

Social and Economic Networks ¹

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Contents

Preface	11
1 Introduction	17
1.1 Why Model Networks?	17
1.2 A Set of Examples:	18
1.2.1 Florentine Marriages	18
1.2.2 Friendships Among High School Students	21
1.2.3 Random Graphs and Networks	24
1.2.4 The Symmetric Connections Model	32
1.3 Exercises	36
2 Representing and Measuring Networks	39
2.1 Representing Networks	39
2.1.1 Nodes and Players	39
2.1.2 Graphs and Networks	40
2.1.3 Paths and Cycles	43
2.1.4 Directed Paths, Walks, and Cycles	45
2.1.5 Components and Connected subgraphs	47
2.1.6 Trees, Stars, Circles, and Complete Networks	49
2.1.7 Neighborhood	51
2.1.8 Degree and Network Density	52
2.2 Some Summary Statistics and Characteristics of Networks	53
2.2.1 Degree Distributions	53
2.2.2 Diameter and Average Path Length	55
2.2.3 Cliquishness, Cohesiveness, and Clustering	57
2.2.4 Centrality	62
2.3 Appendix: Some Basic Graph Theory	70

2.3.1	Hall's theorem and Bipartite Graphs	70
2.3.2	Set Coverings and Independent Sets	71
2.3.3	Colorings	73
2.3.4	Eulerian Tours and Hamilton Cycles	74
2.4	Appendix: Eigenvectors and Eigenvalues	77
2.4.1	Diagonal Decompositions	79
2.5	Exercises	80
3	Empirical Background on Social and Economic Networks	83
3.1	The Prevalence of Social Networks	84
3.2	Observations about the Structure of Networks	85
3.2.1	Diameter and Small Worlds	85
3.2.2	Clustering	88
3.2.3	Degree Distributions	90
3.2.4	Correlations and Assortativity	97
3.2.5	Patterns of Clustering	99
3.2.6	Homophily	100
3.2.7	The Strength of Weak Ties	102
3.2.8	Structural Holes	103
3.2.9	Social Capital	104
3.2.10	Diffusion	104
4	Random Graph-Based Models of Networks	109
4.1	Static Random-Graph Models of Random Networks	111
4.1.1	Poisson and Related Random Network Models	111
4.1.2	"Small World" Networks	112
4.1.3	Markov Graphs and p^* networks	115
4.1.4	The Configuration Model	117
4.1.5	An Expected Degree Model	122
4.1.6	Some Thoughts about Static Random Network Models	123
4.2	Properties of Random Networks	123
4.2.1	The Distribution of the Degree of a Neighboring Node	124
4.2.2	Thresholds and Phase Transitions	127
4.2.3	Connectedness	133
4.2.4	Giant Components	139
4.2.5	Size of the Giant Component in Poisson Random Networks	139

4.2.6	Giant Components in the Configuration Model	141
4.2.7	Diameter Estimation	145
4.3	An Application: Contagion and Diffusion	148
4.3.1	Distribution of Component Sizes*	151
4.4	Exercises	154
4.5	Appendix: Useful Facts, Tools, and Theorems	157
4.5.1	Sums of Series	157
4.5.2	e and Stirling's Formula	158
4.5.3	Chebyshev's Inequality and the Law of Large Numbers	158
4.5.4	The Binomial Distribution	159
4.5.5	Stochastic Dominance and Mean-Preserving Spreads	160
4.5.6	Domination	162
4.5.7	Association	162
4.5.8	Markov Chains	163
4.5.9	Generating Functions	165
5	Growing Random Networks	169
5.1	Uniform Randomness: an Exponential Degree Distribution	171
5.1.1	Mean-Field Approximations	173
5.1.2	Continuous Time Approximations of Degree Distributions	175
5.2	Preferential Attachment	176
5.3	Hybrid Models	181
5.3.1	Mean-Field Analyses of Growing Network Processes	183
5.3.2	Mixing Random and Preferential Attachment	183
5.3.3	Simulations as a Check on the Degree Distribution	184
5.3.4	Fitting Hybrid Degree Distributions to Data	186
5.4	Small Worlds, Clustering, and Assortativity	189
5.4.1	Diameter	189
5.4.2	Positive Assortativity and Degree Correlation	191
5.4.3	Clustering in Growing Random Networks	193
5.4.4	A Meetings-Based Network Formation Model	194
5.4.5	Clustering	196
5.5	Exercises	200

6	Strategic Network Formation	205
6.1	Pairwise Stability	207
6.2	Efficient Networks	210
6.2.1	Efficiency	210
6.2.2	Pareto Efficiency	210
6.3	Distance-Based Utility	212
6.3.1	Externalities	216
6.3.2	Growing Networks and Inefficiency	217
6.3.3	The Price of Anarchy and the Price of Stability	219
6.4	A Co-Author Model and Negative Externalities	222
6.5	Small Worlds in an Islands-Connections Model	225
6.5.1	The Islands-Connections Model	226
6.6	A General Tension Between Stability and Efficiency	230
6.6.1	Transfers: Taxing and Subsidizing Links	230
6.6.2	Component Balance	232
6.6.3	Equal Treatment of Equals	233
6.6.4	Incompatibility of Pairwise Stability and Efficiency	234
6.7	Exercises	237
7	Diffusion through Networks	243
7.1	Background: The Bass Model	245
7.2	Spread of Information and Disease	247
7.2.1	Percolation, Component Size, Immunity, and Diffusion	248
7.2.2	Breakdown, Attack and Failure of Networks, and Immunization	254
7.2.3	The SIR and SIS Models of Diffusion	256
7.2.4	The SIR Model	257
7.2.5	The SIS Model	258
7.2.6	Remarks on Models of Diffusion	271
7.3	Search and Navigation on Networks	273
7.3.1	Navigating Random Networks	273
7.3.2	Navigating Structured Networks: Taking Advantage of Homophily	279
7.3.3	Social Structure and Navigation Speed*	283
7.4	Exercises	289

