Displacement, Diversity, and Mobility: Career Impacts of Japanese American Internment

Jaime Arellano-Bover †

November 27, 2018

Abstract

One of the largest population displacement episodes in the U.S. took place in 1942, when over 110,000 persons of Japanese origin living on the West Coast were forcibly sent away to ten internment camps for one to three years. Having lost jobs and assets, after internment they had to reassess labor market and location choices. This paper studies the long-run career consequences of this episode for those affected. Combining information from Census data, camp records, and survey data I develop a predictor of a person’s future or past internment status based on Census observables. Using a difference-in-differences framework I find that internment had a positive average effect on earnings in the long run. This effect is robust to different control groups of non-interned Japanese and Chinese Americans. The evidence is consistent with information and skills exchange, possibly enabled by the camps’ economic diversity, followed by increased occupational and geographic mobility as likely mechanisms. I find no evidence of other potential drivers such as increased labor supply, or changes in cultural preferences. These findings provide evidence of labor market frictions preventing people from accessing their most productive occupations and locations, and shed light on the resilience of internees who overcame a very adverse initial shock.

JEL codes: J61, J62, N32, O15.

Keywords: Labor Mobility, Displacement, Diversity, Japanese American Internment, World War II

*I wish to thank Ran Abramitzky, Caroline M. Hoxby and Luigi Pistaferri for their thoughtful advice. Manuel Arellano, Barbara Biasi, Liran Einav, Joseph Ferrie, Nate Hilger, Gordon Leslie, Guido Martirena, Petra Moser, Santiago Perez, Nicola Pierri, Isaac Sorkin, Caio Waisman, seminar participants at Stanford University, the All-UC Economic History group, and the ASREC 17th Annual Conference provided very useful comments that have enriched this paper. This project benefited from the support of a Shultz Graduate Student Fellowship in Economic Policy through a grant to the Stanford Institute for Economic Policy Research, as well as a Summer Research Fellowship from the John M. Olin Program in Law and Economics at Stanford Law School. Their financial support is gratefully acknowledged.

†Stanford University. E-mail: jarebov@stanford.edu.
1 Introduction

In 1942 the U.S. government forcibly removed over 110,000 people of Japanese origin from their homes on the West Coast and sent them to ten internment camps in remote locations of the country, triggering one of the largest population movements of U.S. history. The communities that developed in these camps until their final closing in 1945 were completely new. Daily roles and activities changed, and individuals were surrounded by people from very different backgrounds than the ones they had encountered in their previous lives (Spicer et al., 1969). After leaving the camps and having lost previous jobs and assets back home, many families and individuals had to start from scratch and reassess career and location choices.

This paper seeks to study the long-run career impacts of this displacement episode for those affected. That is: several years after internment, how different were the earnings, occupations, and residential locations of former internees, relative to those they would have had if they had not been incarcerated? Studying this question provides an opportunity to learn about economic forces and mechanisms (recovery from economic loss and displacement, mobility, peer interactions) surrounding an episode of historical importance.

The answer to the above question is not obvious. On the one hand, internment constituted a huge negative shock. The contemporaneous costs for those affected were large, evident, and hard to quantify. Not only did internees lose their freedom of movement and civil rights. They also lost previous jobs, experienced detachment from the outside labor market, and were displaced to remote locations far away from their homes. In many occasions they were forced to sell their assets at “fire sale” prices before being taken away. In short, they experienced huge economic loss and personal hardship. All these circumstances suggest that, either from labor-market detachment or from the loss of personal wealth, the future labor market prospects of internees could have been affected in negative and persistent ways.

On the other hand, the pre-internment locations, jobs, and social exposure of Japanese Americans may not have been optimal from a labor market perspective. Family ties, community preferences, migration costs, and lack of information are all labor market frictions that may hinder individuals’ long-run outcomes through underexposure to locations and jobs where economic opportunities are best. Precisely due to the losses at home and to geographic displacement, many internees were forced to start from scratch after release, possibly inducing migration to areas and occupations where opportunities were greater.\footnote{Improved labor market outcomes in the aftermath of forced displacement has recently been documented in other settings. See Nakamura et al. (2016), Sarvimäki et al. (2018), or Deryugina et al. (2018).}

Making the most of a new start might have been enabled due to the economic and human capital diversity present in the camps and the resourcefulness of internees. In 1942
Japanese Americans were represented in all strands of society, from highly educated urban professionals, to small farm and business owners, and to rural laborers. In the camps, many experienced less economic and human capital segregation than in their former lives. Living arrangements in the camps and interactions with others, in very close proximity and for a prolonged period of time, could have enabled the exchange of information, skills, and opportunities. These could have been channeled through social exposure, or more formally by the numerous and popular internee-operated adult education programs (Su, 2011).

Understanding how and to what extent these circumstances affected internees’ prospects is valuable for two main reasons. First, the findings would shed additional light on our understanding of economic phenomena such as labor market detachment and the relevance of information and mobility costs in deterring workers from accessing the jobs in which they would be more productive. Second, it would give us a better understanding of the long-run consequences and responses to a very important episode in the history of the U.S. and of Japanese Americans in particular.

This paper proceeds in several steps. I first estimate the long-run average causal effect of internment on earnings using a difference-in-differences (DiD) framework. This approach compares outcomes of interned Japanese Americans before and after internment with outcomes of a comparable group of Asians living in the U.S. and not subject to internment. When choosing this control group, it is key to account for institutionalized discrimination towards Asians before WWII—especially in the West Coast—and its decline thereafter (Hilger, 2016). For this reason, my control group consists of a combination of West Coast Chinese and non-interned Japanese Americans (those who were living outside the West Coast in 1942). While West Coast Chinese Americans faced similarly severe pre-war racial discrimination, China was a U.S. ally and itself at war with Japan. Because Japanese Americans who did not live on the West Coast were fewer in number and far from areas considered important for the war in the Pacific, they were able to avoid the racially-motivated anti-Japanese drive that led to mass internment. Although limited by the amount of pre-WWII data, I provide some evidence indicating that these groups had similar incomes in 1940, and that they were on similar trajectories.

I combine data from different sources. I start from the 1940, 1950 and 1960 U.S. Censuses (Ruggles et al., 2015), which include information on income, race—Chinese or Japanese—and place of residence. A key empirical challenge is that future or past internment is unobserved in Census data. To address this issue, I develop a method to estimate the probability of internment conditional on Census observables, combining Census data with two additional datasets: administrative camp records listing all internees, and a sociological survey from the 1960s which interviewed around 4,000 Japanese Americans (Levine and Rhodes, 1981). The value of the camp records is that it lists everyone that indeed was interned, while the survey asks respondents to describe their migration history in the U.S. Combining the

---

2While race and state of residence in 1940 would be a very good internment predictor it is harder to do this in 1950 and 1960 data. This is due to two reasons. First is the cross-sectional nature of the data and the lack of information regarding place of residence at the time of internment. Second is the large migration and dispersion of former internees across the U.S. after leaving the camps.
administrative records with the 1940 Census, I first use Bayes’ Rule to predict internment based on Census observables in a fully nonparametric way. Then, I use the survey information on migration patterns to modify the estimator in a way that takes post-internment moves into account, which permits applying it to 1950 and 1960 Census data.

Following this approach, the results indicate that internment had a long-run positive and large effect on the annual income of internees (5 and 15 years after the closing of the camps). This finding is robust to modifications of the control group (Chinese only, non-interned Japanese only, or both) as well as to different empirical specifications. The magnitude of this effect ranges from 9% to 22% of the counterfactual average income.

I investigate potential explanations behind this result and find evidence consistent with two complementary channels. The first is the re-optimization of location and career decisions after internment. The second is the exchange of information and skills mediated by the high economic and human capital diversity of the camps.

Evidence in favor of the first channel comes from analyzing the effect of internment on occupation and location transitions. The 1960s survey asked Japanese Americans retrospective questions about their occupational history, their places of residence in the U.S., and whether they were in an internment camp or not. I find that internees experienced more occupational and geographic mobility compared to non-interned Japanese Americans. A 19% higher probability of having changed occupation after the war, and a 24% higher probability of living in a different state. In addition, the occupational mobility effect is almost entirely driven by those young internees who were previously working in farming jobs. Finally, former farm workers who were interned were much more likely to have climbed the occupational ladder (into professional and technical occupations) than the former farm workers who were not interned, who were more likely to be working after the war as laborers or in service occupations. If forced displacement indeed led people to move to jobs and locations with better opportunities (even when displacement reduced wealth that could have financed these moves), this would imply that adjustment costs were playing a big role before internment, or that the experience provided information and/or skills that enabled these moves.

Although limited by data availability, I consider if access to new information and skills could have played a role. Camp life was filled with hardship, and it intrinsically led to much more intense interactions than in regular communities. In addition to a strong social fabric, camps featured adult education programs taught and operated by skilled internees that became very popular (Su, 2011). I begin by showing evidence of the economic and human capital diversity present in the camps. Each of these ten communities housed people from all educational levels, urban/rural origin, and occupational skills. Combining camp records with 1940 Census data, I compare the level of economic diversity in the camps with that present in the immediate communities of similar size where West Coast Japanese

---

Due to the small number of non-interned Japanese Americans, the estimated effects when only using them as control group are imprecisely estimated and not statistically significant at conventional levels. However, they are very similar in magnitude to the precisely-estimated ones that arise when using the other control groups (Chinese Americans only, or Japanese and Chinese Americans together).
Americans lived before internment. This analysis shows that the shares of highly educated and highly skilled workers in the camps were larger than that in the previous communities of residence of most internees.

If camp interactions generated any productive responses (through social exposure or education programs), it is plausible that they accrued to the less educated and less skilled. In accordance with this idea, I use Census data to show how in 1950 and 1960 internees were more equal as a group (in terms of income) than the counterfactual offered by the DiD control group. Relatedly, the survey data is suggestive of a lower intergenerational correlation of income for those Japanese Americans who were interned, and this differential seems to be driven by the poorer families.

I also study whether other mechanisms might be at play in explaining the long-term earnings result. I first consider the possibility that internees increased their labor supply or work effort to compensate income and asset losses during internment. I analyze labor supply variables in the Census together with survey questions on work effort and find no consistent evidence pointing towards this direction. I then use the richness of the survey data to test whether internment changed work attitudes more generally, or cultural and assimilation preferences. I find little evidence supporting these hypotheses. Formerly interned Japanese Americans were, in the 1960s, equally likely as non-interned Japanese Americans to agree or disagree with certain statements regarding the importance of merit, work, and occupational status. In addition, they positioned themselves at the same point in the Japanese-American spectrum, and their descendants were equally likely to speak Japanese. While I find that former first-generation internees were slightly less likely than non-internees to have become naturalized, any reasonable assumptions about the labor market benefits of citizenship would point in the opposite earnings effect than the one I find.

Finally, to tackle more directly the notion that internment allowed to lift barriers preventing individuals from accessing certain occupations and locations, I revisit a Roy model of occupational choice with occupation/group-specific frictions based on Hsieh et al. (2013). The model provides a mapping between statistics of the income and occupation distribution and the labor market barriers faced by each group (internees and non-internees) when accessing different occupations. I find that the frictions that internees faced relative to the control group decreased after internment in professional, white collar, and blue collar occupations, providing additional supportive evidence for the proposed mechanisms.

This paper contributes to three strands of literature. First, it informs a recent literature studying the relationship between geographical displacement shocks and labor market outcomes. It has been shown in different settings how individuals who are forced to move against their will can react to these shocks by re-optimizing in ways that improve labor market outcomes in the long run (Nakamura et al., 2016; Sarvimäki et al., 2018; Sacerdote, 2012; Deryugina et al., 2018). I complement this literature by showing how such mechanisms took place in one of the largest policy-driven displacement of people in U.S. history, which not only forced those affected to leave their homes but kept them incarcerated for a signif-
significant amount of time. The forces at play in these episodes are also related to the literature on factor misallocation (Hsieh and Klenow, 2009). Hsieh et al. (2013) show how barriers preventing women and blacks from accessing the occupations where they had the highest comparative advantage were prevalent in the second half of the 20th century and how this had a considerable impact on aggregate output. Applying their occupational choice model to a new setting, I show how frictions preventing labor from flowing to its more productive uses declined for a large group of individuals, likely due to the internment experience.

