CHAPTER THIRTY-SIX

THE CULTURAL MATRIX OF SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY

ALAN PAGE FISKE, University of California, Los Angeles
SHINOBU KITAYAMA, Kyoto University
HAZEL ROSE MARKUS, Stanford University
RICHARD E. NISBETT, University of Michigan

All phenomena with which the mental sciences deal are, indeed, creations of the social community.
—WILHELM WUNDT, Elements of Folk Psychology

I. INTRODUCTION

Social psychologists have demonstrated that there are powerful and pervasive processes that produce phenomena such as self-enhancing biases, the tendency to characterize the self in terms of global attributes, the "fundamental attribution error," the tendency to discount one's intrinsic motivation to perform tasks for which one receives extrinsic rewards, the need for cognitive consistency between expressed attitudes and behavior, and the logical progression of stages in moral development. In the last decade, however, the argument has been made more and more frequently and persuasively that such "basic" psychological processes depend substantially on cultural meanings and practices (e.g., Berry et al., 1992; Bond, 1988b, 1996a; Cole, 1991; Gergen et al., 1996; Kim & Berry, 1993; Markus & Kitayama, 1991; Markus, Kitayama, & Heimann, 1996; Matsumoto, 1989; Miller, 1994a, 1997; Moghadam, Taylor, & Wright, 1993; Pepitone, 1989; Shweder, 1990; Shweder & Levine, 1984; Smith & Bond, 1994; Stigler, Shweder, & Herdt, 1990; Triandis, 1990, 1995).

A good deal of evidence, most of it very recently obtained, shows that psychological processes can be very different in cultures other than European and American ones. For example, though Europeans and Americans often prefer to explain social behavior primarily in terms of personal attributes and dispositions, for other populations and groups—probably for most (Hirschfeld, 1995)—explanation of behavior seems to require an analysis of social roles, obligations, and situational factors. And whereas many Europeans and Americans typically emphasize that they are unique, different, and better than others, people in many East Asian and other cultures typically emphasize that they are ordinary, quite similar to, or no different than others.

Using the new evidence about how psychological processes are culturally contingent, some psychologists are now studying the dynamic mutual constitution of culture and the psyche. A premise underlying this work is that in order to participate in any social world, people must incorporate cultural models, meanings, and practices into their basic psychological processes. These psychological processes in turn constrain, reproduce, and transform the

We thank the following readers for their very valuable (and rapidly returned) comments on earlier drafts: Scott Arran, David Buss, Incheol Choi, Dov Cohen, Phoebe Ellsworth, Barbara Fiske, Donald Fiske, Susan Fiske, Daniel Gilbert, Patricia Greenfield, Steven Heine, Lawrence Hirschfeld, Lijun Ji, Yueh-Ting Lee, Darrin Lehman, Kwok Leung, Takahiko Masuda, Clark R. McCauley, Joan Miller, Michael Morris, Randolph Nesse, Ara Norenzayan, Kaiping Peng, Paul Rosin, Richard Shweder, Twila Tardif, Harry Triandis, and Leigh Ann Vaughn. Siri Fiske supported the chapter with unflagging good humor, patience, and perspective. Fiske’s work on this chapter was supported by NIMH grant ROI MH 38857; Kitayama’s work was supported by grants in aid from the Japanese Ministry of Education C-066113, 07044036, and 08451027; Nisbett was supported by NSF grant 941644; a grant from the Russell Sage Foundation, and by the office of the Vice President for Research of the University of Michigan; Kitayama and Markus were fellows at the Center for Advanced Study in the Behavioral Sciences during the time the chapter was written. We are extremely grateful for this support.
Cultural system. So while each culture is constructed by the coordinated interaction of many psyches, these psyches are themselves oriented, structured, and motivated by the particular culture in which they operate. Thus many of the findings currently regarded as “basic” to social psychology are a function of particular cultural frameworks that may be unseen and unexamined because they are shared by investigators and subjects alike. Conversely, seemingly anomalous “failures to replicate” these standard phenomena in other cultures make sense when we understand the cultural models with which people are thinking, feeling, judging, and acting—including the models of persons.

Humans are born with the capacity to function in any culture, but as they mature they develop psyches that are organized to function in one specific culture. For example, children can learn any language, but they learn to speak a particular one, and adults can communicate only with speakers of their own particular language. Humans have evolved unique psychological capacities and propensities to take adaptive advantage of cultures, but in the course of development these propensities also make their psyches dependent on their own particular cultures. Hence cultural psychology needs to explore how evolution both enables and constrains the nature of human psyches and socialities, as well as the links between psyche and society.

A major goal in this chapter is to show that culture, psyche, and evolutionary biology constitute one another. There have recently appeared several excellent, comprehensive reviews of the literature in cultural psychology, cross-cultural psychology, and psychological anthropology (“Cross-cultural and Comparative Research,” 1991; Berry, Poortinga, & Pandey, 1996; Berry et al., 1992; Berman, 1990; Bock, 1994; Bond, 1988b, 1996a; Cole, 1996; Cole & Cole, 1995; Himmelweit & Gaskell, 1990; Miller, 1994a, 1997; Moghadam, Taylor, & Wright, 1993; Munroe & Munroe, 1994; Oyserman & Markus, 1994; Schwartz, White, & Lutz, 1992; Shweder & LeVine, 1984; Shweder & Sullivan, 1993; Smith & Bond, 1994; Stigler, Shweder, & Herdt, 1990; Triandis, 1994a, 1995; Vijver & Hutschemaekers, 1990). The current chapter does not attempt to be a comprehensive review of this kind. Rather than attempting to duplicate these fine works, we have aimed to show why social psychologists should read this literature in the first place.

In order to accomplish this aim, in this first section we will develop the thesis that culture and the psyche are mutually constitutive. The mutual constitution thesis implies that the psyche is a function of its socioculturally and historically constituted environment. In Section II we will compare European-American models of independence with East Asian models of interdependence, contrasting two very different conceptions of the self and social relations. We focus on East Asia because so much of the recent provocative research has been conducted there. Then in Section III we review this research. It shows dramatic divergence in psychological functioning between European Americans and East Asians in some of the phenomena that social psychologists have been most concerned with and that they have regarded as universal. These differences are fully concordant with—indeed we would argue understandable only within the context of—the differences between the two cultural systems. Section IV explores a variety of strategies for understanding the links between culture and psyche, including developing typologies or dimensions of sociality that differentiate the world’s cultures and identifying structural frameworks for social coordination. Finally, in Section V, we discuss how the human brain has evolved to use cultural models that enable people to coordinate and cooperate in diverse culture-specific adaptations.

**Cultural Psychology: Mutual Constitution of Culture and the Psyche**

Cultural psychology begins with the thesis that cultural practices and meanings complement and inform psychological processes, which in turn generate and transform these cultural practices and meanings (Bruner, 1990; Cole, 1991, 1995a; D’Andrade, 1981; Greenfield & Cokely, 1994; Miller, 1994b, in press; Rogoff, 1990; Schwartz, White, & Lutz, 1992; Shweder, 1991; Shweder & LeVine, 1984; Shweder & Sullivan, 1993; Stigler, Shweder, & Herdt, 1991; Wertsch, del Río, & Alvarez, 1995; White & Kirkpatrick, 1985). Cultural psychology has three coordinated aims. First, it aims to characterize varied cultural meanings and practices and the psychological structures and processes to which they are linked. Second, it aims to discover the systematic principles underlying the diversity of culturally patterned socialities and psyches. Third, it aims to describe the processes by which psyches and cultures construct each other, elucidating how cultures create and support psychological processes and how these psychological tendencies in turn support, reproduce, and sometimes change the cultural systems. Its dual premise is that human psychology is relative to culture, but that this contingency is governed by universal principles.

The capacity to form culturally prescribed social relationships is essential for human survival, reproduction, and well-being. Consequently, the human mind has evolved specifically to operate in culturally patterned social worlds (Durham, 1991; Geertz, 1973)—not a particular world, but worlds whose specific parameters are indeterminate in advance, unknowable at birth. At the beginning of development, the human infant requires and possesses many capacities to engage in the social world. These motivated capacities can be realized by utilizing culture-specific models to mediate social interaction. Children and adults actively use the locally available cultural practices to generate meaningful interactions. They select among various alterna-
agree that such facts often create or heavily influence cultural practices and meanings. But, together with Weber (1904–1906/1958), we believe that there is substantial causality in the opposite direction as well: cultural ideas can influence economic practices and ecology (Sahlins, 1976). Furthermore, along with practice theorists (see Orr, 1984), we believe that institutions, norms, ideologies, economic and political systems, and ecologies are generated and transformed by the actions of persons pursuing their everyday goals and performing their everyday practices together. Many of the cultural practices that frame collective reality are not represented in conscious ideology or any other explicitly accessible schemas (cf. Bourdieu’s [1977] notion of habitus).

Section II will present two different collective realities, along with the practices, institutions, and everyday activities related to them. First, however, we want to note that the hallmark of almost all theories in social psychology is the idea that human thought and action are thoroughly social. When the modern social sciences began to take shape a century ago, most thinkers emphasized that the human psyche is a product of the social (and, as we would now say, cultural) milieu in which it develops and functions (Durkheim, 1912/1968; Durkheim & Mauss, 1901–1902/1963; Marx, 1956; Stocking, 1974; Tönnies, 1887/1988). This was the perspective taken by most of the researchers who founded what are now social psychology and cultural psychology (Baldwin, 1897, 1910; Dewey, 1917; Le Bon, 1894, 1895/1952; Levy-Bruhl, 1910; McDougall, 1908, 1920; Mead, 1934; Tarde, 1903; Vygotsky, 1980, 1987; Wundt, 1916; for histories, see Dessor, 1912; Jahoda, 1993; Karpf, 1932; and Stocking, 1982; especially on Bastian, Waiz, Lazarus, Steinthal, and Wundt). For example, Baldwin (1910) wrote, “The social relation is in all cases intrinsic to the life, interests, and purposes of the individual; he feels and apprehends the vitality of social relations in all the situations of his life” (p. 29). As G. H. Mead (1934) described the process, attending to and incorporating the views of others into the self is an ongoing, moment-by-moment process that lies at the heart of thinking itself, so the manner in which a person represents the social world is a product of that person’s social engagement. Social engagement in a culturally organized social world is not something that humans can voluntarily choose to do; it is something that they must do to function. Asch (1952) wrote, “The organic characteristics of man demand social life as their natural environmental condition” (p. 124). Asch pointed out that to become human, people require social experience:

The paramount fact is that men come into relations not alone with the objects of nature but also with other men, and through this encounter they are transformed into human beings. The environment of others and the products of their labor become a powerful, comprehensive
region of forces within which each moves and has being. Here each person discovers the existence and character of human beings and becomes bound to them: here he discovers the reality of his own self; and of work, art, and thought. In the process the radius of his life undergoes a profound extension: the content and form of his understanding, needs, and emotions are revolutionized. (p. 119)

Given its original orientation to social context, social psychology could have come to recognize that culture is the most basic and far-reaching context in which psychological processes are engaged and thus formed. Yet, psychology in the last half century has largely failed to develop these insights of its founders so as to include the cultural perspective in its modern conceptual frameworks. On the contrary, contemporary social psychology takes the individual person as a given, a naturally isolable analytic category. Research focuses on the perception of persons and the influence of the immediately perceptible laboratory situation—often ignoring the way the psyche is attuned to cultural meanings, institutions, relationships, and practices.

Social psychology, as a result, has become almost synonymous with the study of social influence (Allport, 1924; Aronson, 1992).

Until recently, the cognitive view that has dominated the discipline of psychology in the last four decades typically adopted a mechanistic metaphor, describing the mind as a machine or computer that is the same in all times and places, while only the raw materials processed by the machinery or the data in the computer vary. But this metaphor is based on a misleading distinction between mechanism and material, supposing that there are separable “process” and “content” that do not interact. It also rests on a methodological individualism, since it presupposes mechanisms that operate in isolated units. It ignores the fact that many psychological processes are the result of engagement in a given cultural context, and are inseparable from that context. Indeed, according to the view illustrated in Figure 1, psychological process and cultural content are continually reconstituting one another. Consequently, we cannot assume that psychological “processes” remain the same despite dramatic variations in cultural “content” around the world. This assumption impedes progress in under-
standing the sociocultural nature of psychological processes, as we will see.

Most contemporary social psychological theorizing begins with an autonomous individual whose relationships are a means to certain asocial ends. The assumption is that people are independent entities who struggle to retain control over their own actions and who resist influence from various groups and collectives. (For discussion of the tenets of individualism, see Baumeister, 1987; Bellah et al., 1985; Dumont, 1977, 1986; Farr, 1991; Geertz, 1974/1984; Giusinger & Blatt, 1994; Markus & Kitayama, 1994a; Mead, 1937/1961; Sampson, 1985; Shweder & Bourne, 1984; Triandis, 1990, 1995). Consequently, social psychological theorizing often reflects a Western concern that the social group will somehow overwhelm or disempower the autonomous, agentic self. Thus, American researchers tend to discuss forms of social influence with pejorative labels such as conformity, obedience, groupthink, deindividuation, social loafing, risky shift, and diffusion of responsibility. Social behavior is very often presented as being in opposition to individual behavior and as compromising individual rights and preferences (Markus & Kitayama, 1994a). This orientation seems natural and obvious to investigators and subjects—in North America and Europe. These people share a set of implicit and unexamined cultural values and practices that emphasize individual rights, independence, self-determination, and freedom. But many other cultures—indeed, most—place a higher value on interdependence and fostering empathic connections with others (cf. Fiske, 1991a). In these cultures, people gladly emulate their associates and are responsive to others’ wishes in order to sustain smooth social relationships.

Cartwright (1978) noted two decades ago that 90 percent of the social psychologists who had ever lived were alive at that time and had been trained and had worked within one set of cultural frameworks. They were, and still are, to a considerable extent, a relatively homogeneous European-American, middle-class cultural population. Their scientific theories, concepts, categories, models, metaphors, images, and taxonomies, their prevalent methodological approaches, their questions, their empirical findings, and their generalizations are rooted in scientific studies, to be sure. But these studies are designed, conducted, and interpreted with reference to a very particular cultural framework. Social psychologists often disregard the cultural frameworks that are limiting conditions for their results—sometimes tacitly assuming that the social forms and psyches of the modern West are representative of the human species. Consequently, the science of social psychology reflects and incorporates a vast set of cultural meanings and practices that are nearly invisible from within its own subculture. If we look beyond this one culture, we immediately see that there are many forms of sociality and personhood, each of which engenders different kinds of psyches and is in turn generated by them.

II. TWO CONTRASTING SOCIALITIES: EUROPEAN-AMERICAN AND EAST ASIAN

To illustrate the links between culturally patterned sociality and psyche, we have to compare different cultures. The cultures whose psychologies have been most intensively studied are those of North America and Europe. In addition, there is now a large and growing body of psychological research in East Asian cultures. No other culture areas have been studied so extensively, and no other culture areas have been compared in as many studies. In this section and the next we focus on these two areas and the contrasts between them, illustrating what can be done with a typological contrast between socialities. Our purpose in this chapter is to demonstrate the importance of studying the cultural matrix of psychology. We make no attempt to survey, sample, or represent the general literature on psychological diversity across cultures. Instead, our intention in these two sections is simply to use this one contrast between Euro-America and East Asia to show why psychology cannot be isolated from culturally patterned social relations, practices, institutions, and ideas.

In this section, we describe some of the principal features of the sociality of East Asia and the sociality of Europe and America. Then we discuss some of the complexities of this typological contrast. Although there exists great variability within each cultural region, the comparison between Euro-America and East Asia is a very fruitful starting point. This binary contrast will conflate many interesting and important distinctions within each diverse region. But it may enable social psychologists to begin to appreciate the degree to which current social psychology has been grounded in a peculiar, historically situated cultural framework. Moreover, since the United States (let alone the subculture of college students and professors) is an atypical, unrepresentative culture, examination of the East Asian data may begin to provide a broader foundation for a future social psychology of the species as a whole.

From the beginning of modern social science, theorists have contrasted traditional, agrarian, communitarian societies with modern, market-oriented, individualistic societies (Douglas, 1978; Dumont, 1977, 1986; Durkheim, 1893/1933; Hofstede, 1980; Maine, 1861/1963; Marx, 1857-1858/1973, 1964; Mead, 1937/1961; Morgan, 1877; Redfield, 1955; Tönnies, 1887/1988; Triandis, 1972, 1989, 1995; for comparisons among some of the early writers, see McKinney & Loomis, 1988; Sorokin, 1988). Beginning in the 1950s and continuing to the present, a great many other sociologists, psychologists, and psychological
anthropologists have proposed dimensional theories of social relations. In every case a principal dimension has been solidarity or affiliativeness (see Fiske, 1991b, pp. 35-37; Fiske, 1992, pp. 709-710).

Many theorists developed variations on this contrast to compare the societies of modern Europe or North America with contemporary societies in other parts of the world. Beginning during the Second World War, anthropologists and psychologists following the lead of Ruth Benedict (1946) and Francis S. K. Hsu (1948, 1953/1970) began to use a similar typology to compare East Asian cultures with European and American cultures (Doi, 1962/1974; Geertz, 1974/1984; Lebra, 1976; Markus & Kitayama, 1991; Roland, 1989; Triandis, 1989, 1994a; Weisz, Rauthbaum, & Blackburn, 1984). In the following sections, we use the contrast between independence and interdependence to bring out some of the major differences that distinguish European-American cultures from the cultures of East Asia. This dimension fails to capture many other important differences between these culture areas, or the many important differences among the numerous cultures within each area. But it is a powerful heuristic for investigating the psychological consequences of the cultural patterning of sociality.

The European-American Culture Area

Within many European-American contexts, the person is understood to be the only intelligible unit of thought, motivation, emotion, evaluation, and action. The person is believed to consist of a set of “internal,” “personal” attributes such as abilities, talents, personality traits, preferences, subjective feeling states, beliefs, and attitudes. These attributes are thought to be internal and personal in the sense that they come from within and characterize the person regardless of the situation (that is, a person’s attributes are not generated by or relative to current social context). Taken together, these attributes define each person as an autonomous, freely choosing, special individual. Within this social system, a human being is a person by virtue of being distinguishable from others on the basis of these attributes, which collectively constitute the person’s social identity.

The independent cultural model that prevails in North America and in much of Europe emphasizes certain features of the person as natural, necessary, “healthy,” and good. The person

* is a bounded, coherent, stable, autonomous, “free” entity,
* “possesses” a set of characteristic identifying attributes—preferences, motives, goals, attitudes, beliefs, and abilities—that are the primary forces that enable, guide, or constrain actions.

In addition (especially in the United States since the 1970s), the model of the ideal person has often come to include the additional assumptions that the person

* is oriented primarily toward independent “success” and “achievement.”
* formulates personal goals derived principally from these attributes and orientations.
* evaluates life with reference to the achievement of these goals.
* makes (or should make) independent, more or less rational choices in the pursuit of those goals.
* is largely in control of—and individually responsible for—“personal” behavior and its outcomes.
* often regards relationships as competing with personal needs and regards group pressures as interfering with personal goals.

In recent years, the U.S. cultural model has also come to include the assumption that the person

* strives first and foremost to feel good about the self.

These cultural ideas are not fully shared by every American or European. But they are regularly embodied in most of the major prevailing practices, institutions, and public symbols and meanings of most of the dominant cultures of this region (Farr & Moscovici, 1984; Geertz, 1974/1984; Moscovici, 1984; Oyserman and Markus, 1994). Thus, for example, development European-American style is almost synonymous with individualizing and decontextualizing the self. Caretakers, friends, and teachers see themselves as discerning and fostering these attributes of the child; but from a cultural psychological perspective, they may actually be working with the child to construct such stable, individuating qualities. In any event, the project is one of progressively “personalizing” the child as a unique agent. Many of the contributing practices are so much a part of everyday life that they are invisible. Especially within the middle class, infants are given their own beds, sometimes their own rooms, in order to encourage and to foster autonomy (Shweder, Balie-Jensen, & Goldstein, 1995). Similarly, children are encouraged to “stand on their own two feet,” and most developmental markers center on autonomous activity—rolling over, sitting up, walking, and eating by one’s self. On the playground, children are taught to “stand up for themselves” and sometimes even to fight back. More than caretakers in some other culture areas, American caretakers continually categorize and label, dividing the world into selves, others, and distinct objects (Bornstein et al., 1990; Fernald & Morikawa, 1993, 1994).

Child-rearing practices in the United States, with some roots in Freudian theory, filtered through Dr. Spock and more recently the self-esteem movement, reinforce the importance of having an autonomous and distinctive self that the individual can feel good about. Chao (1993) found, for example, that 64 percent of European-American mothers, in comparison with 8 percent of Chinese mothers, stressed
building children's "sense of themselves" as an important goal of child rearing. American children appear to have a sense of who they are and the attributes that characterize them by as young as three years of age (Eder, 1989).

In many schools, the American child is praised, encouraged, complimented, and made to feel special. American children are often asked to compare themselves with others and they are encouraged to feel good when they have reason to believe that they have some qualities that distinguish them from others in a positive way. As early as four years of age, American children describe themselves, for example, as better than their peers in all domains (Harter, 1983). Children are often grouped and tracked according to individual ability (Stevenson & Stigler, 1992). In many American schools, the explicit goal is the development of the child's individual potential, so the curriculum is individualized to fit the unique learning style and pace that are said to distinguish each child.

Children must not only develop and know themselves; they must express themselves. From their earliest days, American infants appear to vocalize more than infants in some other culture areas (Morikawa, Shand, & Kosawa, 1988). Middle-class children are encouraged to express themselves and to present their own ideas in speech and in writing. A common elementary-school practice is "show and tell," in which children bring items into class that are important in their lives and stand in front of the class and tell a story about the object.

Many American children are also socialized to be "true to themselves" and to stick by their convictions or principles. To do otherwise would be to risk inconsistency and inauthenticity. The desire for a consistent self is tied to the notion that the healthy self is naturally and properly whole, stable, and integrated (not divisible and contextual; cf. Marriott's 1976, 1990) account of the fluid "individual" person in South Asia). For example, expressing a view in one situation but concealing that view in another situation—let alone expressing a contrary view—tends to be interpreted as a failure to have the courage of one's convictions. In many other cultures such behavior is assumed to reflect proper sensibility to the subtleties of different situational requirements: people should respectfully and empathetically preserve harmony by avoiding any expression of discord.

Another important feature of an individualist approach to personhood is the emphatic stress on the right (and necessity) to make one's own choices. In individualist cultures, people perceive themselves as making choices on a purposive, utilitarian basis according to personal preferences—unaware of the cultural framing of the meanings of the alternatives and excluded possibilities (see Sahlin, 1976). Choices serve to articulate and reify the self as a distinct individual. The central themes in many domains of American life revolve around the availability of a wide variety of styles, flavors, and colors that permit and require people to pick their favorite and "have it your way." In supermarkets and even restaurants there is a battling array of choice: will you have caf or decaf? Swiss water process or chemical decaffeination? large, medium, or small? Colombian, Ethiopian, hazelnut, vanilla, chocolate raspberry, or house blend? organic or regular? espresso. French roast, or light? cinnamon, chocolate, or nutmeg on top? cream milk, or nondairy whiteners? brown sugar, refined sugar, aspartame, or saccharin? for here or to go? plastic or paper bag? cash, debit card, or charge? Choosing involves knowing, communicating, and realizing one's preferences or attitudes; consequently, choice allows people to manifest their individuality, to express themselves, and to be active agents who control their own destinies. Commercials and advertisements promote soft drinks, cars, and shoes on this basis. Likewise, American hosts commonly tell their guests, "Help yourself." With this suggestion, the host invites the guest to affirm the self by expressing some of the preferences that are thought to constitute the "real self" (see Doi, 1973/1981, for a wonderful description of his embarrassment, confusion, and hurt feelings, when, at his first American cocktail party, his host asks him to make a myriad of choices about his drink, rather than empathetically discerning his needs).

From an early age American children are expected, almost required, to develop and emphatically assert consistent, identity-defining preferences about foods, ice cream flavors, fantasy characters, clothing, hairstyle, and all kinds of other things. This sense is developed by practices such as constantly asking young children (and everyone else around the child) to make choices and express preferences; announcing these preferences proudly to friends and neighbors; discussing people's likes and dislikes and their reasons for their choices; organizing family activities, making purchases for the child, and giving gifts in accord with imputed preferences. Providing children with a choice is believed to be an effective way to encourage compliance when parental directives might go unheeded: "Do you want to go to bed now, or take a bath and then go to bed?" With their frequent choice questions and requirement that children choose, caretakers signal to children the importance of the capacity for independent choice, while forcing them to develop preferences in order to make choices.

Growing up and living within these European-American meanings, practices, institutions, symbols, and ideas, most people may tend to become independent, autonomous selves with clearly articulated attributes and preferences, who are consistent, in control, and express high self-esteem. Or at least they will perceive themselves and others this way, believing that this kind of personhood is natural and good. Depending on the extent and manner of their participation, on regional and subcultural background, and on the extent to which people incorporate or contest the core ideas, practices, and institutions, there is signifi-
cant variation in this enculturation. But to participate in such a social system at all, people have to constitute themselves as agents of choice: how can an American obtain food, clothing, housing, transportation, medicines, an occupation, a job, friends, a spouse, or children, except by making choices? Even the most conforming, imitative behavior (choice of jewelry, clothing, hair, soft drink, hamburger, or automobile) is defined as an expression of individuality—indeed, as the rebellious assertion of self against society. Hence even resistance to a culture of individual choice is formulated and perceived as an individual choice, defining a "personal" identity.

