that the algorithm converges.
- Numerically solve the model in Python to illustrate how the equilibrium inefficiency is exacerbated as the market thickens.

A Decade of Signaling at the AEA, What have we learned? with M. Niederle and A. E. Roth

- Study the use of the preference signalling mechanism provided by the American Economic Association for the economics job market.
- Survey academic institutions and candidates, and use Python to clean and analyze the collected data and merge with signaling data.
- More than 20% of institutions interviewed a candidate who signaled them, and whom they otherwise wouldn't have interviewed.

On Ordinal Interview Assignment Mechanisms

- Prove that no stable interview assignment mechanism is strategy-proof for either side, unless all agents' interview capacities are 1.
- Implement numerical simulations in Python to show that the incentives to misreport preferences vanish in unbalanced markets.
- Demonstrate numerically that the number of unmatched firms and workers falls quickly for even slight market imbalances.

Experience and the Skin-in-the-Game Effect: An Experiment with D. Zuckerman

- Design an experiment to test whether risk-taking behavior depends on whether subjects' past experience involved skin-in-the-game.
- The design allows us to control subjects' information, control for income effects, and elicit subjects' beliefs.
- Create a web interface using Qualtrics, JavaScript, HTML. Use matplotlib, pandas and statsmodels in Python to analyze the data.

Green Grass or Sour Grapes? An Experiment on Chosen Preferences with B. D. Bernheim and G. Charness

- Design an experiment to test how subjects' willingness to perform real effort tasks depend on their anticipated number of tasks.
- The design allows us to exclude explanations based on reference-point theories and habit formation.
- Implement the experiment online using Qualtrics, JavaScript and HTML. Data analyzed using matplotlib and pandas in Python.

Welfare Economics with Endogenous Preferences with B. D. Bernheim and L. Nagel

EXPERIENCE

Research Assistant for Prof. Alvin Roth at Stanford University, 2017-21.

Research Assistant for Prof. Paul Milgrom at Stanford University, 2016-17.

Junior Researcher at the Norwegian Central Bank, 2014-15.

Research Assistant at the Norwegian Central Bank, 2011-13.

Research Assistant at the Norwegian Institute for Urban and Regional Studies, 2011-12.

Teaching Assistant. Taught TA sections and held office hours.

- *Microeconomics I* for PhD students at Stanford University, 2017.
- *Calculus for CS majors* for undergraduate students, taught in German, at the University of Mannheim, 2014.
- *Introductory Econometrics, Microeconomics and Game Theory, Statistics 2* for master's students at the University of Oslo, 2012-13.
- *Economics for Math majors, Macroeconomics 2, Statistics 1* for undergraduate students at the University of Oslo, 2011-13.

PROGRAMMING SKILLS

ML methods: OLS, Logistic regression, Lasso, Ridge, Elastic Net, Random Forest, Gradient Boosting, PCA, K-means, Kernel methods

Languages: Python, SQL, JavaScript, HTML, MATLAB, STATA

FELLOWSHIPS AND AWARDS

Leonard W. Ely and Shirley R. Ely Graduate Student Fellowship Stanford University, 2021

Graduate Research Opportunities Research Grant (joint with D. Zuckerman) Stanford University, 2018

Norges Bank PhD Scholarship Norwegian Central Bank, 2016

Faculty of Social Sciences Master's Thesis Award University of Oslo, 2014

ESOP Master's Thesis Scholarship University of Oslo, 2014

E.ON Ruhrgas Personal Mobility Grant Norwegian Research Council, 2013