Ilya R. Segal

Department of Economics
Stanford University
Stanford, CA 94305-6072
Tel. (650) 724-4905
Ilya.Segal@stanford.edu
  http://www.stanford.edu/~isegal/

Academic Positions

· 2002 – present:   Roy and Betty Anderson Professor in the Humanities and Sciences, Department of Economics, Stanford University (Courtesy appointment, Stanford Graduate School of Business, 2004-present)

· 1999 – 2002:      Associate Professor of Economics, Stanford University

· 1995 – 1998:      Assistant Professor of Economics, University of California at Berkeley

Visiting Positions

· Visiting Researcher, Microsoft Research Silicon Valley, Summer 2008

· Member, The Institute for Advanced Study at Princeton, 2002-2003

· John Stauffer National Fellow in Public Policy, Hoover Institution, 1998 – 1999

· Visiting Assistant Professor, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Fall 1995

· Pew Foundation Visiting Scholar, Harvard University, 1991-92

Education

· Harvard University, Ph.D., Economics, 1995. Advisors: Eric Maskin, Oliver Hart, Andrei Shleifer

· Moscow Institute of Physics and Technology, M.S., Applied Mathematics, 1991

Research and Teaching Interests

Microeconomic Theory, Contract Theory, Industrial Organization, Theory of the Firm

Honors, Awards, Grants

· Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory, Economic Theory Fellow, elected in 2013

· 2008 Compass Lexecon Prize for “the most significant contribution to the understanding and implementation of competition policy” (joint with Michael Whinston)

· Toulouse Network on Information Technology, Member, 2005-present

· Econometric Society Fellow, elected in 2003

· John Simon Guggenheim Memorial Foundation Fellowship, 2002-2003

· Alfred P. Sloan Foundation Research Fellowship, 1999-2001

· National Science Foundation Research Grants 1998-2000, 2000-2002, 2002-2004, 2004-2005, 2004-2006, 2010-2012

· Review of Economic Studies European Meetings, 1995

· Alfred P. Sloan Foundation Dissertation Fellowship, 1994-95

Publications (in PDF)

Refereed Journal Articles             

·   “The Communication Requirements of Efficient Allocations and Supporting Prices,” with Noam Nisan, Journal of Economic Theory 129(1), July 2006, pp. 192-224

·         “Robust Predictions for Bilateral Contracting with Externalities,” with Michael Whinston, Econometrica, 71(3) 2003, pp. 757-791

·   “Optimal Pricing Mechanisms with Unknown DemandAmerican Economic Review 93(3), 2003, pp. 509-529

·    “Collusion, Exclusion, and Inclusion in Random-Order BargainingReview of Economic Studies 70(2), 2003, pp. 439-460

·    “Coordination and Discrimination in Contracting with Externalities: Divide and Conquer?” Journal of Economic Theory 113(2), 2003, pp. 147-181

·    “Communication Complexity and Coordination by AuthorityAdvances in Theoretical Economics, forthcoming

·    “Envelope Theorems for Arbitrary Choice Sets,” with Paul Milgrom, Econometrica 70(2), 2002, pp. 583-601

·    “The Mirrlees Approach to Mechanism Design with Renegotiation (with Applications to Hold-Up and Risk Sharing),” with Michael Whinston, Econometrica 70(1), 2002, pp. 1-45

·    “Exclusive Contracts and Protection of Investments,” with Michael Whinston, RAND Journal of Economics 31(4), 2000, pp. 603-633

·    “Naked Exclusion: Comment,” with Michael Whinston, American Economic Review 90(1), 2000, pp. 296-309

·    “Contracting with ExternalitiesQuarterly Journal of Economics 114(2), 1999, pp. 337-388

·    “Complexity and Renegotiation: A Foundation for Incomplete ContractsReview of Economic Studies 66(1), 1999, pp. 57-82

·    “Monopoly and Soft Budget ConstraintRAND Journal of Economics 29(3), Autumn 1998, pp. 596-609

Refereed Conference Proceedings

·         “Exponential Communication Inefficiency of Demand Queries," with Noam Nisan, Theoretical Aspects of Rationality and Knowledge X, June 2005, pp. 158-164

·    “The Communication Cost of Selfishness: Ex Post Implementation,” with Ronald Fadel, Theoretical Aspects of Rationality and Knowledge X, June 2005, pp. 165-76

·         “Multi-Player and Multi-Round Auctions with Severely Bounded Communication," with Liad Blumrosen and Noam Nisan, European Symposium on Algorithms, September 2003, Proceedings. Lecture Notes in Computer Science 2832 Springer 2003, ISBN 3-540-20064-9

Invited Contributions

·    Designing Efficient Dynamic Mechanisms for Dynamic Bilateral Trading Games, with Susan Athey, American Economic Review Papers and Proceedings, 97(2), May 2007, pp. 131-6

·    Communication in Economic Mechanisms, in Advances in Economics and Econometrics: Theory and Application, Ninth World Congress (Econometric Society Monographs), ed. by Richard Blundell, Whitney K. Newey, and Torsten Persson, Cambridge University Press, 2006

·    Communication Requirements of Combinatorial Allocation Problems, in Peter Cramton, Yoav Shoham, and Richard Steinberg (eds.), Combinatorial Auctions, MIT Press, 2006

Other Publications

·    “Public vs. Private Enforcement of Antitrust Law: A Survey,” European Competition Law Review, 2007, 323-32

·    Solutions Manual for “Microeconomic Theory” by Mas-Colell, Whinston, and Green , 1996, with Chiaki Hara and Steve Tadelis, Oxford University Press

Working Papers

Selected Invited Lectures

· Keynote Speaker, Southern California Symposium on Network and Game Theory, 2012

· Semi-Plenary Speaker, 4th World Congress of the Game Theory Society, Istanbul, 2012

· Lecturer, Summer Schools in Economic Theory at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem, 2007 and 2012

· Invited Speaker, North American Summer Meetings of the Econometric Society (Evanston 2012), Latin American Meetings of the Econometric Society (Rio de Janeiro 2008), 9th World Congress of the Econometric Society (London 2005)

Professional Service

· Journal of Economic Theory, Associate Editor, 2013-present

· Review of Economic Studies, Foreign Editor, 2010-present

· National Science Foundation Economics Panel, 2008-2010

· Program Committee, Bay Algorithmic Game Theory Symposia, BAGT1-BAGT4, 2006-2009

· B.E. Journals in Theoretical Economics, Editor, 1999-2005

· American Economic Review, Editorial Board, 2002-2005

· RAND Journal of Economics, Associate Editor, 1998-2006

· Director, Stanford Institute for Theoretical Economics, 2003-2005

· Program Committee, North American Meetings of the Econometric Society, Winter 2002, Winter 2004, Summer 2004; 8th World Congress of the Econometric Society (August 2000); ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce (2003, 2008, 2012), Theoretical Aspects of Rationality and Knowledge IX (2003)

· Segment Organizer, Stanford Institute for Theoretical Economics (2000, 2001, 2002, 2004); Workshop on Multiparty Contracting, European Summer Symposium in Economic Theory, Gerzensee, July 2000

· Director of Graduate Studies, Economics Department, 2005-2011

· Stanford University Committee on Libraries, 2004-2007

· Chair of Graduate Admissions, Economics Department, Stanford University, 2004-2005

Languages: Bilingual Russian - English, fluent in Ukrainian, basic knowledge of French 

Last Modified: May 9, 2014