This individualist model of sociality and the self is the model implicitly or explicitly used by most of the field of social psychology. Rooted in Western philosophical presuppositions about human nature and in layers upon layers of practices and institutions, this model seems a characterization of objective reality. And it has been a useful framework for organizing empirical work on the social psychology of European and American subjects who themselves operate with reference to these individualist axioms. However, this model of persons and socialities is not based on objective empirical evidence about a representative sample of Homo sapiens. It has not been adopted by social psychologists after being compared to other models and found to be the best available description. Indeed, when we look at other cultures, we find people using other models of persons and socialities. Their models fit their social psychologies better than the individualist model does.

The East Asian Culture Area

A very different model of the self has long been prevalent in many of the cultures of China, Japan, Korea, and Southeast Asia (Benedict, 1946; Doi, 1962/1974, 1971/1981; Geertz, 1973, 1974/1984; Hsu, 1948, 1953/1970; Lebra, 1976; Markus & Kitayama, 1991; Marsella, DeVos, & Hsu, 1985; Ohashi-Tierney, 1993; Triandis, 1995; Triandis, McCusker, & Hui, 1990). This model emphasizes that the person is inherently and fundamentally connected to others, stressing empathy, reciprocity, belongingness, kinship, hierarchy, loyalty, respect, politeness, and social obligations. The focus of life is the self in relation to others, so people experience themselves as mutually interdependent. In this model, social relationships, roles, norms, and group solidarity are more fundamental and more valued than self-expression. The person is expected to adjust one's self to meet others' expectations and work for the good of the dyad, the group, the institution, or the nation. Human fulfillment comes from harmonious participation in honorable social relations.

It is no accident that a Chinese-American psychological anthropologist, Francis S. K. Hsu (e.g., 1948, 1953/1970; Marsella, DeVos, & Hsu, 1985) played a major role in developing the psychological study of individualist versus collectivist societies. Hsu pointed out that the predominant East Asian model of persons and sociality stresses the importance of fitting in with others, participating in relationships so as to fulfill and create social obligations. The Japanese psychoanalyst, L. Takeo Doi (1962/1974, 1971/1981) also focused attention on this contrast through his analysis of the primacy of dependence on others (amae) in Japan as an explicitly articulated motive and highly valued way of being (see also Kumagai, 1981; Kumagai & Kumagai, 1986; Morsbach & Tyler, 1987). Later, in an influential essay, Geertz (1973b) sketched a Balinese model of the person as the momentary embodiment of an intersection of timeless social roles and responsibilities. From this perspective the person is an integral component of relationships and larger forms of being. Creating, sustaining, enhancing, and redressing these relationships takes precedence over individuality, separation, autonomy, or freedom. In Buddhist theology, for example, the self (or ego) as a distinct and enduring individuality is considered an illusion that people should attempt to transcend; in truth a person is nothing but transitory flux and becoming. The ultimate religious goal is the salvation that consists of merging the personal soul or self (atman) with the universal soul (brahman) by overcoming all needs, emotions, goals, and attachments (see Spiro, 1982a). In South Asia, the very substance of the self is something shared with others: people (especially within a caste) are interdependent in their very essence. The main tasks of life there have to do with maintaining the necessary flow, compatibility, mixture, and purity of the substances of the shared self (Daniel, 1984; Marriott, 1976, 1990).

The interdependent model of the person emphasizes certain features of the person that are natural, necessary, "healthy," and good. The person

- is a connected, fluid, flexible, committed being who is bound to others,
- participates in a set of relationships, roles, groups, and institutions that are the primary forces that enable, guide, or constrain actions,
- is principally oriented toward the harmonious functioning of these social entities (which are centered on collective needs and purposes),
- naturally attempts to meet obligations and conform to norms,
- finds consensus and focuses on the collective requirements of these relationships and institutions,
- evaluates life with reference to collective needs and one's contributions to them,
- conforms (or should conform) to relational norms and is responsive to group goals,
- is a partner in interaction with others who are mutually responsible for each other and for the consequences of their joint behavior.
• Subordinates personal beliefs and needs to norms and relationships.

Thus the interdependent East Asian person is a relational being connected to others and belonging to groups, constituted as a member of society by virtue of this participation in a web of relationships and roles—which people devote their lives to creating, sustaining, and enhancing.

From this perspective, an assertive, autonomous, self-centered person is immature and uncultivated. The emphasis is on sensitive perception of the other’s perspective and flexible adaptation to the social requirements of each particular situation. In societies focused on fitting in and adapting to others’ expectations, the “demands” of others may be experienced as welcome engagement that invites participation (Lillard, 1997, in press; Minoura, 1992). Relationships and social obligations take precedence because they are regarded as more natural and more valuable than the needs and wishes of individuals.

In most East Asian preschools, group achievements tend to be celebrated. Children are not tracked according to ability, and children are rarely singled out for separate instruction (Stevenson & Stigler, 1992). In contrast to many American schools, where being a good student is associated with especially good performance and with living up to one’s unique potential, Lewis (1995) reports that in Japanese schools the good student is defined in ways that everyone can achieve, i.e., kindness, persistence, enthusiasm, helping, trying one’s hardest, honest self-criticism. Instead of the Western dictum “know thy self” and the idea of self-fulfillment, many Asian practices can be seen as reflecting the Buddhist ideal of ignoring and transcending oneself.

Greenfield and Cocking (1994) point out that although the contrasting developmental scripts of interdependence and independence are intertwined in any society, one is generally stressed more than the other. In many East Asian cultures, child rearing aims to cultivate an asocial baby into a social being (Caudill & Weinstein, 1969). Caretakers explicitly model the rules of interdependence and focus on the goal of maintaining harmonious relationships and attunement to others (Hsu, 1953/1970). Cobathing and cosleeping are common; for example, in Japan sleeping babies are rarely left alone. Caudill and Weinstein (1986) found that Japanese mothers hold their three- to four-month-old infants more and have more body contact with them than do mothers in the United States. The close, fully interdependent mother-child dyad is idealized, and many other relationships in society—between boss and subordinate, for example—are organized according to this model.

People should develop shared understandings of the world, and “intersubjectivity” is a culturally established project (Ames, Dissanayake, & Kasulis, 1994; Kimura, 1972). But this is not typically based on direct or explicit articulation of these shared understandings. If in a Euro-American context a “transmitter” orientation is fostered, in which people are encouraged to express their thoughts and feelings confidently and assertively, in many East Asian cultural contexts a “receiver” orientation is cultivated, in which listening and interpretation are valued (Singelis & Brown, 1995).

A Japanese mother does not typically ask for a child’s preference but instead tries to determine what is best and arrange it. Speakers attempt to adjust themselves to their listeners (Okabe, 1983; Ramsey, 1979). Common conversational scripts presuppose that the listener can understand what the speaker tries to convey without being told, without forcing the listener to say it crudely and explicitly. To say something too directly can send the signal that the listener is not competent enough to catch on quickly to the speaker’s intent. Indeed, miscommunication is more often seen as the listener’s problem than as the speaker’s problem. Consequently, silence and “not saying” are valued.

American and European children are often expected to cultivate their presentations of themselves and their ideas. East Asian schooling practices typically place much greater emphasis on learning to live in human society and experiencing the joy of group life (Lewis, 1995; Tobin, Wu, & Davidson, 1989; Wu, 1994), although many East Asian adolescents and young adults currently proclaim their need to have their “own ideas,” stressing the value of an autonomous identity (see Oerter et al., 1996, for a comparison of the self-characterizations of Japanese, Indonesian, Korean, and U.S. students and older adults).

A focus on feelings and empathy can be found in all spheres of life in Japan, for example. Fernald & Morikawa (1993) found that Japanese mothers who engaged with their two- and three-year-old children in telling a story about a picture were much less concerned than American mothers with how or why a particular situation came about. Instead, they focused on what the protagonists were feeling, asking the child, “What does the boy feel?” or “What is he saying?” Similarly, Lewis (1995) reports a common classroom exercise in which children are to find out about how much their mothers work and then are asked to set themselves a particular goal for easing her work. Such socialization apparently results in adults who are highly attuned to collective emotions. Ellsworth and Peng (1997) presented both American and Chinese undergraduates with a computer image of fish swimming in a group and asked them to describe what the group as a whole would be feeling. Whereas the Chinese respondents had no difficulty in reporting group feelings, the American respondents were at a loss, barely able to report anything elaborate.

In many East Asian cultures apologies are very important and are required whenever another person suffers; who is at fault is not the point (Kataoka, 1991). Rather, by holding a self-critical attitude, one communicates to the other person a commitment to the relationship. When some deviant behavior or transgression occurs, the most important
information to be determined is how the perpetrator of the wrongdoing was feeling at the time (Azuma, Kashiwagi, & Hess, 1981). For the same reasons, punishing or reprimanding Japanese children often involves a threat to the relationship (rather than withholding rights and privileges). Mothers will say, "I don't like children like you," or shame the child by saying, "People will laugh at you" (Okimoto & Rohlen, 1988). Good parenting does not ignore a child's failures, shortcomings, or transgressions. In Japan, children are encouraged to engage in self-reflection and self-criticism, which are necessary steps to self-improvement and mastery. Similarly, Chinese parents often use an explicitly evaluative, self-critical framework with their children (Miller, Fung, & Mintz, 1996). Chinese caretakers claim that shaming keeps children from falling into disgrace or from losing their all-important connection to others.

In the East Asian societies in which interdependence continues to be pervasive, people base their daily thoughts, feelings, evaluations, plans, and actions on this model. It is impossible to function in such a society without reference to this model—everyday life would make no sense. This model is what motivates and gives meaning to social life. Consequently, the psyches of people in these societies incorporate this model, and most psychological processes are predicated on it. Thus these psychological processes differ from those of people who predicate their thoughts, feelings, evaluations, plans, and actions on the model of independence.

Varieties of Interdependence

In Section III we will review the recent studies showing how the psychological processes associated with independent cultures in Europe and America differ from the psychological processes associated with interdependent cultures in East Asia. But first we must pause for a moment to clarify what independence and interdependence signify—and what they do not.

The distinction between independence and interdependence is a powerful heuristic for demonstrating the dependence of psyches on cultures. But in making these comparisons we do not intend to minimize the differences within each region, which are substantial (on Japan, for example, see De Vos & Wetherall, 1974). The 2 billion people in East Asia participate in many diverse cultures and subcultures. The same is true of the hundreds of millions of people of Europe and America. Furthermore, there are many important varieties of independence and interdependence in other parts of the world that differ from the patterns we describe for these particular culture areas (e.g., on interdependence: Malinowski, 1922/1961; Marriott, 1990; on independence: Lindholm, 1982; Miller, 1955; on varieties of both: Mead, 1937/1961). We should keep in mind, for example, that independence need not entail selfishness, maximizing, competitiveness, materialism, natural rights, contractualism, or a rationally calculative market orientation (Fiske, 1991a, 1991b, pp. 396–400; Mead, 1937/1961). Conversely, interdependence is compatible with strong motivation to maximize and achieve—on behalf of the group (K. Doi, 1982; L. T. Doi, 1971/1981; Gallimore, 1981).

Independence is not the same as individualism (Simmel 1908/1971a). In their classic comparison of four cultures in the American Southwest, Kluckhohn and Strodtbeck (1961/1973) made this kind of distinction between the value of "individuality" as permissive tolerance of eccentricity or encouragement to develop and express creativity, and the value of what we are calling independence and what they called "individualism"—autonomy to pursue personal goals and disregard ties to associates or groups. Sometimes these go together in the same culture; sometimes one exists without the other. Likewise, interdependence does not mean conformity or uniformity. For example, during several periods there was an emphasis on individuality of self-expression in China which was quite strong in certain domains (Nakamura, 1964/1985). The same is true of Japan (de Bary, 1970, 1991), especially in the arts.

The sensitive engagement in relationships that is basic to interdependence requires a well-developed sense of self that is clearly delineated from the other. For example, passive dependence (amae) and extreme deferential concern for others' expectations (enryo) are characteristic Japanese relationships; both are based on a sense of the respective needs and responsiveness of each person in the relationship (Doi, 1962/1974; 1971/1981; Kumagai & Kumagai, 1985; Morsbach & Tyler, 1987). We see a distinct self in religious practices as well. It is true that Buddhism prescribes a transcendence of the self (atman) and an abandonment of worldly personal desires, ambitions, and attachments in order to escape the cycle of karmic rebirths and merge with the ultimate (see de Bary, 1969). But the very idea of karma assumes a distinct self that is constant through rebirth in different bodies (including nonhuman ones), and Buddhist theology recognizes that few people are actually able to transcend their phenomenological selves in this way.

Interdependence means an orientation to the paramount importance of social relationships, groups, and normative obligations, but it does not mean that people lack concern about their own personal value. Interdependent people can be extremely sensitive to shame and about how others evaluate their social adequacy, or "face" (Benedict, 1946; Creighton, 1990; Ho, 1980, 1982; Hwang, 1987; Lebra, 1983; Mao, 1991; Morisaki & Gudynkunst, 1994; Piers & Singer, 1953/1971; Redding & Ng, 1982; Spiro, 1996; Ting-Toomey, 1994). Interdependent people's self-evaluations are well developed—so much so that in some cases, intense feelings of social fail-
ulture may lead to suicide. They can also be fiercely competitive about their social standing as individuals (Spiro, 1996) or as social groups such as castes (Moffatt, 1970). In short, living interdependently does not mean the loss of self, the fusion of self with other, or the absence of self-interests. What it does mean, as we shall see, is that attention, cognition, affect, and motivation are organized with respect to norms and relations.

Strong social bonds of interdependence do not imply actual harmony or affection, however. People may be extremely empathic, polite, gracious, and generous without loving or trusting each other (see, for example, Yamagishi & Yamagishi, 1994). Perhaps because strong interdependence makes it difficult to express differences and resolve or escape conflict, some interdependent societies are characterized by extreme social tension. Dependence on others leads to a festering sense of injury, resentment, envy, and sometimes belief in the limited good (the supposition that anyone else’s gain can result only from someone’s loss—probably mine; Foster, 1965). Ethnographic research reveals that people in many interdependent cultures are extraordinarily afraid of supernatural beings and of each other—including family members, friends, and neighbors. Anyone may be an envious, malicious, or greedy sorcerer, witch, or possessor of the evil eye. That is, any associate may be secretly making others ill, destroying their crops and herds, ruining their other endeavors, and even killing them. And people often infer that, by a kind of principle of collective responsibility, they are suffering in punishment for another family member’s transgression. (A few of the myriad ethnographic descriptions of such beliefs, fears, and practices, include Dundes, 1992; Evans-Pritchard, 1937; Favret-Saada, 1980; Jackson & Karp, 1990; and Marwick, 1970.) This pattern is salient in much of Asia (e.g., Knauf, 1985; Lieben, 1967; Ornter, 1978; Stephen, 1987; Vitebsky, 1993). For example, the Balinese are extremely afraid of arousing the envy or anger of human and nonhuman beings by any slight provocation or insult (Connor, Asch, & Asch, 1986; Howe, 1984; Wikan, 1990). It may be no historical coincidence that the rise of individualism in the West has gone hand in hand with a striking diminution in attributions of personal suffering to the malicious magic of friends and neighbors.

Interdependence means a focus on relationships—but not all relationships equally. As Hsu (1971) pointed out, relationships (including group memberships) are always to some degree mutually inhibiting alternatives. People cannot commit themselves to every kind of relationship; the more intense the relationship, the fewer the relationships possible. In general, “collectivists are emotionally attached to a few ingroups and are very concerned about preserving them and doing what will promote them. Individualists have many ingroups” but are less committed to any of them (Triandis, 1990, p. 61; see also Wheeler, Reis, & Bond, 1988). Thus one way to compare cultures (independent or interdependent) is to analyze which relationships they emphasize (Hsu, 1961, 1971; Kluckhohn & Strodtbeck, 1961/1973; for examples, see Marshall, 1983, on siblings, and Kurtz, 1992, on mothers). There are many examples of societies marked by very strong interdependence within primary groups, accompanied by a complete absence of any sense of responsibility or concern for outsiders.

Conversely, independence does not mean a lack of sociability. Independence is a complex of relationships, institutions, and social practices that make people “free,” provide them with choices, and create opportunities for success and happiness. It is ironic that people in the independent modern societies in which food, housing, and clothing must be bought on the market are actually more dependent on each other (and on the institutions of the market) for survival than are self-sufficient subsistence farmers. In this respect and others, independence is a form of interdependence in which social relationships are construed as voluntary and derivative.

Finally, independence and interdependence are cultural organizing principles. Cultures may emphasize one much more than the other, but every culture recognizes both and legitimizes some aspects of both. At the level of persons, there are elements of both independence and interdependence in every self (Greenfield & Cocking, 1994; Oerter et al., 1996a; Simmel, 1908/1971a, 1908/1971b; Spiro, 1993; Triandis, 1990, 1994a, 1995). Moreover, the norms, ideologies, and expectations that are at the core of independence and interdependence are folk theories about human nature and society that, although powerfully self-fulfilling, may not accurately or fully represent human psychology or sociability. For example, although they are not aware of doing so, people in independent societies think primarily in relational terms much of the time—more than in terms of personal attributes (Fiske & Haslam, 1996). Thus even independence is a special form of interdependence (Markus & Kitayama, 1994a).

"Independence" and "interdependence" refer to two contrasting orientations toward sociality and persons. In many respects they are opposites: independence means that individual needs and desires generally take precedence over relationships, group solidarity and functionality, while interdependence means that relationships and groups generally take precedence over personal desires. But we should keep in mind that there are many ways in which persons can take precedence over relationships, and vice versa. Cultures can balance and develop each of these alternatives in many different ways, and the nuances of these elaborations are often crucial. Thus while the social practices based on these two cultural orientations differ dramatically, they are not always diametrical antitheses. Nor are their psychological consequences always simple opposites. East Asian socialities and psyches differ considerably from
those of Europe and America, but these differences cannot usually be predicted by describing a feature in one system and then imagining its polar negation.

III. TWO MENTALITIES: DIVERSITY IN PSYCHOLOGICAL FUNCTIONING

The distinction between the independent and the interdependent modes of cultural participation serves as a framework within which many cross-cultural differences and similarities in psychological processes can be understood, as well as a heuristic device to suggest further differences and similarities. In this section we summarize some of the cultural differences and similarities in several selected domains of social psychological inquiry that are illuminated by the distinction. Evidence is stronger in some domains than others, but taken as a whole we believe this literature will indicate to social psychologists working only in a monocultural (most often European-American) context that a cultural perspective must be taken seriously.

At the same time, however, this literature suggests some difficulties, both conceptual and methodological, that can immediately arise once people from different cultural contexts are included in the design of a study. For example, many social psychological processes are deeply entrenched in the practices of European-American, middle-class cultural contexts, and as a consequence, seemingly identical procedures, or even physically identical stimuli, may not be construed in the same way by people living in other cultural contexts. Further, many theoretical constructs in the social psychological literature presuppose concepts that are not shared by other cultures. For example, referring to several basic emotions proposed by Ekman (1984), Wierzbicka (1984) poses the question of why these basic emotions, which are supposedly biologically prewired and thus precultural, happen to be those that are prominent in English. She asks what "basic emotions" would have been proposed by a scientist from another cultural or linguistic groups where these concepts are not in the lexicon (cf. Ellsworth, 1994). Levy (1973) shows that Tahitians have no sharply formulated cultural concepts of sadness, loss, or mourning (these emotions are "hypocognized"); as a consequence, when a loved one dies or deserts them, they feel ill and tired but are unable to clearly articulate the feelings or associate their illness with the loss. Conversely, Tahitians have an elaborated, well-scripted concept (mehameha) that requires an extensive paraphrase for Americans: the goose bumps, hair-raising, eerie, spooky sensation you get when you perceive something uncanny, something you definitely see or hear but know cannot be real.

The same question can be raised for concepts such as self-esteem, self-efficacy, control, agency, consistency, intelligence, and well-being. The meanings of these concepts vary, sometimes considerably, across cultures. In some cases there is no evidence for the existence of meaningful cultural entities with the properties of these Western constructs. Beyond any problem of linguistic translation, no corresponding culturally recognized entity is manifest in the psyche or the social world. To the extent that these concepts are products of particular patterns of social relations and the psychological processes they engender, the corresponding phenomena may be absent when the social relations differ. And important phenomena novel to Western psychology may be occurring in the context of unfamiliar practices, institutions, and patterns of social relationships (e.g., fear of sorcery: Evans-Pritchard, 1937; Favret-Saada, 1980; Jackson & Karp, 1990; Marwick, 1970; trance and spirit possession: Connor, Asch, & Asch, 1986; Howe, 1984; Wikan, 1987, 1989; Winkelman, 1986; or institutionalized joking relationships: Howell, 1973; Radcliffe-Brown, 1940/1965, 1949/1965).

Social science concepts also can serve the function of creating the reality itself—not only in a scientific context, but also in popular culture. For example, American socialization and schooling practices in the last two or three decades, building in part on notions of social scientists have been organized around the idea that self-esteem, self-empowerment, or internal control are the forces underlying achievement, mental health, and eventual success in life. This version of social reality, which is organized in accordance with the self-esteem construct and thus literally constituted by it, does not exist in most other cultures. This is typical of the way in which social reality is, in part, a product of the concepts and language used to understand and evaluate it (Miller & Goodnow, 1995; Ochs, 1988).

We think, however, that these theoretical and methodological problems must not be an excuse for failing to expand the data base of social psychology to other cultural contexts. The difficulties should be taken as a challenge that social psychology as a discipline should confront outright as it becomes a more comprehensive science. In this spirit, then, we will take the liberty of pointing out some of these problems as we review the existing literature.

The Self

Some of the empirical work most relevant to the cultural shaping of psychological structures and processes focuses on how the self is experienced. Most of the research in this area, as in the other areas reviewed, has focused on a comparison between selves in the American context and selves in an East Asian context, so this will be the focus here. However, there is also a growing literature on selves in South Asian (Daniel, 1984; Derné, 1992; Kurtz, 1992; Parish, 1991), Middle Eastern (Abu-Lughod, 1986), Mexican (Delgado-Gaitan, 1994), Pacific island (Levy, 1975; White & Kirkpatrick, 1985), African (LeVine et al., 1994).
and African-American (Jones, 1986) contexts. These studies have involved a variety of methods, including in-depth interviews and questionnaires. Many studies comparing East Asian and American self-concepts have used the Twenty Statements Test (TST), which requires answering the question “Who am I?” twenty times. Others have elicited free descriptions of self or have asked subjects to endorse uncontextualized psychological attributes.

The problem is that these methods are predicated on the existence of a self that is bounded and stable, transcending relationships and situations. Such methods may not be valid for studying the shifting, relational, contextualized self that is hypothesized to characterize those living in East Asian cultural contexts. In many East Asian contexts, identifying and asserting a distinctive, invariant, context-free self is not a common activity. In fact, doing so may tend to impede the culturally shared goals of maintaining malleability across situations and fostering harmony in relationships. This raises the question, conversely, of what Americans are doing when they answer such questions: are they imagining particular contexts, assessing a particular modal social situation, averaging across contexts (with some sort of appropriate weights), or what? How do Western respondents deal with the difficult task of describing themselves in global, context-independent terms? Is there any meaningful way to represent the complexity of a person’s behavior with a few such descriptors? (For two analyses of these issues, see A. P. Fiske, 1995a, and D. W. Fiske, 1971.)

Markus, Mullally, and Kitayama (1997) note that most studies of the self assume that the respondent has a conscious, bounded conceptualization of the self and will be practiced at introspection and self-disclosure. Many Japanese respondents, for example, appear to struggle with direct questions about the self and require a longer time to generate any type of answer than do Americans. Their answers seem vague, partial, and indirect in comparison with those of Americans. The direct, certain, opinionated self-disclosures of the type “naturally” and easily given by Americans would typically be seen as inauthentic personal disclosure (because it does not seem mediated by careful or deep introspection) and rude and inappropriate public remark (because it seems inconsiderate of the potentially negative feelings it may create in others who hear them in a Japanese context). Compare this response to that of informants in a West African village, who regard self-disclosure as dangerous and foolhardy. For them, knowledge is power—power to control and thwart others. Hence it is more than rude to ask many West Africans to characterize themselves: if it has any meaning in a culture in which people never do such a thing, it is an unwarranted, even aggressive intrusion. Thus, responses depend on the cultural meanings of asking questions and giving answers, together with all the related cultural practices concerning the particular items and responses.

Self-description and Self-knowledge Americans generally assume that a set of internal abilities, talents, personality traits, preferences, subjective feeling states and attitudes define the self and are the source of each person’s actions. In a series of studies with young children, for example, Hart and his colleagues (Hart, 1988; Hart & Edelstein, 1992) asked American children to imagine a “person machine” that makes the original person disappear but at the same time manufactures other people, copies of the original, that receive some, but not all, of the original person’s characteristics. The respondent’s task is to judge which new manufactured person—the one with the same physical attributes (looks like you), the one with the same social attributes (has the same family and friends), or the one with the same psychological attributes (same thoughts and feelings)—will be the most like the original person. By the ninth grade, Hart et al. (1993) find that most respondents believe it is the copy with the original’s psychological characteristics that will be the most similar to the original.