8	Learning and Networks	293
8.1	Early Theory and Opinion Leaders	294
8.2	Bayesian and Observational Learning	295
8.3	Imitation and Social Influence Models: The DeGroot Model	299
8.3.1	Incorporating Media and Opinion Leaders	302
8.3.2	Convergence	302
8.3.3	Consensus in Beliefs	308
8.3.4	Consensus and Non-Constant Updating Rules	309
8.3.5	Social Influence	313
8.3.6	Segregation and Time to a Consensus*	320
8.3.7	When a Consensus is Correct: Wise Crowds	327
8.4	Exercises	333
9	Decisions, Behavior, and Games on Networks	339
9.1	Decisions and Social Interaction	340
9.1.1	A Markov Chain	341
9.1.2	Individual by Individual Updating	342
9.1.3	An Interaction Model with Network Structure	348
9.2	Graphical Games	354
9.2.1	Examples of Graphical Games	355
9.2.2	Equilibrium	356
9.3	Semi-Anonymous Graphical Games	360
9.3.1	Payoffs and Examples	360
9.3.2	Complements and Substitutes	362
9.3.3	Equilibria and Thresholds	363
9.3.4	Comparing Behavior as the Network is Varied	365
9.4	Randomly Chosen Neighbors and Network Games	368
9.4.1	Degree and Behavior	370
9.4.2	Changes in Networks and Changes in Behavior	374
9.5	Richer Action Spaces	377
9.5.1	A Local Public Goods Model	378
9.5.2	Quadratic Payoffs and Strategic Complementarities	383
9.6	Dynamic Behavior and Contagion	386
9.7	Multiple Equilibria and Diffusion in Network Games*	392
9.7.1	Best Response Dynamics and Equilibria	392

9.7.2	Stability	395
9.7.3	Equilibrium Behavior and Changes in the Environment	397
9.8	Computing Equilibria*	400
9.9	Exercises	405
9.10	Appendix: A Primer on Non-cooperative Game Theory	412
9.10.1	Games in Normal Form	412
9.10.2	Dominant Strategies	414
9.10.3	Nash Equilibrium	415
9.10.4	Randomization and Mixed Strategies	419
9.10.5	Sequentiality, Extensive-Form Games and Backward Induction	422
9.10.6	Exercises on Games	426
10	Networked Markets	431
10.1	The Social Embeddedness of Markets and Exchange	432
10.1.1	The Use of Job-Contacts in Labor Markets	432
10.1.2	The Features of some Networked Markets	433
10.1.3	Which Markets Should be Networked?	437
10.2	Networks in Labor Markets	440
10.2.1	Strong and Weak Ties	440
10.2.2	A Networked Model of Employment	442
10.2.3	Duration Dependence	454
10.2.4	Education and Drop-Out Decisions	456
10.2.5	A Labor Market in a Homophilous Network	458
10.2.6	Evidence and Effects of Networked Labor Markets	462
10.3	Models of Networked Markets	464
10.3.1	Exchange Theory	465
10.3.2	Bilateral Trading Models	468
10.3.3	Price Dispersion on Networks	476
10.3.4	Collaboration Networks Among Firms	479
10.4	Some Concluding Remarks	481
10.5	Exercises	482
11	Game-Theoretic Modeling of Network Formation	487
11.1	Defining Stability and Equilibrium	488
11.1.1	An Extensive Form Game of Network Formation	488
11.1.2	A Simultaneous Link-Announcement Game	489

11.1.3	Pairwise Nash Stability	492
11.1.4	Strong Stability	493
11.2	The Existence of Stable Networks	496
11.2.1	Improving Paths, Dynamics, and Cycles	496
11.2.2	The Existence of Strongly Stable Networks	502
11.3	Directed Networks	503
11.3.1	Two-Way Flow	504
11.3.2	Distance-Based Utility	504
11.3.3	One-Way Flow	506
11.4	Stochastic Strategic Models of Network Formation	510
11.4.1	Random Improving Paths and Stochastic Stability*	512
11.4.2	Stochastically Stable Networks*	515
11.4.3	Stochastic Stability Coupled with Behavior	519
11.5	Farsighted Network Formation	520
11.6	Transfers and Network Formation	524
11.6.1	Forming Network Relationships and Bargaining	525
11.6.2	A Network Formation Game with Transfers	527
11.7	Weighted Network Formation	529
11.8	Agent-Based Modeling	533
11.9	Exercises	533
12	Allocation Rules, Networks, and Cooperative Games	539
12.1	Cooperative Game Theory	540
12.1.1	Transferable Utility (TU) Cooperative Games	541
12.1.2	Allocating the Value	542
12.1.3	The Shapley Value	543
12.1.4	The Core	544
12.2	Communication Games	545
12.2.1	The Myerson Value	547
12.3	Networks and Allocation Rules	549
12.3.1	Value Functions	549
12.3.2	Allocation Rules	550
12.3.3	Some Properties of Allocation Rules	551
12.3.4	Egalitarian Allocation Rules	551
12.3.5	The Myerson Value in Network Settings	553

12.3.6	Equal Bargaining Power, Fairness, and the Myerson Value . . .	553
12.3.7	Pairwise Stable Networks under the Myerson Value	555
12.4	Allocations Rules when Networks are Formed	556
12.4.1	Defining Allocation Rules from Network Formation Possibilities	560
12.4.2	The Core in Network Settings	563
12.5	Concluding Remarks	564
12.6	Exercises	564
13	Observing and Measuring Social Interaction	569
13.1	Specification and Identification	570
13.1.1	Specification and Omitted Variables	570
13.1.2	The Reflection Problem and Identification	574
13.1.3	Laboratory and Field Experiments	579
13.2	Community Structures, Block Models, and Latent Spaces	581
13.2.1	Communities and Blocks	582
13.2.2	Methods for Identifying Community Structures	584
13.2.3	Stochastic Block Models and Communities	594
13.2.4	Maximum-Likelihood Estimation of Communities	596
13.2.5	Latent Space Estimation	599
13.3	Exercises	600
14	Afterword	603
	Bibliography	605

Preface

This book provides an overview and synthesis of models and techniques for analyzing social and economic networks. This is meant to serve both as a resource for researchers and a text on the subject for graduate students. The focus is primarily on the modeling of and theory behind the structure, formation, and implications of social networks. Statistical and experimental analyses of networks are also discussed throughout, especially when they help set the stage for issues to be investigated. The main emphasis is on providing a foundation for analyzing and understanding social and economic networks.

The organization of the book can be split into four main parts. The first part introduces network analysis and provides some background on what is known about various networks, how they are measured and useful ways of representing them. The second part presents some of the models that have been used to understand how networks are formed. This draws from two very different perspectives: random graph models, where there is some stochastic process which governs the development of the links in a network, as well as strategic models of network formation, where the development of links is based on costs and benefits and game theoretic techniques are used. These approaches to modeling provide different insights into networks, how they are formed, and why they exhibit certain characteristics. The third main part of the book looks at the implications of network structure. Much of the interest in networks has to do with the fact that their structure is an important determinant of how societies and economies function. This part examines how network models are used to predict the spread of disease, the dissemination of information, the choice of behavior by people, and how markets function. The final part of the book covers empirical analyses of networks and methods of identifying social interaction.

