Information about the armed group is coded from a narrative compiled by the author and a team of research assistants. I include two sample narratives from the Nigeria and Bangladesh cases, although the structure and length is comparable in every other cases. When information is ambiguous or not stated, it is coded as unclear or unknown.

Sample 1. Nigeria

**Group Name:** ODUA PEOPLES’ CONGRESS  
**TORG ID:** 951  
**Min. Group Date:** 1995  
**Max. Group Date:** 2011  
**Onset:** NA

**Aliases:** Odua Peoples’ Congress (Opc), Oodua Peoples Congress, Odua Peoples’ Congress, Odudua Peoples Congress, Oduduwa Peoples Congress, Oodua Peoples Congress, Yoruba O’odua Peoples’ Congress, Yoruba Oodua Peoples Congress (Opc)

**Part 1. Bibliography**


- Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada: The Oodua Peoples Congress (OPC), including when formed, leaders, aims, ethnicity, treatment of members and when it first came into conflict with the government authorities [NGA32576.E], 26. August 1999 (verfügbar auf ecoinet) [http://www.ecoi.net/local_link/188556/306595_de.html](http://www.ecoi.net/local_link/188556/306595_de.html)


Part 2. Basic Coding Changes

Group Formation

The OPC formed in August 1994 in response to the government’s cancellation of a 1993 Nigerian election where a Yoruba candidate appeared the likely winner (Human Rights Watch 2003; Florquin and Berman 2005, 330). The organization has an ethno-nationalist ideology, and claims that their motive is to safeguard the Yoruba culture and language. The OPC seeks autonomy for the Yoruba people, though it is not clear whether their political objective is the formation of a separate state, autonomy under the existing Nigerian government, or territorial reforms (Human Rights Watch 2003). The OPC’s first attack is not officially recorded. By 1999, the group had already conducted several attacks against other ethnic groups and clashed with the police repeatedly (Human Rights Watch 2003).

Geography

The OPC has known bases in southwest Nigeria which has a tropical environment: Oyo, Ogun, Ondo, Osun, Kwara, Lagos, and Kogi (Canada IRB 2001). A majority of attacks and clashes happen with the police in Yoruba areas like Ikorodu and Lagos (GTD 2016). Some records suggest that the OPC was also active in Llorin, the capital of Kwara, around October and November 2000 (Canada IRB 2001). The OPC is not a transnational group.

Organizational Structure
The OPC had several leaders including Dr. Frederick Fasehun, a doctor with no prior political experience (Human Rights Watch 2003). In 1999, the OPC formed two distinct wings, the moderate wing, which was led by Fasehun and was willing to engage in politics. The more radical wing was led by Gani Adams, a previous carpenter, and frequently used violence (Human Rights Watch 2003; Florquin and Berman 2005, 330). The leaders of the OPC tended to have a higher level of education and political experience, while the members have minimum education and are typically young, unemployed men (Human Rights Watch 2003; Florquin and Berman 2005, 330). A majority of OPC members are Yoruba. While it is not clear if the OPC collects fees from regular members, Yoruba politicians that use their OPC membership as a platform to gain support have to pay the group (Florquin and Berman 2005, 330). The group is organized into a hierarchy composed of branches, zones, and wings. The Annual National Conference is at the forefront of all major group decisions, and the National Executive Council is its governing body (Human Rights Watch 2003). There are various estimates of the OPC’s size, but most agree that each of the 20 battalions or zone had approximately 200 men (Florquin and Berman 2005, 330).

External Ties

Many local governments in Yoruba majority areas hired the OPC as a vigilante justice organization (Canada IRB 2006). In addition, Yoruba politicians may have partially financed the OPC’s activities (Florquin and Berman 2005, 330; Canada IRB 2006). The governor of Lagos allegedly hired the OPC as a para-military force to help his 2003 victory (Florquin and Berman 2005 p.330). In 1999, the OPC split into two opposing wings, a moderate wing led by its founder Fasehun, and a radical militant wing, which was led by Gani Adams (also known as the Oodua Liberation Movement, or the Revolutionary Council of Nigeria) (Florquin and Berman 2005 p.330; Global Security N.D).

Group Outcome

A government anti-crime force called “Operation Sweep” in December 1998 in Bariga, Lagos resulted in the death of four members of the OPC (Global Security N.D). In 1999, the Nigerian government banned the OPC, and ordered police officers to shoot on sight. This resulted in a series of violent confrontations in Yoruba territory (Canada IRB 2006). In November 2005, Nigerian police arrested both of the group’s leaders (ibid.). After a spell of non-activity between 2005 and 2013, the organization began using violence again in 2013. Its last suspected attack was in 2014 when it attacked the Nigeria Prisons Service in Ado-Ekiti (GTD 2017). The group is still active in Yoruba politics as of 2017.
Sample 2. Bangladesh

Group Name: CHITTAGONG HILL TRACTS UNITED PEOPLE'S PARTY
TORG ID: 1441
Min. Group Date: 1972
Max. Group Date: 2009
Onset: 1975

Aliases: Parbatya Chattagram Jana Sanghati Samity (Pcjss) - Bangladesh, Chittagong
Hill Tracts United Peoples Party, Chittagong Hill Tracts United People’s Party, Parbatya
Chattagram Jana Sanghati Samiti, Parbatya Chattagram Jana Sanghati Samity, Parbatya
Chattagram Jana Sanghati Samity (Pcjss)

Part 1. Bibliography

- Kristian Gleditsch, David Cunningham, and Idean Salehyan. “Bangladesh vs JSS/SB.”

doi/abs/10.1080/14662049308447665?journalCode=fccp19


  org/military/world/bangladesh/political-parties-cht.htm

Bangladesh_A_Critical_Review_of_the_Chittagong_Hill_Tract_CHT_Peace_Accord

  pdf

  www.mar.umd.edu/assessment.asp?groupId=77101

- Kazi Montu. “Tribal Insurgency in Chittagong Hills Tract.” Economic and Political
  Weekly. 1980. JSTOR.