Recent studies further demonstrate that when asked to freely describe themselves in the absence of any specified context, North American respondents generate many abstract, internal characteristics (Bond, 1996; Cousins, 1989; Markus, Mullally, & Kitayama, 1997; Rhee et al., 1995; Thafimow, Triandis, & Goto, 1991). For example, in a free self-description study of the self-knowledge of eleven- to fourteen-year-olds, Stein, Markus, and Roeser (1998) found that 73 percent of the responses were general statements about the self that were unqualified by reference to the social situation, other people, or time, and 91 percent of the respondents mentioned at least one trait attribute in describing themselves.

A recent representative sample of 1,500 American adults thirty years of age and older (Holmberg et al., 1995) found that most adults had no difficulty responding to the request “tell me about yourself” and that their descriptions were dominated by personality attributes and role categories. These categories accounted for 60 to 72 percent of the self-descriptions generated, depending on age and educational background. The remaining responses focused on actions of the self, describing the self in terms of what the individuals were doing (“I work for a chip company”; “I do a lot of camping”). Across the board, Holmberg et al. report that adult respondents approached the self as an object that could be isolated, dissected, and analyzed. They note that relatively few respondents qualified or contextualized their self-descriptions. Conspicuously absent were responses of the type. “When I am at work, I am very serious.” Still other evidence suggests that in North American populations, individual attributes and characteristics are kept highly accessible in each person’s memory, so that
when concrete behaviors are presented they are spontaneously and habitually understood and interpreted in terms of the corresponding attribute terms (Carlston & Skowronski, 1994; Winter & Uleman, 1984). While in-depth interviewing of respondents can elicit more qualified and complex responses, these data suggest the existence of a view of the self that transcends particular interpersonal relationships and social situations.

By contrast, empirical research on self-description with Chinese, Japanese, and Korean respondents supports theories of East Asian selves as relatively flexible and situation-bound (Markus, Mully, & Kitayama, 1997). Rather than being experienced primarily as a separate or categorical entity, the self is experienced as a relational part of a greater whole. Ip and Bond (1995) report that in response to the Twenty Statements Test (TST), Chinese participants were more likely to refer to social roles (e.g., “I am a daughter”) and were also more likely to qualify these social roles (e.g., “I am Jane’s friend”) than were American participants. Triandis, McCusker, and Hui (1990), after classifying cultures as individualist or collectivist, conclude that collectivists define themselves more in terms of their social groups, particularly their in-groups, than do individualists. Moreover, Markus et al. (1997) found that when describing themselves, Japanese students made proportionately more references to other people than did European-American students. More than 50 percent of their responses (e.g., “I try to make my parents happy”; “I view things differently from other people”; “I cook dinner with my sister”), included references to others, whereas only 24 percent of the European-American statements included such references. And Newman (1993) has shown that the spontaneous inference of personality traits upon exposure to behavioral descriptions increases with each person’s level of individualism within a given culture.

In a study using the TST with Japanese respondents, Cousins (1989) found that high-school and college students gave concrete and specific self-descriptions (e.g., “I play tennis on weekends”). In contrast, the American descriptions included more psychological trait characteristics (e.g., “I am optimistic”). Cousins notes that abstract or global categorizations of self seem unnatural or artificial to Japanese respondents because they reflect a claim of being a separate individual whose nature is not constrained by specific situations and roles. Given a view of the self as interdependent with others, and understood not with reference to a set of internal attributes but with respect to particular situations, it is difficult to think about what the self will be like without knowing the nature of the situation and who will be in it (Bachnik, 1994). Cousins found, for example, that once a particular context is specified for self-description (e.g., “Describe yourself at home with your family”), then psychological attributes were used in self-characterization by Japanese participants. For example, subjects were willing to say that they were fun-loving at home or serious at work.

Further evidence for significant cultural variation in the context and functioning of self-knowledge comes from recent studies with Asian-Americans. Rhee et al. (1995) found that when asked to answer the TST, Korean-Americans who did not identify themselves as being Asian made the sort of highly abstract and autonomous self-statements characteristic of European-Americans, whereas Korean-Americans who felt highly identified as being Asian made more specific and social self-descriptions that were similar to those of Koreans.

**Evaluation and Esteem** Numerous studies of North Americans have shown that there is a robust and pervasive tendency to maintain and enhance a generally positive evaluation of the self (e.g., Gilovich, 1983; Greenwald, 1980; Kunda, 1987; Solomon, Greenberg, & Pyszczynski, 1991: Taylor & Brown, 1988). This tendency has been identified in studies of self-serving or defensive attributions of success and failure (e.g., Miller & Ross, 1975), unrealistic optimism (Taylor & Brown, 1988), social comparison (Schwartz & Smith, 1976; Taylor & Brown, 1988), friendship choice (Tesser, 1986), self-referential judgment or inference (Kunda, 1990; Lewicki, 1984), and justification of one’s choices in experiments on cognitive dissonance (Steele, 1988).

In European-American cultural contexts, the self is made meaningful in reference to a set of attributes that are internal to the bounded, separate self. Those with independent selves, then, may be motivated to discover and identify positively valued internal attributes to the self, to express and confirm these attributes, and to develop an array of psychological processes that enable them to do these things. Holmberg et al. (1995), for example, report that the self-concepts of American adults contain about four to five times as many positive attributes as negative ones. Many Asian cultures do not highlight the explicit separation of each person. Maintaining, let alone increasing, the positive overall evaluation of the self that is separate from the social context may not be the primary concern for these individuals. Consistent with this perspective, in comparison to Americans, Japanese respondents are much less likely to spontaneously make positive statements about the self, and they score significantly lower on translations of American self-esteem scales such as the Rosenberg Self-esteem Scale (Kitayama, Markus, & Lieberman, 1995; Markus, Mullally, & Kitayama, 1997). Similarly, Yeh (1995) reports that the Japanese respondents in her study made very few direct, positive statements about the self, instead giving negative descriptions of the self (“I think too much”; “I’m somewhat of a selfish person”). To the extent that something positive was offered, it was usually in the form of negation (“I’m not lazy”).
Similarly, in studies with Chinese respondents, Bond and his colleagues (Bond & Cheung, 1983; Bond & Smith, 1995) found that when answering the TST, Chinese students made fewer positive statements about the self than did their American counterparts. In a comparison of Chinese and American elementary-school children, Stigler, Smith, and Mao (1985) found that Chinese students rated their competence lower than did U.S. students both in specific domains and in general. And Korean respondents were found to be more likely to endorse negative statements about the self than positive ones, whereas American respondents showed the opposite pattern (Ryff, Lee, & Na, 1995; Schmutte, Lee, & Ryff, 1995).

A variety of studies that compared Japanese respondents with North American respondents found that self-enhancing biases in comparison of the self with others, such as false uniqueness (Markus & Kitayama, 1991), unrealistic optimism (Heine & Lehman, 1995), causal attributions for success and failure (e.g., Shikanai, 1978; see Kitayama, Takagi, & Matsumoto, 1995, for a review), and social comparison (Takata, 1987), do not replicate in Japan and some other Asian cultures (Stevenson & Stigler, 1992). In fact, in some cases a tendency in the direction of self-criticism rather than self-enhancement has been found (Kitayama et al., 1997; Takata, 1987).

It is not likely that the Asian self-reports are due merely to impression management style. Even when responses are recorded in a manner that maintains the anonymity of Japanese respondents, self-enhancement is still absent or reversed (Heine & Lehman, 1995; Kitayama et al., 1997). Instead, it seems likely that the tendency not to self-enhance, or even to self-criticize, may reflect authentic subjective experience. In Japan there is a common, culturally elaborated practice of self-improvement, in which people are encouraged to find a consensual standard of excellence in a given context (e.g., family, classroom, or workplace), to find what they may be missing by way of meeting such a standard, and then to seek to eliminate the deficit (Azuma, 1994; Kitayama et al., 1998; Lewis, 1995). This practice promotes harmony or unity in the relationship and simultaneously affirms one's identity as an interdependent being committed to the shared value of the relationship.

Viewed in this way, Asian practices may paradoxically be comparable in function to Western tendencies toward self-enhancement. The inclination to self-criticize may be a way to affirm the identity of the self as interdependent by engaging in the process of self-improvement—an important element of the interdependent, Japanese sense of well-being (Kitayama & Karasawa, 1997).

If the Japanese sense of well-being is derived not from positive evaluation of the self, but from the extent of improvement toward socially shared, consensual standards of excellence, it would then follow that for Japanese interdependent selves the perceived absence of negative features, rather than the perceived presence of positive features, might be crucial in the maintenance of well-being. In support of this analysis, Kitayama and Karasawa (1995) report evidence that the subjective well-being and physical health of Japanese can be reliably predicted by their appraisal of themselves as not having various negative qualities. In contrast, their appraisal of themselves as having various positive qualities had no observable effect.

Interestingly, the cultural differences in self-enhancing tendencies seem to sustain themselves when groups rather than individuals are used as the object of judgment. Heine and Lehman (1997a) asked Japanese and Canadian students to compare their own university and their rival university. The pairs of universities used in each culture were fairly well matched in reputation the University of British Columbia and Simon Fraser in Canada; Ritsumeikkan and Doshisha in Japan). In Canada there was a clear tendency for in-group enhancement, but in Japan this tendency was totally absent. Similarly, Kitayama et al. (1996) found that Americans living in earthquake-prone cities estimated the preparedness of their own neighborhood to be higher than average, whereas Japanese living in comparable cities revealed the opposite pattern.

It seems plausible that self-enhancement in the United States and self-criticism in Japan are psychological tendencies that are supported by the ways in which social situations are collectively defined and subjectively experienced in particular cultural contexts. Kitayama et al. (1997) presented subjects with statements describing 400 social situations that had been randomly sampled from those that had originally been generated by Japanese and American college students as either ones in which their self-esteem increased or ones in which it decreased. Subsequently, another group of Japanese and American participants read about each of the situations and reported to what extent their own self-esteem would increase or decrease if they were in the situation. Results indicated that Americans were quite self-enhancing: they judged that their self-esteem would increase more in the success situations than it would decrease in the failure situations. By contrast, Japanese were quite self-criticizing: they judged that their self-esteem would decrease more in the failure situations than it would increase in the success situations. Of more importance, however, the study found that U.S.-made situations promote self-enhancement: the U.S.-made success situations were judged by both American and Japanese subjects to have more influence on their self-esteem than the failure situations. By contrast, Japan-made situations fostered self-criticism: the Japan-made failure situations were judged by both American and Japanese subjects to have more influence on their self-esteem than the success situations. On the basis of this evidence, Kitayama et al. (1997) suggested that self-enhancement and self-criticism are both psychological and collective, reflecting the mutual
constitution of these two levels of reality: individuals with self-enhancing tendencies, which by themselves are the product of these individuals' attunement to self-enhancing social situations, will be more likely than those with other tendencies to construct and reproduce social situations that afford self-enhancement. The converse is true for those with self-criticizing tendencies.

An intriguing study of cultural assimilation suggests that self-critical tendencies may be replaced by self-enhancing ones when Asians become part of a European-American cultural context. In a comparison between recent Asian immigrants and second-generation Asian-Americans, Pelham, Hett, and Kuwano (1998) found evidence that the initial changes in bicultural individuals' self-systems may occur at a conscious level, whereas nonconscious self-systems may not be so malleable. Both the recent immigrants they studied and the second-generation Asian-Americans—like European-Americans—endorsed significantly more positive than negative items on the Rosenberg Self-esteem Scale. This result may indicate either that their conscious beliefs about the self have become more "Americanized" or that they were attempting to present themselves in culturally appropriate ways. In a word-priming paradigm, however, Pelham, Hett, and Kuwano found that when primed with the word "me" (personal identity), "us" (social identity), "them," "it," or "that" and then asked to identify either the word "good" or "bad," the second-generation Asian-Americans responded faster to the word "good" after seeing the prime "me." The recently immigrated Asian-Americans did not show this tendency. Furthermore, the recent immigrants distinguished between the primes "us" and "them," such that they responded more quickly to "good" after seeing the prime "us," and "bad" after seeing the prime "them;" in contrast, the second-generation Asian-Americans displayed no such tendency. These findings indicate that the recent immigrants were still operating on more collectively oriented, "self-depreciating" or "self-critical" self-concepts, whereas the second-generation Asian-Americans were operating on more individualistic, "self-enhancing" self-concepts.

In every culture, self-esteem is profoundly affected by what others think of the self (Cooley, 1901/1922; Goffman, 1956; Mead, 1934). In European-American cultural contexts, for example, the practices of praising and complimenting are quite common and further, social situations are likely to be constructed in such a way to promote these self-enhancing perceptions and, thus, self-esteem. This characteristic of cultural meanings and public practices is likely to provide a collective basis for self-enhancement. Ironically, it often gives rise to a sense of independence and autonomy of the self from the collective surrounding. By contrast, in East Asian cultural contexts, the practices of praising and complimenting are much rarer and, further, social situations are often constructed to encourage each other's critical appraisal of the self and self-discipline. As a consequence, people in these cultural contexts are often highly concerned with the judgments and approval of others and more prone to shame than are those in European American contexts (Benedict, 1946; Spiro, 1996). One of the most notable manifestations of this is the concern with "face" (Chang & Holt, 1994; Ho, 1980, 1982; Hwang, 1987; Mao, 1994; Redding & Ng, 1982; Spiro, 1996; Ting-Toomey, 1994).

The form of good feelings in relation to self may vary considerably across cultures to the point where it may seem somewhat questionable to call it "self-esteem." What seems to differ, among others, is the perceived locus of primary responsibility for esteem. Americans are taught that they are responsible for thinking well of themselves. It is up to you to recognize your own potential, assert yourself, strive and succeed. "You are only as good as you think you are." In most East Asian cultures it is explicitly recognized and expected that others will provide essential affirmation, support and collaboration. It remains for further conceptual and empirical research to determine whether self-enhancement is a necessary, integral component of independence, and conversely, whether self-criticism is intrinsic to interdependence in all cultures.

The Fundamental Attribution Error
The belief in consistency between attitude and behavior has been the focus of an extremely active domain of research concerning person perception and interpersonal judgment. Numerous studies conducted with European and American respondents have shown that when people observe another person's behavior, they often immediately draw inferences about the person's internal attributes, such as attitudes, personality traits, or motives, that correspond to the observed behavior. Furthermore, this is the case even when there exists an obvious situational constraint or social inducement for the person to behave in that way. In such cases, because the behavior can readily be explained by the constraint or inducement, it may be illogical to draw a strong inference about a corresponding internal attribute of the person. Thus, there seems to be a pervasive bias to favor explanations of social behavior in terms of relevant internal or dispositional attributes of the person over explanations in terms of situational factors that surround the person. Such a preference for dispositional explanations—or correspondence bias—in the presence of obvious situational explanations seems to violate normative canons of logical inference, and therefore has been referred to as a mistaken form of inference (Gilbert & Malone, 1995; Jones, 1979). Emphasizing its pervasiveness, robustness, and illogicality, Ross (1977) applied the term "fundamental attribution error" (FAE) to the bias.
Categorical versus Narrative Descriptions of People

Recent cross-cultural investigations have raised doubts about the degree to which the correspondence bias is a pan-cultural propensity of the human mind. Instead, a strong case has been made that this tendency is deeply entrenched in the practices and meanings of European and American cultural groups in which the self is viewed as independent and composed of fixed attributes that generate autonomous behavior. Given this view of the self, it is natural to see behavior as guided by internal attributes of the person, such as desires, attitudes, preferences, and motives. This agentic metatheory about the person prompts the social observer to attend to, to elaborate, and, when necessary, to invent internal reasons for action.

But given an interdependent metatheory, the observer appreciates (and if prompted, can elaborate on) the situational, social, or collective forces that enable or compel the focal event to occur. In one of the first studies making this point, Shweder and Bourne (1984) asked both Hindu Indian and American respondents to describe several close acquaintances. The descriptions provided by these two groups of individuals were markedly different in their emphasis on the person. The American descriptions featured traits and other relatively stable attributes of the person. The Indian descriptions characterized the person’s action in a particular context; for example, “He has no land to cultivate but likes to cultivate the land for others.” (Cf. the studies of Japanese versus Americans by Cousins [1989] and by Markus, Mullally, and Kitayama [1997] reported in the section on self-description.) Similarly, Newman (1993) and Zarate and Uleman (1994) found that Hispanic subjects—presumably relatively collectivist in orientation compared to Anglo-Americans—were less likely to make spontaneous dispositional inferences in the Winter and Uleman paradigm (in which subjects read sentences and later are cued with trait words or with some other stimulus) than Anglo-Americans.

FAE for Human Behavior

This line of work has direct implications for explanations of social behavior that have been studied in social psychological laboratories. The tendency to emphasize internal, dispositional attributes in social explanation is common and widespread in European and American populations, but given the interdependent mode of inference, people might emphasize circumstantial, enabling, cooperative causes for behavior. Such an orientation is evident in Buddhist thought, which emphasizes that all events have multiple enabling causes (Fung, 1983); hence to identify any single factor as the cause of the event is to commit a fundamental error almost by definition.

In support of this line of analysis, Miller (1984) found that whereas Americans explained another person’s behavior that had either good or bad consequences predominantly in terms of either good or bad qualities or other corresponding trait terms, Hindu Indians explained similar behaviors in terms of social roles, obligations, and other contextual factors. Contextual attributions were twice as frequent for Indians as for Americans; dispositional explanations were twice as common for Americans as for Indians. Of particular importance, Miller provided evidence that the culturally divergent attributional tendencies develop gradually through socialization. Thus American and Indian adults were much more unlike each other in their modes of inference than were American and Indian children.

A similar demonstration that causal inference differs across cultures was performed by Morris and Peng (Morris, 1993; Morris, Nisbett & Peng, 1993; Morris & Peng, 1994). They took advantage of two parallel tragedies that had recently occurred in the United States. In one, a Chinese Ph.D. candidate at a midwestern university, angry at what he regarded as ill treatment at the hands of his advisor, shot and killed the advisor and several bystanders. At about the same time, a postal worker in Detroit, angry at what he regarded as ill treatment by his superior, shot and killed the supervisor and several bystanders. Morris and Peng analyzed accounts of the two murders in English-language newspapers and in Chinese-language newspapers. Whereas the American accounts speculated almost wholly on the presumed mental instability and other negative dispositions of the two alleged murderers, the Chinese accounts speculated on situational, contextual, and even societal factors that might have been at work. Morris and Peng then showed that the same attributional patterns were obtained when Chinese and American university students were asked to explain the events: Chinese subjects were more likely to prefer contextual explanations; American subjects were more likely to prefer dispositional ones. These tendencies were demonstrated whether subjects were explaining the behavior of the American murderer or the Chinese murderer. Lee, Hallahan, and Herzog (1996) have shown a comparable difference in the types of explanations for sports events given by Hong Kong and American commentators. Hong Kong journalists focused on contextual explanations for sports outcomes; American journalists focused on dispositional ones. These investigators have shown comparable differences in Asian and American differences explaining failure in attaining a goal (Hallahan, Lee, & Herzog, 1998).

FAE for Animal Behaviors

So far, one might argue that cultural differences in causal attribution could be explained in terms of global beliefs or theories about human behavior: Americans believe that traits, abilities, and attitudes are very different from one person to another and are highly stable, whereas Chinese and Indians in contrast believe that particular situations determine people’s behavior in certain predictable ways. Although we have shown that there prob-
ably are such differences, there is also good reason to believe that the explanations reflect more general styles or modes of thought whose range of application goes well beyond human behaviors. Morris and Peng created animated cartoon displays of fish moving in relation to one another in various ways. Each type of movement featured a single fish behaving in one way and a group of fish behaving in another. In one cartoon, for example, the single fish moved away from the group. In another, the single fish was joined by the group. Subjects were asked to say whether the behavior of the single fish was best explained as externally produced or internally produced. Chinese subjects tended to see the behavior as being produced by external factors, and American subjects tended to see the behavior as being produced by internal ones.

Taken together, this evidence suggests that Americans tacitly assume that behavior of all kinds must be produced by the individual; as a consequence, they look inside the individual to explain it. In contrast, Chinese tacitly assume that behavior of all kinds must be made possible by factors in the field of which this behavior is a part; as a consequence, they look for explanations among the factors in this total field.

FAE for Physical Events If there really are such large differences in explanatory tendencies, we might expect to see them even for physical events. In a famous essay, Lewin (1935) argued that there is a tendency to see behavior as due to attributes of the object—a flaw of what he called "Aristotelian" physics:

Aristotelian dynamics are completely determined in advance by the nature of the object concerned. In modern physics, on the contrary, the existence of a physical vector always depends upon the mutual relations of several physical facts, especially upon the relation of the object to its environment. (p. 128, italics in original)

Thus Aristotle accounted for a stone falling as being due to the object's possessing the quality of "gravity." A piece of wood was thought to float on water because it possessed the quality of "levity." Not until the time of Galileo was it understood that the behavior of an object is the result of an interaction between the object and the environment.

In the West, that is. Nakamura (1964/1985) and Needham (1962) have argued that the history of physics was very different in the East, where the fundamental interaction principle, including the concept of action at a distance, was understood in China 2,000 years ago. Certainly magnetism and the movement of the tides were understood in terms that are thoroughly modern. Consistent with these claims, Peng and Nisbett (in press) have shown that Chinese are more likely to refer to the field in their explanations for ambiguous physical events, whereas Americans are more likely to refer solely to factors internal to the object.

Thus we have good reason to believe that causality is understood differently in East Asian and European-American culture and that this difference is not superficial. It is sufficiently deep that naive, intuitive understanding of the social, animal, and physical worlds differs substantially between the two cultures.

Belief in Dispositions To be clear, however, we are not saying that East Asians or other interdependent peoples do not draw any dispositional inferences. On the contrary, there is evidence that Asians and other non-Western people think about personality in ways that are not completely different from those of Westerners (Choi, Nisbett, & Norenzayan, 1998). Numerous researchers have found that, when Western personality instruments are translated into Chinese, the same so-called "Big Five" personality factors are extracted from personality ratings of self or others (Boh; 1985; Bond, 1979; Chen, 1983; Liu, 1991; Luk & Bond, 1993; Yang & Bond, 1990). When indigenous materials are used, it is not so clear how similar the factor structure is to that found in the West, though some investigators do find substantial similarity (e.g., Cheung, Costa, & Yik, 1996). Perhaps more important to social psychologists, Asians can be shown to make dispositional inferences from behavioral data in much the same way that Westerners do. When Norenzayan and Nisbett (1997; Norenzayan, Choi, & Nisbett, in press) asked Chinese, Korean, and American subjects to make predictions about the behavior of an actor given knowledge of his behavior in another, sketchily-described situation, East Asian subjects made predictions that were fully as dispositional-based as those of Americans.

Sensitivity to Consensus Information The differences between East Asians and European Americans probably lies more in sensitivity to factors that signal situational importance than it does in belief in dispositions. Norenzayan and Nisbett (1998) showed that when subjects were asked to think about the base rate for behavior in a particular situation (that is, what percent of people would behave in one way vs. another), Koreans were more responsive to situational factors than Americans. Moreover, as Cha and Nam (1985) have shown, the East Asian understanding of the (1976) paradigm in which subjects are provided with a description of an event ("While dancing, Ralph tripped over Joan's feet") and asked to report why they think the event happened. When American subjects are told that "Almost everyone trips over Joan's feet," their attributions hardly change. Korean subjects, in contrast, recognize the relevance of the consensus information and the understanding of the relative importance of the person to the
Attitude Attribution Paradigm  Several replications of one of the very first experimental demonstrations of the correspondence bias by Jones and Harris (1967) show similarity between East Asian and Western tendencies to make dispositional inferences but heightened East Asian sensitivity to salient situational information. Jones and Harris asked participants to read an essay, either for or against a position on an important social question of the day, that allegedly had been written by another student. Participants inferred that the actual attitude of the student who wrote the "pro" essay was much more favorable than the actual attitude of the student who wrote the "con" essay. Other participants were told that the target had no choice about which side to take in the essay—for example that the target was required to write an essay exam taking a particular position. Though logically this information might be expected to eliminate participants' assumptions that the essay reflected anything about the actual belief of the target, this was far from the case. In fact, the difference between estimated attitudes for pro and con targets was two-thirds as great for no-choice participants as for choice participants.

Choi and Nisbett (in press), Krull et al. (1996), Masuda and Kitayama (1998), and Toyama (1990) have all found a substantial correspondence bias for Korean, Chinese, and Japanese college students, respectively, in the standard "no-choice" condition of the Jones and Harris experiment. It is not clear, however, that this demonstrates that East Asians are as susceptible to the FAE as Americans. Schwarz (1996) and others have argued that the results for no choice conditions may depend in part on a violation of Gricean rules of conversation: why would the experimenter be showing me this essay if it were not relevant to a judgment about the essay writer’s views? To the extent that this artifact exists, one would expect that it might be greater for Asians, who, in general, compared to Americans, are probably more strongly motivated to empathetically discern and conform to a supervisor’s (or experimenter’s) unstated expectations. (What is regarded as an “artifact” in the United States may be the core phenomenon in East Asia.) But we do not wish to push this explanation too far, both because of the lack of direct evidence and because there is strong evidence from two of these studies that Asians are sensitive to situational cues in the Jones and Harris paradigm if these are made salient enough. Following procedures developed by Gilbert and Jones (1986), Masuda and Kitayama had subjects participate in the experiment in pairs.

