Gabriel Carroll's website


Oh, hey there, what's up.  I'm an assistant professor in the economics department at Stanford University.  I work on economic theory, with a particular interest in non-equilibrium approaches to mechanism design.


Click a thing to jump to it: [ CV | Refereed publications | Working papers | Other writings | Classes | Other things | How to find me ]


CV

    There is a PDF here


Refereed publications

    Robustness and Separation in Multidimensional Screening [ online appendix ]
      Econometrica 85 (2), 2017, 453-488

    Robust Contracting with Additive Noise (with Delong Meng)
      Journal of Economic Theory 166, 2016, 586-604

    Informationally Robust Trade and Limits to Contagion
      Journal of Economic Theory 166, 2016, 334-361
      Formerly titled "Informationally Robust Trade Under Adverse Selection"

    Locally Robust Contracts for Moral Hazard (with Delong Meng)
      Journal of Mathematical Economics 62, 2016, 36-51

    Robustness and Linear Contracts
      American Economic Review 105 (2), 2015, 536-563

    A General Equivalence Theorem for Allocation of Indivisible Objects
      Journal of Mathematical Economics 51, 2014, 163-177

    When are Local Incentive Constraints Sufficient? [ online appendix ]
      Econometrica 80 (2), 2012, 661-686

    An Efficiency Theorem for Incompletely Known Preferences
      Journal of Economic Theory 145 (6), 2010, 2463-2470

    Optimal Defaults and Active Decisions (with James J. Choi, David Laibson, Brigitte C. Madrian, and Andrew Metrick) [ online appendix ]
      Quarterly Journal of Economics 124 (4), 2009, 1639-1674


Working papers

    Information Games and Robust Trading Mechanisms

    On Mechanisms Eliciting Ordinal Preferences

    Strategic Communication with Minimal Verification (with Georgy Egorov)

    Robustly Optimal Auctions with Unknown Resale Opportunities (with Ilya Segal)

    Robust Incentives for Information Acquisition

    A Complexity Result for Undominated-Strategy Implementation

    A Quantitative Approach to Incentives: Application to Voting Rules [ online appendices ]

    The Efficiency-Incentive Tradeoff in Double Auction Environments

    Efficient Random Assignment with Constrained Rankings 


Other writings

    Design for Weakly Structured Environments
      Draft essay for The Future of Economic Design (eds. Jean-François Laslier, Hervé Moulin, Remzi Sanver, William S. Zwicker)

    Robust Incentives for Effort
      SIGecom Exchanges 12 (2), 2013, 32-35


Classes

2017-2018

   Econ 286: Game Theory (graduate), Autumn 2017 [ syllabus | Canvas site ]

   On leave Winter-Spring 2018

Past years

   Econ 180: Honors Game Theory (undergraduate)
      Autumn 2016 [ syllabus | Canvas site ]
      Spring 2016 [ syllabus | CourseWork site ]
      Autumn 2014 [ syllabus | CourseWork site ]

   Econ 220: Political Economy I (graduate)
      Spring 2016 (with James Fearon) [ syllabus | CourseWork site ]
      Winter 2015 (with Fuhito Kojima) [ syllabus | CourseWork site ]
      Winter 2014 (with Fuhito Kojima) [ syllabus | CourseWork site ]

    Econ 286: Game Theory (graduate)
      Autumn 2016 [ syllabus | Canvas site ]
      Autumn 2015 [ syllabus | CourseWork site ]
      Autumn 2014 [ syllabus | CourseWork site ]
      Spring 2014 [ syllabus | CourseWork site ]


Other things

    Author ordering statement

    Reading list on modeling in mechanism design


How to find me


Feet: Landau Economics Building, room 245

Ears: +1 650-725-8703

Fingertips: gdc@stanford.edu
Snails:

Department of Economics
Stanford University
579 Serra Mall
Stanford, CA 94305