Second, this paper contributes to the literature that studies peer influences, social contact, and access to opportunity. Recent evidence indicates that communities of residence could have significant impacts on long-term outcomes of children and young adults (Katz et al., 2001; Chetty et al., 2016; Chyn, 2018). Chetty and Hendren (2018) provide evidence of a negative correlation between neighborhoods’ ability to improve their resident children outcomes and socioeconomic segregation. Guiso et al. (2015) find that individuals growing up in a dense firm area are more likely to become entrepreneurs later in life. My findings offer suggestive evidence indicating that the economic diversity of the camps and the educational opportunities within them could have opened up opportunities in new occupations and locations for internees, in spite of the fact that, differently from other settings, this event happened during their adult life. A transmission of information and skills taking place amongst economically diverse individuals with common culture and ethnicity would be in accordance with the findings from the literature that studies the effects of matching demographically similar instructors and students (Dee, 2005; Hoffmann and Oreopoulos, 2009; Price, 2010; Fairlie et al., 2014).

Finally, this paper contributes to empirical work that has studied different aspects of Japanese American internment. Saavedra (2015) finds negative effects on educational outcomes of children who attended internment camp schools. In other work (Saavedra, 2013), he finds that early-childhood internment led to shorter lifespans in the long run. Shoag and Carollo (2016) use internment as an exogenous geographical shock to study the causal effect of place. They carry out an internee-internee comparison of later outcomes based on place of residence, using the variation driven by the quasi-randomness of camp assignment. The paper closest to this one, related to labor market consequences of internment, is Chin (2005). She studies the long-run effect of lost labor market experience during internment. Using cross-sectional 1970 Census data she finds that, among (likely) former internees, the earnings difference between cohorts who were of working and non-working age in 1942 is more negative than that observed in other comparison groups. Under the assumption that labor market prospects of school-aged internees were unaffected by internment, she interprets this differential as a long-run negative earnings effect of lost labor market experience. While this result seems at odds with the findings of this paper, Chin (2005) notes her results are based on internee-internee comparisons, and cannot thus be considered overall effects of internment.

Saavedra’s work (Saavedra, 2013, 2015) brings new evidence to gauge the assumption that young internees’ labor market prospects were unaffected by internment. When comparing with this paper’s findings, it is relevant to note that Chin (2005) restricts attention to U.S.-born Japanese Americans and coarsely defines as in-
This paper adds to this strand of literature in several ways. First, I develop a methodology that combines different publicly available datasets and allows to nonparametrically estimate a person’s probability of internment based on Census observables. These propensity scores allow the study of large numbers of internees both before and after internment, and to derive a general understanding of the career consequences (earnings, occupational choice, migration) of internment as well the mechanisms behind them. Second, I study the economic composition of the internment camps and analyze their human capital and economic diversity in comparison to the communities where Japanese Americans previously lived. Finally, I test whether internment had any long-run effect on attitudes and preferences related to work, culture, and assimilation.

The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the historical background of Japanese American internment and relevant features of life at the camps. Section 3 describes the three main datasets I use. Section 4 discusses the empirical approach, including the procedure to predict internment status on Census data. Section 5 presents the results of the long-term causal effect of internment on income. Section 6 provides evidence on the potential mechanisms behind the income result. Section 7 presents the occupational choice model along with its results. Section 8 concludes.

2 Historical Background

Japanese immigrants began arriving in large numbers to the U.S. during the end of the 19th century, settling predominantly along the West Coast. The flux of Japanese immigrants increased during the first years of the 20th century but substantially decreased starting in 1908 due to restrictive immigration laws. These laws resulted in virtually zero new Japanese immigration arriving to the U.S. between 1924 until 1952, when very small numbers of migrants from Japan started being allowed into the country again. These legal restrictions shaped the demographic composition of Japanese Americans, which featured
termed those who were born in the targeted states of Washington, Oregon, California, and Arizona. Abstracting from first generation internees does not take into account around 40% of the total number of internees. Also, even when focusing on U.S.-born Japanese Americans, tabulations of the JARP surveys (which explicitly asked for past internment) indicate that mobility across states between birth and 1942 meant that 14% of those born in the targeted states were not interned, and that 18% of those born in the remaining continental U.S. states were indeed interned.

Thanks to the recent digitization and availability of the 1940 full count Census (Ruggles et al., 2015) I am able to do this for the full population of 1940 Japanese Americans and at a fine geographical level (enumeration district).

A mention to the Japanese people who migrated to Hawaii is in order. Japanese laborers arrived to Hawaii in large numbers before this happened in the U.S. mainland. Also, between 1891 and 1907 an important number of them migrated from Hawaii to the continental U.S. However, this flow was stopped by the Immigration Act of 1907 that prohibited Japanese laborers from Hawaii, Mexico or Canada to move to the continental U.S. As Spickard (1996) explains, the experience of the Hawaiian Japanese and the Japanese Americans in the mainland (the focus of this paper) was very different due to the different immigration periods and the very different economies, cultures, and policies in the mainland versus Hawaii. In 1942 the Japanese made up almost 40% of the population of Hawaii. Also, it was not until 1959 that Hawaii received statehood.

The so-called “Gentlemen’s Agreement” of 1908 aimed at drastically reducing labor migration from Japan to the U.S. The Immigration Act of 1924 effectively and successfully banned Japanese immigration into the U.S.

See Appendix Figure A1, which shows the time series of immigrants arriving to the U.S. from different Asian countries.
a “missing generation”. This created a sharp distinction between first-generation Japanese (the Issei) and their American-born children (the Nisei). By 1940 there were over 120,000 Issei and Nisei living in the U.S., the vast majority of them living in the West Coast states (see Figure 1). Discrimination against Asians was widespread and institutionalized before WWII, especially in areas where they were more numerous, such as the West Coast (Hilger, 2016).

On December 7, 1941, Japanese war planes attacked the naval base of Pearl Harbor, Hawaii, bringing the U.S. into WWII and turning the Issei into enemy aliens. Mixed with existing racially-motivated animosity, suspicion was quickly drawn towards the community of Japanese Americans in the West Coast and rumors of sabotage and espionage became widespread. The FBI carried out the first Government reaction by picking up and detaining Issei male community leaders. However, there were yet no clear signs of what was to come. Even after Pearl Harbor, both Attorney General Biddle and President Roosevelt made statements in favor of personal freedoms and minority rights, explicitly calling for the rights of enemy aliens and warning against falling into war hysteria and minority persecutions (Leighton, 1950).

Despite these previous claims, on February 19, 1942, President Roosevelt signed Executive Order 9066, which would later on lay the ground for the mass internment of Japanese Americans. This order gave the Secretary of War and designated military commanders the power to prescribe military areas from which any person could be excluded. However, it made no specific mention to Japanese Americans, mass internment, or the West Coast. Events escalated quickly from this point onwards. On February 23, a Japanese submarine fired at oil tanks near Santa Barbara, California, increasing the fear of an invasion and rumors and suspicion towards the Japanese American population. On March 2, the U.S. military divided the states of Washington, Oregon, California and Arizona into designated Military Areas 1 and 2, encouraging Japanese residents in Area 1 to move East. After the failure of the voluntary migration scheme, on March 27 Japanese Americans in Area 1 (citizens and non-citizens alike) were prohibited from moving in preparation for the mass removal and incarceration that ensued.

---

9 These two groups had very different values, identities, and attachment to Japanese and American cultures (Spickard, 1996). While the Nisei where American citizens by birth, race-discriminating laws (in place until 1952) prevented Japanese resident aliens to be eligible for naturalization.

10 For example, Asians, as opposed to other immigrants, where not eligible for naturalization. The California Alien Land Law of 1913 prevented ownership of land by “aliens ineligible to citizenship” and restricted leases to these individuals to three years. Other laws restricted their access to employment, housing, and education. The Japanese and the Chinese would be collectively racialized as the “yellow peril” (Wu, 2013) and many organizations of politicians, intellectuals, and workers would actively defend their segregation and putting a stop to new arrivals.

11 At this time many Italian and German individuals were also detained by the FBI. By mid-December 1,460 Issei had been taken into custody by the FBI. This number amounted to 1,221 Germans and 222 Italians (Japanese American National Museum, 2017).

12 For a discussion on the actual reasons and the decision-making process behind the mass incarceration decision see Daniels (2000).

13 Military Area 1 was comprised of the western half of Washington and Oregon, the southern half of Arizona and the western half of California from Oregon to Los Angeles as well as the area south of Los Angeles. Military Area 2 was comprised of the remaining areas of these states.

14 Voluntary migration was not successful for several reasons. People were fearful of going to other states.
Shortly after, the army Western Command, claiming military necessity, started organizing the mass removal of over 110,000 Japanese Americans from the West Coast. Notices were posted in many cases with less than a week’s notice before departure. Families were told to bring the essential things that they could carry, and there was complete uncertainty regarding if and when they would be able to come back. Many were forced to sell their property, furniture, and other belongings very quickly, at “fire sale” prices. After a short stay in temporary centers and beginning in the summer of 1942, Japanese Americans were sent to ten internment camps in remote and isolated parts of the country that the Government had hastily built. A civilian agency, the War Relocation Authority (WRA), was set up to administer the camps. They were distributed in California, Arizona, Idaho, Utah, Wyoming, Colorado and Arkansas. Figure 2 displays the number of internees in each internment camp, by previous state of residence.

Life at the camps

The camps consisted of blocks of military-style tarpaper barracks, with communal mess halls and lavatories in the middle of each block (see Appendix Figure A4). While internees were provided with basic necessities (food, shelter, healthcare, and schooling for children), life at the camps entailed many hardships. Not only due to the loss of freedom, but also arising from poor living quarters and services. In trying to overcome these adversities, internees strove to lead their lives as normally as possible. With the effort and labor of internees, these camps turned into small communities that became rather self-sufficient in the provision of services and had a rich social life driven by internee-organized activities. Different types of assemblies were set up to organize camp affairs and represent the interest of different groups of internees. Some internees held jobs in the camps (maintenance, cooks, administrative clerks, teachers, hospital workers, food growers) although the wages paid by the WRA were very low.

The economic and human capital composition of the camps was rather diverse. West Coast Japanese Americans in 1942 were represented in all strands of society; from highly educated city professionals, to small business owners, to itinerant farm laborers. This turned camp communities into a mix of people that, while sharing a same ethnic or national origin, were heterogeneous in economic terms.

Using administrative camp records on the population of internees, and recently-digitized Many officials had expressed their rejection to hosting them. Nevada Governor E.P. Carville threatened to place Japanese entering his state in concentration camps, while Kansas Governor Payne Ratner declared that Japanese were not wanted and not welcome in his state (Leighton, 1950). In addition, the military sent mixed signals. As late as March 7, Lt. General DeWitt reiterated that no mass “evacuation”—the term used at the time—was planned for the Japanese.

15See Appendix Figure A2 for an example of one of the notices that were posted along the West Coast informing individuals about their removal.

16Appendix Figure A3 displays a map with the location of the 10 camps.

17Historical accounts are filled with mentions to the low quality of meals and medical services. Saavedra (2015) documents the bad conditions in camp schools.