One of the participants assigned to one of the conditions chose between two identical envelopes which contained essays to be read by the target person. The target person then read in front of a video camera the essay chosen by the participant. The other subject observed all these events. Here it should be very obvious to the subject that the target neither wrote nor chose the essay he read. Even in these conditions Gilbert and Jones found clear evidence for a correspondence bias in American populations. But Masuda and Kitayama found that in these conditions their Japanese subjects did not show the correspondence bias. Thus, once the social inducement information was given, the content of the argument the subject read had no effect on the attitude inferences of Japanese subjects.

A similar demonstration was performed by Choi and Nisbett (in press), who duplicated both the basic conditions of the Jones and Harris study and two conditions of a subsequent study by Snyder and Jones (1974) in which subjects, before making judgments about the target’s attitude, were required to write an essay themselves and allowed no choice about which side to take. In one of these conditions subjects were also shown a list of arguments they should use in their essay. Subjects in these two conditions were told that a target had been through the same procedure they had and were asked to judge the target’s true attitude. Just as Snyder and Jones found, the American subjects in the latter two conditions were as likely to make strong “correspondence inferences” as were subjects who were not put through the procedure themselves. Korean subjects, in contrast, made less extreme inferences when they were put through the procedure themselves and less extreme inferences still when they were also shown arguments they should use.

To summarize: Though Asians sometimes think about personality in ways that may be similar to the ways that European-Americans do, there is also evidence that they sometimes do not invoke traits in circumstances where European-Americans do. Compared to European-Americans, Asians’ greater understanding of the relevance of situations, and, as we see in the next section, their greater attention to the social field, is likely to result in more emphasis on situationally-based explanations and less emphasis on dispositions.

Analytic versus Holistic Modes of Thought

We have noted that the Chinese were long ago aware that physical causality always has to be explained as a result of the interaction between an object and a field of forces. Historians of science (e.g., Lloyd, 1990), and philosophers (Hansen, 1983; Munro, 1985; Nakamura, 1964/1985) have argued that the differences between East and West in apprehension of physical reality are accompanied by very marked differences in epistemology. Eastern physical
holism is accompanied by a broader holistic reasoning style, such that many elements and their relationships are held in thought at the same time. In contrast, in the West there has long been a preference for analysis, for breaking objects up into their component elements and reasoning about their properties in linear, deterministic fashion (Yates & Lee, 1996). Together with this tendency is a preference for placing objects into categories, often on the basis of attributes presumed necessary and sufficient for category membership. Rules based on category membership are then used as the basis for predicting and explaining the behavior of the object. In the East, on the other hand, there has been relatively little interest in categorizing objects and little faith in categories as useful ways of making inductive and deductive inferences about the world (Nagashima, 1973; Nakamura, 1964/1985). Nor has there ever been a tradition of deductive logic in the East, certainly not in the Western tradition, which begins with the assumption that both A and not-A cannot be true (Liu, 1974; Lloyd, 1990). On the contrary, in the East, there is a "dialectic" tradition, which assumes precisely that both A and not-A can be true, indeed that A implies the existence, or the nonexistence, of not-A (Iwao, 1988). As we will now see, there is some evidence that these remarkable claims hold for laypeople in the two cultural traditions today (Nisbett, in press).

Holistic Processing Some of the earliest psychological evidence in support of the claim that Asians are more inclined toward holistic processing came from work by Francis Hsu, the Chinese-American social scientist who worked on the distinction between individualism and collectivism (Abel & Hsu, 1949). Rorschach cards were presented to European-American and to Chinese-American subjects, and the subjects were asked to provide responses according to the standard Rorschach procedures. The Chinese-American participants were more likely than the European-American ones to give so-called "whole-card" responses, in which all aspects of the card, or its overall gestalt, were the basis of the response. The European-American participants, on the other hand, were more likely than the Chinese-American ones to give "part" responses, in which only a single aspect of the card was the basis of the response.

Relations versus Categories in Object Grouping In another early experiment, Chiu (1972) gave items consisting of three pictures of human, vehicle, furniture, tool, or food categories to American and Chinese children. The participant was asked "to choose any two of the three objects in a set which were alike or went together and to state the reason for his choice" (p. 237). The dominant style of the Chinese children was "relational-contextual." For example, human figures might be grouped together because "the mother takes care of the baby." In contrast, American children were much more likely to group objects on the basis of observable parts of an item—for example, "because they are both holding a gun"—and on the basis of inferential and categorical properties—for example, "because they are fruits" or "because they both have a motor."

Focus on Relations versus Objects in the Language of Infants and Adults Whereas a bias toward using more nouns than verbs has been regarded as a universal of early language and cognitive development, Tardif (1996) has found a verb bias for Chinese toddlers. The same verb bias has also been found among Korean infants (Choi & Gopnik, in press). These data are in keeping with the contention that whereas Westerners focus on objects and their analysis, Asians focus on relations between objects.

Categories and Induction Work by Choi, Nisbett, and Smith (in press) suggests that categories are spontaneously salient to Westerners when they make inductive inferences—but not to East Asians. For example, American college students responded more than Koreans to "coverage" of a category when judging the adequacy of an inductive argument. American subjects find it much more persuasive that rabbits have a particular property, given that lions and giraffes have the property (good coverage of the category), than they do given that lions and tigers have the property (poor coverage of the category); this response was much less true for Korean subjects. Koreans made as much use of categories as Americans, however, when categories were made salient in various ways—for example, by mentioning the category in the conclusion (in this instance, having subjects make an inference to "mammals" rather than to rabbits). Thus Koreans are quite capable of using categories for induction; it appears simply that categories are less spontaneously available to them. Of particular importance, these findings completely reversed when the category was a social one, having to do with people, and the attribute was behavioral. For example, subjects were asked which argument was more persuasive: that engineers prefer jazz to classical music given that physicians and lawyers prefer jazz, or given that physicians and psychoanalysts prefer jazz. In this case, Koreans were more responsive to categories in their inductions than were Americans—unless the category was made salient—in which case Americans were as responsive to categories as were Koreans. The Choi, Nisbett, and Smith study thus makes two points: (1) Koreans appear to make less spontaneous use of categories for purposes of inductive inferences than do Americans, but (2) despite this fact, if the relevant inferences are social ones, Koreans do rely on categories.

Category Learning If, as the ethnographic, philosophical, and developmental psychology literature suggest, East Asians really make less use of categories than do Euro-
American-Americans, then we should find that it is more difficult for them to learn some kinds of categories, especially by the formal application of rules. Work by Norenzayan, Nisbett, and Smith (1998) suggests that this is the case. They presented their Asian (mostly Chinese) and American subjects with cartoon animals and told them that some of the animals were from Venus and some were from Saturn. Subjects in a memory condition were asked simply to observe a series of presentations and make guesses, with feedback, as to which was which. Other subjects were put through a more formal category-learning procedure. They were told that they should pay attention to five different properties of the animals—long tail, knobbly antennae, cloven feet, etc.—and that if the animal had any three of these properties, it was from Venus; otherwise it was from Saturn. Though Asian subjects were just as good at the memory task (or “family resemblance” categorization) as American subjects, they showed poorer performance in the formal category-learning condition by three criteria: they learned less well over the training trials, their response times were slower in test trials, and, when the test trial presented an animal that met the formal criteria for a given category but more closely resembled the animals in the other category (negative match) they made more errors of classification. (They did not make more errors when the match was positive—that is, when the animal looked like the category of which it was a member by the terms of the formal rules.)

**Dialectic Reasoning** Peng and Nisbett (Peng, 1997; Peng & Nisbett, 1998) investigated Chinese and American preferences for “dialectic” versus nondialectic, or “linear,” reasoning. They found that dialectic proverbs, in which two contradictory ideas are presented and the reader’s task is to resolve the paradox (“too humble is half proud”) were much more common in Chinese collections of proverbs than in English collections. In contrast, nondialectic proverbs (“as the twig is bent, so grows the tree”) were much more common in English collections. These investigators showed that Chinese university students preferred dialectic proverbs over nondialectic ones, and American students were more likely to prefer linear proverbs—even when the proverbs were Yiddish! They also demonstrated that arguments couched in dialectic terms were more persuasive to Chinese, whereas arguments to the same conclusion couched in logical terms were relatively more persuasive to Americans. And they demonstrated that, when presented with contradictory accounts of a situation, Chinese subjects attempted to find a “middle way” in which both accounts had some validity, whereas American subjects tended to reject one side entirely in preference to the other. Finally, they performed an experiment in which subjects were presented with one statement about a social science finding, a statement of its near-opposite, or both.

Americans increased their belief in the position they were initially inclined to believe when told about the two findings. This is reminiscent of the behavior of subjects in the Lord, Ross, and Lepper (1979) experiment where subjects believed more strongly in their initial view about capital punishment when shown one study contradicting their view and one study supporting it. In contrast, Chinese subjects who read the two studies with contradictory findings reported believing less strongly in their initial position; they also increased their belief in the opposing position. Apparently Americans may react to a controversy by becoming more extreme, while Chinese may seek the middle ground or accept opposing positions.

**Attention to the Field: Detection of Covariation** If basic causal understanding of the world really differs in the way that has been proposed, then it should be possible to show that East Asians attend more closely to the environment than do Westerners. After all, if the environment plays a crucial role in determining outcomes, attention to it is crucial. Work by Peng and Nisbett (1998b) examined the covariation-detection habits of East Asians and Westerners. If East Asians are relatively more attentive to the environment, then their abilities to detect covariation among events should be superior to those of Westerners. And this is what was found. Chinese and American subjects were asked to judge the degree of association between arbitrary figures on a computer screen (e.g., either a medal or a pie on one side and either a dollar sign or a desk on the other). Subjects were asked to judge some correlations that were actually .00, some correlations that were .4, and some that were .6. Chinese subjects saw a greater degree of covariation than did American subjects and were more confident about their covariation judgments. Their confidence judgments were also better calibrated: Chinese subjects were more confident about higher degrees of covariation, whereas Americans were about equally confident of their judgments regardless of degree of covariation. In addition, American subjects appeared to have based their judgments of covariation largely on the first presentation they saw: in the great majority of cases, predictions about a final observation were identical to the pairing they had seen on the first observation. Chinese were much less likely to use this simple heuristic.

A very important aspect of the results is that all findings were sharply modified when subjects were allowed to push a button to determine which of two stimuli would be presented first. Whereas these features could have no effect on the degree of covariation, Americans who were given “control” in this fashion saw more covariation, expressed more confidence in their judgments about covariation, and improved in the calibration of their judgments relative to Chinese, who performed somewhat more poorly when they had control over stimulus presentations than when they did not.
This experiment provides a very clear object lesson about the arbitrariness of separating content and process. We have a great deal of evidence that East Asians believe that causality is located in the physical and social field. But such an ontogenetic orientation could scarcely fail to have implications for perceptual and cognitive processes. If causality is in the field, one must look to the field. Apparently East Asians do so, or at any rate they do so more effectively with respect to discovering covariation than do Westerners. A process point can be made in the other direction as well. If Westerners believe that they have a great deal of control over events, then “putting them in control” even when the control is illusory, may have the effect of causing them to look more effectively at the events they believe they are controlling.

Thus we would argue that as a result of participating in different cultural milieus, people in East Asian contexts are likely to experience the world differently from people in Western cultures. Given their typically interdependent patterns of cultural engagement, Asians will likely often see the world in a more holistic fashion, relating elements of objects to one another and to the environment and believing that causality resides in the interaction between the object and the environment. As a consequence, East Asians may be more skilled at detecting covariation in their environment than Westerners are—even when personal control is highlighted in the task. Westerners apparently tend to approach the world in an analytic fashion, examining attributes in isolation and using judgments about them to place objects into categories, which can then be used as reliable guides to further inferences. Preferred arguments are deductive or appeal to abstract rules. As a consequence of these cognitive and perceptual habits, Westerners are more likely to focus exclusively on the properties of the object in explaining its behavior, whether the object is inanimate, animate, or human, both for purposes of explanation and for purposes of directing their attention.

Intrinsic versus Extrinsic Motivation and Locus of Control

In studies of European-Americans, two types of motivations have been distinguished. One, called intrinsic motivation, is the type that arises from endogenous factors such as internal desires, interests, or personal choices. The other type, called extrinsic motivation, includes motives that are anchored in exogenous factors, such as pursuit of rewards or avoidance of punishments associated with task performance. One powerful demonstration of the distinction between the two types of motivations comes from studies that show a decline of intrinsic motivation when external rewards are made available. In one of the earlier studies, Lepper, Greene, and Nisbett (1975) showed that American children were less likely to persist on an interesting drawing task when no reward was offered after they had previously worked on the same task while knowing that they would receive a nice reward for their work. This is consistent with the notion that people engage in attributional inference to judge their intrinsic interest in a task. When they perform a task without any obvious external inducement, an intrinsic interest in the task is the most plausible reason for engaging in it. The intrinsic interest thus identified through this attributional analysis is reflected in their subsequent persistence in working on the task. When there is an external inducement, their task performance is “overjustified”: either their intrinsic interest or the external inducement can be a sufficient reason for their performance. There arises, therefore, an attributional ambiguity, and as a result, people may discount their own intrinsic interest because the external inducements provide a competing explanation for their own behavior. The diminished intrinsic interest is then reflected in their subsequent failure to persist in the task.

The Lepper et al. (1975) study indicates that the American children they examined had an implicit inference rule that one’s own behavior can be caused by two competing sources, one intrinsic and the other extrinsic. Furthermore, once one’s intrinsic motivation, or sense of choosing to engage in the task, has been identified as the cause of behavior, it facilitates future performance in the task. Deci and Ryan (1990) have argued that the importance of construing action as having been chosen applies equally well to relationships with other people: only to the extent that relationships are experienced as being the consequence of each person’s free choice and voluntary consent to engage in them are they perceived to be authentic, nonoppressive, and thus satisfactory. From a cultural perspective, however, these assumptions may be rooted in a view of the self as independent. According to this view, the self is seen as an entity that is separate, self-motivating, and contrasted against its social background. Behavior is made fully meaningful only to the extent that it is completely self-determined and self-chosen. Any other causes—especially those outside of the segregated, bounded individual—are seen as competing or interfering with the intrinsic causes.

By contrast, given an interdependent view of the self, relationships with others may be seen as a necessary context in which one’s own behavior is made meaningful. As a consequence, the distinction between the internal and the external tends to be blurred, and what appears to be an external inducement from the independent perspective may not be identified as such. Behavior may be made meaningful not in reference to one’s internal attributes, but in reference to a relationship or the pertinent action field in which the behavior is embedded.

This, of course, is not unheard of in Western cultures. For example, a mother watching her young daughter in play on a stage may smile, speak to, and even try to mimic...
behavior by the self and its relational surrounding is both normal and normative. Hence "control" in the agentic Western sense may not be a universal motive with the same correlates in every setting for every cultural group. In support of this analysis, Morling and Fiske (1998) showed that perceived control over events is stronger for European Americans than for East Asian and Hispanic Americans, even though the perceived control for internal personal conditions is stronger for the latter groups. In school settings, Little and colleagues (1995) have documented a heightened sense of effectiveness in influencing one's own academic performance among Americans and Germans compared to Japanese.

Further, evidence has begun to show that whereas for independent populations the perceived sense of controlling external events is associated with adaptation in the immediate situation (e.g., Heckhausen & Schulz. 1995; Langer. 1983; Taylor & Brown. 1988), this may be less true for interdependent ones. In a sample survey of the perception of mitigation of earthquake risks in California and Japan (areas within and near the Tokyo metropolitan area), Kitayama et al. (1996) asked respondents to indicate which of eleven risk-mitigating behaviors (such as placing furniture near the wall, discussing with family members where they would meet in an emergency, storing foods and water) they had adopted. The researchers also measured levels of fatalism, which implies the perceived loss of personal control over natural hazards and all consequences associated with them (e.g., "Earthquakes happen when they do — there's nothing I can do about them"). In all age groups, ranging from twenty to sixty or above, Japanese exhibited a markedly higher level of fatalism than Americans. Further, in the United States, fatalism negatively predicted risk mitigation, indicating that the lack of perceived control of external events is associated with maladaptation. In Japan, however, fatalism had no relationship with risk mitigation.

The data are not sufficient for us to speak with any confidence about whether there will be differences between East and West with respect to phenomena of control and intrinsic motivation. But a great deal that we know about the two culture areas leads us to believe that such differences will be found. Control and choice are so central to the requirements of the independent self that it would be surprising if phenomena involving them did not look very different for interdependent selves.

Cognitive Consistency

The idea that people are motivated toward a resolution of cognitive inconsistencies has a long and respectable history in social psychology. Inconsistencies, once recognized and represented as such by the perceivers, engage a tendency to resolve them. Thus people may distort their memories to
obtain cognitive balance in their representations of social relationships (Heider, 1958). Or they may modify their attitudes or preferences so that they fit better with an action they have performed (Festinger, 1957). Although the tendency toward cognitive consistency is often described as a marker of human rationality and therefore might be expected to be widespread or even universal, a cultural perspective suggests that social psychological notions of "consistency" may be more or less culturally local.

Cultures that emphasize the importance of the individual place great value on the expression of personal desires and the pursuit of personal goals. In such cultures, people will regard it as hypocritical to fail to act in accord with personal attitudes—despite possible damage to personal relationships. To accommodate others may seem to involve giving in to external constraints and failing to be true to oneself. For cultures that emphasize relationships, it may be regarded as selfish, immature, or disloyal to act in accord with personal attitudes—or even to express such attitudes—if they conflict with the maintenance of a smooth social equilibrium. Accommodating personal desires may frequently seem to involve self-indulgent failure to acknowledge legitimate commitments to others.

For example, consider an African villager who appreciatively accepts an invitation for a meal, even though he knows that he must attend a crucial clan ritual at home and will not show up for the meal. His acceptance may be an expression of respect; to refuse the invitation would be to provoke a mutually embarrassing situation in which he and his host would have to publicly acknowledge that he values his clan rituals more than their friendship. Given local practices and culturally organized motives, the villager experiences no strain for consistency between his private intention (and obligation) to attend the clan ritual and his respectful expression of intent to attend the meal—any well-bred person would do as much for a friend.

Restoring "Balance" in the Case of Disagreement with Others It is much too early to declare that members of interdependent cultures do not exhibit the same sort of inconsistency phenomena that members of independent cultures do. But Iwao (1988) offers some suggestive evidence that people in interdependent cultures often sacrifice consistency for the sake of interpersonal accommodation. Iwao asked American and Japanese respondents what they would prefer to do when confronted by various disagreements—try to change the other person's view, change their own view, or feign agreement. Americans preferred to try to change the other person's view more than did Japanese, while Japanese were much more likely to prefer to feign agreement. The latter type of behavior among Japanese might seem hypocritical to holders of the independent view of the self, since the Japanese prefer to behave in ways that differ from what they "truly" believe. Given the interdependent view, however, maintaining a good relationship may be much more important than attempting to "settle" the disagreement, so it would be uncouth and insensitive to contradict or argue.

Dissonance in the "Free Choice" Paradigm In his original statement of cognitive dissonance theory, Festinger defined dissonance as a state in which one cognition does not "follow from" another. Work since that time has shown, however, that inconsistency resolution effects are typically found only when at least one of the cognitions involves the self in some important way. Typically, it is a particular behavior that does not follow from a particular attitude held by the individual. But, of course, "following from" can be defined very differently in different cultures. Behavior that would be regarded by individuals from an independent culture as not following from an attitude may be regarded by individuals from an interdependent culture simply as a flexible response to a situation. In line with this possibility, Kashima et al. (1992) examined the strength of the belief that attitudes are normally consistent with behaviors and found that this view is much more strongly held among Australians than among Japanese.

An implication of the finding by Kashima et al. is that East Asians should be less perturbed when their behavior does not follow from a particular attitude or belief and therefore might not show the standard cognitive dissonance effects. A recent study by Heine and Lehman (1997b) has provided initial support for such a possibility by using a free-choice paradigm of cognitive dissonance. Respondents were given a choice between two equally attractive CDs. After such a choice, some inconsistencies are likely to arise because the chosen CD may have certain negative features, while the unchosen CD may have certain desirable features. Such inconsistencies directly contradict the premise central to the model of the independent person—namely, that one's behavior (choice) is to be consistent with one's internal attributes (preferences). (See Steele, 1988, for an account of how threatening it can be to the independent self to experience making choices that do not fully satisfy preferences.) Hence, there should arise a motivation to eliminate such a dissonant state by changing some of the cognitions involved. As have countless other investigators, Heine and Lehman found that among their North American participants, there was a considerable "spread" of preference after the choice, such that liking for the chosen CD increased and liking for the unchosen CD decreased. However, these researchers failed to find the comparable effect among Japanese respondents. This result supports the idea that the requirement of internal consistency is much weaker for people operating with an interdependent model of the self.

Dissonance in the "Insufficient Justification" Paradigm The normative expectation that one's own behavior is to be
guided by an internal attribute of the self has implications for the other major dissonance paradigm—the so-called "forced choice" or "insufficient justification" paradigm in which subjects are maneuvered into performing some behavior that violates their beliefs or attitudes related to the behavior. For example, Festinger and Carlsmith (1959) argued that unpleasant acts such as telling someone that a boring task is highly interesting, with little or no extrinsic justification in the form of money or other compensation, should make people uncomfortable. Once they have carried out such an action, people should be motivated to increase their liking for the task, thereby avoiding a discrepancy between their attitudes and their behavior. This argument is predicated on the assumption that people feel that action normally must be derived from "internal" factors such as preferences, intentions, or reasons (such as direct compensation). It further assumes that accommodating the experimenter’s request to state that the task was interesting is not recognized by the subjects to be sufficient and appropriate motivation (it does not count as the kind of internal factor that should explain behavior). In Festinger and Carlsmith’s famous experiment and countless replications, subjects shift their attitudes in a direction that would justify the behavior. The most obvious expectation is that this result would be blunted or not found at all in many cultures of East Asia. And indeed there are some failures to replicate the Festinger and Carlsmith experiment and other forced compliance experiments in East Asia (Choi, Choi, & Cha, 1992; Yoshizaki, Ishii, & Ishii, 1977, in two different studies), although two studies have found an apparent insufficient justification effect in Japan (Tagata & Hashimoto, 1973; Yoshida, 1977). So we are far from an understanding of when insufficient justification effects will obtain.

One way to approach the psychological analysis of consistency and dissonance effects is to analyze the presuppositions that are required for these psychological processes to operate. These effects seem to depend on assumptions roughly equivalent to the following:

- Actions are freely chosen.
- Choices imply a preference.
- Preferences are stable over time.
- Preferences implicate the identity of the self.
- Outcomes are mostly controllable.
- People are responsible for (and hence the self is implicated in) the choices they make and the resultant outcomes.
- Smart (good) people make good choices whose outcomes they are happy with.

These ideas are axiomatic, though generally implicit, in many modern Western cultures. Many other cultures do not share all of these assumptions or would substantially qualify some of them. Consequently, the kinds of dissonance, consistency, and insufficient-justification effects that operate in the West would not necessarily occur. What we need to do, then, is to analyze what cultural axioms are necessary for these psychological processes to occur.

**Moral Judgment**

The study of moral reasoning and moral development has not been a focal concern for social psychologists. Yet among the significant consequences of a cultural analysis is the understanding that all cultural systems incorporate some sense of the proper, the good, and the moral, together with the realization that there is significant diversity in how communities conceive of the good. Within a society, much if not most social behavior is constructed, fostered, and sanctioned with reference to the community’s conceptions of the good.

In American society, for example, some of the significant moral goods include freedom, independence, self-determination, and individual rights. And as is evident in the preceding two sections of this chapter, on control and cognitive consistency, such concepts are the key to the understanding of many social psychological phenomena. But, as moral philosophers have shown, moral systems are diverse (e.g., Aristotle, 1953, 1982; Berlin, 1980; Brandt, 1954; Harre & Krausz, 1996; McIntyre, 1981; Wong, 1984). Psychologists have long recognized that moral systems (including but not limited to religious moralities) may be based on respect, awe, and fear of parents, ancestors, and social superiors (Piaget, 1932/1965; Freud, 1923/1962). Fiske (1990, 1991b) developed a theory of four basic moral frameworks that people use to different degrees and in differing ways across all cultures: caring and sharing, based on a relationship of equivalence; respect and responsibility, based on a relationship of legitimate authority; equality and reciprocity, based on a relationship of balance and matching; and proportionality, based on a relationship of equity or a rational utilitarian calculus of the greatest good for the greatest number. Shweder and colleagues (Shweder et al., 1997) have highlighted a trilogy of moral systems that they call the “big three.” Besides autonomy, which is a sacred moral good in much of the West, they suggest there is community, which is highlighted in much of East Asia, and divinity, which is particularly well elaborated in India.

Any consideration of diversity in patterns of morality raises significant questions for the analysis of social behavior. If, for example, filial piety, community, or interdependence is the moral good that is fostered in a given group’s meanings and elaborated in its patterns of sociality, then social behavior that is sometimes negatively valued and difficult to fathom from the autonomy-valuing European-American perspective will require new frameworks for interpretation and analysis. For example, moral rectitude may
require a person to remain silent and be modest, humble, full of shame, withdrawing, acquiescent, and conforming.

