Motivation: What makes international politics so different from domestic politics? We say the answer is ‘anarchy’ because it means states cannot be forced to cooperate with each other. We get a unique set of cooperation problems under anarchy which Professor Fearon slowly explores throughout the course. These cooperation problems are unique to the international system and require a unique set of solutions to overcome them.

I. Recap: Collective Action Problems

AKA commitment problem, prisoner’s dilemma, collaboration problem, cooperation problem

Criteria: (c.f. FLS Chp 2)

• Players are rational aka maximize their expected payoffs
• Players have an incentive to not cooperate (‘defect’)
• Equilibrium is Pareto inefficient
• Both parties would be better off if they could cooperate

Game:

See Game Theory Cheat Sheet from Week 2 Section Notes.

Equilibrium: (Defect, Defect) This is Pareto inefficient because parties could make themselves both better off if they could commit to (Cooperate, Cooperate)

Solutions:

• First-Party Enforcement. Why? Changing preferences of parties increases payoffs to cooperation, worsens payoffs to defection, e.g. ‘naming and shaming’ in Paris Agreement

• Second-Party Enforcement. Why? Exploits repeated interaction and reciprocity between parties. Generally relies on tit-for-tat strategies to induce compliance, e.g. ‘snapback sanctions’ under JCPOA (Iran Nuclear Deal) or WTO Dispute Settlement Procedure.

• Third-Party Enforcement. Why? Government, law, or other political order can force parties to comply.

Limits to Conditional Cooperation/Second-Party Enforcement (c.f. Fearon Lecture Slides Week 2, 3, 10)

• Number of Parties
• Shadow of Future
• First-Strike Advantages
• Comparative Costs vs Benefits
II. Course Themes: 5 Classes of International Cooperation Problems (Week 2-3)

1. Arms, Arms Racing, and Proliferation
   a. What’s the collective action problem?
      States can’t commit to not proliferate or build up arms for deterrence even though doing so increases the risk of war.
   b. What is a solution? Why?
      2nd-Party Enforcement Mechanisms: arms control agreements
   c. What specific examples apply here?
      Readings: Jervis (O-D Balance), Fearon, Sagan and Waltz, Section Notes Week 2, Nuclear Weapon Slides, Guns/Butter Game from Week 3
      Examples: JCPOA, IAEA, NPT, START, SALT II

2. Interstate War
   a. What’s the collective action problem?
      States can’t commit to not use force or invade other countries even though doing so increases the risk of war. (note: assumes there is already some motivation to go to war, e.g. nationalism and conflicting preferences)
   b. What is a solution? Why?
      1st-Party Enforcement: moral opprobrium against war
      2nd-Party Enforcement: international institutions governing opportunity to go to war, e.g. UN Security Council
   c. What specific examples apply here?
      Readings: Lake, Mearsheimer and Waltz, FLS Chp. 3, Bargaining Model of War slides, preventive war slides

3. Civil War
   a. What’s the collective action problem?
      Rebels and governments can’t commit to disarm due to first-strike advantages even though ending the civil war would make everyone better off.
   b. What is a solution? Why?
      2nd-Party Enforcement: power-sharing agreements
      3rd-Party Enforcement: UN Peacekeeping Operations, others?
   c. What specific examples apply here?
      Readings: FLS Chp 6., Stedman lecture, Fearon and Laitin (2003), Fearon and Laitin (2004), section notes week 3
      Examples: Syrian Civil War, Bosnia, DRC
4. Trade and Protectionism
   a. What’s the collective action problem?
      States can’t commit to not implement suboptimal protectionist policies (e.g. tariffs) even though all states would be better off by engaging in free trade.

   b. What is a solution? Why?
      2nd-Party Enforcement: International Institutions with tit-for-tat mechanisms, opportunities increased bargaining

   c. What specific examples apply here?
      Readings: FLS Chp. 7, Frankel, Fearon lecture slides (week 10)
      Example: RTAA (USA), WTO Dispute Settlement Procedure, MFN Status, Preferential/Regional Trade Agreements

5. Environmental Agreements
   a. What’s the collective action problem?
      States can’t commit to not exploit a common pool resource (such as limiting carbon emissions to help prevent climate change) even though everyone would be better off by preserving the resource or minimizing carbon emissions.

   b. What is a solution? Why?
      1st-Party Enforcement: naming and shaming (n.b. note how compliance trades off with enticing a lot of parties to enter into any agreement)
      2nd-Party Enforcement: tit-for-tat strategies and retaliatory action

   c. What specific examples apply here?
      Readings: Sunstein, FLS Chp. 13, Dorsey
      Examples: Pelagic sealing, Montreal Protocol (and TFT with trade sanctions!), Kyoto Protocol, Paris Agreement