18Initially a wage scale of $12, $16 and $19 per month was put in place ($174, $232 and $275 in 2017 dollars approximately). The $12 wage was later abandoned, $16 became general, and workers whose job was seen as specially important, such as hospital workers, were paid the $19 wage (Spicer et al., 1969).
1940 Census population data with fine geographic identifiers, Table 2 provides new descriptive evidence on internees’ previous communities of residence and internment camps. This table shows that most internees were surrounded by a higher share of highly-educated and highly-skilled individuals than in their former communities. For each of the 10 camps, Table 2 displays the fraction who had at least some college education (Column 3), the fraction with professional or managerial occupation skills (Column 5), and the fraction with white collar occupation skills (Column 7). Using 1940 Census data, Columns 4, 6, and 8 show what fraction of West Coast Japanese Americans were living in neighborhoods with a lower share of each of the corresponding groups of people. For example, focusing on education and on Heart Mountain camp (which had the average camp population), Column 3 shows that 12.7% of their adult internees had at least some college education. Column 4 reflects that 61.8% of West Coast Japanese Americans were living in 1940 in neighborhoods with a share of college educated people below 12.7%. Looking at these quantiles across measures and camps, we see that they usually reflect high values, mostly over 0.5. This indicates that the shares of highly educated and skilled workers in the camps were larger than that in the previous communities of most internees.

Through communal mess hall and lavatories, assemblies, leisure activities, and organization to keep the camps running, internees came in very close and constant contact with their camp neighbors. The diversity of individuals at the camp level was also present at the much finer level of the block, which was an important social and organizational unit within each camp. The people internees saw several times a day, lived with in very close physical proximity, and shared mess halls and lavatories with, were very different from the ones they had known and interacted with in their previous lives. As Spicer et al. (1969) put it:

> Everyone was faced with more new than familiar persons in the unaccustomed intimacy of the imposed block basis of social life. Moreover these strangers faced one another in wholly new roles, as chefs and workers in the mess halls as well as table companions, as block managers entirely outside the Japanese-American experience, and in a host of other roles required in the organization of center life (p14).

> Waiting in turn to brush one’s teeth in the lavatory the morning after arrival, it was clear that neighbors would be more than neighbors. They would be encountered many times a day in all

---

19 I define neighborhoods in 1940 Census data as groups of Census enumeration districts within a county, such that the average neighborhood size is around 10,000 people, the same number as in camp populations. I focus on such neighborhoods in Washington, Oregon, California, and Arizona where at least one Japanese person was living in 1940. Calculations with respect to these neighborhoods are weighted by the number of Japanese people in each of them.

20 See Appendix Figure A5 for a photograph of one of the mess halls where internees had their meals together.

21 This environment could have been propitious for people to find out about what different Japanese Americans did professionally, gather information, and potentially envision new things to do after camp. There is at least some anecdotal evidence of this. In 1955, the Saturday Evening Post ran a story about Californian Japanese Americans and their readjustment to normal life (Bess, 1955). It mentioned the story of a man named Victor Ikeda:

> Victor Ikeda, now head of his own prosperous insurance agency, was working in Li’l’ Tokyo as a vegetable broker when he was thrust into a camp with his family and kept there for three years. […] While Mr. Ikeda was in camp he decided to sell insurance after the war, and occupied many leisure hours practicing upon prospects who were not then in a position to buy anything.
the most intimate operations of living (p75).

[...], the people in any one block constituted a heterogeneous assortment. Although it might consist of 300 persons from Los Angeles, or Santa Clara County, of Fresno, or Seattle, and although it might consist of a dozen groups of families, each group of whom had known each other before evacuation, still the dozen circles of friends often had very little in common. A typical block of country people might contain eight to ten families of well-to-do farmers, fifteen or twenty itinerant farm laborers, a dozen or more families of poor tenant farmers, a few small-town shopkeepers, possibly a dentist and his family-people who had lived according to widely different economic standards, who had gone to different churches, and who perhaps belonged to none of the same organizations. No block had from the beginning a background of common participation of all its members in some former community (p103).

A relevant way in which the interactions between people of diverse skills were channeled was through the adult education programs present in the camps, which are well documented by Su (2011). These programs were entirely internee-operated, and taught by those internees who had relevant prior professional or academic skills to share. The availability of time, the fact that they were internee-driven and operated, and internees’ desire to prepare for their lives after internment made these programs very popular. The course offerings were varied, including English (for the Issei), shorthand, typing, bookkeeping, mathematics, and business.  

Leaving camp

Individuals started to very gradually leave the camps in the winter of 1943-1944. They were not yet allowed to return to the West Coast, but after application and approval, they could leave and resettle in other parts of the country. The WRA tried to encourage and help these moves by setting up field offices in different cities to help internees resettle and find jobs. Cities close to the restricted area such as Salt Lake City or Denver were popular destinations, although many ended up leaving for farther away places such as Chicago, Milwaukee or Atlanta. The beginning of the end of internment came from the courts. The Supreme Court ruled in December 1944 (Ex parte Mitsuye Endo) that the retention of loyal citizens in internment camps was unconstitutional. At the same time, the Government announced that by January 1945 the exclusion order would be rescinded, Japanese Americans would be allowed to return to the West Coast, and a timeline for the closing of the camps was put in place.

In the fall of 1945, more than three years after leaving the West Coast, the majority of internees had left the camps (Tule Lake camp closed in 1946). Many returned to their places of origin to pick up their former lives, while others looked to establish themselves elsewhere.

22 Although they are not the object of my study, it should be mentioned that evidence suggests that school-aged internees, as opposed to adults, had worse educational opportunities in the camps that what they would have experienced outside (Saavedra, 2015).

23 The Supreme Court had two other rulings with respect to the mass internment of Japanese Americans. Korematsu v. United States declared also in 1944 that the exclusion order was constitutional. In 1943, Hirabayashi v. United States held that the curfews imposed on Japanese Americans prior to internment were constitutional.
Initial destinations outside the West Coast were rarely definitive, and a migratory movement was set in motion where thousands of people looked for new beginnings around the country, leaving the internment experience behind. Around 40% of former internees initially resettled outside the West Coast.²⁴ ²⁵

3 Data

I use three main sources of data. Firstly, the U.S. Census for the years 1940, 1950, and 1960. Secondly, the Japanese American Research Project (JARP), a 1960s survey of Japanese Americans and their descendants. Lastly, the War Relocation Authority (WRA) records, a comprehensive list with information on every individual who was interned in each of the ten internment camps.

Decennial Census 1940-1960

I use the 1940 full count, 1950 1% sample, and 1960 5% sample of the Decennial Census made available by IPUMS (Ruggles et al., 2015). These provide three cross-sections of Japanese and Chinese Americans before and after the internment episode. The key relevant variables in the Census are those providing information on race, income, and current place of residence. The 1940 Census provides some but incomplete information on non-wage income, so I use a simple imputation procedure for non-wage income in this census year.²⁶ My difference-in-differences strategy using Census data focuses on the 1896-1924 birth cohorts of male individuals of Japanese or Chinese race.²⁷

Two key features of Census data motivate much of my empirical approach. The first is that internment status (future or past) is unobserved. Second is the lack of panel linkages between the three datasets. These two characteristics, together with the large geographical dispersion of internees across the U.S. after leaving the camps, makes determining internment status based solely on Census information unfeasible. While the combination of race and current state of residence would be an almost perfect determinant of internment status in 1942, this is certainly not the case in 1950 or 1960. I overcome this issue by developing a method that combines Census data with survey data and administrative camp records. As

²⁴ Appendix Figure A6 shows the destination of former internees who changed state of residence. The more popular states for movers were Illinois, Ohio, and Utah.
²⁵ In 1980 the U.S. Congress appointed the Commission on Wartime Relocation and Internment of Civilians. Their conclusions were that mass internment had constituted a “grave injustice”, that incarceration was not justified by military necessity but based on “race prejudice, war hysteria, and a failure of political leadership.” In 1990, camp survivors were given $20,000 as compensation, along with an apology letter from President Bush.
²⁶ The outcome variable in the DiD analysis is total annual income. While this is readily available in the 1950 and 1960 Censuses, the 1940 Census only asked for wage income and whether non-wage income was above or below $50. I impute non-wage income in the 1940 Census using non-wage income in 1950 and 1960. To do so I group individuals in 1,680 cells based on 5 wage income groups, whether non wage income is above or below $50, 12 occupation groups, 7 age groups, and a year-round work dummy. I compute median non-wage income in 1950-60 (using Japanese, Chinese, and native whites) in each of these cells. I use this to merge non-wage income at the cell level in 1940. Finally, I winsorize total income at the 1st and 99th percentiles.
²⁷ For reasons I describe in Section 4, I will focus on Japanese individuals living across continental U.S. and Chinese living in the West Coast states of California, Oregon, Washington, and Arizona.
I explain in Section 4, this allows me to predict internment status based on Census observables while taking into account the characteristics of the population of internees and their migration patterns after internment.  

Table 1 presents summary statistics on the Census sample, separately for Japanese and Chinese in the relevant states and birth cohorts. Given the very low number of Japanese and Chinese Americans in the 1950 1% sample, I group 1950 and 1960 as a single “post” period in most of the empirical analysis. Compared to the Japanese, the Chinese were somewhat older and more likely to have been born abroad. Likely in part because of this, they had a lower educational attainment. Due to these differences, I control for these covariates in the DiD analysis. Finally, the table shows how average income across the two groups was very similar in 1940.

### Japanese American Research Project surveys

The Japanese American Research Project (JARP) was initiated in 1960 by the Japanese American Citizens League (JACL). Its objectives included conducting a sociological survey of Japanese Americans, as well as collecting objects, documents and oral history from the community (Niiya, 2017). The JACL partnered with the University of California Los Angeles to conduct the survey and store the collected materials. By 1967, survey data on a total of 4,153 Japanese Americans of three different generations had been collected.

A list of around 18,000 surviving Issei (1st generation Japanese American) in the continental U.S. was compiled with the help of Japanese American associations and local authorities. This list aimed at being as comprehensive as possible. A sample of them was selected to be interviewed and between 1963 and 1966 a total of 1,047 Issei were interviewed. Issei respondents were asked to provide a list of their Nisei (2nd generation Japanese American) children. This provided a list of 3,817 Nisei who were contacted for in-person, mail, or telephone interviews. With a response rate of 60 percent, a total of 2,304 Nisei were interviewed. In the same way as their parents, they provided the contact details of their (adult) children. This provided a total of 1,063 adult Sansei (third generation Japanese American) of whom 802 (75 percent) responded to a mail questionnaire. Nisei and Sansei survey data

---

28 Another concern emanating from the lack of panel structure is the stability of the sample. An issue would arise if during the time period of study, selective in- or out-migration took place in ways that jeopardized my DiD strategy. I believe this should be less of a concern due to the restrictive migration laws of the time. Asian migration was completely shut off with the Immigration Act of 1924, making the Japanese and Chinese Americans still present in the country in 1940 likely to be those that had established in the country for the long run. It was not until the Immigration Act of 1952 was passed that very small quotas were assigned for Asians (see Appendix Figure A1). In order to exclude potential recent migrants after internment, I drop individuals in the 1950 Census who were Asian-born and declare living in Asia one year ago. In the 1960 sample I exclude those individuals who were born abroad and were living abroad 5 years ago.

29 Levine and Rhodes (1981) describe the survey in detail. Their book includes descriptions of the sampling procedure and the representativeness of the sample of the entire Japanese American population up until that time. Here I describe the main characteristics of the surveys (sampling procedure and main variables) and refer the reader to Levine and Rhodes (1981) for further details.