- Patrick Brogan. World Conflicts: A Comprehensive Guide to World Strife since 1945
  Scarecrow Press. 1999

- Mohammad Fakhrus Salam and Hajera Aktar. “Ethnic Problems in Bangladesh: A
Part 2. Basic Coding Changes

Additional Aliases: Shanti Bahini
Group Formation: 1972 (form), 1975 (Attack)
Group End: 1997 (disarm)

Part 3. Narrative

Group Formation

PCJSS was formed in 1972 by members of the Chittagong Hills Tract (CHT) tribe in eastern Bangladesh (UNDP 2005; Salam and Aktar 20154, 55). They created an armed wing, the Shanti Bahini, in 1973 (UNDP 2005). They were an ethno-nationalist separatist groups that claimed the Chittagong Hills District after settlers began to immigrate to the area from other parts of Bangladesh. The Prime Minister of Bangladesh, Mujib, rejected the claims and threatened to send even more settlers into the region (UNDP 2005). Initially, the group was very hopeful it could bargain a negotiated settlement with the government, but eventually started their armed campaign after Mujib was assassinated in 1975 (UNDP 2005). The group partially ascribed to Marxist-styles of warfare as seen by the type of guerrilla tactics employed, although they were not a leftist organization (Ahmed 1999).

Geography

The group operated throughout the Chittagong Hill District, but primarily operated in three districts: Rangamati, Bandarban, and Khagrachari, all located in the CHT district (Chowdhury 2002; Ahmed 1999). There is no evidence it ever conducted any transnational attacks (GTD 2017). Manobendra Narayan Larma fled to India after Mujib’s assassination in 1975 and organized the insurgency from an external base there, but it is unclear whether this move predates or postdates the start of the insurgency (UNDP 2005; Salam and Aktar 2014, 57).
Organizational Structure

PCJSS leader was Manobendra Narayan Larma who fled to India after Mujib’s assassination and organized the insurgency from India (UNDP 2005; Salam and Aktar 2014). His brother Manobendra Narayan also helped him lead the group (Ahmed 1999). The group was composed of ethnic CHT (Gleditsch et al. 2013, 434). MAR argues the group has a “high level of group organization and cohesion,” but provides no evidence why (MAR 2006). The group’s armed wing was divided along several different fields including a medical wing, communication, and tech teams (Ahmed 1999). It studied Marxist guerrilla tactics and appointed J.B. Larma the leader (Ahmed 1999) UCDP estimates the group had 2000-7000 guerrillas “during the course of the conflict” (Gleditsch et al. 2013, 434). The group primarily funded itself through extortion and taxation of officials (Ahmed 1999).

External Ties

In late 1975 or early 1976, India began providing external support to the PCJSS and SB under the Research and Analysis Wing (RAW) (Ahmed 1999; Gleditsch et al. 2013, 434). SB had an external base in Tripura, received military training from Indian security forces, and also had Indian weaponry (UNDP 2005). India later denied these claims (Gleditsch et al. 2013, 434).

Group Outcome

As early as 1973, the government began increasing its military response in the area. The JSS formed in response to “came in the wake both of Sheik Mujib’s refusal to consider autonomy and of a series of sweeping and indiscriminate reprisal raids against the CHT” (Leven 1999, 357). Bangladesh banned the PCJSS political group and led to the creation of the armed wing (Leven 1999; Dowlah 2013). The government responded to the group in 1975 with a massive military campaign including a full-scale occupation of the CHT (UNDP 2005). These state-initiated actions match the UCDP’s start date of the conflict.

When Rahman came to power in 1976, he deployed 150,000 military personnel to the region, which forced the JSS/SB to go underground and increase their level of effort against Rahman (Dowlah 2013). Larma was arrested in 1975 (Ahmed 1999). It also tried to make some accommodations including the creation of the Chittagong Hills Development Board in January 1976 (Chowdhury 2002). A conflict in the PCJSS leadership led to the assassination of Larma on November 10, 1983 (Chowdhury 2002).

Talks between Zia and the PCJSS fell through repeatedly during his tenure due to a lack of trust between parties (UNDP 2005). The government continued its militant, hard-line approach until 1991 when the BNP - a civilian government - initiated peace talks and began to treat the insurgency as a political movement (UNDP 2005). An eventual peace accord was reached on Dec. 2, 1997 granting the CHT some greater autonomy and a fixed number of seats in the Parliament (UNDP 2005). The group’s last violent attack was in 1997 (GTD 2017).