A specific outline of the grouping by chapters is as follows:

- Part I: Some Background and the Fundamentals of Network Analysis

- Introduction (Chapter 1)

- Representing and measuring networks (Chapter 2)
- Empirical Background on Social and Economic Networks (Chapter 3)
- Part II: Models of Network Formation
 - Modeling network formation through random graph models, (Chapters 4 and 5),
 - Modeling network formation through strategic models, (Chapter 6),
- Part III: Implications of Network Structure
 - How information, diseases, and behaviors propagate through networks, (Chapters 7, 8, and 9),
 - How network structure impacts behavior (Chapter 9),
 - Analysis of some networked markets (Chapter 10),
- Part IV: Methods, Tools, and Empirical Analyses
 - Game theoretic foundations of network formation, (Chapter 11)
 - The allocation of productive value and utility through a network (Chapter 12).
 - Observing and Measuring Social Interaction through Data and Experiments and Community Structures (Chapter 13).

Although this represents a categorization of the chapters by subject, the relationship between the chapters is not entirely linear. I have intermingled some subjects to tie different approaches together, and the chapters will refer to each other. Also, there is a progression in the book with some of the more technically demanding chapters coming later, as well as those that draw on concepts from earlier chapters.

The modeling of networks requires some mathematical background, but I have made the book as self-contained as possible. I do not presume any knowledge beyond some familiarity with linear algebra (vectors and matrices), calculus, and some familiarity with probability and statistics. The discussions employing graph theory and game theory are self-contained and there are appendices with introductions to some of the topics, including various useful results from graph theory, math, game theory and

probability theory. There are some sections and exercises that are more mathematical in nature, and those are marked with an *.

There are several reasons for writing this book. First, and foremost, networks of relationships play central roles in a wide variety of social, economic, and political interactions. For example, many, if not most, markets function not as centralized and anonymous institutions, but rather involve a variety of bilateral exchanges or contracts. As a case in point, most jobs are filled by people who were informed about the job through a social contact. This fact has consequences for patterns of employment, inequality in wages across groups, and social mobility. As such, understanding social network structure and how it influences human interaction is not only important to science (and the social sciences in particular), it is essential. Second, the topic is timely for two reasons. One is that recent technological advances have made information networks much more prominent (e.g., the world wide web), and people are more conscious of the role of networks in their lives. Another is that the formal modeling of networks has now reached a maturity across fields that permits a book-length treatment devoted to it. Finally, the inter- and multi-disciplinary nature of research on networks means that knowledge is quite diffuse, and there is much to be gained by collecting aspects of it from different fields in a unified treatment. Substantial research on networks has been conducted in sociology, economics, physics, mathematics, and computer science, and these disciplines take different approaches and ask varied questions.¹ This makes it important to bridge the literatures and produce a text that collects and synthesizes different modeling approaches and techniques and makes them all available to researchers from any discipline who are interested in the study of networks.

At the end of each chapter in this book you will find “exercises.” The exercises here are meant to serve several purposes. They serve the usual purpose of problems in a textbook: that is, to help ensure that students have a chance to work with concepts and more fully familiarize themselves with the ideas presented in a given chapter; and thus can be made part of a course material. And, of course, the interested researcher can work the exercises as well. But beyond this, the exercises also introduce *new* material. I have used the exercises to introduce new concepts and material that is not

¹Social network analysis is a central and well-developed area of study in sociology, with societies, journals, conferences and decades of research devoted to it. With occasional overlap, a literature on graph theory has matured in mathematics over the same period. While the literature on networks has been thriving in sociology for over five decades, it has emerged in economics primarily over the last ten to fifteen years. Its explosion in computer science and statistical physics has been rapid and mostly during the past decade.

covered in the text. These are meant to be closely related to material in the text, but complementary to it. These are often ideas that I feel are important enough to include here, but for one reason or another did not fit easily with the main thread of a chapter without making it longer than I desired or taking us on a tangent. This means that researchers consulting this book as a reference should not ignore the exercises, and may in many instances actually find what they are looking for in exercises.²

As with any such undertaking, there are many acknowledgements due, and they do not adequately represent the scope and depth of the help received. This project would not have been possible without financial support from the Center for Advanced Studies in the Behavioral Sciences, the Guggenheim Foundation, and the Lee Center for Advanced Networking, as well as the NSF under grants SES-0316493 and SES-0647867. I began this project while I was at the California Institute of Technology and concluded it while at Stanford University, and their support is gratefully acknowledged. In terms of the content of this monograph, I have been deeply influenced by a number of collaborators. First and foremost, my initial interest in this subject arose through conversations and subsequent research with Asher Wolinsky. I have continued to learn about networks and enjoy the interaction with a group of co-authors (in chronological order): Alison Watts, Bhaskar Dutta, Anne van den Nouweland, Toni Calvó-Armengol, Francis Bloch, Gary Charness, Alan Kirman, Jernej Copic, Brian Rogers, Dunia Lopez-Pintado, Leeat Yariv, Andrea Galeotti, Sanjeev Goyal, Fernando Vega-Redondo, Ben Golub, Sergio Currarini, and Paolo Pin. Their collaboration and friendship is greatly appreciated. Although not co-authors on network-related projects, Salvador Barbera, Darrell Duffie and Hugo Sonnenschein have been great mentors (and friends) and profoundly shaped my approach and writing. I thank Lada Adamic, Marika Cabral, Toni Calvó-Armengol, Jon Eguia, Marcel Fafchamps, Ben Golub, Carlos Lever, Laurent Mathevet, and Tim Sullivan for extensive comments on earlier drafts. For all of the emotional support and enthusiasm needed to keep such a project afloat, I owe profound thanks to my wife, Sara, my daughters, Emily and Lisa, and to my parents. Special thanks are due to Sara, whose encouragement through the persistent asking of the question “Did you get to work on your book today?” always kept me pointed in the right direction, and whose juggling of many tasks allowed me to answer “yes” more often than “no.”

²This is obviously not the first text to do this, as one sees important results appearing as exercises in many mathematical texts. The usefulness of this technique was made obvious to me through the superb text on axiomatic social choice by Hervé Moulin [471].

Matthew O. Jackson
Stanford University, February 2008

Chapter 1

Introduction

This chapter provides an introduction to the analysis of networks through the presentation of several examples of research. This provides not only some idea of why the subject is interesting, but also of the range of networks studied, approaches taken and methods used.