30 According Levine and Rhodes (1981) less than 1 percent of those initially sampled refused to participate. These were interviews based on the family as a unit. Whenever the male member of the marriage was still alive, he was the one who was interviewed.
was collected between 1966 and 1967.\textsuperscript{31} \textsuperscript{32}

I focus on the Issei and Nisei questionnaires since the Sansei were either not born or very young during internment. Questionnaires were exhaustive and questions ranged many different topics. Surveys were different for each generation. Topics included work and occupations, migration from Japan and within the U.S., attitudes, network of relationships, beliefs, and expectations for the future. Importantly for my purposes, many questions were asked in a retrospective way providing some panel data. Also, respondents were asked about their internment status between 1942 and 1945.\textsuperscript{33}

The JARP surveys are relevant in two different roles. First, they will allow me to take into account migration patterns when predicting internment status in the Census. Second, I will explore mechanisms behind the long-term income result by comparing career trajectories and attitudes of interned versus non-interned JARP respondents. Tables 3 (Issei) and 4 (Nisei) present summary statistics on the main JARP baseline variables of interest, separately for interned and non-interned respondents.

**War Relocation Authority records**

The third dataset I use in this paper comes directly from the internment camps. It contains information on every individual who was interned in each of the ten WRA camps, and it was recorded by WRA employees at the time of internment. A digitized version of the original records is made available online through the National Archives.

The dataset has information on 109,247 individuals. Information about each individual internee includes their name, internment camp, previous address, educational attainment, occupational skills, and birthplace, among other social and demographic characteristics. Figure 1 shows the state of origin of the population of internees, compared with the state of origin of individuals of Japanese race in the 1940 Census. Figure 2 displays the number of internees in each internment camp, by previous state of residence. Figure 7 shows the distribution of occupations, educational attainment, and urban/rural origin at the camp level and overall.

### 4 Empirical Approach

I now describe the empirical approach I follow to estimate the long-run effect of internment on income. I first describe the difference-in-differences (DiD) framework as if internment status were observed. I then show how I get around missing internment information...
in the Census by combining different datasets and estimating the probability of internment conditional on observables.

**Difference-in-Differences setting**

The objective is to estimate the effect of internment on income using repeated cross-sections from the Census. The 1940 Census provides information before internment, while the 1950 and 1960 Censuses provide information 5 and 15 years after the last individuals left the camps. Hence, the estimated effects on earnings should be interpreted as long-term, and not as the immediate labor market conditions faced by internees once they left the camps. I focus on males, born between 1896-1924. The choice of birth cohorts is set so that I observe individuals in working age both before and after internment.

The empirical DiD model based on observed internment has the following form:

\[ y_{it} = \alpha_t + X_{it}' \gamma + \delta I_i + \beta (I_i \times Post_t) + \varepsilon_{it} \]  

(1)

Where \( y_{it} \) is annual income for individual \( i \) in Census year \( t \), \( \alpha_t \) are time fixed effects for each of the three Census years, \( X_{it} \) are time-varying controls, \( I_i \) equals one if individual \( i \) was interned, and \( Post_t \) equals one for Census years 1950 and 1960.\(^{34}\) Using a suitable control group, the assumptions of parallel trends and zero conditional mean of \( \varepsilon_{it} \) are satisfied and \( \beta \) is equal to the average effect of internment for internees.

When choosing a suitable control group it is key to account for the institutionalized discrimination towards Asians before WWII—especially in the West Coast—and its decline thereafter (Hilger, 2016). Comparing interned Japanese Americans with groups who did not experience the same shift in racial discrimination could confound the effect of internment with these trends. The control group I employ is a combination of non-interned Japanese Americans (those living outside the West Coast when internment took place) and Chinese Americans from the West Coast (Washington, Oregon, California and Arizona—the states targeted for mass internment). The former shared with internees a common country of origin and migratory background but were not interned because in 1942 they were residing in areas other than the West Coast. The latter, while being the target of the same anti-Asian discrimination prevalent in the West Coast before WWII and living in the same areas, were not targeted by government authorities because China, as opposed to Japan, was a U.S. ally during WWII. Given these different similarities, I believe that these two sub-groups complement each other nicely in creating a suitable control group for internees.\(^{35}\)\(^{36}\)

\(^{34}\)At baseline \( X_{it} \) will include functions of age and birthplace. Alternative specifications also include educational attainment and current place of residence. Due to the small sample size of the 1950 Census 1% sample, I am not able to estimate \( \beta \) separately for 1950 and 1960. It can thus be interpreted as an average effect 5 and 15 years after internment.

\(^{35}\)Appendix Figure A1 shows the time series of immigrants arriving to the U.S. from different Asian countries. Between 1940 and 1960 the vast majority of Asian immigrants in the U.S. were from China or Japan. The peak decade of Chinese immigration took place in 1871-80, whilst the corresponding one for Japan happened in 1901-10.

\(^{36}\)Note that the ideal Chinese control group are those that were residing on the affected West Coast areas at the time of internment in 1942. Given that Census data are repeated cross-sections, in practice I will include Chi-
I provide some evidence to examine the plausibility of non-interned Japanese and Chinese being a suitable control group. Outcome variable trends prior to treatment are usually examined as indication of the validity of the parallel trends assumption. Such a check is not available since the 1940 Census was the first to record income information. However, I examine trends for the occupational income score, an income proxy available in both the 1930 and 1940 Censuses. Appendix Figure A8 shows the average occupational income score between likely interned Japanese Americans, likely not interned Japanese Americans, and West Coast Chinese Americans (see the following section for a definition of the estimated probability of internment). Caution should be taken when interpreting this figure since there are only two data points and it represents an imperfect measure of my outcome variable. However, it is somewhat reassuring to see that the 1930-1940 trend is parallel between the three groups.

Similarity of pre-treatment characteristics, though not necessary for the DiD assumptions to hold, is a desirable feature in such a setting. Appendix Figures A9 and A10 provide some insight into the similarity of labor market characteristics of both groups in 1940. Appendix Figure A9 plots the distribution and average (vertical lines) of income after conditioning on place of birth, age, and high school completion (covariates in Equation 1) for both groups in 1940. The average is the same across both groups and the distributions show significant overlap. Appendix Figure A10 plots the occupational distribution for both groups in 1940. While the probability of working in farming or being a laborer varied substantially between internees and non-internees, the remaining occupations were held in similar proportions.

Overall, the historical context and the empirical evidence from the 1930 and 1940 Censuses suggest that the required DiD assumptions are likely to hold in this setting. In Section 6 I provide additional evidence regarding the pre-internment similarity of interned and non-interned Japanese Americans in the JARP surveys. Next, I deal with the fact that \( I_i \) is actually not observed in the Census.

Appendix Figure A8 shows the average occupational income score between likely interned Japanese Americans, likely not interned Japanese Americans, and West Coast Chinese Americans (see the following section for a definition of the estimated probability of internment). Caution should be taken when interpreting this figure since there are only two data points and it represents an imperfect measure of my outcome variable. However, it is somewhat reassuring to see that the 1930-1940 trend is parallel between the three groups.

Similarity of pre-treatment characteristics, though not necessary for the DiD assumptions to hold, is a desirable feature in such a setting. Appendix Figures A9 and A10 provide some insight into the similarity of labor market characteristics of both groups in 1940. Appendix Figure A9 plots the distribution and average (vertical lines) of income after conditioning on place of birth, age, and high school completion (covariates in Equation 1) for both groups in 1940. The average is the same across both groups and the distributions show significant overlap. Appendix Figure A10 plots the occupational distribution for both groups in 1940. While the probability of working in farming or being a laborer varied substantially between internees and non-internees, the remaining occupations were held in similar proportions.

Overall, the historical context and the empirical evidence from the 1930 and 1940 Censuses suggest that the required DiD assumptions are likely to hold in this setting. In Section 6 I provide additional evidence regarding the pre-internment similarity of interned and non-interned Japanese Americans in the JARP surveys. Next, I deal with the fact that \( I_i \) is actually not observed in the Census.

37 This measure of income is solely based on occupation. It assigns each occupation the median total income of all persons with that particular occupation in the 1950 Census. See variable OCCSCORE in Ruggles et al. (2015). Measures of income using statistics of the distribution of income across occupations are common in historical settings where individual earnings were not recorded. See, for instance, Abramitzky et al. (2014).

38 In this case, where the persons of study belong to a discriminated racial minority, occupational income scores statistics—based on the median worker in each occupation—should be interpreted with extra caution.

39 Unfortunately, the lack of panel data prevents me from controlling for occupation prior to internment. I specifically focus on farmers in Section 6.
Predicting unobserved internment status

Census data do not include internment status information. This prevents me from estimating Equation 1. The nature of the data (no panel data) and the historical context (migration after internment) pose additional challenges to inferring the value of $I_i$ from Census observables.

Given how Japanese American internment took place, the combination of a person’s race and state of residence in 1942 would be a very good predictor of $I_i$. This means that it is rather straightforward to predict internment for 1940 Census observations. It would also be straightforward to predict internment in 1950 and 1960 if panel data were available and thus state of residence in 1940 was observed in 1950 and 1960. This is not the case since I am relying on repeated cross-sections that do not record place of residence ten and twenty years before. The large migration of internees to states away from the West Coast after internment complicates matters, since state of residence in 1950 and 1960 is not a good proxy for state of residence in 1940.

I address these issues by bringing in two additional datasets that complement Census information: the JARP surveys and the WRA internee files. The goal is to extract different information from each one of them in order to be able to estimate an individual’s probability of internment based on Census observables. To be more precise, the goal is to estimate $Pr(I_i = 1|Z_i, s_i^t) \equiv E[I_i|Z_i, s_i^t]$, where $Z_i$ are immutable characteristics of individual $i$ observable in the Census (year of birth, birthplace, race) and $s_i^t$ is the state of residence of person $i$ in Census year $t$, for $t = 1940, 1950, 1960$. Given the historical context of Japanese American Internment, I assign $E[I_i|Z_i, s_i^t] = 0$ for individuals whose race is recorded as Chinese in the Census. The following discussion applies for individuals of Japanese origin.

Estimation of $E[I_i|Z_i, s_i^t]$

In 1940 Census

I start by estimating $E[I_i|Z_i, s_i^{40}]$, the probability of internment based on state of residence in 1940. Applying Bayes’ rule,

$$Pr(I_i = 1|Z_i, s_i^{40}) = \frac{Pr(Z_i, s_i^{40}|I_i = 1) \cdot Pr(I_i = 1)}{Pr(Z_i, s_i^{40})} \tag{2}$$

I take advantage from the WRA records, where I observe all individuals that were interned along with several individual characteristics (which include $Z_i$ and $s_i^{40}$). Together

---

39This is obvious for the 1940 Census since internment had not yet taken place. In the 1950 and 1960 Censuses there is no information about this either. To the best of my knowledge, the JARP surveys are the only source of data in which large numbers of Japanese Americans were asked about their past internment status.

40Race (with different categories for persons of Chinese and Japanese origin) is observed throughout the 1940-1960 Censuses.

41Since there is no evidence of large inter-state migration of Japanese Americans in the short period of time between 1940 and 1942.

42Focusing on U.S.-born Japanese Americans and using state of birth as a proxy for internment is also not desirable. See footnote 4.

43I assume throughout that individuals’ state of residence in the 1940 Census was the same one as the one
with the 1940 Census, where I observe all individuals of Japanese origin who were or were not interned, I can nonparametrically estimate each of the three pieces in the right-hand side of Equation 2.

Grouping individuals in cells according to $Z_i \times s_{40}^i$, $Pr(Z_i, s_{40}^i | I_i = 1)$ is estimated as the proportion of individuals in the WRA records in each $Z_i \times s_{40}^i$ cell. The unconditional probability of internment, $Pr(I_i = 1)$, is estimated as the total number of individuals in the WRA records over the total number of individuals in the 1940 Census reporting to be of Japanese race. Finally, $Pr(Z_i, s_{40}^i)$ is estimated using the 1940 Census by computing the proportion of Japanese Americans in each $Z_i \times s_{40}^i$ cell.

This procedure provides $\hat{Pr}(I_i = 1 | Z_i, s_{40}^i)$, a nonparametric estimate of the probability of internment based on observables $Z_i$ and state of residence in 1940. This allows me to attach a probability of internment for each individual of Japanese origin in the 1940 Census.