The philosopher Taylor (1989) points out that a community's conception of morality is completely bound up with its conceptions of what is human, such that the questions "what is good?" and "what is self?" are essentially the same question. Western approaches to morality incorporate a view of the person as a separate, bounded, independent entity whose dignity depends on personal liberty and the guarantee of certain natural rights, such as life, liberty, and property. From this view individuals are morally entitled to be able to conduct their lives as they see fit and should be "free" to pursue their own personal vision of the good.

The Morality of Justice The Western moral tradition, especially since the Enlightenment, is an individualistic one in part because ontological priority is given to the separate, essentially nonsocial individual who is considered to enter, subsequently and secondarily, into social relations by mutual consent with other, similar individuals. Many of the assumptions spelled out in the previous section on dissonance—particularly the ideas that individuals possess a set of attributes including rights, that actions are freely chosen, that outcomes are mostly controllable, and that people are responsible for their actions—are incorporated within the Western approach to morality. A fundamental assumption of the Western approach is that society has developed to serve individual needs and desires and that the needs of others are often at odds with one's own desires. The main idea is that for their mutual benefit, individuals enter into a social contract—they consent to comply with a set of abstract principles that justify a social order. These principles are assumed to be legitimate to the extent that they are mutually beneficial to participants' individual interests. Social welfare results from protecting people against unjustified encroachments. According to this view, when a conflict arises, it should be possible to use reason to discern which principles should be followed. The individual then has moral autonomy and is "free" from political and religious authority (Kittay & Meyers, 1987).

The idea of personal liberty and the notion of a social contract are at the core of what is called the justice tradition in moral-reasoning research. The justice perspective derives from the theorizing of Locke, Kant, Mill, and more recently, Rawls. This tradition judges individuals according to whether their actions violate the "rights" of others. Advancing the rights of others, or helping them, is not a moral requirement, because given the particular individualist focus of the justice perspective, people are not entitled to aid: thus helping them or working to maintain society is discretionary, not a moral requirement (Eisenberg et al., 1986; Nunner-Winkler, 1984).

Until very recently, almost all psychological research on morality and the development of moral reasoning was rooted in this justice tradition. Psychologists conceptualized moral development as the process of approaching the ideal of the morally autonomous person. Despite the wealth of ethnographic and philosophical treatments of conceptions of morality tied to alternative conceptions of the person, psychologists ignored all other frameworks. Kohlberg (1958, 1981, 1984), the most well-known theorist in the justice tradition, argued that, as in the physical world, judgments about the moral world could be true or false, better or worse. He did not believe, like Taylor or Hume, that moral judgments are based in a community's particular interests and values. He proposed a six-stage process of moral development. In stages 1 and 2—the "preconventional" level—people obey rules to avoid punishment or receive rewards. In stages 3 and 4—the "conventional" level—people acknowledge the value of societal rules and of proper conduct (law and order) that maintains society; in stages 5 and 6—the "postconventional" level—morality becomes associated with the protection of individual rights and with the belief in abstract principles such as the value of life, liberty, and equality.

Kohlberg's view was that his six-stage theory of morality was universally applicable and that tests of moral reasoning could evaluate people's level of moral development. The primary standard was verbal reasoning about hypothetical stories, with no attention to any moral schemata that subjects could not explicitly articulate (let alone their behavior). Leaving aside the potential conceptual difficulties in Kohlberg's claim of a universal approach to morality, the universality of his theory has been a source of continuing empirical controversy. Edwards (1981) and Bergling (1981), in reviews of numerous studies, contend that stages 1 to 3 are universal. Likewise Snarey (1985), in an analysis of forty-five studies, finds that stages 1 to 3 are universally applicable but that stages 4 and 5 tend to be emphasized only in modern Western cultures.

The Morality of Caring Gilligan (1982) was the first psychological theorist in this moral judgment tradition since Piaget (1932/1965) to present a compelling argument for the view that moral truth is diverse. She argued that the justice perspective failed to reflect the concerns and the moral decision-making strategies of many women in society. In what is called a "care" perspective, she proposed that men are likely to view morality in terms of competing rights that can be resolved through the application of deductive reasoning and abstract general principles. Women are more likely to view the world in terms of human relationships that can be negotiated through communication. For Gilligan, moral development depends on an increasing understanding of human relationships and an effort to maintain one's integrity and freedom of choice without neglecting one's responsibility to others. Such a perspective, she suggests, should not condemn one to a lower level of
moral reasoning as it does in Kohlberg's system. Her ideas, along with related perspectives of Chodorow (1978), Miller (1991, 1994a), Ruddick (1987), and Noddings (1984), emphasize that a concern for caring and social obligation should not be regarded as a moral weakness or a hurdle to be overcome, but instead as a strength that recognizes the social embeddedness of the human being. Gilligan's approach makes apparent the link between morality and the self-concept, arguing that the needs of the other are experienced as integral to an individual's personal identity or sense of self.

Miller and Bersoff (1992, 1994b) contend, however, that while Gilligan's approach reveals that there is a morality of caring and attends to the moral diversity between men and women, it remains rooted within a Western, individualist paradigm. The feelings and needs of the individual are emphasized. Even within the ethic of caring, the goal is to discover one's own individuality within the context of the group, and a central struggle within this perspective is the conflict between responsibility to self and responsibility to other. However, within an interdependent cultural context, a concern with one's own needs and rights may be secondary to social duty, and the interpersonal obligation arising from one's fundamental interdependence may be experienced as a powerful moral "good." From a Confucian perspective, for example, individuals are not separate from other people, individuals must work through groups of others; that is their nature. They must be part of groups—families, communities, nations—to reveal themselves (Tu, 1994; cf. Fiske's (1991b) concept of the morality of communal sharing).

Yeh (1996), in an extensive review of morality within a wide variety of Asian and East Asian contexts, concludes that justice and individual rights are clearly secondary concerns for these cultures (cf. Leung & Morris, in press). For example, Heubner and Garrod (1993) used two dilemmas adapted from Kohlberg in an interview study with twenty Buddhist monks and showed that an analysis of their morality required an understanding of the concepts of karma and dharma. "Karma" refers to "the universal law of cause and effect," in which it follows that all bad actions produce bad results and good actions produce good results (Heubner & Garrod, 1993). And dharma is "based on the virtue of compassion and concentrates on preventing suffering and promoting unselfishness" (Heubner & Garrod, 1993, p. 181).

Individually Based versus Duty-Based Morality The work of Miller and her colleagues shows that qualitatively distinct forms of interpersonal morality exist among Hindu Indians as compared with European-Americans (Miller, 1994b). In particular, the work indicates that an individually oriented form of a morality of caring develops among European-Americans. This orientation emphasizes the importance of personal freedom of choice and the ongoing tension between the needs of the individual and requirements of the large social whole. In contrast, a duty-based form of the morality of caring develops among Hindu Indians. This latter orientation emphasizes the importance of social duties and the compatibility that exists between the requirements of individuals and those of the social whole. This research suggests that interpersonal responsibilities are mandatory and have a moral force. In comparison with Americans, Indians are more frequently judged that there is a responsibility to help others in special relationships (Miller, Bersoff, & Harwood, 1990; Miller & Bersoff, 1992; Miller & Luther, 1989), and tended to approve rather than disapprove of agents subordinating their personal goals and ambitions in order to fulfill interpersonal responsibilities.

Americans, Miller and Bersoff (1998) suggest, develop a more contingent sense of interpersonal morality than do Indians. In one vignette study that manipulated personal affinity and liking, Americans' judgments of their interpersonal responsibility to their siblings or colleagues was contingent on whether or not they liked them or experienced some personal affinity with them. In contrast, concerns for personal affinity and liking had no impact on Indians' perceptions of interpersonal responsibilities to friends and colleagues.

Morality in a Japanese Cultural Context Yeh (1996) reviewed Japanese studies of moral development and found that interpersonal responsibility is also a critical aspect of morality in this cultural context. Yamagishi (1976), for example, used a sentence-scoring procedure developed by Kohlberg (1981) and found that Japanese respondents were decidedly more likely than Americans to provide responses reflecting a relational orientation. Such responses would be coded as stage-3 moral reasoning. Similarly Araki and Yoshida (1985) found that Japanese respondents are particularly likely to use an interpersonal orientation in moral reasoning. Iwasa (1990) compared Japanese and American adults who scored at postconventional levels in Kohlberg's scheme. Iwasa found that the Americans viewed the Heinz dilemma in which a man steals medicine to save his dying wife in terms of a conflict between two rights—right to life and right to property. The Japanese, however, viewed the dilemma in terms of human relationships.

Azuma (1994; Azuma & Karasawa, 1991) studied the type and amount of information needed by Japanese and American college students to make moral judgments. When Japanese respondents rated a series of morally questionable acts, they were more favorable in their moral ratings of the actors than were the American students. Azuma argues that in a Japanese cultural context, early condemnation in relationships is inappropriate and potentially destructive (and we might add that the relative insusceptibility of Japanese to the fundamental attribution error might contribute to their hesitation to condemn). In a second
stage of the study, participants selected from a list what information they would need to make a complete moral judgment. Whereas the Americans requested information about the protagonist’s background and the severity of the transgression, Japanese respondents requested information about the protagonist’s feelings and remorse.

Yeh (1996) compared the story completions of Japanese students with those of American students. She found that the Japanese finishing a story about a transgression were significantly more likely than (1) focus on the relationship in their story; (2) maintain harmony in the relationship; (3) suggest altruistic motivations for the morally questionable act; (4) portray the main character sympathetically; and (5) center on emotions and feelings rather than on specific factual details regarding the moral transgression. Yeh contends that Japanese respondents consider morality to be situation-specific. Moral judgments are referenced to the relationship and the feelings associated with the act rather than to the act itself. For the Japanese, one’s feelings following a moral act can often determine the moral evaluation of the act. In contrast, American respondents emphasize the need to adhere to a consistent set of principles in determining morality.

In the Japanese legal system even more than in American legal practice, for example, a sentence may be significantly reduced if the defendant apologizes for his or her actions and expresses substantial regret. And the importance of an apology can be seen in many spheres of life. In the Japanese version of “Little Red Riding Hood,” for example, the wolf has tears in his eyes, apologizes, and asks for forgiveness (Lanhan, 1979; Yeh, 1996). In the American system, it is the act and not the perpetrator’s feelings that is paramount in determining the punishment. The Japanese emphasis on relationships, feelings, and social harmony may be reinforced by Shinto traditions stressing that human nature is essentially good and by Buddhist traditions emphasizing the importance of piety and of modesty in relationship with others.

Japanese schools directly socialize this interpersonal moral orientation in ongoing ethics courses focusing on compatibility in relationships. Hamilton et al. (1989) note that moral education in the United States is less formal and less uniform, enforcing a “morality of duty” whose implementation focuses on punishing student misbehavior. The emphasis is on the minimal standards that must be met before violators will be punished. Hamilton et al. contrast this morality of duty with what they call the “morality of aspiration” characteristics of Japan, in which a teacher sets high standards, provides positive feedback, and emphasizes perseverance and effort. The assumption in this type of moral training is that everyone can make an effort to do his or her best. The response to failure is more encouragement, not punishment.

Morality in a Chinese Cultural Context  Chinese moral philosophy also champions the fulfillment of interpersonal or role responsibilities. Dien (1982) notes that European-American morality, with its focus on freedom of choice and individual rights, is rooted in Judeo-Christian theology and Greek philosophy, while Chinese morality is rooted in Confucian thoughts and emphasizes the concept of jen, which translates as love, sympathy, human-heartedness, or deep affection. Confucian philosophy stipulates that society is possible and stable when five basic relationships are appropriately maintained: father-son, emperor-subject, husband-wife, elder-younger, and friend-friend. As the fact that three of these five relationships are in the family attest, Chinese morality emphasizes obligations to the family (Chang & Holt, 1984). The requirement to act altruistically outside the family is relatively weak (Hui, 1984). In a study of morality in Taiwan, Young, Lei, and Cheng (1982) found that morality was decidedly more centered on collective unity and filial piety than it was on individual rights. People tend to assess moral outcomes with regard to whether they further the good of the family and whether people exercise self-control toward this end (Young, 1981). People are responsible for their families, and families are responsible for their members. During the Cultural Revolution and through Chinese history are numerous accounts of entire families being punished for the acts of one member.

In conjunction with its strong emphasis on the needs and goals of the in-group, particularly the family, Chinese morality strongly emphasizes hierarchy. (Of the five basic relationships that Confucian moral philosophy prescribes, four are fundamentally hierarchical.) In contrast to the Western view, in which moral rules are not contingent on the position or rank of the agent, in the Confucian view, for harmony to exist actions must be differentiated according to the position of the agent. Society is conceived of as dependent on hierarchical relationships of different classes and positions. According to Young (1981), equality between positions was impossible, and it was said in the Zou Zhan that “equal queens, equal sons, equal powers and equal cities—all lead to disorder” (p. 42). Recent studies on the justice concerns of contemporary Chinese underscore the importance of these hierarchical understandings for moral judgments. Chiu (1991) found that the violation of role expectation was the chief criterion employed in making judgments of injustice. Bond et al. (1985) found that Chinese subjects are less critical of a person who delivers an insult when this person is an in-group member and of higher status. Leung and Bond (1984) suggest that in-group and out-group behavior is governed by different types of morality. They find that in comparison with Americans, Chinese are more likely to apply equity norms to out-group members and equality norms to in-group members.

Moral systems based on obedience to and reverence for
superiors are widespread around the world. Indeed, Judaic, Christian, and Moslem theology base morality on the will and the word of God, while religious practices in much of Asia and Africa define morality as deference to ancestors' (and elders') edicts. It may be no exaggeration to say that outside of some subcultures of secular Europe and America, obedience and reverence are the foundations of morality in most of the world.

**How Much Moral Diversity?** Besides the ethics of autonomy (which includes concerns about freedom, rights, harm, and justice) and the ethics of community (concerns about duty and the collective enterprise), Shweder et al. (1997) have proposed an ethics of divinity (including concerns about purity, sanctity, and the realization of one's spiritual nature). Shweder's view is that autonomy, community, and divinity are abstract, self-evident moral truths but that they cannot all be equally appreciated by all cultures all of the time, and thus cultures specialize—some emphasizing and elaborating justice and fidelity, some the truths of duty and caring, and others the truths of purity and pollution. The moral truths are the "frames," or "gross architecture," within which communities implement local, historically specific, and quite divergent moral practices.

In a comparison of Brazilians and North Americans, Haidt, Koller, and Dias (1993) asked subjects in two social classes to evaluate stories about victimless but offensive actions such as eating one's dead pet dog or cleaning the toilet with one's national flag. Brazilian and U.S. college students at elite universities judged such offenses to be matters of social convention or personal preference. Most other adults and children in both cultures judged these actions to be universally wrong moral violations. These findings show that moral judgments are a function of social class, education, and other aspects of culture. Many people make moral judgments that have little to do with harm, rights, or justice, but are based instead on culturally organized models and emotions. Balle-Jensen (1995) finds that although American college students tend to rely exclusively on the ethics of autonomy in their judgments, older respondents sometimes implicate concerns for community and divinity in their judgments.

Cultural differences are not limited to moral judgments; moral emotions also differ. As we noted, Shweder and colleagues report that different cultures focus on different moral codes (Shweder et al., 1997). Rozin and colleagues found that Japanese and American students match violations of Shweder's community code with the emotion of contempt, violations of autonomy with anger, and violations of divinity with disgust (Rozin et al., 1997; cf. Ellsworth, 1994). The kind of roles that others play in regulating and sanctioning social behavior is also clearly related to the dominant moral concerns. In interdependent cultures the emphasis is on fulfilling duties and living up to social-relational standards; inadequate performance leads primarily to shame. In independent cultures the emphasis is on not harming others or violating their rights; transgression leads primarily to guilt (Benedict, 1946; Creighton, 1990; Lebra, 1983; Piers & Singer, 1953/1971).

In short, the evidence clearly shows that the manner in which people judge morality is culturally defined.

**Acculturation and Culture Change**

One of the strongest implications of the view that culture and psyche constitute one another is that, without the collective practices and meanings that any given psychological process is attuned to and coordinated with, the psychological process may dissipate. For example, the propensity for self-enhancement in the United States is a psychological tendency that is constantly maintained by the very nature of the sociocultural surroundings. To illustrate, one practice of the U.S. middle-class culture that is relevant to this issue involves a frequent interpersonal exchange of praise and compliments. Kitayama, Markus, and Lehman (1998) asked both Japanese and American respondents how many days prior was the latest occasion in which they had said something "good" to someone else. The modal response for the Americans was one. Thus, they say something good to someone else at least once a day, and perhaps even more frequently. By contrast, the modal response for the Japanese was four. It is likely, then, that there exists a collective, cultural climate of self-enhancement in the United States such that once you are immersed in it, your self-esteem and self-pride are constantly bolstered and elevated not so much because this is a tendency that is inherent in the human psyche, but because the response is afforded by the collective surroundings. It seems likely, however, that once people are socialized in such a cultural context, they will eventually develop relatively autonomous psychological tendencies for enhancing self-esteem, a conclusion that the social psychological evidence supports. Yet at the same time, once this collective surrounding is removed, the tendency for self-enhancement may be difficult to maintain.

Recall that Kitayama et al. (1997) randomly sampled social situations from both Japan and the United States and asked both Japanese and American subjects to judge the extent to which their self-esteem would increase or decrease if they were in each situation. These researchers found that Japanese are self-critical and Americans are self-enhancing, especially when responding to the situations of their own culture. When the Japanese responded to the American situations, they were less self-critical. Likewise, when the Americans responded to the Japanese situations, they were less self-enhancing. This is an experimen-
ual analog of moving to another culture. Psychological tendencies of self-criticism and self-enhancement in the respective cultures become very hard to maintain once individuals move to another culture.

In another study, Kitayama, Kroonen, and Markus (1998) examined a group of American students temporarily staying in Japan. These students were asked to judge whether or not each of many traits applied to themselves either (1) when they were interacting with their Japanese friends in Japanese contexts or (2) when they were interacting with their American friends in American contexts. Half of the traits were evaluatively positive, and the other half were negative. In the American-context condition, the students endorsed a greater number of positive traits than negative traits, thus replicating the characteristically American tendency for self-enhancement. This tendency was reversed in the Japanese-context condition, again suggesting the difficulty of maintaining the psychological tendency of self-enhancement once Westerners are placed in a Japanese cultural context. An alternative interpretation for this finding is that people find it difficult to maintain self-esteem in foreign, unfamiliar places. However, Heine and Lehman (1997c) monitored the self-esteem of a group of Japanese exchange students at a Canadian university, and found that their self-esteem, originally comparable to the level of self-esteem common in Japan, and much lower than that of Canadian students, gradually increased over a period of several months.

These findings suggest that self-esteem is literally sociopsychological. It is psychological because it entails subjective experience, mediated by a host of psychological processes (e.g., self-enhancement in America, and criticism and subsequent attempts to improve the self in Japan), but it is also social and collective because both the subjective experience and the underlying psychological processes can fully sustain themselves only when immersed in the appropriate cultural context. This inevitably invites a question of what will happen to those who are bicultural. There is a distinct possibility that people develop multiple sets of psychological processes that are attuned to different cultural contexts and become capable of switching back and forth between them as they move to different cultures. And indeed it is not uncommon that an American who is an expert about Japanese culture and, like many others in American academia, is assertive and outspoken on home territory becomes docile, subdued, and deferential when working in Japan and interacting with Japanese colleagues. The reverse pattern may also be found for some Japanese working in the United States.

The notion of mutual constitution is more broadly applicable to other psychological domains. We may expect sizable changes in social structure or collective practice often to be followed by changes in the corresponding psychological tendencies. This seems to be the case for the fundamental attribution error in Hong Kong. Studies by Morris and Peng (1994) on Chinese subjects both in mainland China and living temporarily in the United States show that Chinese people are more sensitive to the holistic field in which any social act takes place, and as a consequence, they are less susceptible to the fundamental attribution error. But when Wong, Hong, and Lee (1996; see also Hong, Chiu, and Kung, 1997) recently used the Morris and Peng procedures with a group of Chinese subjects native to Hong Kong and highly knowledgeable about Western culture, their subjects’ responses resembled those of Morris and Peng’s American subjects if the Chinese subjects had been exposed to a set of symbols emblematic of American culture (e.g., a picture of Mickey Mouse or a cowboy). Priming with symbols emblematic of traditional Chinese society prompted responses more like those of Chinese who were relatively unfamiliar with Western culture. An implication is that the very rapid and far-reaching westernization under the British rule of Hong Kong, or the long capitalist tradition in Hong Kong, or both, may have created a bicultural population capable of responding quite differently depending on cultural context.

Change in China may be occurring even more rapidly than is suggested by the work of Hong, Wong, and Lee. Mu et al. (1998) have shown that expressed desire for individual success has increased enormously among Beijing elementary-school children in the last ten years. Shin-Ying Lee and H. Stevenson (1998, personal communication) have shown that the mothers of these children, over the same time period, have shifted their primary concern from the social aspects of their child’s development to the psychological aspects. Perhaps dispositions will become more relevant in people’s explanations of others’ behavior. The spirit of capitalism (Weber, 1958) was originally invented and institutionalized in the modern West, but crucial aspects of it (along with other features of western culture) have now spread to many other parts of the world. This capitalist ethos tends to be transformed as it is incorporated into other cultural systems. However, quite often the cultures adopting capitalism have retained the central cultural idea that people act by personal choice according to their true nature, so that people’s individual dispositions can be read from their behavior. Many East Asians seem to be acquiring this correspondence bias along with the other capitalist institutions and ideas they are adopting.

Implications for the Study of Social Psychology

People are composed of distinctive, stable, positive attributes and self-interested motives that give rise to internally controlled behavior consistent with these attributes and motives; furthermore, people reason analytically with reference to discrete categories, and as a consequence they gradually learn to make moral judgments based on abstract
principles of universal justice. Subjects and experimenters alike think and act like this—if they believe that people naturally think and act like this. However, people who share other folk models of human nature think and act in other ways. In short, Western models of human psychology have substantial accuracy as models of the psychology of Western humans. The models are accurate partly because they represent the folk models that Westerners implicitly use. But people who use other cultural models of the person have psychologies that differ accordingly. This is not to say that folk models make adequate scientific theories, but simply that people predicate their actions, thoughts, and feelings on their shared implicit or explicit conceptions of how they and others act, think, and feel.

In many cultures outside the modern West, people perceive the social world as a network of vital relationships that engage and envelop every person. People strive to sustain and enhance those relationships, which means that human desires, attitudes, and thoughts are largely oriented to the needs of those relationships. Believing that everyone naturally thinks and acts in these ways, people generally think and act accordingly. Consequently, in each distinct relational context, most East Asians tend to embody the attitudes, motives, and thoughts suitable to that context. In East Asia and similar cultures elsewhere, thought and behavior are more a function of the relationship or the group than of the person.

In short, many of the processes once thought to be basic to human social psychology actually vary according to culture. This discovery does not imply that psychologists cannot formulate valid, highly general explanatory principles. What it does imply is that, to be valid, such explanatory principles must be formulated with reference to culture. Indeed, what we need to do next is to explore which cultural practices, meanings, and institutions inform which psychological processes, and how they do so. It will not always be possible to disentangle the web of culture and to isolate discrete practices that affect distinct psychological structures, or particular meanings that generate specific processes. But we need to explore the causal and constitutive interconnections between culture and psyche and find out how they operate. Furthermore, as we begin to understand more about how psyches are contingent on cultures, we also need to start studying precisely how those psyches sustain and generate the cultures.

IV. STRATEGIES FOR CHARACTERIZING SOCIALITIES ACROSS CULTURES

In this section, we present some recent research that will be of interest to social psychologists with an interest in culture. We organize the research by describing it under rubrics corresponding to types of strategies that have been proposed for characterizing cultures. The strategies overlap, and there are perhaps few pure cases, but we believe it will be helpful to consider the various ways in which anthropologists and psychologists have thought about culture and its relation to psyche.

Relativizing Particularism One strategy is to focus on the unique aspects of each culture or community, assuming that cultures are incomparable (Geertz, 1983; 1974/1984; Gergen, 1993; Gergen & Davis, 1985; Schneider, 1984). This approach usually seeks to elucidate the distinctive interrelations of meaning (or of action) within a particular culture. It aims to understand each culture in its own terms, attempting to avoid ethnocentrism and imperialistically assimilating the practices of the “other” to the researcher’s own prior cultural categories and presuppositions. This has the merit of helping researchers stay open to unexpected possibilities, but it has proven difficult to formulate a relativistic epistemological stance that explains how we can know or describe other cultures (see Harre & Krausz, 1996: Varieties of Relativism). Consequently, some postmodernists have adopted the view that objective knowledge of other cultures is impossible and all descriptions are contingent on the subjective process of inquiry. We will not review any research in this tradition. Suffice it to say that from about 1976 until about 1996 a vast amount of anthropological research and writing adopted a postmodernist version of this approach.