1.1 Why Model Networks?

Social networks permeate our social and economic lives. They play a central role in the transmission of information about job opportunities, and are critical to the trade of many goods and services. They are the basis of the provision of mutual insurance in developing countries. Social networks are also important in determining how diseases spread, which products we buy, which languages we speak, how we vote, as well as whether or not we decide to become criminals, how much education we obtain, and our likelihood of succeeding professionally. The countless ways in which network structures affect our well-being make it critical to understand: (i) how social network structures impact behavior, and (ii) which network structures are likely to emerge in a society. The purpose of this monograph is to provide a framework for an analysis of social networks, with an eye on these two questions.

As the modeling of networks comes from varied fields and employs a variety of different techniques, before jumping into formal definitions and models, it is useful to start with a few examples that help give some impression of what social networks are and how they have been modeled. The following examples illustrate widely different perspectives, issues, and approaches; previewing some of the breadth of the range of

topics to follow.

1.2 A Set of Examples:

The first example is a detailed look at the role of social networks in the rise of the Medici.

1.2.1 Florentine Marriages

The Medici have been called the “godfathers of the Renaissance.” Their accumulation of power in the early fifteenth century in Florence, was orchestrated by Cosimo de’ Medici despite the fact that his family started with less wealth and political clout than other families in the oligarchy that ruled Florence at the time. Cosimo consolidated political and economic power by leveraging the central position of the Medici in networks of family inter-marriages, economic relationships, and political patronage. His understanding of and fortuitous position in these social networks enabled him to build and control an early forerunner to a political party, while other important families of the time floundered in response.¹

Padgett and Ansell [493] provide powerful evidence for this by documenting the network of marriages between some key families in Florence in the 1430’s. The following figure provides the links between the key families in Florence at that time, where a link represents a marriage between members of the two linked families.²

As mentioned above, during this time period the Medici (with Cosimo de’ Medici playing the key role) rose in power and largely consolidated control of the business and politics of Florence. Previously Florence had been ruled by an oligarchy of elite families. If one examines wealth and political clout, however, the Medici did not stand out at this point and so one has to look at the structure of social relationships to understand why it was the Medici who rose in power. For instance, the Strozzi had

¹See Kent [369] and Padgett and Ansell [493] for detailed analyses, as well as more discussion of this example.

²The data here were originally collected by Kent [369], but were first coded by Padgett and Ansell [493], who discuss the network relationships in more detail. The analysis provided here is just a teaser that offers a glimpse of the importance of the network structure. The interested reader should consult Padgett and Ansell [493] for a much richer analysis.




Figure 1.1: 15th Century Florentine Marriages Data from Padgett and Ansell [493] (drawn using UCINET)

both greater wealth and more seats in the local legislature, and yet the Medici rose to eclipse them. The key to understanding this, as Padgett and Ansell [493] detail, can be seen in the network structure.

If we do a rough calculation of importance in the network, simply by counting how many families a given family is linked to through marriages, then the Medici do come out on top. However, they only edge out the next highest families, the Strozzi and the Guadagni, by a ratio of 3 to 2. While this is suggestive, it is not so dramatic as to be telling. We need to look a bit closer at the network structure to get a better handle on a key to the success of the Medici. In particular, the following measure of betweenness is illuminating.

Let $P(ij)$ denote the number of shortest paths connecting family i to family j .³ Let $P_k(ij)$ denote the number of these paths that family k lies on. For instance, the shortest path between the Barbadori and Guadagni has three links in it. There are

³Formal definitions of path and some other terms used in this chapter appear in Chapter 2. The ideas should generally be clear, but the unsure reader can skip forward if they wish. Paths represent the obvious thing: a series of links connecting one node to another.

two such paths: Barbadori - Medici - Albizzi - Guadagni, and Barbadori - Medici - Tournabouni - Guadagni. If we set $i = \text{Barbadori}$ and $j = \text{Guadagni}$, then $P(ij) = 2$. As the Medici lie on both paths, $P_k(ij) = 2$ when we set $k = \text{Medici}$, and $i = \text{Barbadori}$ and $j = \text{Guadagni}$. In contrast this number is 0 if we set $k = \text{Strozzi}$, and is 1 if we set $k = \text{Albizzi}$. Thus, in a sense, the Medici are the key family in connecting the Barbadori to the Guadagni.

In order to get a fuller feel for how central a family is, we can look at an average of this betweenness calculation. We can ask for each pair of other families, what fraction of the total number of shortest paths between the two the given family lies on. This would be 1 if we are looking at the fraction of the shortest paths the Medici lie on between the Barbadori and Guadagni, and $1/2$ if we examine the corresponding fraction that the Albizzi lie on. Averaging across all pairs of other families gives us a sort of betweenness or power measure (due to Freeman [239]) for a given family. In particular, we can calculate

$$\sum_{ij:i \neq j, k \notin \{i,j\}} \frac{P_k(ij)/P(ij)}{(n-1)(n-2)/2} \quad (1.1)$$

for each family k , where we set $\frac{P_k(ij)}{P(ij)} = 0$ if there are no paths connecting i and j , and the denominator captures that a given family could lie on paths between up to $(n-1)(n-2)/2$ pairs of other families. This measure of betweenness for the Medici is .522. That means that if we look at all the shortest paths between various families (other than the Medici) in this network, the Medici lie on over half of them! In contrast, a similar calculation for the Strozzi comes out at .103, or just over ten percent. The second highest family in terms of betweenness after the Medici is the Guadagni with a betweenness of .255. To the extent that marriage relationships were keys to communicating information, brokering business deals, and reaching political decisions, the Medici were much better positioned than other families, at least according to this notion of betweenness.⁴ While aided by circumstance (for instance, fiscal problems resulting from wars), it was the Medici and not some other family that ended up consolidating power. As Padgett and Ansell [493] put it, “Medician political control was produced by network disjunctures within the elite, which the Medici alone spanned.”

⁴The calculations here are conducted on a subset of key families (a data set from Wasserman and Faust [617]), rather than the entire data set which consists of hundreds of families. As such, the numbers differ slightly from those reported in footnote 31 of Padgett and Ansell [493]. Padgett and Ansell also find similar differences in centrality between the Medici and other families in terms of a network of business ties.

This analysis shows that network structure can provide important insights beyond those found in other political and economic characteristics. The example also illustrates that the network structure is important beyond a simple count of how many social ties each member has, and suggests that different measures of betweenness or centrality will capture different aspects of network structure.