In 1950 and 1960 Censuses

Since the WRA records do not include state of residence in 1950 and 1960, the same procedure cannot be carried out for these Census years. The key to estimating the probability of internment for these years is the JARP data. This survey asked respondents retrospective information regarding their internal migration within the U.S. Thus, in the JARP dataset I observe for each individual their state of residence in 1940, 1950, and 1960. This allows me to estimate a state-state matrix of migration probabilities for Japanese Americans and, in combination with $\hat{Pr}(I_i = 1 | Z_i, s_{40}^i)$, estimate $\hat{Pr}(I_i = 1 | Z_i, s_{50}^i)$ and $\hat{Pr}(I_i = 1 | Z_i, s_{60}^i)$.

I begin by making the assumption that conditional on state of residence in 1940, state of residence in 1950 and 1960 does not impact the probability of internment. That is, I assume $E(I_i | Z_i, s_{40}^i, s_t^i) = E(I_i | Z_i, s_{40}^i), \; t = 1950, 1960$

Given the historical context, in which internment was based solely on race and state of residence, the above assumption is credible. Under this assumption, one can use the estimated probabilities for the 1940 Census and integrate out $s_{40}^i$,

$$E(I_i | Z_i, s_t^i) = \sum_s E(I_i | Z_i, s_{40}^i = s) \cdot Pr(s_{40}^i = s | Z_i, s_t^i)$$

where $Pr(s_{40}^i = s | Z_i, s_t^i)$ is an entry in the migration matrix which is estimated using JARP.\footnote{In the empirical implementation and due to data limitations, I estimate a common migration matrix for all values of $Z_i$. That is, I assume that $Pr(s_{40}^i = s | Z_i, s_t^i) = Pr(s_{40}^i = s | s_t^i) \forall Z_i$.}

In short, Equation 2 shows how one can use a combination of the 1940 Census and the WRA records to estimate the probability of internment in 1940. Equation 3 adapts this predictor for 1950 and 1960, using migration information contained in JARP. I now show some characteristics of the distribution of $E[I_i | Z_i, s_t^i]$.  

\footnote{In the empirical implementation and due to data limitations, I estimate a common migration matrix for all values of $Z_i$. That is, I assume that $Pr(s_{40}^i = s | Z_i, s_t^i) = Pr(s_{40}^i = s | s_t^i) \forall Z_i$.}
Descriptives of $\mathbb{E}[I_i|Z_i, s_t^i]$

Figure 3 shows the distribution of $\mathbb{E}[I_i|Z_i, s_t^i]$ for Japanese individuals in different Census years, residing in California, Illinois and Utah.\textsuperscript{46} I have also estimated probabilities for the 1930 Census year for illustration purposes following the same procedure as for 1950 and 1960. These three different states are chosen because they represent different historical evolutions with respect to Japanese American migration and internment. California was the state with the largest population of persons of Japanese origin (see Figure 1). Its residents were also targeted for internment by the U.S. government. Hence, in any given Census year, a Japanese residing in California has a high chance of having been/going to be interned, which is what Figure 3 shows. Illinois represents a different scenario. It had practically no residents of Japanese origin before internment. However, after internment a very significant number of former internees resettled in Chicago. This means that in 1950 and 1960, a Japanese residing in Illinois would have a high probability of being a former internee. Finally, Utah is an in-between case. There was a significant—though small—community of Japanese residing in Utah before 1942, but it was not targeted for internment. Because of this, a Japanese living in Utah in 1930 has a small but positive probability of going to be interned, allowing for the possibility that between 1930 and 1940 he migrated to the West Coast. In 1940, Japanese from Utah have no probability of being interned since it was not targeted by the U.S. government. Finally, in 1950 and 1960 the probability is positive to allow for those that migrated to Utah after having been interned.

Given that the JARP recorded respondents’ past internment status, I can use it to perform a sanity check of my estimate of $\mathbb{E}[I_i|Z_i, s_t^i]$. I compute the probability of internment for each individual-year in the JARP dataset and I compare it to actual internment. Figure 4 is a binned scatterplot of actual versus predicted internment together with the 45 degree line. The points align pretty closely to the 45 degree line, suggesting that my estimate does a good job at predicting internment.

Estimation and interpretation of coefficients

Equipped with $\mathbb{E}[I_i|Z_i, s_t^i]$, I now discuss how this allows me to estimate the effect of internment on income, the required assumptions, and the interpretation of the estimated parameter. Going back to equation (1) and taking conditional expectations,

$$\mathbb{E}[y_{it}|Z_i, s_t^i] = \alpha_t + X_{it}'\gamma + \delta\mathbb{E}[I_i|Z_i, s_t^i] + \beta(\mathbb{E}[I_i|Z_i, s_t^i] \times \text{Post}_t)$$

under the assumption that $\mathbb{E}[\varepsilon_{it}|Z_i, s_t^i] = 0$. Using the estimated probabilities, $\beta$ can be estimated from the following DiD regression:

$$y_{it} = \alpha_t + X_{it}'\gamma + \delta(\mathbb{E}[I_i|Z_i, s_t^i] + \beta(\mathbb{E}[I_i|Z_i, s_t^i] \times \text{Post}_t) + u_{it}$$

Some remarks are in order. For equation (4) to hold, $X_i$ is required to be a subset of $Z_i$.

\textsuperscript{46}Appendix Figure A11 shows maps with the mean probability of internment for each state and year.
This is indeed the case as $Z_i$ contains the same information as $X_i$ plus race. In this sense, estimating $\beta$ through equation (5) is similar in spirit to an instrumental variables procedure in which $I_i$ is the endogenous variable and race and state of residence are the excluded instruments. In this case I am not using fitted values of $I_i$ due to endogeneity concerns, but because $I_i$ is unobserved in my main dataset.

Another necessary assumption for this procedure to work is that race and state of residence are indeed excluded instruments, and only affect income through the probability of internment. Since both Japanese and Chinese Americans suffered the same type of pre-War discrimination towards Asians, it is plausible to assume that race has no direct effect on income other than through internment. Current state of residence as an excluded instrument might be more problematic if there are premiums to residing in one state or another. To address this concern, I estimate versions of equation (5) in which $X_{it}$ includes fixed effects for 5 geographical partitions of the U.S. This specification allows for time-invariant location premia, making the new required assumption that before-after changes in location premia only affect income through internment probability.

Under the maintained assumptions, the parameter $\beta$ can be interpreted as the average treatment effect on the treated thanks to one-sided non-compliance. Since Chinese individuals are interned with zero probability, there are no “always-takers” so that the population of treated and compliers are identical (Imbens and Angrist, 1994).

5 Long-Term Impact of Internment on Income

Figure 5 plots raw income averages for likely internees (using the estimated probability of internment) and different control groups, before and after internment. Internees had similar levels of annual income, around $2,000-$2,500, as non-interned Japanese and West Coast Chinese in 1940. However, the figure shows how internees experienced a higher income growth between 1940 and 1950-60 than any of the three control group combinations. I next see whether this patterns hold in a DiD regression framework with different sets of controls.

Table 5 shows the results from estimating different specifications of equation (5). I show estimates of $\beta$ for different choices of control group and different $X_{it}$ regressors. Columns labeled 1 include as control group non-interned Japanese and Chinese from the West Coast. In columns 2, I exclude Japanese individuals with zero predicted probability of internment.

---

47 In this spirit, the estimation of equation (5) is related to two-sample IV methods (Angrist and Krueger, 1992), where the IV first stage is estimated with one dataset and the second stage with another one. I compute my fitted values of $I_i$ by combining not two, but three different datasets.

48 In fact, historical accounts claim that to the eyes of many white Americans the Japanese were indistinguishable from the Chinese (Higgs, 1978) and were collectively racialized as the “yellow peril” (Wu, 2013).

49 Due to the small sample sizes of the 1950 and 1960 Census samples, I am not able to include finer geographic fixed effects. The five partitions correspond to the four Census regions (Northeast, South, Midwest, West), subdividing the Western region into the two divisions that compose it - Mountain and Pacific.

50 I show results using bootstrap standard errors throughout. These are computed bootstrapping the whole procedure - estimation of $E[I_i|Z_i, s_i]$ followed by DiD regressions - and take into account the sampling error of my generated regressor.
Columns 3 exclude all Chinese individuals and only use non-interned Japanese as control group.

Panel A shows estimates of $\beta$ for the baseline specification, where $X_i$ includes a quadratic in age and birthplace dummies. Estimates of the effect of internment on income range from $482.47$ when only using the Chinese as control group, to $556.56$ when using both Chinese and non-interned Japanese. This translates to increases in annual income of between 12.3% and 14.4% (with respect to the counterfactual average income implied by $\hat{\beta}$). Coefficients are significant at regular confidence levels except for the specification that excludes the Chinese. The relatively small number of non-interned Japanese makes this estimate noisy and non-significant, but similar in magnitude to the more precisely estimated ones that include the Chinese. This feature is common across the four panels.

Panel B adds education to the set of controls, in the form of a dummy variable that equals one if a respondent has a high school diploma. In this panel and other specifications controlling for education I exclude the youngest set of cohorts, those born between 1920 and 1924. I do so in case internment affected education decisions for these younger cohorts, so as to not control for an endogenous outcome. The estimated effects of internment are somewhat larger than in the baseline, ranging from $551.17$ (15% increase) when excluding the Chinese to $761.8$ (22% increase) when using the full sample.

Panel C includes current location of residence controls, in the form of fixed effects for the 5 geographical partitions described in the previous section. As discussed in Section 4 this changes the identification assumption, relying now on the interaction of place and time effects as excluded predictor of internment (along with race). Under this specification, the estimates of the effect of internment on income are still positive and significant, although smaller in magnitude than the previous one. The effect ranges now between $349.85$ (8.6% increase) to $387.16$ (9.6% increase), depending on which control group is used.

Panel D specifications include both education and location controls. The estimated effects in this case range in between the ones obtained on panels B and C. They range from $478.33$ (12.8% increase) when excluding Chinese to $601.42$ (16.6% increase) when using the whole sample. In the same way as in the previous panels, these two estimates are significant at the usual levels while the estimate that excludes the Chinese is not.

The graphical and DiD results imply that internment led individuals to, on average, generate higher incomes in the long term. This finding is robust to a range of different specifications that vary both the choice of the control group as well as the set of controls used in the regressions. The estimated effects on income are economically meaningful, with the more conservative ones implying an average increase in annual income with respect to the counterfactual of about 9%.

51 I include separate dummies for four birthplace categories: West Coast states (CA, WA, OR, and AZ), the rest of continental U.S., country of origin (Japan for Japanese, China for Chinese), and everywhere else.

52 When education is included in $X_i$, it also needs to be included in $Z_i$. For regressions controlling for education I re-estimate $E[I|Z_i, s_i]$ including education in the set of predictors. This turns out not to make a big difference, and the correlation between the two predicted internment values is 0.97.

53 Appendix Table A1 replicates Table 5 using log total annual income as dependent variable instead of the level. The results are quantitatively similar although more dispersed across specification, and with noisier estimates. Note that satisfying the parallel trends assumption in levels (as suggested by Appendix Figure A8,
The positive effect of internment on long-run earnings can be surprising when thinking about the forced nature of the removal, the significant asset and income losses that internees experienced, and the lost labor market attachment during internment. I now show how other forces that help explain this finding were also at play.

6 Mechanisms

I show evidence consistent with two complementary explanations: the re-optimization of location and occupational choices after internment, and skills and information acquisition mediated by the camps’ economic and human capital diversity.

I also consider other potential mechanisms such as increases in labor supply due to asset and income losses during internment, changes in attitudes towards work due to the internment experience, or an increased desire of assimilation and integration of former internees. I conclude that the data offers little support for these alternative channels.