Universals The opposite strategy is to uncover universal practices, beliefs, or institutions that can be studied in every culture (see Brown, 1991; Lonner, 1980; Pepitone & Triandis, 1988). Lévi-Strauss (1966, 1967) analyzed the binary contrasts that underlie the meaning of myths: Mauss (1925/1967) described gift-giving; Merton (1968) discussed reciprocity and complementarity; Gennep (1909/1960) analyzed status-changing rites of passage; Simmel (1908/1971b) described social forms such as conflict and prostitution, and social types such as strangers and adventurers; Weber (1922/1978) explored how rulers legitimate their power; Jung (1964) searched for universal archetypes; Freud (1900/1955) and Spiro (1982b) analyzed the Oedipus complex and its resolution. This approach focuses on the psychic unity of humankind, searching for commonalities beneath surface idiosyncrasies. Researchers in this tradition typically focus on demonstrating that a particular entity is universal, despite surface differences. However, it is also possible to investigate diverse cultural expressions of a universal practice as a tool for understanding cultural differences related to the manner in which the universal is expressed (e.g., Kurtz, 1992, 1993; and Parsons, 1969, on variations in the Oedipus complex). In the latter case, the varied manifestations of a universal can be analyzed according to any of the other five strategies described here. Our own discussion here of the search for
cultural universals will be limited to a description of the evolutionary process that we believe is responsible for culture in the first place and to the human diversity that has been made inevitable by the psychic flexibility with which humans are endowed by evolution.

**Typologies and Dimensions** A third strategy is to construct typological contrasts or differentiating dimensions. Most of this work has developed variations and refinements on one particular contrast, beginning with Marx's (1857–1858/1973, 1964) description of the differences between capitalist systems and other forms of production, especially primitive and postcapitalist communism; Maine's (1861/1963) contrast between status law and contract law; and Morgan's (1877) comparison of societies with cities. Tönnies (1887/1988) developed this into his famous analysis of Gemeinschaft and Gesellschaft, while Durkheim (1893/1933) compared organic and mechanical solidarity, characterized respectively by restitutive and retributive sanctions. Later Mead (1937/1961) developed a classification of societies as competitive, cooperative, or individualistic, and Redfield (1955) delineated the folk-urban continuum. Then Dumont (1977, 1986) analyzed the logic of individualism and hierarchy, while Douglas (1978) developed the dimensions of grid and group and Hofstede (1980, 1991) and Triandis (1972, 1989, 1995) pioneered empirical analyses of the basic dimensions of cultural differences, especially individualism and collectivism.

The typological or dimensional strategy aims at discovering basic features that must be clearly defined in any culture, and then at characterizing cultures according to the presence, absence, or degree of such features. The defining characteristic of typological and dimensional schemes is that they are formulated in terms of a feature contrast, usually between opposites. The whole culture is the usual unit of comparison, so this approach necessarily assumes that cultures can be more or less readily identified and delineated into distinct units. Usually the focus is on discovering subsidiary features of the culture or its members that are associated with the major feature contrast.

There are important differences between typologies, which assume discrete categories, and dimensions, which assume continuous variation. However, both are based on contrastive features. Most such theories posit that the typology or dimension can be used with validity to assess all cultures. We will deal at some length in the first part of this section with efforts to dimensionalize the individualism-collectivism notion and the concept of power differentials.

**Generative Structures** Another strategy is to characterize universal entities whose cultural realizations are inherently variable. What is universal is a capacity or potential that is incomplete and can be used to generate thought, affect, or interaction only with reference to particular cultural systems. Transformational linguists led by Chomsky (1965, 1980) and Pinker (1994) take this approach, as does A. Fiske in his analyses of relational models and rituals (Dulaney & Fiske, 1994; Fiske, 1991b; Fiske & Haslam, 1997a, 1997b). This strategy usually focuses on systems of meaning or syntaxes that are necessary for the mediation of communication and other forms of essential social coordination. Such systems can be implemented only in unique, culture-specific realizations, according to local precedents and prototypes. For example, language is necessary for human social coordination. But what is required is a specific language; people in different communities speak mutually unintelligible languages.

Relational theory takes the same approach, while adding the concept that people have four basic models to choose from in organizing any aspect of any social interaction. The multiplicity of relational models (diversely implemented) creates the further possibility of diverse combinations of nested or linked models. Componential analysis of kinship uses a similar principle to explore how kin terms in any culture are defined as a system of categories with respect to a small number of basic distinctions (D'Andrade, 1995; Goodenough, 1981).

In general, such systems are generative at two levels. First, there are culture-specific implementations such as a particular language (Portuguese) or a particular societal system of balanced exchange (feuding among the llongot). Second, operating with reference to these culture-specific collective implementations, each person or social unit generates particular acts, such as an utterance ("Y zig be neere") or a retaliatory homicide. An integral aspect of both these generative levels is that people use these systems to construct interpretations of the meanings of such communicative and social coordinative acts.

**Culture Complexes** A fifth strategy is to identify a major "culture complex"—a practice, institution, custom, norm, belief, culture trait, or theme—that is an important component or organizing ethos of some cultures. (Our term is closely related to Whiting and Child's [1953] concept of a "custom complex," a term that we feel is too limiting in its connotations of action and practice only.) Examples that have been widely studied include writing, schools, bureaucracy, honor, castes, concern about purity and pollution, witchcraft, the evil eye, many specific folklore themes, blood sacrifice, divine kingship, shamanism, age sets, blood brotherhood, or joking and funerary relationships. Such complexes involve patterns of action, values, relationships, objects, architectures, myths, and all the complementary features of the psyche. Sometimes such a culture complex is salient in only one or a few particular sets of geographically proximate or historically related societies; sometimes the culture complex is much more widely dispersed. But in either case, the goal is usually to discern the
causes and consequences of the complex (or its variants), either comparing variants among closely related cultures or making comparisons with cultures in which the complex is absent. This approach focuses on salient patterns of practices and ideas wherever they appear, obviating the need to define discrete cultural units or to characterize all aspects of any culture as a whole.

One well-developed variant of this strategy that overlaps somewhat with the typology approach is the cross-tabulation of cultural traits. Tylor (1871/1974) was the originator of this approach, but George Peter Murdock (1967, 1981), founder of the Human Relations Area Files and the Society for Cross-Cultural Research, was the modern leader. Murdock compiled his own and other researchers’ classifications of 1,264 cultures on scores of categorial typologies. These compilations permit easy cross-tabulation of codings for hundreds of culture complexes or traits.

The culture complex approach may overlap with the universalizing or typology approaches when the relevant culture complexes occur in every culture. Marriage, kinship, ritual, rites of passage, and gift giving are culture complexes that exist, in one form or another, in almost every culture. Anthropologists often compare and contrast these complexes across cultures.

Temporal Sequences The oldest contrastive framework compares cultures along a particular temporal (or quasi-temporal) sequence (Marx, 1964, 1857–1858/1973; Montesquieu, 1748/1977; Morgan, 1877; Polanyi, 1944/1957, 1968; Service, 1975; Spencer, 1897–1906; Steward, 1951, 1955; Tylor, 1871/1974; White, 1959). This temporal sequence is usually cast in evolutionary or historical terms, from primitive to civilized, traditional to modern. The researcher’s own culture is always the most advanced (except in Marx’s scheme). For example, building on a century of thinking about cultural evolution, Leslie White (1959) and Julian Steward (1951, 1955) suggested schematic typologies of progressive levels of social integration. Stewart’s was family, band, tribe, chieftain, state. Sometimes historical sequences are connected with a typology of means of production, assuming that the general trend is from hunting and gathering, agricultural and pastoral, to industrial, to postindustrial; or from underdeveloped to developed. This approach assumes that there is some consistent temporal ordering of the “stages” of cultural transformations, and that “primitive” contemporary societies correspond in some way to a stage that “advanced” societies previously passed through. Temporal ordering of cultures usually is associated with an evaluative ordering according to a particular moral or functional criterion. In principle, however, it is possible to have either a temporal or an evaluative ordering without the other.

Archaeologists orient their research to temporal sequences of this sort, while cultural anthropology and social history have recently come together to form the field of “ethnohistory,” focusing on more specific, local, and short-term processes of culturally organized social change (e.g., Sahlins, 1981, 1985). Both of these anthropological approaches are associated with a focus on the processes (or mechanisms) by which cultures change.

These six comparative strategies are effective in different ways, for different purposes; the factors that limit one strategy may facilitate another. Used judiciously in conjunction with one another, they are all powerful tools for characterizing patterns of sociality across cultures. In this section, we turn first to typological and dimensional approaches. Then we consider an example of generative structures—namely the “relational models” scheme—followed by an example of a culture complex: honor. Then we contrast an economic account of culture change with an ideological account. Finally in Section V we consider a theory about a very long-term temporal process—natural selection—that potentially encompasses and reconciles the universalizing approach with the other approaches to cultural diversity. We present there a set of generative-structure notions that constitute an attempt to connect social psychology, culture, development, and evolution.

Typological and Dimensional Approaches to Studying Sociality

The comparison between independence and interdependence has a long ancestry. Many of the major theorists in the social sciences have proposed typologies related to this comparison in many cases contrasting urban, modern, or market-oriented societies with agrarian, traditional, or technologically simpler ones (Dumont, 1977, 1986; Durkheim, 1893/1933; Maine, 1861/1963; Marx, 1857–1858/1973, 1964; Mead, 1937/1961; Morgan, 1877; Redfield, 1955; Tönnies, 1887/1988). This comparison was originally most systematically developed by Ferdinand Tönnies (1887/1988), who contrasted ideal types for the analysis of real societies, namely Gemeinschaft (community based on a sense of identity) and Gesellschaft (society based on instrumental advantage). Gemeinschaft is based on relationships for their own sake, inherently desired, involving a sense of unity and mutuality, as exemplified by relationships among family members, neighbors, or friends; it is a product of intimacy, sympathy, mutual understanding, frequent face-to-face interaction, and shared experiences or property. Gesellschaft is based on artifactual interactions that are means to material ends, involving the exchange of material commodities, often based on bargaining and contract, labor markets, and calculative struggle to gain power over others, as exemplified by a corporation. These two forms of sociality are ideal types for the analysis of real societies, which always involve associations of both types.
Some of these theorists also go beyond binary contrast. For example, Mead’s (1937/1961) anthropological group set out to contrast cooperative societies with competitive ones, but found they had to add a category of individualistic societies. Bailey (1972) used a solidarity dimension and a power dimension to analyze types of relationships or interactions within cultures. Later Douglas (1978), a symbolic and social anthropologist, invented the terms “grid” (hierarchical structure) and “group” (autonomy) to analyze orthogonal dimensions of social organization which, she argued, affect the construction of distinctive cultural ideologies (Douglas & Wildavsky, 1982; Thompson, Ellis, & Wildavsky, 1990). Bailey’s and Douglas’s dimensional analyses were theoretically constructed, but the evidence later collected independently by Hofstede (1980) and Triandis (1972. 1989. 1995) is consistent with them.

Other frameworks for comparing cultures have also been proposed. In anthropology the most famous is that of Ruth Benedict (1934/1959), who developed and illustrated three culture types with reference to the Zuni Pueblos of New Mexico, the Kwakiutl of Vancouver Island, and the inhabitants of Dobu Island, off the southeast coast of New Guinea. Her typology describes cultures in terms of the dominant type of personality: respectively Apollonian, Dionysian, and Paranoic. The Apollonian Zunis are calm, mild-mannered, orderly, emotionally controlled, and socially responsive. The Dionysian Kwakiutl (like the Native Americans of the Great Plains) are fiercely competitive, aggressively self-aggrandizing, violent, and ecstatic, using bloody rituals to transcend normal experience. The Paranoic Dobuans are uncooperative, lawless, suspicious, spiteful, treacherous sorcerers who use magic to ruin each other. Benedict describes cultural values, beliefs, practices, and institutions as expression of the dominant personality in each society. Conversely, Benedict argues that cultures select from the human repertoire of potential personalities, fostering and elaborating a more or less integrated subset of the possibilities.

Later Benedict (1946) suggested another famous contrast between guilt cultures such as the United States and shame cultures such as Japan (see also Lebra, 1983). Piers and Singer (1953/1971) and Creighton (1990) offer reconceptualizations related to the idea that shame involves failure to live up to social standards, resulting in fear of abandonment or ostracism; guilt involves transgression of standards, resulting in fear of punishment. All researchers agree that every normal person in every culture must be able to experience both of these emotions, but the relative importance of these two kinds of sanctions varies substantially across cultures.

Geertz (1973, 1974/1984) raised the question of whether the person is the same across cultures with an influential comparison of cultural models of the person in Java, Bali, and Morocco. More recently, inspired by fieldwork in India, Shweder (1995) has suggested a trichotomy, identifying an individualist view of the person as “the preferences seeker,” a collectivist view of the person as “the office holder,” and a spiritual view in which the person is regarded primarily as a divine entity vulnerable to pollution. Finally, one of the typologies best known to anthropologists and most widely used by them is Lévi-Strauss’s (1961/1949) contrast between social systems based on restricted exchange and those based on generalized exchange. Focusing on the systems through which people transfer brides, he showed that strictly reciprocal, bilateral “restricted exchange” produces only local social integration. More complex systems of “generalized exchange” result in more extensive, tighter social integration, because each group gives brides to some groups but relies on other groups to provide them with brides, thereby creating more complex, cross-cutting bonds of interdependence.

Subjective Values By far the most extensive body of dimensional research assesses values, using rating scales (or sometimes rankings). The goals of this paradigm are to characterize cultures (usually defined on the level of nations) and the dimensions that differentiate them. This paradigm differs from the typologies already discussed in several respects, particularly by using nations as the unit of analysis, collecting numerical data, and relying on factor analysis or multidimensional scaling of group means. After generating a set of items, researchers translate them into various languages and obtain samples of highly literate subjects (usually business managers, college students, or teachers). The basic assumptions of this approach are that these samples represent the cultures of nations; that valid comparisons can be made across samples among ratings (or rankings) of items; that means of individual responses reflect collective values; that the items tap most of the important values of all cultures; and that “values” are important features of cultures, related in some way to action, practices, relationships, institutions, and other features. In our view, all of these assumptions are quite problematic, but nevertheless the agreement among these studies is appreciable and intriguing.

In pioneering research, Hofstede (1980) administered a questionnaire on work-related values to 116,000 service and marketing managers of IBM in forty countries. Hofstede computed mean scores for each value statement in each of the forty countries and performed a factor analysis on these means by treating each country as a unit of analysis. From this analysis he identified four dimensions—power distance, individualism (versus collectivism), masculinity (versus femininity), and uncertainty avoidance. Power distance implies the degree to which unequal power distribution in social institutions and practices is accepted or, conversely, egalitarianism is endorsed. Individualism (versus collectivism) refers to the relative priority ac-
corded to persons or groups. The masculinity (versus femininity) dimension is assumed to differentiate cultures according to the extent to which they value "masculine" values such as achievement and material success or "feminine" values such as caring and interpersonal harmony. Finally, uncertainty avoidance taps the degree to which a culture tolerates uncertainty and ambiguity. In his subsequent work Hofstede (1990) has added a fifth dimension: time perspective.

Subsequent work in this area has focused primarily on the dimensions of individualism (versus collectivism) and power distance, which have proven to reliably differentiate European-American individualist, egalitarian cultures from East Asian collectivist, high power-distance cultures (Markus & Kitayama, 1991; Smith & Bond, 1994; Triandis, 1990, 1994a, 1995). Working within a different research tradition that can be traced back to Rokeach's (1973) work on values, Schwartz (1992; Schwartz & Bardi, in press; Schwartz & Bilsky, 1990; Schwartz & Ros, 1995) sampled fifty-six values from several cultural regions of the world. About 44,000 schoolteachers and college students from the fifty-six nations ranked the personal significance of each value. Two dimensions emerge from multidimensional scaling of the national means on the forty-five values that appear to have the most stable meanings. One dimension is similar to the individualism/collectivism dimension, anchored by "openness to change" (including affective and intellectual autonomy) at one end and "conservatism" (including security, tradition, and honor) at the other. A second dimension, which appears similar to power distance, is anchored at one end by "self-enhancement" (including mastery and power) and at the other end by "self-transcendence" (including egalitarianism and harmony with nature). Trompenaars and colleagues (Trompenaars, 1993; Smith, Dugan, & Trompenaars, 1996) used multidimensional scaling on the responses to a very diverse array of value items from 8,841 managers and organizational employees from forty-three countries. They interpret the first dimension as egalitarian commitment versus conservatism (which includes hierarchy and power). The second dimension is defined by loyalty to in-groups versus utilitarian considerations in deciding on one's engagement in social relations.

Overall, the three data sets converge on more or less the same two dimensions. Western European nations are both egalitarian and individualist; eastern European, postcommunist countries are individualist and hierarchical; whereas East Asian nations are hierarchical and collectivist. More fine-grained analysis reveals that Western European nations are more egalitarian and higher in intellectual (but not affective) autonomy than are North American samples. China comes out rather similar to eastern European nations, perhaps reflecting their common communist heritage. The value profile of Japan consistently deviates from those of the rest of East Asian countries in the direction of European-American cultures. This tendency toward Western values could result from the noncommittal response style of the Japanese (which would force their value profile toward the middle), the westernization of the Japanese culture in the past 100 years, or both.

To what extent do these instruments encompass the full range of values across cultures? A group of researchers organized by Michael Bond developed a set of values from Chinese indigenous cultural contexts (Bond, 1988b; Chinese Culture Connection, 1987). Factor analysis performed on the means of twenty-three countries suggests that there is considerable overlap between the Chinese indigenous values and the dimensions of individualism/collectivism and power distance (Bond, 1996a). Another dimension also emerged: Confucian work dynamism, composed of values related to the Confucian work ethic such as perseverance, patience, and thriftiness. This dimension resembles Hofstede's (1980) time perspective, and may be related to the relational self-improvement process identified by Kitayama et al. (1997) and the form of achievement in East Asia that has attracted considerable research attention of late (e.g., De Vos, 1973; Stevenson & Stigler, 1992).

When subjective values are examined by questionnaire, the overall means are often aligned in the predicted direction (with, for example, U.S. samples being more individualist and less collectivist than, say, Japanese or Korean samples). However, there is considerable overlap between the distributions of responses in any two cultures. Hence subjective endorsement of values is only a rough proxy for the collective practices and meanings corresponding to such values, and it may not adequately represent the magnitude or nature of cultural differences. Indeed, subjective endorsement of values may actually reverse true differences in values. Peng, Nisbett, and Wong (in press) found that Chinese university students and American students sometimes reported holding values that were quite contrary to the picture of these cultures painted by ethnographers. For example, Chinese students reported rating inner harmony lower than Americans, and equality higher. But value reports are likely to be tacit comparisons: believing that he or she values equality more than other Chinese, a Chinese respondent then reports a higher value on the dimension than an American making the same kind of comparison. Or one may value something precisely because one does not have as much of it in one's culture as one might like. Thus a member of a relatively authoritarian society may report valuing equality more than a member of an egalitarian society who takes equality for granted. However, it may be possible to develop more valid techniques. Peng, Nisbett, and Wong showed that ratings by Chinese and American subjects of the actions they would wish to take in various concrete scenarios agreed fairly well with ethnographers'
comparisons of the two cultures, and far better than value ratings or attitude statement endorsements.

Hence, although impressive in both the breadth of cultures covered and the general convergence of the findings by different research groups, the subjective-value literature must confront some methodological and conceptual problems. This literature generally assumes that means of individual responses can be used to compare cultures. Nevertheless, different meanings may be associated with any given abstract value item. Further, subjects’ responses regarding the importance of values do not reflect many important features of those values. For example, values may vary in the extent to which they are perceived to be consensual, legitimate, and enforceable, and in the manner in which they are connected with each other. Further, some values may be perceived to be moral and obligatory, but others may be perceived to be mostly conventional or a matter of personal choice (e.g., Miller, 1994a; Shweder et al., 1989; Turiel; Killen; & Helwig, 1987) or matters of group or individual identity. What may be a bigger problem is the assumption that people have meaningful global values that effectively organize a wide range of disparate actions or that are valid reflections of cultural meanings and practices. The literature on attitudes casts considerable doubt on these assumptions. Future research should address these validity issues.

Relational Theory: An Approach to Generative Structures for Sociality

A quite different approach to the characterization of cultures is possible. This approach is to identify basic patterns of social relationships that recur across cultures, comparing the ways that they operate in different cultures and their links with other features of culture and psyche. The assumption of cultural psychology is that psyche and social relations function in complementarity to each other: psyche and social relations each require the other and in turn reproduce the other. Relational theory (Fiske, 1991b, 1992) represents an attempt to identify the basic structures of meaningful social interaction, characterizing them simultaneously with respect to psyche and culture.

Four Ways to Generate and Understand Relationships

Relational theory posits that people in every culture use just four elementary models to generate, understand, coordinate, evaluate, and contest most social interaction. Each of these four models is a motivated, affectively colored, cognitive schema or grammar with reference to which people jointly construct meaningful social relations (personal and impersonal). Communal Sharing (CS) is a relationship based on participants’ feeling that all the members of a particular group or category are the same in a significant respect, so the group transcends its individual members with regard to the issue at hand. People in a CS relationship (e.g., lovers, close kin, teammates who identify with the team) feel a sense of solidarity and corporate identity. Authority Ranking (AR) is a relationship based on transitive asymmetrical differentiation in a linear hierarchy. Subordinates in an AR relationship owe respect and often obedience, while superiors have prerogatives as well as duties with respect to their subordinates (e.g., military officers; juniors and seniors in a relation of filial piety). Equality Matching (EM) is a relationship based on a standard of balance and a concern about the additive magnitude of deviations from that standard. Typical manifestations of EM are turn taking, balanced exchange, tit-for-tat reciprocity, eye-for-an-eye vengeance, contributions or distributions in which shares are equated one for one, and in-kind compensation to even things out. Car pools and rotating credit associations are good examples. Market Pricing (MP) is a relationship based on a sense of proportion, in which people calculate social values as ratios (for example, of input to output). Common forms of MP are prices, wages, rents, interest, proportional taxes, tithes, proportional rationing, various kinds of social rates, and utilitarian moral calculations. For example, street vendors and their customers typically relate according to MP, as do stockbrokers. As a basis of decision making, MP entails rational “cost-benefit” analysis.

People ordinarily combine the four models, using them as building blocks to construct complex dyadic relationships, group structures, and institutions. For example, a woman may interact with her son at a construction site as boss to employee (AR), play chess or basketball with him according to EM, prepare and eat dinner with him on the CS basis in which cooking is a joint task without regard to how much each person contributes or consumes, make an interest-bearing loan (MP) to him or, again using MP, rationally calculate the most effective and least risky strategy for getting him to marry his girlfriend. One model may be the legitimation or motivation for using another, as when a grocery store limits a bargain to one per family (EM), in the interests of maximizing profits by attracting the greatest number of customers at the least cost (MP). Furthermore, people may use different models simultaneously—for example when a man in a feuding society seeks tit-for-tat EM vengeance for the killing of his kinsman (with whom he has a CS relationship) by killing any member of the killer’s kinsmen (whom he treats as equivalent in CS terms).

Relational theory thus describes the basic structures and operations that are socially meaningful in terms of four fundamental affective cognitive schemata that motivate all aspects of relationships. Relational theory posits (and research confirms) that these four models are discrete structures: there are no intermediate forms and they are not reducible to any set of continuous dimensions (Haslam, 1994a, 1994b; Haslam & Fiske, 1994). They funda-
mental and they are also incommensurable, in the sense that there is no general, systematic, higher-level schema that mediates among them. CS, AR, and probably EM have identifiable phylogenetic precursors among social primates and other animals; MP does not (Haslam, 1997). The theory—which was developed from fieldwork among the Moose of Burkina Faso, a comparison of diverse ethnographies, a synthesis of major social theories, and the integration of empirical social psychological research in North America and Europe, has subsequently been tested in a score of studies confirming that the four relational models are salient in all kinds of everyday cognition with respect to real relationships. The models affect intentional retrieval of persons from memory; judgments of similarity among relationships and categorization of relationships; intentional substitutions when people seek an alternate partner to replace the original one; confusions in verbal naming; confusions in identifying partners to previous everyday interactions; and substitutions in misdirected social actions (Fiske, 1993, 1995c; Fiske, Haslam, & Fiske, 1992; Haslam, 1994a, 1994b; Haslam & Fiske, 1994; see Fiske & Haslam, 1996, for a summary).

Relational theory posits that people use these four models to organize exchange, distribution, work, and decision making, to give meaning to time, land, and many material objects (Fiske, 1991b, 1992). For example, land can be (1) an investment (MP); (2) a kingdom that is the personal domain of the king or a fiefdom conferred by a king, giving lordship over the inhabitants (AR); (3) a mark of equal status such as that which once conferred voting rights in the United States (EM); or (4) the motherland defining a collective identity, or a commons, park, or highway (CS). People implement the relational models to make moral judgments, to formulate legitimating ideologies, to punish and to redress transgressions, to interpret misfortune, and to constitute relations with gods, spirits, and ancestors. Thus morality may be construed in the utilitarian calculus of the greatest good for the greatest number of people (MP); as equal treatment of each person (EM); as doing whatever the highest authority (god, religious leaders, the ancestors, fathers, military leaders) dictates (AR); or as acting on the ideal of compassion for all, such that anyone's suffering or joy is your suffering or joy (CS). The same models are the basis for social influence, as well as for organizing groups and constituting social identities. Conversely, any of the four models can generate conflict, and people often organize aggression according to one or another of them. For example, people may attack others for profit—in an economic enterprise such as slavery—or the strategy of war may be calculated by the body count ratio (both MP); feuds and retaliatory vengeance often operate on a tit-for-tat basis—an eye for an eye (EM); a war may be an act of conquest to extend the sovereignty of a ruler, carried out by soldiers in obedience to his dictates (AR); and warfare may be focused on "purification of the race" or "ethnic cleansing," in which the objective is to rid the in-group of polluting differences (CS).