This example also suggests a series of other questions that we will be addressing throughout this book. For instance, was it simply by chance that the Medici came to have such a special position in the network or was it by choice and careful planning? As Padgett and Ansell [493] say (footnote 13), “The modern reader may need reminding that all of the elite marriages recorded here were arranged by patriarchs (or their equivalents) in the two families. Intra-elite marriages were conceived of partially in political alliance terms.” With this perspective in mind we then might ask why other families did not form more ties, or try to circumvent the central position of the Medici. We could also ask whether the resulting network was optimal from a variety of perspectives: was it optimal from the Medici’s perspective, was it optimal from the oligarchs’ perspective, and was it optimal for the functioning of local politics and the economy of 15th century Florence? These types of questions are ones that we can begin to answer through explicit models of the costs and benefits of networks, as well as models of how networks form.

1.2.2 Friendships Among High School Students

The next example comes from the The National Longitudinal Adolescent Health Data Set, known as “Add Health.”⁵ These data provide detailed social network information for over ninety thousand high school students from U.S. high schools interviewed during the mid 1990s; together with various data on the students’ socio-economic background, behaviors and opinions. The data provide a number of insights and illustrate some features of networks that are discussed in more detail in the coming chapters.

Figure 1.2 shows a network of romantic relationships as found through surveys of

⁵Add Health is a program project designed by J. Richard Udry, Peter S. Bearman, and Kathleen Mullan Harris, and funded by a grant P01-HD31921 from the National Institute of Child Health and Human Development, with cooperative funding from 17 other agencies. Special acknowledgment is due Ronald R. Rindfuss and Barbara Entwisle for assistance in the original design. Persons interested in obtaining data files from Add Health should contact Add Health, Carolina Population Center, 123 W. Franklin Street, Chapel Hill, NC 27516-2524 (addhealth@unc.edu). The network data that I present in this example were extracted by James Moody from the Add Health data set.

students in one of the high schools in the study. The students were asked to list the romantic liaisons that they had during the six months previous to the survey.




Figure 1.2: A Figure from Bearman, Moody and Stovel [47] based the Add Health Data Set. A Link Denotes a Romantic Relationship, and the Numbers by Some Components Indicate How Many Such Components Appear.

There are several things to remark about Figure 1.2. The network is nearly a *bipartite* network, meaning that the nodes can be divide into two groups, male and female, so that links only lie between groups (with a few exceptions). Despite its nearly bipartite nature, the distribution of the degrees of the nodes (number of links each node has) turns out to closely match a network where links are formed uniformly at random (for details on this see Section 3.2.3), and we see a number of features of large random networks. For example, we see a “giant component,” where over one hundred of the students are connected via sequences of links in the network. The next largest component (maximal set of students who are each linked to one another via sequences of links) only has ten students in it. This component structure has important implications for the diffusion of disease, information, and behaviors, as discussed in detail in Chapters 7, 8, and 9. Next, note that the network is quite “tree-like” in that there are very few loops or cycles in the network. There is a very large cycle visible in

the giant component, and then a couple of smaller cycles present, but very few overall. The absence of many cycles means that as one walks along the links of the network until hitting a dead-end, most of the nodes that are met are new ones that have not been encountered before. This is important in navigation of networks. This feature is found in many random networks in cases where there are enough links so that a giant component is present, but there are also few enough links so that the network is not fully connected. This contrasts with what we see in the denser friendship network pictured in Figure 1.3, where there are many cycles, and a shorter distance between nodes.

The network pictured in Figure 1.3 is also from the Add Health data set and connects a population of high school students.⁶ Here the nodes are coded by their race rather than sex, and the relationships are friendships rather than romantic relationships. This is a much denser network than the romance network, and also exhibits some other features of interest.

A strong feature present in Figure 1.3 is what is known as “homophily,” a term due to Lazarsfeld and Merton [406]. That is, there is a bias in friendships towards similar individuals; in this case the homophily concerns the race of the individuals. This bias is above what one would expect due to the makeup of the population. In this school, 52 percent of the students are white and yet 86 percent of whites’ friendships are with other whites. Similarly, 38 percent of the students are black and yet 85 percent of blacks’ friendships are with other blacks. Hispanics are more integrated in this school, comprising 5 percent of the population, but having only 2 percent of their friendships with Hispanics.⁷ If friendships were formed without race being a factor, then whites would have roughly 52 percent of their friendships with other whites rather than 85 percent.⁸ This bias is referred to as “inbreeding homophily” and has strong consequences. As we can see in the figure, it means that the students end up somewhat

⁶A link indicates that at least one of the two students named the other as a friend in the survey. Not all friendships were reported by both students. For more detailed discussion of these particular data see Currarini, Jackson and Pin [173].

⁷The Hispanics in this school are exceptional compared to what is generally observed in the larger data set of 84 high schools. Most racial groups (including Hispanics in many of the other schools) tend to have a greater percentage of own-race friendships than the percentage their race in the population, regardless of their fraction of the population. See Currarini, Jackson and Pin [173] for details.

⁸There are a variety of possible reasons for the patterns observed, as it could be that race is correlated with other factors that affect friendship opportunities. For more discussion of this with respect to these data see Moody [460] and Currarini, Jackson and Pin [173]. The main point here is that the resulting network has clear patterns and those will have consequences.



Figure 1.3: “Add Health” Friendships among High School Students Coded by Race: Hispanic=Black, White=White, Black=Grey, Asian and Other = Light Grey.

segregated by race, and this will impact the spread of information, learning, and the speed with which things propagate through the network; themes that are explored in detail in what follows.

1.2.3 Random Graphs and Networks

The examples of Florentine marriages and high school friendships suggest the need for models of how and why networks form as they do. The last two examples in this chapter illustrate two complementary approaches to modeling network formation.

The next example of network analysis comes from the graph-theoretic branch of

mathematics, and has recently been extended in various directions by the computer science, statistical physics, and economics literatures (as will be examined in some of the following chapters). This is perhaps the most basic model of network formation that one could imagine: it simply supposes that a completely random process is responsible for the formation of the links in a network. The properties of such random networks provide some insight into the properties that some social and economic networks have. Some of the properties that have been extensively studied are how links are distributed across different nodes, how connected the network is in terms of being able to find paths from one node to another, what the average and maximal path lengths are, how many isolated nodes there are, and so forth. Such random networks will serve as a very useful benchmark against which we can contrast observed networks; as such comparisons help identify which elements of social structure are not the result of mere randomness, but must be traced to other factors.

Erdős and Rényi [213], [214], [215] provided seminal studies of purely random networks.⁹ To describe one of the key models, fix a set of n nodes. Each link is formed with a given probability p , and the formation is independent across links.¹⁰ Let us examine this model in some detail, as it has an intuitive structure and has been a springboard for many recent models.