Migration and Occupational Change

When forcibly leaving the West Coast, internees lost previous jobs and assets and were displaced to locations in many cases very far away from their homes. When leaving the camps, this forced many internees to reassess location and occupational choices starting from scratch. It is plausible that, due to labor market and migration frictions, many Japanese Americans’ previous locations and jobs were not those maximizing their long-run labor market outcomes. Because internees were forced to start over after internment, they may have migrated to areas and occupations where opportunities were greater for them. This could have happened, even after a negative wealth shock, due to the presence of adjustment costs, or previous lack of information about outside opportunities.

This would not be the first instance in which a shock forcing individuals to move against their will leads them to re-optimize in a way that improves labor market outcomes. This has been recently shown in settings where a forced move is driven by an Icelandic volcano (Nakamura et al., 2016), Soviet annexation of parts of Finland (Sarvimäki et al., 2018), or Hurricane Katrina (Sacerdote, 2012; Deryugina et al., 2018).

I test for this mechanism by analyzing location and occupational transitions of internees before and after internment, comparing them to those of non-interned Japanese Americans. I do so by taking advantage of the longitudinal aspect of some JARP survey questions, and the fact that internment status is observed in the JARP dataset.

First, I check the comparability of the two groups before internment took place. Table 3 and the parallel trends between likely not interned Japanese Americans and Chinese Americans in Figure 5 (and the parallel trends between likely not interned Japanese Americans and Chinese Americans in Figure 5) implies that it will not be satisfied in logs. However, the fact that the general result holds in both specifications is reassuring.

By way of an example, discriminatory laws in place in the West Coast before the War prohibited Issei from owning land in their name. A common way of getting around this issue was to buy property in the name of their American-born children. This led many first-generation Japanese Americans to significantly rely on their children in order to conduct business (Spicer et al., 1969). It is reasonable to think that this imposed additional barriers and elevated the cost of Nisei leaving their place of origin in search of opportunity.
shows that interned and not interned Issei were equally likely to be female, had the same age, arrived to the U.S. at the same time, had the same amount of education in Japan and the U.S. and were equally likely to own their place of residence. As expected, their propensity to live in different parts of the country was different, and interned Issei were more likely to live in a Japanese neighborhood (most likely due to the fact that Japanese Americans were more numerous in the states targeted for internment).

Table 4 shows similar facts for the Nisei. Interned and not interned Nisei were equally likely to be female, had similar ages, educational attainment, and likelihood of living in a Japanese neighborhood. They were equally likely to be in farming, professional and technical or craft occupations. Some small differences do arise in the Nisei occupational distributions. Interned Nisei were somewhat more likely to hold managerial and clerical occupations, while non-interned Nisei were more likely to work as laborers or service occupations.

Tables 3 and 4 show that, although living in different parts of the country, interned and non-interned Japanese Americans were comparable at baseline. As such, it seems a reasonable assumption to attribute differential migration or occupational mobility patterns to the very big shock that the internment episode represented.

The top-left panel of Figure 6 shows that around 42 percent of non-interned Nisei held different occupations before and after WWII. This number is equal to 50 percent for interned respondents and this difference is significant at the 95% level. Overall, it seems that internment made individuals more likely to change occupations before and after WWII.55

Many Nisei were farmers or farm laborers before internment (see Table 4). Once we break down overall occupational change based on baseline occupation, differential occupation switching is driven by those who were farmers before internment. The bottom-left panel of Figure 6 shows that while non-farmers were equally likely to change occupation (between 51-52 percent of them did), interned farmers were much more likely to hold a different occupation after internment than their non-interned counterparts (42 vs. 30 percent).

So what were these ex-farmers doing after internment? Did they move up the occupational ladder or did they transition to low-skill occupations? The bottom-right panel of Figure 6 shows that the answer to this question is very different for ex-farmers who were interned and those that were not. Those farmers who were interned and changed occupation were much more likely to switch to professional and technical or clerical occupations, while former non-interned farmers were much more likely to transition to working as laborers or in service occupations.56

I next turn to examine cross-state migration. The top-right panel of Figure 6 plots the proportion of JARP respondents who lived in different states before and after internment, by internment status. Internnees were more likely to have migrated to another state (31%...
versus 25% of non-internes). Note that this does not capture temporary moves right after internment, since the survey questionnaire asked for main state of residence between 1946 and 1952.57

**Human Capital and Peer Exposure Effects**

In Section 2 I described how internment camp communities were an heterogeneous mix of people, with diverse economic and human capital backgrounds who interacted in close proximity through social activities and internee-operated adult education programs. This could, in turn, have enabled information and skills exchange during internment.58 As such, I consider the camps’ economic and human capital diversity as a potential channel behind the earnings and mobility effects.59

While I am not able to test for a direct link between information and skills exchange and later incomes, I provide suggestive evidence consistent with the plausibility of this channel. First, I quantitatively document the ten camps’ high economic and human capital diversity. I then show that most internees were exposed to more high-skill persons in the camps than in their previous communities. Finally, I provide evidence indicating a decrease in group income inequality, and a decrease in the intergenerational correlation of income driven by sons of poorer families. These two results are consistent with the initially less skilled seeing their labor-market outcomes improve the most, something we would expect from information and skills exchange enabled by exposure to higher economic diversity.

Using WRA internment records, Figure 7 plots the distribution of occupational skills, the distribution of educational attainment of adult internees, and the distribution of previous place of residence size. The figure shows how Japanese Americans had diverse backgrounds and skills, and how this diversity was present in each of the ten internment camps.

Table 2 additionally shows that most internees were surrounded in the camps by higher numbers of highly educated and highly skilled individuals, than in their pre-internment communities (see description in Section 2). Moreover, even for those who might have lived close to high-skill people in their previous communities, camp life was such that close social interaction between people of different economic backgrounds was arguably more likely than in previous communities of the same size. Not only through camp organization and social activities, but also through the adult education programs described in Section 2.60

---

57Former internees who chose to resettle in a state different from their state of origin were scattered all along the U.S. Chicago, Cleveland, Salt Lake City and Denver were popular destinations. Appendix Figure A6 plots the main state of residence in 1946-52 for internees who changed state of residence after internment. Bars are broken down showing the fraction of residents who had previously been interned in their new state of residence.

58Recent evidence on neighborhood impacts suggesting that exposure to diverse individuals or specific types of human capital could impact long-term outcomes (e.g. Chetty and Hendren, 2018; Guiso et al., 2015).

59This channel encompasses information, skills, and opportunities exchanged both through social interactions and the more formal adult education programs in place in the camps (Su, 2011). Since the latter were operated and taught by internees, they could not have taken place in the absence of human capital diversity in the camps.

60The combination of common ethnic and cultural background, but diverse human capital could have facilitated the exchange of skills and opportunities between individuals. Indeed, the idea that cultural and racial similarity might facilitate the exchange of skills and information is not new. The economics of education lit-
If there were any benefits to internment due to the exchange of skills and information, they may have been disproportionately experienced by internees who were initially less skilled. A fact that would be consistent with this is if, as a group, internees became more equal in terms of income as a consequence of internment. Figure 8 shows that the Census data used for the difference-in-differences analysis is consistent with this idea. I plot the trend in the coefficient of variation of income as a measure of inequality for likely internees, together with that of non-interned Japanese and West Coast Chinese as comparison. While inequality increased for internees before and after internment (from a coefficient of variation of 0.61 to 0.63), that of the control group increased substantially more (from 0.65 to 0.78). Under a parallel trends assumption, this would suggest that internment turned internees into a more homogeneous group.

Finally, I study the possibility of a change in the relationship between parents’ and sons incomes. I use JARP data, where I observe family linkages, internment, and measures of family income in the 1960s. I test whether the correlation between Nisei incomes and that of their parents is different across previously interned and not interned respondents. For each Issei respondent I compute a residual income measure that nets out age, sex of respondent, and past internment. This Issei income score is meant to capture earnings potential abstracting from age and internment effects.

Figure 9 shows binned scatterplots of the relationship between Nisei incomes and the income score of their parents, separately by past internment status. The left panel (which plots a linear fit line) shows that the relationship between sons’ incomes and their parents’ income scores is weaker for Japanese Americans who were interned. The right panel (quadratic fit line) suggests that the weaker relationship is coming mostly from sons of poorer families. Table 7 estimates these relationships in an OLS regression adding additional controls. The same pattern from Figure 9 emerges although the differences are somewhat noisily estimated. Adding demographic and education controls improves precision, making the differences significant at the 10% level.

Other Mechanisms

Increased labor supply or work effort

Given the asset and income losses that internees experienced during internment, it is plausible that they increased their work effort and labor supply in order to make up for these losses. While such a response would be consistent with the positive effect on

...continued...

...references...

...continued...
comes, one could think that this mechanism was more likely in the immediate aftermath of internment, but less so 5 and 15 years afterwards.

I check whether the data supports this hypothesis in two different ways using JARP and the Census. JARP Issei respondents were asked whether they had ever taken a vacation for more than a weekend. The second row of Figure 10 compares the responses of former internees and non-internees. Both groups present rather similar probabilities of ever having taken a vacation. If anything, former internees were slightly more likely to have done so, which runs contrary to an increased work effort hypothesis.

Next, I use Census data on hours and weeks worked and apply the DiD strategy from Equation 5 to test for the presence any positive effects on labor supply. Appendix Table A3 shows the results of such exercise by specification, control group, and dependent variable. Columns 1-3 show the DiD coefficient β estimate and standard error for Census question of hours worked last week. Columns 4-6 do the same when using as dependent variable weeks worked last year.63 Results on hours worked are positive but small (on the order of 0.3 - 2 hours per week) and the majority are not statistically different from zero. Results on weeks worked are however mostly negative and not very stable when varying the control group. Negative coefficients have magnitudes between -1.5 and -2. When only using non-interned Japanese as control, coefficients are positive but not significantly different from zero.

Note that these DiD results should be interpreted with caution, since labor supply is noisily reported in the Census, and it is hard to assess the parallel trends assumption for these dependent variables. However, these results together with JARP survey responses do not suggest that increased labor supply or work effort might have played a big role in explaining the long-term positive income effect of internment.

Attitudes toward work

Could it be that the unconventional labor market institutions in place during internment led internees to change their attitudes towards work in different ways than that reflected in labor supply? I use JARP Nisei responses to several questions to address this possibility. Rows 3-6 of Figure 10 show that former internees and non internees were equally likely to agree with the statement that effort pays off, with the importance of living for the present, the assertion that Americans place too much stress on occupational success, and that how money is made is more important than how much is made. This evidence suggests that internment did not affect long-run attitudes toward merit, work, or occupational status.

Assimilation and cultural preferences

Finally, one might think that mass internment could alter in some way the preferences of individuals over cultural and identity aspects, which somehow translate into employ-

63Both hours worked last week and weeks worked last year are intervalled in Census data for this period. I assign each respondent the midpoint of their interval in order to estimate these regressions.
ment and migration decisions. To test this hypothesis I compare assimilation measures of internees and non-internees in the JARP survey.

The first row of Figure 10 shows that former internees and non-internees were equally likely to work for/with other Japanese Americans. The top-left panel of Figure 11 displays the answers of a JARP question which asked Issei respondents to state how American versus how Japanese they felt. The distribution of answers of Issei internees practically coincides with that of non-interned respondents. The top-right panel of Figure 11 shows the probability that an Issei respondent had obtained American citizenship by the time of the survey. Non-interned Issei were more likely to have become naturalized (68% vs. 55%). However, assuming that citizenship is associated with better labor market prospects, the sign of this difference is not consistent with explaining the positive income effect of internment. Finally, the bottom-left panel of Figure 11 makes use of JARP third generation respondents (the Sansei). It plots the proportion of them who speak Japanese, separately by whether their grandparent was interned or not. The fraction of Sansei who speak Japanese, around 11%, is exactly the same for the two subgroups.

Overall I find that by the 1960s, at least in the studied margins, interned and non-interned Japanese Americans were practically identical in terms of culture and assimilation. This suggests that these type of channels are not likely to explain the long-run income effect.