There is an obvious connection between the four relational models and the independence/interdependence dimension (see Triandis, 1995, pp. 48-51, for one discussion). Across cultures, independence seems to be correlated with the prevalence and valuation of MP, while interdependence seem to be correlated with the prevalence and valuation of CS. However, the logical and causal connections are much more complex than they may appear. First, relational theory stresses that people use different models in different domains, and that each culture may use each model in distinctive ways in each domain. Furthermore, in a given domain people may value one model and represent themselves ideologically as using it, while in practice they operate according to a second model. And people commonly legitimate, select, or motivate the use of one model by a different one.

Another set of complexities results from the fact that much of the interdependence in many societies, including those of East Asia and feudal Europe, is based on a considerable extent on AR. (Max Weber [1922/1978] makes this quite clear in his discussion of traditional authority.) Furthermore, in some societies, such as those in Melanesia and some parts of Asia, EM is elaborated into a strong kind of interdependence. Moreover, there are many highly independent cultures in which MP plays only the most minor role; this was once the case among some North American Indians and many hunting and gathering cultures, as well as some pastoral cultures (Kluckhohn & Strodtbeck, 1961/1973; Mead, 1937/1961; Miller, 1955). Conversely, in some cultural contexts MP may be implemented as a relation between groups such as corporations, while the relationships among the members of each respective group emphasize CS, AR, or even EM. Sheppard and Tuchinsky (1996) have shown how corporations use each of the four models to relate to each other (regardless of the types of relationships that constitute the respective corporations). To further complicate matters, many writers, beginning with Karl Marx, have persuasively argued that MP requires and reinforces powerful AR relationships. In any event, a particular, very tight linkage between AR and MP is the basis for modern bureaucracies. As these connections suggest, the links between power distance and the AR and EM models are also complex. Certainly a culture high in power distance is likely to be one in which people value and commonly utilize AR, but cultures low in power distance may emphasize EM, CS, or MP.

Many studies of people's perceptions of their own relationships (as well as studies of ratings and groupings of hypothetical ones), using diverse methods, have repeatedly found that people think in terms of discrete relational structures—not continuous dimensions (see especially Fiske,
nize our work on a task. Shall we take turns working on it, or divide it into equal pieces? What counts as a turn or an equal piece?

Thus an advantage that relational theory shares with other generative theories (e.g., in linguistics) is that it is simultaneously a theory of universals and a theory of diversity. The psychological invariance goes together with the indefinite scope and necessity for cultural variation; both are intrinsic to the idea of relational models. Moreover, the ambiguity, agency, and creativity of social life are inherent in the theory, because the cultural implementation rules cannot possibly be determinate: they always require interpretation and negotiation.

In one sense, the relational models are "in people's heads": there is ample evidence that the relational models organize everyday social cognition in real interactions in diverse cultures (see summary in Fiske & Haslam, 1996). But this should not lead us into the methodological individualism trap of supposing that the individual is the only natural or intelligible unit of action, affect, motivation, intention, or evaluation. The relational models are also "in" the culture: "in" the flow of culturally patterned interactions; "in" institutions, architecture, and objects. Indeed, the relational approach illustrates the fruitlessness of assigning a spatiotemporal locus to many aspects of sociality and psychology—they are not objects with coordinates in space and time. If we touch our foreheads to the dust, placing our elbows on the ground and flexing our forearms up and down (as Moose and other peoples in Burkina Faso do to mark their fealty in major AR relationships), is the deferential meaning of these acts in the subordinate, the superior, the onlookers, the apperceived situation, the culture, the precedents established by prior practices, or all of these taken together? Relationships do not take place entirely in the brain, and their significance is not determined by processes isolated in individual minds.

Change in Relational Models The same kind of mutual constitution can be seen at a much more aggregated level of social process. Contemporary social change in the nature of the relational models underlying modern Western society provides a particularly good snapshot of culture shaping psyches, which in turn shape culture. MP is coming increasingly to be the dominant relationship mode of Western capitalist countries, and with it comes the psychological stance of "cost-benefit" analysis that accompanies MP. Cost-benefit theory holds that people evaluate the costs and benefits of the outcome possibilities for each action they might take and weight these by their probability of occurrence. The action with the highest probability-weighted ratio of costs to benefits is the one chosen. Cost-benefit analysis is at the heart of both macroeconomic and microeconomic theory. The market is supposed to operate according to rational cost-benefit principles, and the same
principles are supposed to hold (both in the descriptive sense and the prescriptive sense) for every sort of personal choice from stock options to mate preference. Cost-benefit theory is now the official decision-making strategy of the U.S. government.

However, psychological research shows that even Americans (and other Westerners) think in this MP, economic mode only in certain circumstances, with many limitations, and as a function of their education. Kahneman and Tversky (1979) and others have shown that people often do not follow the fundamental axioms of cost-benefit theory in their choices. For example, they value outcomes not on an absolute scale but relatively, with respect to a subjective reference point; they often do not show recognition of "opportunity costs"—that is, what they are losing by virtue of making a particular choice; and they often fail to realize when they are victims of a "sunk cost trap"—that is, when they are carrying out some activity or consuming something simply because they have paid for it, not because it still has positive value. However, Larrick and his colleagues (Larrick, Morgan, & Nisbett, 1990; Larrick, Nisbett, & Morgan, 1993) have found that college students who have taken economics courses are more capable of recognizing the cost-benefit solution to a host of problems (though not necessarily of using those rules in their personal choices). And professional economists were shown to be more likely to use a variety of cost-benefit rules both in their judgments about political and social events and in their personal lives than were biologists or humanities professors. For example, economists were more likely to recognize that sunk costs should be absorbed and that activities no longer having positive value should be abandoned. They report walking out on bad movies, being opposed to buying a computer system for which a down payment has been made if a superior one can be purchased for about the same price, and so on. Other investigators have shown that economists behave in ways that are atypical of other members of their culture. For example, economists assume that a rational decision maker would "free-ride," that is, take advantage of a benefit without paying for it if this could be done without detection. However, most American subjects were found to pay for a benefit even when they could not be detected if they failed to pay, while economists in the same situation did not. (The amusing title of this particular paper, by Marwell and Ames [1981], was "Economists Free Ride. Does Anyone Else?"; see also Frank, Gilovich, & Regan, 1993.)

It has proved easy to teach some aspects of formal decision theory, using relatively abstract techniques, in brief sessions lasting less than an hour (Larrick, Morgan, & Nisbett, 1990). College students were taught about the sunk-cost concept and, when called later in the context of a survey of consumer choice and policy preferences, reported making decisions in their daily lives that were more in accord with the concept than were the decisions of control subjects.

Interestingly, although it is axiomatic for economists that decisions guided by cost-benefit analysis are superior to any other kind, they have provided no empirical proof for this. Work by Larrick, Nisbett, & Morgan (1993) indicates that, at least in American society, playing by these rules can have its advantages. Faculty members—whether economists or not—whose personal choices reflected a greater reliance on cost-benefit rules had higher average salaries and higher average annual raises than those whose choices were less in line with the rules. Similarly, college students whose choices reflected a use of cost-benefit principles had higher grade point averages, even when SAT scores were taken into account; indeed, the association was stronger when SAT scores were partialed out, indicating that the users of cost-benefit rules are the overachievers in college.

As many theorists have pointed out, capitalism encourages the use of cost-benefit rules in choice procedures. What has not been obvious is that we have, in effect, high priests of this new religion who are hastening the process by teaching people how to make choices using the rules. Thus this work provides a particularly clear example of the mutual constitution of culture and psyche. Psyches are altered not only through a press from the cultural milieu to move in that direction, but through formal education. Individuals then begin making decisions and even changing societal rules in such a way as to move the culture in the direction of a new relational model. Anyone doubting the existence of the latter process might want to count the number of economists and policy analysts boarding planes for Washington each Friday morning to testify before congressional committees and offer advice to government agencies about rules and practices!

But the cost-benefit orientation is more than a rule system for choices. It tends to encourage adoption of a theory of human nature as rational, calculative, and focused exclusively on self-interest. This theory reifies individualism, tends to legitimize selfish motives, fosters rational cost-benefit thinking to the exclusion of other considerations, and promotes the adoption of public policies conducive to furthering this type of psyche and social relations. In short, the MP ideology and theory of human nature is largely a product of a particular economic system, which in turn fosters the development of concordant psyches, which in turn strengthen that economic system and the culture it serves. (At the same time, however, many effective communitarian, religious, and other countercurrents are also manifest, some in conscious opposition to the rationalist trend.)

The relational models represent one kind of generative structure, but there are many others. Human language is the best known, but there may be others related to attachment, humor, ritual, sex and food taboos, and other aspects
of human sociality. Generative structures are universal human proclivities that make certain kinds of sociality possible. In contrast, there are many important culture complexes that are not universal, but which constitute central organizing themes in certain cultures. These culture complexes shape cognition, affect, perception, motives, and behavior in distinctive ways. One of the best studied of these culture complexes revolves around the idea of honor.

Honor: An Example of a Culture Complex

Izzat—an Arabic and Persian word for honor—"is a word often heard in men's talk, particularly when the talk is about conflict, rivalry, and struggle. It crops up as a kind of final explanation of motivation, whether for acts of aggression or beneficence" (Mandelbaum, 1988).

Honor is a set of social models, a culture complex, that constitutes the social and psychological core of many cultures. It is neither a dimension nor a structural component of culture, but an organizing principle. It is particularly widespread and salient in cultures around the Mediterranean basin and farther east. Variants of this complex are salient in many other cultures with roots in this region, including much of Latin America and many societies strongly oriented to Catholicism or Islam. While there are many differences, a remarkable number of common elements occur in most of the traditional cultures in this region. All of these features occur together in many Mediterranean cultures and in many cultures elsewhere that have been historically influenced by this region. In some other cultures there are derivative culture complexes that exhibit many of these features but lack others. The elements include the following cultural norms, institutions, and practices:

- Patrilineal kin groups (often very small) characterized by strong Communal Sharing bonds.
- Atomistic male autonomy and freedom from—indeed, defiance of—any constraints imposed by others (except elder kinsmen).
- An extreme concern with reputation and insults: a person's and a group's honor or shame is largely a function of how the community perceives the person or group—especially what other people say in public.
- Assertive, often violent relations outside the small kin groups: distrust of all others, a preference for taking by guile or force, and little sense of any moral obligations aside from those toward kin, affines, compadres, clients, and guests.
- The absolute duty to provide hospitality and special bonds resulting from the host-guest relationship.
- Concern about the vulnerability of women, their sexual desire, and the shamefulness of their sexuality (so that it is often required that women be veiled, sequestered, and/or subjected to clitoridectomy or infibulation).
- The collective dishonor that women's violation of sexual norms—or even the imputation of such a violation—brings on their fathers, brothers, sons, and husbands, especially if the kin group fails to retaliate.
- The shame of men who are dishonored and their vulnerability to gossip, ridicule, and ostracism from basic social interaction.
- A tendency toward acceptance of men's pre- and extra-marital sexual relations, often extending to a certain admiration of sexual advances toward women and sometimes approval of men who dishonor other men by seducing women under their protection.

Many of these features, as well as many other distinctive and specific characteristics, appear in parts of Spain (Gilmore, 1987; Lison-Tolosa, 1963/1983; Pitt-Rivers, 1966b, 1977); in Naples, Italy (Parsons, 1969); in Sicily (Giovaninni, 1981); among shepherds in Greece (Campbell, 1964; Friedl, 1962) and Cyprus (Pitt-Rivers, 1966a); and among many Arab groups (Abu-Lughod 1986; Antoun, 1968; Bourdieu, 1966; Jamous, 1981; Meeker, 1976). A very similar constellation of norms and practices is salient in Muslim and Hindu (including Sikh) communities across northern South Asia and elsewhere (e.g., Jamous, 1981; Jeffrey, 1979; Keiser, 1991; Lindholm, 1982; Mandelbaum, 1988). Many of these features also occur in Latin America and in Latin gangs in the United States.

This culture complex has existed for many centuries with some limited changes. In Venice during the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries, the sexual purity of women was very important to the honor of their fathers and husbands, and to the masters of slaves and servants (Ruggiero, 1985). The complex was also present in pre-Islamic Arabia (Fares, 1932, pp. 196–202). Judging by the evidence from Homer, a constellation of norms related to these appears to have existed in the Mediterranean for more than 2,700 years (see Friedrich, 1977; Yamagata 1994, p. 242).

Honor in the U.S. South Not only in traditional Catholic, Muslim, and Hindu cultures of the Mediterranean, the Middle East, Central Asia, East Africa, or Latin America can one find cultures of honor. It has been argued that the white Protestant society of the U.S. South has long been host to a variant of such a culture (Cash, 1941; Fischer, 1989; Greenberg, 1996; McWhiney, 1988; Nisbett, 1993; Nisbett & Cohen, 1996; Wyatt-Brown, 1982). Nisbett and Cohen and their colleagues have argued that the culture of honor of the South accounts for the high rates of violence that have long been claimed to distinguish the region from the North. More particularly, they have shown that the preference for violent solutions that characterizes the South is circumscribed in ways that are well understood in culture-of-honor terms. Although the culture of honor in the American South may focus less on female
chastity than do many other honor cultures, this feature is present, along with most of the other characteristic features. For the American South, moreover, we now have a wide array of evidence about the psychological processes involved in this culture complex.

When southerners are asked about their endorsement of violent solutions to problems in the abstract, or when they are asked about the appropriateness of violence in a wide range of specific situations, they are no more favorably disposed toward it than northerners (Cohen & Nisbett, 1994). However, when the situation refers to cases in which violence might be used for protection of self, family, or property, or in response to an insult, southerners are more in favor of violence. Moreover, the rates of homicide in the South reflect the concern with insults. Though murder rates are no higher for felony-related crimes such as robbery, homicides committed in the context of arguments—barroom brawls, lovers' triangles, and the like—are much more common among white southern males than among white northern males; the rates are four times higher in small southern counties than in northern ones.

Experiments in which college students were insulted—shoved and called an “asshole” by a confederate—revealed southerners to be highly angered by the event (Cohen et al., 1996). Compared to northerners, they subsequently expressed more violent thoughts in response to another “affront” situation that was described to them, their levels of cortisol (indicating stress) and testosterone (indicating readiness for aggression) increased more, they manifested more dominance toward a stranger, and they were more inclined to “rise to the bait” to respond to a stranger who challenged them physically.

Field experiments revealed similar regional differences (Cohen & Nisbett, in press). Supposed job application letters were sent to employers in large commercial chains having franchises in the North and South. The alleged applicant stated that he had killed a man who had insulted him deeply. Southern employers were more accepting of this on several counts, including expressions of sympathy and stated willingness to consider a formal application. In another field experiment, college newspaper editors were paid to produce a news story from supposed police blotter accounts of a stabbing provoked by insults. The resulting stories were more sympathetic to the perpetrator if written in the South than if written in the North. In both experiments, control groups who responded to crimes not involving insults showed no regional differences in the sympathy shown the perpetrator.

Why might southerners be so sensitive to insults? Nisbett and Cohen (1996) argued that the original reasons were a mix of economic and cultural factors. Unlike the North, which was settled mostly by farmers (from England, Holland, and Germany), who must cooperate with one another to be successful, much of the South was settled predominantly by people (especially from Scotland and Ireland) whose economy was based largely on the keeping of animals. Herding peoples do not need to cooperate to the same extent or in the same manner as neighboring farmers do. Moreover, someone in that occupation can become wealthy in an instant by stealing the animals that belong to someone else (Schneider, 1971). Nisbett and Cohen argued that, as a stance to protect themselves against such predation, herding peoples adopt a pose of extreme belligerence in the face of confrontation. An insult must be retraced, because to allow it to stand means that one may be too weak to defend oneself. Hence, a constant vigilance concerning one’s “honor,” or reputation for strength, toughness, and personal integrity, is an economic necessity. Consistent with this view, the other regions of the world where a culture of honor prevails are in general traditionally based on herding economies.

Psiches and Cultures in a Cycle of Mutual Reinforcement. Few southerners are herders today. How can the culture sustain itself if the economy is the original explanation of the culture?

Southerners live in a society in which their daily interactions teach them that honor is important: they observe the behavior and attitudes of others, including institutions such as businesses and the mass media, and can even find these cultural stances embodied in the law. Every time an individual acts in accord with the culture of honor—rises aggressively to a challenge, responds sympathetically to an insulted person, invokes law and social policy in support of his violent actions protecting his property—he is reinforcing and extending the sway of the culture over the lives of the society as a whole. Such a mutually reinforcing cycle suggests some countereintuitive predictions concerning violence and social anomie. Theories of violence generally presume that social disorganization at the community and family level should increase the degree of violence observed. But a cultural approach leads to the expectation that this will be true only when the norms of the culture are in opposition to violence. When the norms of the culture support violence, stability might be associated with greater violence—because stability implies more effective communication of cultural norms. Indeed, Cohen (1998) has found that, whereas greater family and residential stability are associated with lower rates of homicide in the North, they are associated with higher rates of homicide in the South. This southern pattern of positive correlation between stability and homicide holds, as would be expected from culture-of-honor theory, only for argument-related homicides and not for felony-related homicides. Perhaps the most telling of Nisbett and Cohen’s results for the question of sustaining the culture of honor is the finding that insulted southern college students felt that a person who had observed the insult would regard them as unas-
culine. In theory, such a fear could sustain the culture of honor indefinitely.

**Temporal Sequences: Theorizing about the Origins of Forms of Sociality**

The account of the origins of the culture of honor that we have just discussed is a variant of the sort of economic explanation that many social theorists have offered for the origin of different cultural forms. Economic explanations have been a predominant sort of theory since Marx (1857–1858/1973; Marx & Engels, 1867/1906), who believed that the means of production literally dictated all forms of culture. One of the best-developed arguments concerns the differences between sedentary farmers and pastoralists. An economy in which people must cooperate extensively, participating in enduring collectivities or networks of neighbors, requires and fosters broad relational interdependence. Sedentary farmers—particularly those who share an irrigation system and whose population density relative to arable land makes mobility impossible—are economically and hence socially interdependent. Farmers who live where there is unlimited land, who can move far apart. Transhumant or nomadic pastoralists are even more mobile. They may have to coordinate use of water holes or band together for defense, but their alliances are transitory and ever-shifting. Little cooperation is necessary outside of the residential group, so they don’t have to be conciliatory with neighbors or mute their differences. Hunters and gatherers are still less economically dependent on one another. True, it is worthwhile to band together and share the day’s unpredictable catch, but it doesn’t much matter with whom you associate (provided you are capable hunters and gatherers). Band membership is fluid and people go where they please. Ironically then, hunters and gatherers share many social, and probably psychological, qualities with people who live in modern market economies: they choose their friends, transfer from community to community, and do as they please. In short, economies constrain social relations, which in turn constrain psyches. (See Edgerton, 1971, for the classic comparison of the psychology of pastoralists and farmers; consider also his 1979 discussion of urban life. Witzkin and Berry [1975] and Whiting and Whiting [1975] have developed similar arguments.)

The economic argument applies with equal force to modern economic forms. Many thinkers have argued that the patterns of social relations, and therefore the psyches, of modern Western cultures are to a considerable degree products of their economies. The market system has only quite recently and locally come to dominate the processes of producing, distributing, and consuming goods, services, land, and labor (Firth & Yamey, 1964; Marx, 1857–1858/1973; Polanyi, 1944/1957, 1968; Polanyi, Arensberg, & Pearson, 1957). Most societies throughout most of history produced, exchanged, and consumed things in the framework of a system of pooling work and sharing goods, or a hierarchical system of direction, appropriation, and redistribution. Often these systems were supplemented by a system of balanced, in-kind exchange of labor or goods. In much of the world today, the modern type of impersonal market remains a secondary, undesirable form of production and exchange.

Everyone who has looked at the problem agrees that the market has had a profound impact on the psychology of the people who live in it, selling their labor as a commodity in order to purchase the commoditized necessities of life. Independence is clearly a product of this market way of life. In part, the reason is that people must become mobile, interchangeable elements in a labor market; in part, it is that independence is required to amass capital. (Otherwise, you are obliged to share your earnings or profits with your kin, friends, and neighbors as quickly as you acquire them; and you acquire kin, friends, and neighbors as quickly as you acquire more earnings—a serious barrier in the way of economic development for some traditional collectivists.)

In contrast to these economic or ecological views of culture, some theorists have emphasized the role of ideology in organizing cultures. Weber (1904–1906/1958) argued that capitalism was an outgrowth of a particular religious orientation, Calvinism. He noted that the central theme of Calvinism was that salvation for each individual was predestined by God, but that this salvation manifested itself in the worldly success and good works of the individual. Thus, people were highly motivated to prove that they were among the “elect,” and the result was worldly ambition that was particularly well suited to the establishment of capitalism.

Regardless of whether it was an economic system that initially resulted in the ideology of individualism, or the ideology of individualism that initially created the conditions favorable to capitalism, it seems clear that the two go hand in hand. They reinforce each other. The economic form supports and makes sense of the ideology, and the converse is also true. Nevertheless, the two views—the economic or ecological view on the one hand, and the ideational view on the other—have some different implications. The economic view might suggest, for example, that after industrialization and the development of a full-blown market economy, collectivist societies should experience a turn to individualism. As we noted earlier, there are some indications that such a process might be occurring in Hong Kong and China. On the other hand, Japan has been a capitalist country for many decades and remains largely interdependent. As Okimoto and Rohlen (1988) put it, theirs is a "relational capitalism" whose emphasis on organiz-
V. EVOLUTION AND ENCULTURATION

One of the most basic problems for cultural psychology concerns the relation between the biological universals common to all humans and the tremendous cultural and psychological diversity across different communities. We take it for granted that any "normal" human infant could grow up to become a fully functioning participant in any culture. But how do children develop culturally particular psyches from a common biological constitution? How is the cultural perspective developed in this chapter compatible with the biological and evolutionary perspectives in psychology (cf. Buss & Kenrick, 1998, in this Handbook)? We suggest that evolution has given rise to the human propensity to construct culture and that culture has subsequently shaped the course of evolution. Consequently biology and culture make one another up in the same way that psyche and culture do. In this section we consider the nature of the human capacity for culture, the human dependence on culture, and the psychological consequences of this capacity and dependence.

It may be helpful to start with an example of social behavior that sociobiologists and evolutionary psychologists have often used to argue for strong biological foundations for human conduct—that of dominance—and show how it is essential to think in cultural terms about this evolved system. Many vertebrates have dominance hierarchies involving one or both sexes that are more or less linear, more or less stable, and more or less isomorphic across contexts. In particular, most—but not all—primates have dominance hierarchies of some sort (Cheney & Seyfarth, 1990a, 1990b; McGonigle & Chalmers, 1977). These hierarchies are clearly a product of natural selection (Hand, 1986; Packer, 1979; Vehrencamp, 1983; Wade, 1978). Dominant animals gain access to certain resources without having to struggle continually with subordinates or divert their attention, while subordinates avoid injurious conflict (giving them the potential to survive to move up the hierarchy later).

Humans benefit in many of the same ways from dominance systems as do members of other species, and we may well have been subject to somewhat similar processes of natural selection. Thus it is reasonable to suggest that human hierarchies are meaningfully homologous to other vertebrate dominance hierarchies. Yet there are vast differences in the prevalence of social hierarchies in different cultures, in the positive or negative evaluation of such relationships, in the domains in which they operate, and in how they are constituted. (See Fiske, 1991b; also Hofstede, 1980, on power distance.) For example, in much of traditional China and Africa, rank is based primarily on age and gender. In parts of traditional Melanesia, male rank derived in large part from the practice of overwhelming peers with gifts they could not reciprocate, thereby humiliating and subordinating them. South Asian societies base social rank largely on hereditary occupation, diet, marriage, and the other collective practices of castes. Rank may be based on charismatic achievement, or on the acquisition of ceremonial offices of greater and greater prestige, such as the sponsorships (called "cargoes") of Catholic festivals in Central America. On the other hand, in some hunter-gatherer societies and certain American subcultures—Quakers and hippies, for example—any overt assertion of dominance is odious and improper.

Thus, regardless of their degree of biological preparedness, any propensities or potentials for dominance and submission cannot be realized outside of a cultural and historical context. In other words, even if we grant that the capacity to organize interactions according to rank is an important element in the human biological repertoire and that responsiveness to issues of rank can be a biologically prepared adaptive resource, people only realize this proclivity—if they realize it at all—in the manner of their particular culture. In the terms of relational theory, the models cannot be realized except in terms of culturally formulated implementation rules that specify when, how, with whom, and with respect to what issues dominance is expressed. The evolved propensity is adaptive only to the extent that people's behavior fits their culture. It is not adaptive for a
person to act as if everyone were ranked according to age in matters of priority and control over pastures, if everyone around the person treats pastures as a commons while operating with reference to a hierarchy of religious merit with respect to precedence in the distribution of food delicacies.

This example illustrates the complex interplay among natural selection, culture, and diverse psychological processes. The more we learn about each of these issues, the better the vantage points we gain for illuminating each of the others. As we have seen in the preceding sections of this chapter, the more we learn about cultures, the better our foundation for investigating cognition, motivation, group processes, and all the other topics in this Handbook. Knowledge about evolution can help us understand the constraints and opportunities for the construction of cultures, and conversely, knowledge about culture helps us understand the constraints and possibilities for natural selection.