Consider a set of nodes $N = \{1, \dots, n\}$, and let a link between any two nodes, i and j , be formed with probability p , where $0 < p < 1$. The formation of links is independent. This is a binomial model of link formation, which gives rise to a manageable set of calculations regarding the resulting network structure.¹¹ For instance, if $n = 3$, then a complete network forms with probability p^3 , any given network with two links (there are three such networks) forms with probability $p^2(1 - p)$, any given network with one link forms with probability $p(1 - p)^2$, and the empty network that has no links forms with probability $(1 - p)^3$. More generally, any given network that has m

⁹See also Solomonoff and Rapoport [578] and Rapoport [526], [527], [528], for related predecessors.

¹⁰Two closely related models that they explored are as follows. In one of the alternative models, a precise number M of links is formed out of the $n(n - 1)/2$ possible links. Each different graph with M links has an equal probability of being selected. In the second alternative model, the set of all possible networks on the n nodes is considered and one is randomly picked uniformly at random. This can also be done according to some other probability distribution. While these models are clearly different, they turn out to have many properties in common. Note that the last model nests the other two (and any other random graph model on a fixed set of nodes) if one chooses the right probability distributions over all networks.

¹¹See Section 4.5.4 for more background on the binomial distribution.

links on n nodes has a probability of

$$p^m(1-p)^{\frac{n(n-1)}{2}-m} \quad (1.2)$$

of forming under this process.¹²

We can calculate some statistics that describe the network. For instance, we can find the degree distribution fairly easily. The degree of a node is the number of links that the node has. The degree distribution of a random network describes the probability that any given node will have a degree (number of links) of d .¹³ The probability that any given node i has exactly d links is

$$\binom{n-1}{d} p^d (1-p)^{n-1-d}. \quad (1.3)$$

Note that even though links are formed independently, there will be some correlation in the degrees of various nodes, which will affect the distribution of nodes that have a given degree. For instance, if $n = 2$, then it must be that both nodes have the same degree: the network either consists of two nodes of degree 0, or two nodes of degree 1. As n becomes large, however, the correlation of degree between any two nodes vanishes, as the possible link between them is only one out of the $n - 1$ that each might have. Thus, as n becomes large, the fraction of nodes that have d links will approach the expression in (1.3). For large n and small p , this binomial expression is approximated by a Poisson distribution, so that the fraction of nodes that have d links is approximately¹⁴

$$\frac{e^{-(n-1)p} ((n-1)p)^d}{d!}. \quad (1.4)$$

¹²Note here that there is a distinction between the probability of some specific network forming and some network architecture forming. With four nodes the chance that a network forms with a link between nodes 1 and 2 and a link between nodes 2 and 3 is $p^2(1-p)^4$. However, the chance that a network forms which contains two links involving three nodes is $12 p^2(1-p)^4$, as there are 12 different networks we could draw that have this same shape. The difference between these counts is whether we pay attention to the labels of the nodes in various positions.

¹³The degree distribution of a network is often given for an observed network, and thus is a frequency distribution. Here, when dealing with a random network, one can talk about the degree distribution before the network has actually formed, and so we refer to probabilities of nodes having given degrees, rather than observed frequencies of nodes with given degrees.

¹⁴To see this, note that for large n and small p , $(1-p)^{n-1-d}$ is roughly $(1-p)^{n-1}$. Then, we write $(1-p)^{n-1} = (1 - \frac{(n-1)p}{n-1})^{n-1}$ which, if $(n-1)p$ is either constant or shrinking (if we allow p to vary with n), is approximately $e^{-(n-1)p}$. Then for fixed d , large n , and small p , $\binom{n-1}{d}$ is roughly $\frac{(n-1)^d}{d!}$.




Figure 1.4: A Randomly Generated Network with Probability .02 on each Link

Given the approximation of the degree distribution by a Poisson distribution, the class of random graphs where each link is formed independently with an identical probability is often referred to as the class of *Poisson random networks*, and I will use this terminology in what follows.

To provide a better feeling for the structure of such networks, I generated a couple of Poisson random networks for different p 's. I chose $n = 50$ nodes as this produces a network that is easy to visualize. Let us start with an expected degree of 1 for each node. This is equivalent to setting p at roughly .02. Figure 1.4 pictures a network generated with these parameters.¹⁵ This network exhibits a number of features that are common to this range of p and n . First, we should expect some isolated nodes. Based on the approximation of a Poisson distribution (1.4) with $n = 50$ and $p = .02$, we should expect about 37.5 percent of the nodes to be isolated (i.e., have $d = 0$), which is roughly 18 or 19 nodes. There are 19 isolated nodes in the network, by chance. Figure 1.5 compares the realized frequency distribution of degrees with the Poisson approximation.

¹⁵The networks in Figures 1.4 and 1.6 were generated and drawn using the random network generator in UCINET [90]. The nodes are arranged to make the links as easy as possible to distinguish.




Figure 1.5: Frequency Distribution of a Randomly Generated Network and the Poisson Approximation for a Probability of .02 on each Link

The distributions match fairly closely. The network also has some other features that are common to random networks with p 's and n 's in this relative range. In graph theoretical terms, the network is a “forest,” or a collection of trees. That is, there are no cycles in the network (where a cycle is a sequence of links that lead from one node back to itself, as described in more detail in Section 2.1.3). The chance of there being a cycle is relatively low with such a small link probability. In addition, there are six components (maximal subnetworks such that every pair of nodes in the subnetwork is connected by a path or sequence of links) that involve more than one node. And one of the components is much larger than the others: involving 16 nodes, while the next largest component only has 5 nodes in it. As we shall discuss shortly, this is to be expected.

Next, let us start with the same number of nodes, but increase the probability of a link forming to $p = \log(50)/50 = .078$, which is roughly the threshold where isolated nodes should start to disappear. (This threshold is discussed in more detail in Chapter 4.) Indeed, based on the approximation of a Poisson distribution (1.4) with $n = 50$ and $p = .08$, we should expect about 2 percent of the nodes to be isolated (with degree 0), or roughly 1 node out of 50. This is exactly what we see in the realized network in Figure 1.6 (again, by chance). With the exception of the single isolated node, the rest of the network is connected into one component.

As shown in Figure 1.7, the realized frequency distribution of degrees is again similar to the Poisson approximation, although, as one should expect at this level of randomness, not a perfect match.

The degree distribution tells us a great deal about a network's structure. Let us examine this in more detail, as it provides a first illustration of the concept of a *phase transition*, where the structure of a random network changes as we change the formation process.