7 Model of Occupational Choice: Evolution of Occupational Barriers

So far the evidence suggests that the need to re-optimize from scratch after internment led former internees to access different locations and occupations than the ones they would have in the absence of internment. I have also provided suggestive evidence on how this could have been facilitated by the exchange of skills and information, enabled by a prolonged interaction of diverse peers in the camps. That is, an interpretation of the evidence is that internment reduced frictions preventing individuals to access their most productive occupations and locations.

To test this hypothesis I borrow and adapt a logistic model of occupational choice from Hsieh et al. (2013) which features group-occupation specific frictions. Through the lens of this model, I am able to interpret observable statistics of the occupation and income distributions as the barriers that each group (internees vs. non-internees) faced when accessing different occupations. I compute these model-implied frictions in Census data before and after the internment episode, and study the evolution of barriers faced by internees relative to non-internees in accessing different occupations. The following model description is based on Hsieh et al. (2013).

64First generation Japanese Americans became eligible for naturalization with the Immigration Act of 1952.
Setup

There is a population of individuals and each belongs to one of two different groups $g$: interned Japanese Americans, or non-interned Japanese Americans and Chinese. There are $N$ possible occupations, one of which is the home sector. Individuals differ in their occupation-specific abilities. Each individual randomly draws a vector of occupational abilities $(\epsilon_1, \epsilon_2, \ldots, \epsilon_N)$ from the following extreme value distribution:

$$F(\epsilon_1, \epsilon_2, \ldots, \epsilon_N) = \exp \left\{ - \left[ \sum_{j=1}^{N} T_j \epsilon_i^{-\theta} \right]^{1-\rho} \right\}$$  \hspace{1cm} (6)

The parameter $\rho$ is related to the correlation of skills for an individual, while $\theta$ is related to the same correlation and the overall dispersion of skills.\(^{65}\)

Each individual derives utility from consumption $c$ and leisure $(1 - s)$ according to the utility function

$$u(c, s) = c^\beta(1 - s)$$ \hspace{1cm} (7)

where $c$ is consumption, $s$ is time spent on human capital accumulation, and $\beta$ governs the tradeoff between the two.

Each individual works one unit of time in his occupation of choice $j$. In a pre-period, the individual makes the choice of how much time to devote to human capital accumulation $h$. This is done by combining time $s$ and educational inputs $e$ according to the following function:

$$h(e, s) = s^{\phi_j}e^{\eta}$$ \hspace{1cm} (8)

where the elasticity of human capital with respect to time invested, $\phi_j$, varies across occupations and $\eta$ represents the elasticity with respect to educational inputs.

Individuals’ decisions are distorted by frictions that vary across occupations $j$ and groups $g$. They come in two different forms: $\tau^w_{jg}$ is a labor market friction that acts as a tax on earnings for individuals of group $g$ employed in occupation $j$. It can be interpreted as an occupation-group specific form of wage discrimination.

On the other hand, $\tau^h_{jg}$ represents a human capital friction. It acts as a barrier that makes it harder for individuals in group $g$ to acquire human capital to work in occupation $j$. It comes in the form of a mark-up on educational expenditures and it can broadly be interpreted as barriers that prevent individuals from acquiring the skills or information that are relevant to access a given occupation.

An individual belonging to group $g$ employed in occupation $j$ faces the following budget constraint:

$$c = (1 - \tau^w_{jg})w_j\epsilon_jh(e, s) - (1 + \tau^h_{jg})e$$ \hspace{1cm} (9)

Where earnings are determined by the per-efficiency unit of labor wage in occupation $j$,

\(^{65}\)Following Hsieh et al. (2013), the expression in equation 6 is actually a re-parametrization of the actual distribution which makes notation more manageable. The actual distribution is $F(\epsilon_1, \epsilon_2, \ldots, \epsilon_N) = \exp \left\{ - \left[ \sum_{j=1}^{N} (T_j \epsilon_i^{-\theta})^{1-\rho} \right]^{1-\rho} \right\},$ and $\theta \equiv \theta/(1 - \rho)$ and $T_g \equiv T_g^{1/(1-\rho)}$.\n
$w_j$, the individual’s ability in that occupation, $\epsilon_j$, as well as the acquired human capital and the wage friction. Expenditures on educational inputs $e$ are inflated by the human capital mark-up.

**Optimal choice**

Conditional on a given occupation $j$, each individual solves the following problem:

$$U_j = \max_{c,s,e} c^{\beta}(1-s)$$

s.t. $c = (1 - \tau_{jg}^w)w_j\epsilon_j h(e,s) - e(1 + \tau_{jg}^h)$

The solution to this problem provides the optimal levels of $s$ and $e$ for a given occupation $j$. Substituting the optimal values, we arrive to the indirect utility of occupation $j$:

$$U_j = \left( \frac{w_js_j^h(1-s_j)^{1-\eta}}{\tau_{jg}} \right)^{\frac{\eta}{1-\eta}}$$

Where the term $\tau_{jg}$ combines the two types of frictions in the following way:

$$\tau_{jg} = \frac{(1 + \tau_{jg}^h)^{\eta}}{1 - \tau_{jg}^w}$$

Individuals choose the occupation $j$ that delivers the highest utility $U_j$. Hsieh et al. (2013) show how a closed form for the occupational shares across groups can be obtained from optimal choices across individuals thanks to the characteristics of the extreme value distribution (McFadden, 1974). The usefulness of the model stems from the fact that it allows to compute measures of $\tau_{jg}$, a composite of labor market and human capital frictions, as a function of observable statistics in the data.

**Computing occupational barriers $\tau_{jg}$**

Under the distributional assumptions of the model, the equilibrium share of group $g$ (internees or non-internees in this case) employed in occupation $j$, $p_{jg}$, has the following log-linear form:

$$\ln p_{jg} = \kappa_g + \alpha_j + \theta \cdot \ln w_j - \theta \cdot \ln \tau_{jg}$$

The group effect, $\kappa_g$, is a combination of the frictions that group $g$ faces in accessing all occupations. The occupation effect, $\alpha_j$, is related to the differing human capital accumulation technologies in different occupations. The term $w_j$ is the wage per efficiency unit in

---

66 The optimal levels of $s$ and $e$ are $s_j^* = \frac{1}{1+\tau_{jg}^w}$ and $e_j^* = \left( \frac{\eta(1-\tau_{jg}^w)w_j\epsilon_j h(e,s)}{1+\tau_{jg}^h} \right)^{\frac{1}{1-\eta}}$

67 In terms of the parameters of the model $\alpha_j = \ln T_j + \theta \phi_j \ln s_j + \theta (\frac{1-\eta}{\eta}) \ln (1-s_j)$; $\kappa_g = \ln \left( \sum_{s=1}^N \tilde{w}_{sg} \right)$, where $\tilde{w}_{sg} = \frac{T_j^{\frac{1}{\eta}} w_j s_j^h (1-s_j)^{1-\eta}}{\tau_{jg}}$. 28
occupation \( j \), and \( \tau_{jg} \) is the composite friction that group \( g \) faces in occupation \( j \). These last two terms are scaled by \( \theta \), one of the parameters of the talent distribution.

The model also implies that in equilibrium, average earnings are log linearly separable into an occupation term and a group term:\(^{68}\)

\[
\ln \bar{wage}_{jg} = \gamma_j - \frac{1}{\theta(1-\eta)} \kappa_g
\]

The key result of the model, made clear in equation (14), is that average wages for a given group in a given occupation do not depend on the level of frictions they face in that occupation. This is due to a positive selection effect arising by within-group heterogeneity in ability for occupation \( j \). When frictions in occupation \( j \) are high for group \( g \), only its most talented individuals (high \( \epsilon_j \)) find optimal to access the occupation. Given the model assumptions, this positive selection effect perfectly offsets the friction effect that pushes earnings downwards.\(^{69}\)

Equations (13) and (14) provide the key to recovering \( \tau_{jg} \) from the data. Specifically, we can express relative frictions of group \( i \) (interned) with respect to those of group \( c \) (not interned) for each occupation \( g \) in terms of occupation odds ratios and wage gaps, which are observable in the data:

\[
\ln \left( \frac{\tau_{ji}}{\tau_{jc}} \right) = -\frac{1}{\theta} \ln \left( \frac{p_{ji}}{p_{jc}} \right) - (1-\eta) \ln \left( \frac{\bar{wage}_i}{\bar{wage}_c} \right)
\]

That is, the relative composite friction for occupation \( j \) for group \( i \) is expressed in terms of the occupational odds ratios, normalized by the wage gap and scaled by the parameters \( \theta \) and \( \eta \).

The expression in equation (15) corresponds to the composite friction, containing both labor market discrimination and human capital barriers. If we assume that both groups faced the same labor market discrimination due to their Asian origin then:

\[
\tau_{ji}^w = \tau_{jc}^w \quad \forall j, \quad \text{and} \quad \ln \left( \frac{\tau_{ji}}{\tau_{jc}} \right) = \ln \left( \frac{(1 + \tau_{ji}^h)}{(1 + \tau_{jc}^h)} \right) \eta \]

This assumption allows the recovery of the human capital frictions that internees faced with respect to their DiD control group. These types of frictions—barriers that prevent individuals from acquiring skills or information—are precisely the ones more likely to have been affected by the internment episode.\(^{70}\) Note that even if the assumption in equation (16) does not hold, the right-hand-side of equation (15) can still be interpretable as a composite of labor market and human capital barriers.\(^{71}\)
Empirical results

I compute measures of the relative frictions faced by internees, \( \ln \left( \tau_{ji}/\tau_{jc} \right) \), using the expression in equation (15). I do this separately in 1940 and 1960 Census data and analyze their evolution before and after internment.

I use the same DiD sample from Section 5.\(^{71}\) I compute average wage gaps \( \frac{\text{wage}_i}{\text{wage}_c} \) using total annual income, the same measure as in the DiD analysis. I assign individuals to 7 occupational categories, consistent with those in JARP survey, where one of them is the home sector.\(^{72}\)

Figure 12 shows the evolution of \( \ln \left( \tau_{ji}/\tau_{jc} \right) \), the barriers faced by internees, relative to the control group, in accessing three relevant occupational categories: professional, white collar, and blue collar occupations.\(^{73}\) A value of zero for a given occupation indicates that internees, as a group, faced the same level of labor market and human capital frictions as non-interned Japanese Americans and West Coast Chinese.

Figure 12 shows that, between 1940 and 1960, the barriers faced by internees when accessing these occupations fell significantly with respect to the control group. Before internment, internees-to-be faced significantly higher barriers to accessing professional and blue collar jobs, and a similar level in accessing white collar jobs. However, according to these results, by 1960 the picture had flipped and former internees now faced less labor market and human capital barriers in all of these three broad occupational categories.

I interpret these results as supportive of the human capital and re-optimization mechanisms from Section 6. The evidence is consistent with some internees who, in the absence of internment, would have never accessed a given set of occupations or locations doing so because internment i) made them re-evaluate and start from scratch, and ii) exposed them to new information or skills in the camps.

8 Conclusion

This paper has studied the career consequences of the forced removal and internment of thousands of West Coast Japanese Americans during WWII. In order to do so I have combined different publicly available data sources from before, during, and after the episode:

\(^{71}\)Males born between 1896 and 1924 who are Japanese and living in the continental U.S., or Chinese living in the West Coast states. I follow the same approach as in previous parts of the paper and assign to the internee category \( i \) Japanese individuals with estimated probability of internment higher than .75. Individuals in the control category \( c \) are West Coast Chinese plus Japanese with estimated probability of internment lower than .25.

\(^{72}\)In dealing with the home sector I follow Hsieh et al. (2013). I assign to the home sector those who are currently not employed or those that worked less than 26 weeks in the year. I split the sampling weight of those who worked part of the year (worked between 26 and 39 weeks) between the home sector and the occupation in which they work. I impute the average earnings in the home sector from the group composition in terms of schooling, age, place of birth, state of residence, and race and using the relationship between these variables and income in the market sector.