**Natural Selection for Culturally Patterned Sociality**

Various theorists have discussed the idea that humans have been selected for social competence (Byrne & Whiten, 1988; Cavalli-Sforza & Feldman, 1981; De Wall, 1982, 1986; Eisenberg & Dillon, 1971; Gibson & Ingold, 1993; Goody, 1995; Hirschfeld & Gelman, 1994; Humphrey, 1976; King, 1994) or for their capacity for culture (Alexander, 1979, 1981; Boyd & Richerson, 1985; Durham, 1991; Lumsden & Wilson, 1981; Quitt & Reynolds, 1993; Tooby & Cosmides, 1992). However, these theorists have generally not emphasized that for humans, social competence is competence in culturally shaped sociality; conversely, the core of cultural competence is competence at coordinating social relationships. Several distinctively human preadaptations evidently resulted in natural selection for this biological preparedness for acquiring culture and organizing the psyche in a cultural manner. Humans are born at an immature stage of development, are unusually dependent at birth and for a very long time afterward, and reach sexual maturity very late. Immature birth and delayed maturation necessitate cooperative caretaking of young: children generally cannot survive without extensive and prolonged investment by multiple parents and usually other kin. Conversely, extensive and prolonged parental and kin investment (see Hamilton, 1963, 1964, 1971) make immature birth and delayed maturation possible. The long delay before sexual maturity also makes young people’s short-term fitness dependent on kin for a very long time: until they are able to reproduce they have no immediately realizable fitness. This encourages early investment in siblings and other kin. Indeed, in most traditional cultures, older siblings and cousins are the principal caretakers of young children (Weisner, 1996; Weisner & Gallimore, 1977), thereby increasing the fitness of the children who are cared for (they have more caretakers), of the children’s parents (they have help), and of the caretakers themselves (who are not yet capable of reproducing but are able to invest in kin who share their genes, thus increasing their own likely “inclusive” fitness). Subsequent to sexual maturation, the long span of human life (including female survival beyond menopause) permits people to invest in kin in many similar ways, including enduring contributions to the care of invalids and the care, socialization, and counseling of children, grandchildren, nieces, and nephews.

The necessity for cooperative, extended care and other investments in dependent children and other kin require group living. Coresidence greatly facilitates investment in kin, because benefits can be conferred and received most readily among people who live near one another. The opportunities for advantageous reciprocal altruism (Trivers, 1971) and mutually beneficial solutions to potential social dilemmas (Dawes, 1980) are also vastly enhanced by coresidence, longevity, language, and the many cultural devices for preventing and punishing defection.

Group living and cooperation require coordination. The more thorough and sophisticated the coordination, the more effective the cooperation and the greater the benefits of sociality (see Caporeai & Brewer, 1995). Language is one of the key coordinating devices, and language permits important new kinds of information transfer that enhance fitness of kin at little or no cost to the donor (King, 1994). Division of labor and the simultaneous performance of multiple activities also permit very advantageous outcomes that are difficult or impossible for individuals acting independently. Rules about borrowing, sharing, and reciprocity are essential to achieve maximal advantages, not least because they enable planning and analysis of the consequences of social action. Other important kinds of coordination involve entities such as promises, contracts, threats, punishments, and all kinds of rules. Some of the most powerful coordinative devices are shared models for the interpretation and sanctioning of actions, particularly relationships. The independence and interdependence models, the four relational models, and the honor model are among the clearest examples. Fiske (1991b, 1992; Fiske & Haslam, in press) argues that such models cannot be implemented in practice without specifying an enormous number of society-specific cultural parameters.

Innate knowledge of cultural models is impossible. To survive and reproduce, people have to master the coordinating systems that mediate cooperation, conflict, and strategic calculation in the particular community in which they live (by birth, marriage, or immigration). Hence, there is strong natural selection for the capacity and disposition to learn and use effectively any culture into which a person may be born or may come to live (Fiske, 1998).

Many evolutionary psychologists, influenced by ethology, initially focused on the attempt to locate evolved fixed-action patterns that might be more or less invariant
across the species. They typically sought evidence that a behavior was "universal" to support the contention that it had evolved. But many researchers now believe that this approach disregarded the most powerful adaptation of the human species: culture. The human capacity for culture permits innumerable interbreeding communities to utilize very diverse cultural adaptations, and to change them very rapidly when conditions change or people invent new adaptations. Furthermore, while adaptation by natural selection is based on fitness in previous environments and is entirely blind to novel possibilities in the future, cultural inventions can be purposefully designed to meet anticipated conditions. A consequence of this line of reasoning is the idea that the human psyche is adapted to depend on and take advantage of indefinitely variable—yet nevertheless limited and structured—cultural possibilities. Humans who have been able to exploit these cultural models more fully have had greater fitness than those who have not. But in order to benefit from culture, the mind has to become contingent on it. Incorporating the culturally flexible, genetically unspecified models necessary for social cooperation, the mind becomes reliant on them in the ways discussed earlier in this chapter. Thus people have evolved to take advantage of and hence to depend on the culturally formulated knowledge, scripts, goals, means, artifacts, and relational systems that they require for participation in a social world—and hence for survival.

Though the human mind is flexible, it is not a tabula rasa. What we know from the limits to learning theory established by ethologists, from the study of meaning by the philosopher W. V. O. Quine (1960), from the analyses made by the linguist Noam Chomsky, from the points made by Vygotsky (e.g., 1978) and other members of the Russian school early in the century, and most convincingly from the work of learning theorists themselves—such as Garcia (e.g., Garcia et al., 1968), Seligman (1970), and Rozin (1976)—is that no organism can learn very much—if anything—without a great many relevant, specifically focused constraints on constructible hypotheses. Learning requires implicit Bayesian prior probability distributions and theories of possible worlds, plausible dynamics, and credible causes. And learning requires well-tuned motives to focus attention and orient action (e.g., Gelman, 1993). All learning mechanisms are biased—extremely prone to "learn" some things (even when they may be false), fairly proficient at readily learning other things, if spatial and temporal and other factors match the relevant adaptive specialization, and quite unable to figure out other things. Every organism can readily solve complex problems in some "domains" but never solve equally complex problems in other domains: learning devices are for the most part domain-specific (see for example Buss & Kenrick, 1998, in this Handbook; Carey & Spelke, 1994; Cosmides & Tooby, 1987; Hirschfeld & Gelman, 1994).

The clearest case for such prepared structures is language. Chomsky (1965, 1980), Fodor (1983), Pinker (1994), and others have referred to this prepared structure as a module: an evolved, motivated, highly structured proclivity for the acquisition of speech and grammar. Though this structure is a part of everyone's biological equipment, a child cannot communicate much of anything without setting phonetic, syntactic, and semantic parameters so as to enable it to communicate in the language of the particular community in which it is raised. Conversely, human language would not exist without the child's highly structured, strongly motivated psychological propensity for acquiring and using it. Other such prepared structures that have been proposed include those for facial recognition, displays and perceptions of emotion, parental (especially maternal) attachment to offspring, infant attachments to caretakers, infant crying when distressed, toddler imitation, long-term heterosexual bonding, male propriety sexual jealousy, aversion to sexual relations with persons who were intimate co-residents during childhood, theory of objects and dynamics (naive physics), theory of mind (the recognition that others perceive, intend, evaluate, etc.), propensity to taxonomize natural kinds in particular ways, relational models, and ritual.

Fiske (1998) theorizes that many different evolved, prepared human propensities and constraints are necessary for the acquisition and utilization of culture. He theorizes that there are many basic evolved psychological proclivities whose functional development requires and depends on certain delimited kinds of cultural experience. These are motivated, modifiable, biologically incomplete capacities to use the cultural models that are essential for mediating meaningfully coordinated, harmoniously communicative sociality. Such propensities presumably evolved to function in conjunction with a wide and indeterminate range of cultural complements; they would have no adaptive advantage and indeed could not operate at all unless they are completed and elaborated into specific cultural models. Drawing on the Indo-European root "mod-" (the source of "mold," "modify," "moderate," "accommodate," "mediate"), Fiske has proposed the term mod to characterize any such evolved, linked sets of motivated capacities that may make possible human cultural adaptation. The crux of the concept is that the mods' generative potential to grow into coordinating cultural models is a function of a combination of constrained orientation, motivated search, focused receptivity, and organized selectivity, in conjunction with closely linked constructive response potentials. (There is no implication that mods necessarily involve functionally dedicated modular components of the brain, but this may often be the case.) Somewhat similar concepts have been proposed by Dawkins (1982), Lumsden and Wilson (1981), Boyd and Richerson (1985), and others.

The existence of any mods other than the capacity for human language remains speculative. However, the concept focuses our attention on the question of what kinds of
mental structure or prepared processes—if any—are required for learning and using culture. It reminds researchers that we need to investigate the extent of the specificity of any prior constraints and the nature of the plasticity that form the developmental psychological foundation for culture. Are the evolved human propensities for culture conducive to the germination of models with a certain range of features, while providing far less fertile ground for the growth of others?

Fiske argues that genotypic mods would evolve in a cultural environment in which past societies provided a range of complements that, on average, enhanced the fitness of the phenotypes that were expressed as a result of the conjunction of the mods with these cultural complements. However, present and future cultural complements may be different in significant ways from those whose selective advantage resulted in the evolution of the mods in the first place, and some may actually be deleterious. Sperber (1994, 1996) has made a related point in distinguishing the "proper" domain in which a module evolved to function adaptively from the "actual" domain in which the module, or its descendant, is currently applied.

**Enculturation**

The mod concept indicates one kind of psychic unity that may characterize the human species, providing the basis for cultural diversity while restraining the nature of that diversity. The concept is that mods are shared across the species, but the cultural models that grow out of them are diverse and may be mutually unintelligible at first encounter. This framework focuses attention on exploring how prior constraints, focused motivation, or specifically tuned attention or learning devices are involved in the acquisition of cultural models. This perspective implies that the child is the active agent principally responsible for constructing cultural models that permit progressively more meaningful and satisfying interactions. Lave (1988; Lave & Wenger, 1991) and Rogoff (1990; Rogoff et al., 1993) have shown that much of learning takes the form of this kind of apprenticeship activity, involving "guided participation" or "legitimate peripheral participation." Influenced by Vygotsky and the Russian activity theorists, these researchers—including the pioneer Cole (1995a, 1995b, 1996)—have emphasized how learning is embedded in sociality, even to the extent that conversation becomes a medium for thought.

Children seek to participate in the culturally organized social relationships that surround and envelop them. However, the data available to the child from observation is insufficient to enable a child to learn how to participate by pure induction (Chomsky, 1959). The child needs mods (or something like them) to begin to make sense of experience and start creating the initial models that dialectically develop into full cultural competence. The communications and interactions that the child observes are imperfect samples that lack the statistical power to differentiate among all of the logically possible alternative hypotheses. The samples are error-ridden, full of exceptions, and influenced by many extraneous factors that are irrelevant to the particular models that mediate the relationships. But by using the hypothesis constraints and focused attention provided by mods, the child perfects the correct models (Goldin-Meadow & Mylander, 1990). We see this, for example, in deaf children's active construction of sign languages (Feldman, Goldin-Meadow, & Gleitman, 1978). Hearing parents of deaf children typically learn sign language as adults, and consequently sign in a somewhat more rudimentary, badly inflected, inconsistent manner, full of errors. Their deaf children, exposed only to this linguistic mess, quickly and reliably perfect it into a consistent, subtle, and sophisticated competence (Singleton & Newport, 1992). Similar processes are probably at work to enable children to learn relational models and other aspects of their cultures from the messy and insufficient evidence available to them.

One suggestive line of evidence indicating that children require mods to generate their cultural models has to do with sensitive periods—extended critical periods when the child displays unique faculties for rapid, focused, irreversible learning that cannot be duplicated in the same manner after the period closes, despite any amount of experience or practice. Research on the acquisition of both verbal and sign languages shows that very few speakers are able to attain full fluency in a language that they attempt to acquire after age eleven, no matter how long they are immersed or how they study (Johnson & Newport, 1989; Mayberry, 1993; Newport, 1990, 1991). Lucy and Gaskins (in press) have assembled intriguing preliminary evidence suggesting that middle childhood may be a crucial stage in the acquisition of a cultural psyche as well, and Minoura (1992) reports that Japanese children who come to the United States after age nine do not acquire behavioral and especially affective facets of American social relations that younger migrants readily pick up. Middle childhood is the period after most brain development is complete but before sexual maturation and full body size are attained. This ontogenetic segment is unique to the developmental biology of *Homo sapiens*, Neanderthals, early *Homo*, and *Australopithecus* (Bogin, 1988; Mann, Lampl, & Monge, 1996). Yet other things being equal, delayed reproduction considerably diminishes fitness. Petrza and Altmann (1985) indicated that this unique human pattern of maturation may have evolved because of a compensating advantage that it conferred for acquiring the social competence necessary for successful reproduction. Fiske (1998) suggests that this is the period during which children use many of their mods to develop the cultural coordinating devices essential for human communication, cooperation, survival, and reproduction.

In any event, it is clear that most of the complex innate
capacities and dispositions with which humans come into the world are invariably transformed, enhanced, redirected, or left dormant by the culture in which a child grows up. For example, it is now clear that infants as young as three months have a notion of objects as being continuous in space and time, solid, cohesive, bounded, and as a unit rather than in pieces (Carey & Spelke, 1994; Spelke, 1988, 1990). They also distinguish causal from noncausal relationships in the physical domain (Leslie & Keeble, 1987) and distinguish sharply at a very early age between the animate and the inanimate world (Gelman, 1990). There are also intriguing (albeit controversial) claims that children come into the world with a highly prepared theory of mind as well (e.g., Asch, 1952; Leslie, 1994; Wellman, 1990; but see also Lillard, 1997, in press). Children as young as two can be shown to make different inferences about physical objects than they do about mental events. Some evidence suggests that, from a very early age, children explain behavior as being due to the conjunction of beliefs and desires. This domain-specific inference system has been found in North America, Europe, and China (Flavell et al., 1983); Japan (Gardner et al., 1988); and a hunter-gatherer group in Africa (Avis & Harris, 1991). Yet as we have seen throughout this chapter, the manner in which people manipulate and make inferences about objects and humans depends on their culture. Beginning with their shared innate physics and theory of mind, by participating in the everyday activities of their cultures children develop culturally diverse and distinctive practices and beliefs about faxes, amulets, magic, computers, souls, software, ghosts, angels, ancestor spirits, viruses, witches, holograms, and gods, whose defining attributes are remarkable transformations and recombinations of these initial preconceptions.

Learning a culture is the crux of the process by which biology, psyche, and culture make each other up: to join the ongoing social worlds around them, children have to figure out how to generate the models that guide the meaningful social relations of their culture. This is a highly focused, intensely motivated search, and the evidence from several cultures "shows infants to be active in setting intermental, co-operative, meaning-seeking goals from the start" (Trevarthen, 1988, p. 80).

**How Psyches Shape Cultures**

As we have noted repeatedly in this chapter, cultures shape psyches, but the process is inherently bidirectional. The psyche is not infinitely plastic. If it were perfectly fluid and formless, it could not learn, develop, or make use of culture. But the reciprocal point is also true. Because of the constraints on psyche, some cultural forms will be far more common than others and more readily reproduced.

Though psychologists may assume that the primary job of the psychologically oriented anthropologist is to show how cultures shape psyches, the complementary tradition also exists and is currently quite active. One of the progenitors of this school is Lévi-Strauss (e.g., 1966, 1967), who argued that humans construct cultural meanings using binary contrasts resembling the oppositions that mark meaningful differences between phonemes. For example, he showed how myths were constructed using contrasts between nature and culture, or between raw and cooked. Similarly, Berlin and Kay (1969) studied color classification across cultures and maintained that although boundaries of color terms vary, the focal point of each basic color (e.g., the most prototypical red in an array of reds) is largely the same across languages. Heider and Oliver (1972), working with Dani tribesmen in New Guinea, whose language has only two basic color terms, demonstrated experimentally that memory for color, as well as the naming of colors, is also largely independent of color vocabulary. Another universal is that every culture uses the human body, along with its sexual and excretory processes and the contrast between male and female bodies, to symbolize diverse aspects of social relations and society. For example, Needham (1973) has illustrated the widespread tendency to contrast the right hand from the left, valuing the right. The psychological foundations of these apparent universals are not yet well understood—and the mere fact that they are universal should not be taken to mean that their implications for the human psyche are deep.

An ambitious program of research on the "epidemiology of representations" has been undertaken by Sperber (1985, 1994, 1996) and his cognitive anthropologist colleagues. The approach seeks to explain cultural features in terms of the ecology of belief (e.g., the distribution of ideas in a population) on the one hand, and psychological constraints on communication on the other, as opposed to "macroprocesses" such as power dynamics and ideology. The basic notion is that, because of the natural contours of the human mind, some ideas are easier to develop and to spread (more "contagious") than others. These ideas are learned in each culture without any formal instruction (Atran & Sperber, 1991) and spread from one culture to another with relative ease. For Sperber the goal of anthropology is less to uncover and account for cultural differences in terms of local beliefs and practices than to explain cultural effects by reference to panchrural psychology and communicative potentials.

One example of cross-cultural uniformity in a content area that previously had been assumed to vary widely was uncovered by Berlin's work on folk biological classification. In a series of studies, Berlin (1992; Berlin, Breedlove, & Raven, 1973) showed that in spite of significant variation in the plants and animals that any local population encounters, and even though many of these plants and animals lack cultural salience for any given local population, there is striking consistency in the way humans everywhere
classify the world of living things. Atran (1990, 1994, 1995, in press) has elaborated on this notion. He has argued that all people use similar folk-biological categories that are "essence-based" and center on specieslike groups. Moreover, he claims that rankings of species in lower-order and higher-order groups is highly similar across cultures. He argues that folk taxonomies have the power that they do because the constraints and flexibility they provide allow people to make inferences about the natural world. And Atran has shown that people as different from American students as Maya Indians make inductive inferences in much the same way that Americans do by making use of their folk-biological notions of species. These universal aspects of everyday cognition of the biological world also appear to strongly constrain the historical development of the species concept and other taxonomic concepts in scientific biology. It is important to note that the uniformities found in people's categorization habits are not a result of their simply placing plants and animals into categories on the basis of "mere similarity." Gelman (1988) and others have shown that such judgments, even by young children, are heavily guided by theory and that theoretical beliefs about species relations can override similarity in judgments about species memberships.

Similarly, Pascal Boyer (1993, 1994) points out that religions in many of the world's cultures show recurrent themes that could not be the result of chance. For example, most religious systems assume that a nonphysical aspect of a person is maintained after death and becomes an invisible intentional being, and that certain individuals, but not others, are especially likely to be inspired by supernatural beings, such as gods and spirits (Boyer 1993). Boyer proposes, following Sperber (1985), that these cross-cultural regularities in religion are the result of the fact that religious ideas, like other cultural ideas, depend on the cognitive properties of the minds that represent these ideas. To capture the cross-cultural regularities encountered in religious systems, Boyer constructed a taxonomy of religious representations, based on a cognitive recipe for religion. This recipe is based on two properties: the first is that a religious idea has to include a proposition that violates some aspect of our common sense knowledge of the world; the second is that a religious idea is embedded in a larger set of commonsense assumptions about the world. The former property, according to Boyer, makes the idea attention-grabbing, while the latter property allows us to make ordinary inferences from the idea. For example, a god who is angry at the people and demands sacrifices violates our intuition about biology (that all living things are mortal), but still allows us to use our ordinary understanding of folk psychology (that intentional beings have desires, emotional states, etc.).

Hirschfeld (1988, 1994, 1995, 1996) has made similar arguments with respect to social categories. He notes that there is good evidence that the ontogeny of racial and gender concepts follows a similar trajectory in a variety of populations and may well be largely independent of any explicit teaching about either racial or gender differences. Indeed, young children's clarity about racial concepts is unrelated to their parents' degree of racial stereotyping or racial prejudice. He observes that "children are prepared to find that humans come in groups, that is, they have social identities" (Hirschfeld, 1994, p. 222), and their approach to understanding social categories is essentialist—assuming that, just as giraffes have an essence that makes them giraffes no matter how transformed, humans have gender and racial essences.

To understand how the psyche potentiates and constrains culture, we also need to look at the complement of the highly successful cultural components—those ideas and practices that fall on deaf ears and quickly die out. For example, although people are quite capable of inventing the idea of a community whose sexual relationships are unrestricted by anything resembling marriage—and indeed have often tried this—no such community has ever persisted long. The mediating mechanism perhaps is human sexual jealousy—at any rate this is widely presumed to be the cause of the dissolution of the "free love" communes of the 1960s in the United States. But of course human sexual jealousy itself is in the service of something (cf. Buss & Kenrick, 1998, in this Handbook).

We should conclude by noting that the phylogeny of the species, the history of the culture, and the life course of each person are never fully adapted to each other, in part because their mutual influences are dynamic and never reach equilibrium. Stresses between them also result from certain quasi-systemic properties of each, such that the interaction of the components of each system may constrain its adaptation to the other systems. Moreover, the three systems are not fully and exclusively determined by each other. Each is subject to some substantial influences beyond the other two, as well as to unique sequences of historical events. Two facts strike us as remarkable, however: cultures are incredibly diverse and psyches are almost equally varied, yet in most instances the psyches and cultures that operate together are remarkably concordant.

One final point is that these notions about evolution and enculturation are preliminary and require much testing and reformulation, but they provide one framework for understanding how the diversity and uniqueness of cultures can be explained with reference to universal processes. Universalism and relativism are fully compatible: it is our shared human nature that makes us so diverse.

Implications for Research Strategy and Theory

The research and theory discussed in this chapter is only one small, rather unrepresentative sample of the beehive of
current activity in cultural psychology and psychological anthropology. But it is enough, we believe, to indicate that social psychology must consider the idea that psyche and social relations are culturally contingent. Beginning now, we need to focus on the task of understanding how culturally organized social relations shape the psyche and are shaped by it in turn. There are two possible ways for the field to proceed from this point.

First, we can consider the major phenomena of social psychology, such as those reviewed in Section III. One by one, we can analyze the cultural conditions that are necessary for each phenomenon to operate. Then we can investigate a sample of the world’s cultures to see the various culturally limiting conditions of these phenomena. This may be an effective and hence appropriate early strategy for establishing that social psychology is culturally contingent, since it will reorient the field and facilitate a paradigm shift. However, this is a backward-looking strategy that eventually may need to be superseded. Analysis of the limiting cultural conditions of the particular psychological processes that happen to be salient in the modern West is unlikely to lead us to a general understanding of how psyches and social relations shape each other. Social psychology experiments are often designed to “imitate” and “reproduce in the lab” a daily practice that makes sense—in one cultural context, usually that of European or American students. This approach encounters formidable problems when social psychologists seek to “export” the method to other cultural contexts, in which the procedure either makes no sense to local subjects or has a completely different, unintended meaning—which the researchers may not recognize. Consequently, a culturally informed experimental social psychology has to focus on meaning as much as on methods—because the validity of any method depends on how closely its meaning corresponds to the everyday practices it is intended to reflect.

In the long run, we will learn more by tackling the problem directly. We can do this using any of the six frameworks for comparing cultures: relativizing particularism, or searching for important universals, typologies, temporal sequences and processes, culture complexes, or generative structures. We need to ask the questions, What are the psychological consequences of living in a certain kind of cultural system? and What are the cultural patterns generated by certain kinds of psyches?

Clearly we are only beginning to build the foundation of this field. The agenda for the coming decades might profitably focus on the following goals:

- Exploring how psyches generate and constrain or channel various cultural patterns.
- Discovering how these mutually constructing systems of culture and psyche reproduce and change over time.

In order to understand the meanings, practices, and institutions that shape and are shaped by psyches, we need to analyze and compare cultures in depth. Ethnographies are an invaluable resource; and it is important to read ethnographies of many diverse cultures to situate any particular comparison in the framework of the total range of cultural diversity in the world. Extended participant observation—along with working fluency in the relevant languages—is an important precursor and complement to experimentation. Working closely with anthropologists, psychologists can further deepen their understanding of the practices and meanings linked to psychological processes. But in conjunction with these tools, the most enlightening strategy is collaboration among researchers from each of the cultures to be compared—and ideally researchers from other cultures as well. This kind of collaboration can result in extraordinary synergy.

REFERENCES


Hallahan, M., Lee, F., & Herzog, T. (1998). It’s not just whether you win or lose, it’s also where you play the game: A naturalistic, cross-cultural examination of the positivity bias. Unpublished manuscript, Clemson University, Clemson, SC.


Lévi-Strauss, C. (1949/1961). The elementary structures of
thropy in Oceania Monograph no. 8). Lanham, MD: University Press of America.


McDougall, W. (1920). The group mind, a sketch of the principles of collective psychology, with some attempt to apply them to the interpretation of national life and character. New York: Putnam.


Morgan, L. H. (1877). Ancient society, or, Researches in the line of human progress from savagery through barbarism to civilization. Chicago: Kerr.


Moscovici, S. (1984). The phenomena of social representa-


Weisner, T. S. (1996). The 5 to 7 transition as an ecocultural project. In A. Sameroff & M. Haith (Eds.), The five to seven year shift: The age of reason and responsibility (pp. 295–326). Chicago: University of Chicago Press.