Consider what fraction of nodes are completely isolated; i.e., what fraction of nodes have degree $d = 0$? From (1.4) it follows that this is approximated by $e^{-(n-1)p}$ for large networks, provided the average degree $(n-1)p$ is not too large. To get a more precise expression, let us examine the threshold where this fraction is just such that we expect to have one isolated node on average. That is where $e^{-(n-1)p} = \frac{1}{n}$. Solving this yields $p(n-1) = \log(n)$, or right at the point where average degree $(n-1)p$ is $\log(n)$. Indeed, this is a threshold for a “phase transition,” as we shall see in Section




Figure 1.6: A Randomly Generated Network with Probability .08 of each Link

4.2.2. If the average degree is substantially above $\log(n)$, then probability of having any isolated nodes goes to 0, while if the average degree is substantially below $\log(n)$, then the probability of having at least some isolated nodes goes to 1. In fact, as we shall see in Theorem 4.2.1, this is the threshold such that if the average degree is significantly above this level then the network is path-connected with a probability converging to 1 as n grows (so that any node can be reached from any other via a path in the network), while below this level the network will consist of multiple components with a probability going to 1.

Other properties of random networks are examined in much more detail in Chapter 4. While it is clear that completely random networks are not always a good approximation for real social and economic networks, the analysis above (and in Chapter 4) shows us that much can be deduced in such models; and that there are some basic patterns and structures that we will see emerging more generally. As we build more realistic models, similar analyses can be conducted.




Figure 1.7: Frequency Distribution of a Randomly Generated Network and the Poisson Approximation for a Probability of .08 on each Link



Figure 1.8: The utilities to the players in a three-link four-player network in the symmetric connections model.

1.2.4 The Symmetric Connections Model

Although random network formation models give us some insight into the sorts of characteristics that networks might have, and exhibit some of the features that we see in the Add Health social network data, it does not provide as much insight into the Florentine marriage network. There, marriages were carefully arranged. The last example comes from the game-theoretic, economics literature and provides a basis for the analysis of networks that are formed when links are chosen by the agents in the network. Through this example, we can begin to look at the questions about which networks might be best for a society and which networks might arise if the players have discretion in choosing their links.

It is a simple model of social connections that was developed by Jackson and Wolinsky [345]. In this model, links represent social relationships, for instance friendships, between players. These relationships offer benefits in terms of favors, information, etc., and also involve some costs. Moreover, players also benefit from indirect relationships. A “friend of a friend” also results in some indirect benefits, although of a lesser value than the direct benefits that come from a “friend.” The same is true of “friends of a friend of a friend,” and so forth. The benefit deteriorates with the “distance” of the relationship. This is represented by a factor δ that lies between 0 and 1, which indicates the benefit from a direct relationship and is raised to higher powers for more distant relationships. For instance, in the network where player 1 is linked to 2, 2 is linked to 3, and 3 is linked to 4: player 1 gets a benefit of δ from the direct connection with player 2, an indirect benefit of δ^2 from the indirect connection with player 3, and an indirect benefit of δ^3 from the indirect connection with player 4. The payoffs to this four players in a three-link network is pictured in Figure 1.8.

For $\delta < 1$ this leads to a lower benefit from an indirect connection than a direct one. Players only pay costs, however, for maintaining their direct relationships.¹⁶

¹⁶In the most general version of the connections model the benefits and costs may be relation specific, and so are indexed by ij . One interesting variation is where the cost structure is specific

Given a network g ,¹⁷ the net utility or payoff $u_i(g)$ that player i receives from a network g is the sum of benefits that the player gets for his or her direct and indirect connections to other players less the cost of maintaining his or her links. In particular, it is

$$u_i(g) = \sum_{j \neq i: i \text{ and } j \text{ are path-connected in } g} \delta^{\ell_{ij}(g)} - d_i(g)c,$$

where $\ell_{ij}(g)$ is the number of links in the shortest path between i and j , $d_i(g)$ is the number of links that i has (i 's degree), and $c > 0$ is the cost for a player of maintaining a link.

The highly stylized nature of the connections model allows us to begin to answer questions regarding which networks are “best” (most “efficient”) from society’s point of view, as well as which networks are likely to form when self-interested players choose their own links.

Let us define a network to be *efficient* if it maximizes the total utility to all players in the society. That is, g is efficient if it maximizes $\sum_i u_i(g)$.¹⁸

It is clear that if costs are very low, it will be efficient to include all links in the network. In particular, if $c < \delta - \delta^2$, then adding a link between any two agents i and j will always increase total welfare. This follows because they are each getting at most δ^2 of value from having any sort of indirect connection between them, and since $\delta^2 < \delta - c$, the extra value of a direct connection between them increases their utilities (and might also increase, and cannot decrease, the utilities of other agents).

When the cost rises above this level, so that $c > \delta - \delta^2$ but c is not too high (see Exercise 1.3), it turns out that the unique efficient network structure is to have all players arranged in a “star” network. That is, there should be some central player who is connected to each other player, so that one player has $n - 1$ links and each of the other players has 1 link. The idea behind why a star among all players is the unique efficient structure in this middle cost range, is as follows. A star involves the minimum number of links needed to ensure that all pairs of players are path connected, and it has each player within two links of every other player. The intuition behind this dominating

to some geography, so that linking with a given player depends on their physical proximity. That variation has been studied by Johnson and Gilles [351] and is discussed in Exercise 6.13.

¹⁷For complete definitions, see Chapter 2. For now, all that is important is that this tells us which pairs of players are linked.

¹⁸This is just one of many possible measures of efficiency and societal welfare, which is a well-studied subject in philosophy and economics. How we measure efficiency has important consequences in network analysis and is discussed in more detail in Chapter 6.




Figure 1.9: The Gain in Total Utility from Changing a “Line” into a “Star”.

other structures is then easy to see. Suppose for instance we have a network with links between 1 and 2, 2 and 3, and 3 and 4. If we change the link between 3 and 4 to be one between 2 and 4, we end up with a star network. The star network has the same number of links as our starting network, and thus the same cost and payoffs from direct connections. However, now all agents are within two links of each other whereas before some of the indirect connections involved paths of length three. This is pictured in Figure 1.9.

As we shall see, this is the key to the set of efficient networks having a remarkably simple characterization: either costs are so low that it makes sense to add links, and then it makes sense to add all links, or costs are so high that no links make sense, or costs are in a middle range and the unique efficient architecture is a star network. This characterization of efficient networks being either stars, empty or complete, actually holds for a fairly general class of models where utilities depend on path length and decay with distance, as is shown in detail in Section 6.3.

We can now compare the efficient networks with those that arise if agents form links in a self-interested manner. To capture how agents will act, let us consider a simple equilibrium concept introduced in Jackson and Wolinsky [345]. This concept is called “pairwise stability” and involves checking two things about a network: first, no agent would raise his or her payoff by deleting some link that he or she are directly involved in; and second, no two agents would both benefit by adding a link between themselves. This stability notion captures the idea that links are bilateral relationships and require the consent of both individuals. If some individual would benefit by terminating some

relationship that he or she is involved in, then that link would be deleted; while if two individuals would each benefit by forming a new relationship, then that link would be added.

In the case where costs are very low $c < \delta - \delta^2$, as we have already argued, the direct benefit to the agents from adding or maintaining a link is positive, even if they are already indirectly connected. Thus, in that case the unique pairwise stable network will be the efficient one which is the complete network. The more interesting case comes when $c > \delta - \delta^2$, but c is not too high, so that the star is the efficient network.

If $\delta > c > \delta - \delta^2$, then a star network (that involves all agents) will be both pairwise stable and efficient. To see this we need only check that no player wants to delete a link, and no two agents both want to add a link. The marginal benefit to the center player from any given link already in the network is $\delta - c > 0$, and the marginal benefit to a peripheral player is $\delta + (n - 2)\delta^2 - c > 0$. Thus, neither player wants to delete a link. Adding a link between two peripheral players only shortens the distance between them from two links to one, and does not shorten any other paths - and since $c > \delta - \delta^2$ adding such a link would not benefit either of the players. While the star is pairwise stable, in this cost range so are some other networks. For example if $c < \delta - \delta^3$, then four players connected in a “circle” would also be pairwise stable. In fact, as we shall see in Section 6.3, many other (inefficient) networks can be pairwise stable.

If $c > \delta$, then the efficient (star) network will not be pairwise stable, as the center player gets only a marginal benefit of $\delta - c < 0$ from any of the links. This tells us that in this cost range there cannot exist any pairwise stable networks where there is some player who just has one link, as the other player involved in that link would benefit by severing it. For various values of $c > \delta$ there will exist nonempty pairwise stable networks, but they will not be star networks: as just argued, they must be such that each player has at least two links.

This model makes it clear that there will be situations where individual incentives are not aligned with overall societal benefits. While this connections model is highly stylized, it still captures some basic insights about the payoffs from networked relationships and it shows that we can model the incentives that underlie network formation and see when resulting networks are efficient.

This model also raises some interesting questions that we will examine further in the chapters that follow. How does the network that forms depend on the payoffs to the players for different networks? What are alternative ways of predicting which networks will form? What if players can bargain when they form links, so that the payoffs are

endogenous to the network formation process (as is true in many market and partnership applications)? How does the relationship between the efficient networks and those which form based on individual incentives depend on the underlying application and payoff structure?

1.3 Exercises

EXERCISE 1.1 *A Weighted Betweenness Measure*

Consider the following variation on the betweenness measure in (1.1). Any given shortest path between two families is weighted by inverse of the number of intermediate nodes on that path. For instance, the shortest path between the Ridolfi and Albizzi involves two links and the Medici are the only family that lies between them on that path. In contrast, between the Ridolfi and the Ginori the shortest path is three links and there are two families, the Medici and Albizzi, that lie between the Ridolfi and Ginori on that path.

More specifically, let ℓ_{ij} be the length of the shortest path between nodes i and j and let $W_k(ij) = P_k(ij)/(\ell_{ij} - 1)$, (setting $\ell_{ij} = \infty$ and $W_k(ij) = 0$ if i and j are not connected). Then the weighted betweenness measure for a given node k be defined by

$$WB_k = \sum_{ij:i \neq j, k \notin \{i,j\}} \frac{W_k(ij)/P(ij)}{(n-1)(n-2)/2}. \quad (1.5)$$

where we take the convention that $\frac{W_k(ij)}{P(ij)} = 0/0 = 0$ if there are no paths connecting i and j .

Show that

- $WB_k > 0$ if and only if k has more than one link in a network and some of k 's neighbors are not linked to each other,
- $WB_k = 1$ for the center node in a star network that includes all nodes (with $n \geq 3$), and
- $WB_k < 1$ unless k is the center node in a star network that contains all nodes.

Calculate this measure for the the network pictured in Figure 1.10 for nodes 4 and 5.

Contrast this measure with the betweenness measure in (1.1).




Figure 1.10: Differences in Betweenness measures.

EXERCISE 1.2 *Random networks*

Fix the probability of any given link forming in a Poisson random network to be p where $1 > p > 0$. Fix some arbitrary network g on k nodes. Now, consider a sequence of random networks indexed by the number of nodes n , as $n \rightarrow \infty$. Show that the probability that a copy of the k node network g is a subnetwork of the random network on the n nodes goes to 1 as n goes to infinity.

[Hint: partition the n nodes into as many separate groups of k nodes as possible (with some leftover nodes) and consider the subnetworks that end up forming on each of these groups. Using the expression in (1.2) and the independence of link formation, show that the probability that the none of these match the desired network goes to 0 as n grows.]

EXERCISE 1.3 *The Upper Bound for a Star to be Efficient*

Find the maximum level of cost in terms of δ and n , for which a star is an efficient network in the symmetric connections model.

EXERCISE 1.4 *The Connections Model with Low Decay**

Consider the symmetric connections model in a setting where $1 > \delta > c > 0$.

Show that if δ is close enough to 1, so that there is “low decay” and δ^{n-1} is nearly δ , then in every pairwise stable network every pair of players have some path between them and that there are at most $n - 1$ total links in the network.

In a case where δ is close enough to 1 so that any network that has $n - 1$ links and connects all agents is pairwise stable, what fraction of the pairwise stable networks are also efficient networks?

How does that fraction behave as n grows (adjusting δ to be high enough as n grows)?

EXERCISE 1.5 *Homophily and Balance Across Groups*

Consider a society of two groups, where the set N_1 comprises the members of group 1 and the set N_2 comprises the members of group 2, with cardinalities n_1 and n_2 , respectively. Suppose that $n_1 > n_2$. For an individual i , let d_i be i 's degree (total number of friends) and let s_i denote the number of friends that i has that are within own group. Let h_k denote a simple homophily index for group k , defined by $h_k = \frac{\sum_{i \in N_k} s_i}{\sum_{i \in N_k} d_i}$. Show that if h_1 and h_2 are both above 0 and below 1, and the average degree in group 1 is at least as high as the average degree in group 2, then $h_1 > h_2$. What are h_1 and h_2 in the case where friendships are formed in percentages that correspond to the relevant populations.