\(^{73}\)I take Hsieh et al. (2013) parameter values of \( \theta(1 - \eta) = 1.36 \) and \( \eta = .103 \). They estimate these parameters using 1) the fact that wages within an occupation for a given group should follow a Frechet distribution governed by \( \theta(1 - \eta) \), and 2) calibrating \( \eta \), the elasticity of human capital with respect to expenditures, using educational expenditure shares in U.S. GDP.
Census data, administrative camp records, and a 1960s sociological survey of Japanese Americans. By combining these datasets I have first developed a method that enables the computation of a nonparametric estimate of a person’s probability of internment based on Census observables. Using this method, I have estimated the long-run effect of internment on earnings using Census repeated cross-sections and a difference-in-differences (DiD) strategy, using the fact that West Coast Chinese Americans and Japanese Americans living outside the West Coast were not affected by this episode. The results from this exercise imply that 5 and 15 years later, internment caused former internees to generate annual incomes that were on average between 9% and 22% higher than the counterfactual.

The positive effect of internment on long-run earnings can be surprising when taking into account the forced nature of the removal, the significant asset and income losses that internees experienced, and the lost labor market attachment during internment. However, I have showed how there were other forces at play that explain this finding. The ten internment camps evolved into communities with a very high degree of economic diversity, much more than the typical internee’s Japanese American community of origin. Life at the camps brought about very close social interactions, with a collaboration of individuals of very different backgrounds that many internees would have never experienced in their former lives. Adult education programs, which were internee-operated and taught, were very popular and could have channeled the skills and experience of the more talented internees towards their camp peers. All this could have facilitated the exchange of opportunities, information, and skills. Moreover internees left the camps—in many cases thousands of miles away from their previous homes and without being allowed to return right away—with the need of re-optimizing job and location choices. This starting from scratch brought down barriers—information, adjustment costs, family ties—that would have stopped internees from accessing their most productive endeavors.

As further supporting evidence of these mechanisms, I have adapted a Roy model of occupational choice (Hsieh et al., 2013) that features group-occupation specific frictions and enables to compute them using occupation and earnings data. Applying it to internees and the DiD control group I find that the labor market and human capital barriers that the former faced with respect to the latter significantly decreased between 1940 and 1960 for professional, white collar, and blue collar occupations. Furthermore, I am able to reject hypotheses related to increased work effort, or a broad change in attitudes and preferences towards work, culture, and assimilation.

Japanese American internment constituted a grave violation of civil rights and personal freedoms whose costs are large and hard to quantify. In all my empirical analysis I do not speak to these costs. However, the findings of this paper do provide some hopeful evidence on the ability of individuals to take the opportunities that a bad situation presents and overcome adversity in the long-run. Further, it provides a case study into the importance of barriers to occupation and geographic mobility, and how new information and skills might lower these barriers. Applying the lessons learned from a bad episode may enable other people to pursue their most productive paths.
References


Figures

Figure 1: Japanese in 1940 Census and camp internees

Note: Gray bars: Total number of individuals of Japanese race residing in each state in the 1940 Census. Black bars: Total number of internees in War Relocation Authority records, by previous state of residence.
Figure 2: Internment camp population by previous state of residence

Note: Total number of internees in each camp by previous state of residence, as recorded in the War Relocation Authority records.

Figure 3: Probability of internment over time for California, Illinois and Utah

Note: Boxplots of the distribution of the estimated probability of internment for individuals of Japanese origin in different Censuses and states of residence. Probability of internment estimated as explained in the text.
Figure 4: Actual vs. predicted internment

Note: 45 degree line and binned scatterplot of actual against predicted internment in Japanese American Research Project survey data. Probability of internment estimated as explained in the text.
Figure 5: Average income across time and groups

Note: Average total annual income, before and after internment by likelihood of internment. Likely interned are those Japanese with estimated probability of internment greater than .75. Not likely interned are those Japanese with estimated probability of internment less than .25. These two groups include 87 percent of the Japanese sample. Probability of internment estimated as explained in the text. Chinese residing in West Coast States (CA, WA, OR, and AZ). Labor supply weights are used. Male, 1896-1924 birth cohorts in 1940, 1950, and 1960 Census.
**Figure 6: Occupational and geographic mobility**

**Occ. change**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Not interned</th>
<th>Interned</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Professional, Technical, Managers and administrators</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>0.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Clerical, sales</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>0.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Craftsmen, operatives</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>0.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Laborers (not farm), service</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>0.2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**State of residence change**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Not interned</th>
<th>Interned</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Professional, Technical, Managers and administrators</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>0.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Clerical, sales</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>0.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Craftsmen, operatives</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>0.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Laborers (not farm), service</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>0.2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Occ. change by pre-farmer**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Not interned</th>
<th>Interned</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Professional, Technical, Managers and administrators</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>0.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Clerical, sales</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>0.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Craftsmen, operatives</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>0.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Laborers (not farm), service</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>0.2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Occ. distribution for former farmers post-internment**

- Professional, Technical, Managers and administrators: 0.1
- Clerical, sales: 0.1
- Craftsmen, operatives: 0.2
- Laborers (not farm), service: 0.2

**Note:** Occupations: 2nd generation JARP respondents. State of residence: 1st and 2nd generation JARP respondents. Occupation change equals one if respondent stated that the main occupation held in 1932-41 was different from that in 1946-52. State of residence change equals one if respondent stated that their main residence in 1932-41 was in a different from that in 1946-52. 95% confidence intervals computed using robust standard errors from regressing an occupational/state of residence change dummy on an internment dummy.
Figure 7: Internment camp economic and human capital diversity

Note: Distribution of occupational skills, educational attainment, and urban/rural background in WRA records, by internment camp and overall. For educational attainment I exclude internees who were less than 18 years old.
Note: Coefficient of variation of total annual income, before and after internment by likelihood of internment. Likely interned are those Japanese with estimated probability of internment greater than .75. Not likely interned are those Japanese with estimated probability of internment less than .25. These two groups include 87 percent of the Japanese sample. Probability of internment estimated as explained in the text. Chinese residing in West Coast States (CA, WA, OR, and AZ). Labor supply weights are used. Male, 1896-1924 birth cohorts in 1940, 1950, and 1960 Census.

Note: Binned scatterplot. 2nd generation JARP respondents log family income as a function of their parents’ residual income, by past internment status, and controlling for past internment status. N=1,584. Parents' income residualized of past internment status, a quadratic of age, year of interview dummies, and sex. Both parents' and sons' incomes are midpoints of reported income brackets. Left panel plots a linear fit, right panel plots a quadratic one.
Figure 10: Work characteristics and attitudes

1. works for/with Japanese Americans
2. ever took vacation
3. agrees: effort paying off
4. agrees: live for the present
5. agrees: Americans place too much stress on success
6. agrees: importance of how is money made vs. how much

Note: Questions 1, 3, 4, 5, and 6: 2nd generation JARP respondents. Question 2: 1st generation JARP respondents. Q1 equals 1 if self-employed and reports most clients are of Japanese ancestry or if salary worker and works for Japanese or Japanese American employer. Q2: “Did you or your wife (husband) ever take off from work for more than a week-end for a vacation with your family?”. Q3: “If you try hard enough you usually get what you want.”. Q4: “Nowadays a person has to live pretty much for today and let tomorrow take care of itself.”. Q5: “Americans put too much stress on occupational success.”. Q6: “Even today, the way you make money is more important than how much you make.”. 95% confidence intervals computed using robust standard errors from regressing each dummy dependent variable on an internment dummy.
Figure 11: Attachment to Japan and Japanese language

Note: How American vs. Japanese survey question stated that 100% Americanized would correspond to “[...] an Issei who has become completely American in his dress, eating habits, recreation, and all other aspects of his life.” First generation Japanese Americans became eligible for naturalization with the Immigration Act of 1952. 95% confidence intervals computed using robust standard errors from regressing each dummy dependent variable on an internment dummy.
Figure 12: Occupational frictions, internees relative to non-internees

Note: Occupation-internees specific frictions implied by Roy model, relative to non-interned Japanese and West Coast Chinese. Likely interned are those Japanese with estimated probability of internment greater than .75. Not likely interned are those Japanese with estimated probability of internment less than .25. These two groups include 87 percent of the Japanese sample. Computed in 1940 and 1960 Decennial Censuses, using Hsieh et al. (2013) parameter estimates.
### Table 1: Summary statistics 1940, 1950, and 1960 Censuses

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Japanese</th>
<th>Chinese</th>
<th>All</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>year of birth</td>
<td>1909.9 (7.955)</td>
<td>1907.6 (7.314)</td>
<td>1909.1 (7.815)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>born in the U.S.</td>
<td>0.535 (0.499)</td>
<td>0.283 (0.451)</td>
<td>0.447 (0.497)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>total annual income 1940</td>
<td>1928.9 (1213.0)</td>
<td>1908.1 (1177.7)</td>
<td>1921.6 (1200.8)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>total annual income 1950-60</td>
<td>4775.1 (2936.1)</td>
<td>4079.0 (2831.6)</td>
<td>4535.8 (2918.8)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>probability of internment</td>
<td>0.797 (0.274)</td>
<td>0 (0)</td>
<td>0.519 (0.440)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1940 Census</td>
<td>0.904 (0.294)</td>
<td>0.906 (0.291)</td>
<td>0.905 (0.293)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1950 and 1960 Censuses</td>
<td>0.0956 (0.294)</td>
<td>0.0935 (0.291)</td>
<td>0.0949 (0.293)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>in California</td>
<td>0.782 (0.413)</td>
<td>0.895 (0.306)</td>
<td>0.822 (0.383)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>in Washington</td>
<td>0.0924 (0.290)</td>
<td>0.0457 (0.209)</td>
<td>0.0761 (0.265)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>in Oregon</td>
<td>0.0255 (0.158)</td>
<td>0.0321 (0.176)</td>
<td>0.0278 (0.164)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>in Arizona</td>
<td>0.00341 (0.0583)</td>
<td>0.0271 (0.162)</td>
<td>0.0117 (0.107)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>high school or more</td>
<td>0.522 (0.500)</td>
<td>0.218 (0.413)</td>
<td>0.416 (0.493)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>college or more</td>
<td>0.0722 (0.259)</td>
<td>0.0386 (0.193)</td>
<td>0.0605 (0.238)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| N                          | 17,585     | 9,421      | 27,006     |

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Camp</th>
<th>Pop.</th>
<th>(3) Fraction of camp (adults)</th>
<th>(4) Quantile in 1940 neighborhood distribution</th>
<th>(5) Fraction of camp (adults)</th>
<th>(6) Quantile in 1940 neighborhood distribution</th>
<th>(7) Fraction of camp (adults)</th>
<th>(8) Quantile in 1940 neighborhood distribution</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Poston, AZ</td>
<td>18058</td>
<td>0.119</td>
<td>0.564</td>
<td>0.128</td>
<td>0.347</td>
<td>0.151</td>
<td>0.557</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tule Lake, CA</td>
<td>15074</td>
<td>0.108</td>
<td>0.493</td>
<td>0.107</td>
<td>0.232</td>
<td>0.129</td>
<td>0.442</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gila River, AZ</td>
<td>13158</td>
<td>0.116</td>
<td>0.543</td>
<td>0.137</td>
<td>0.445</td>
<td>0.138</td>
<td>0.478</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Heart Mountain, WY</td>
<td>10919</td>
<td>0.127</td>
<td>0.618</td>
<td>0.200</td>
<td>0.811</td>
<td>0.165</td>
<td>0.610</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Manzanar, CA</td>
<td>10151</td>
<td>0.109</td>
<td>0.502</td>
<td>0.148</td>
<td>0.565</td>
<td>0.180</td>
<td>0.668</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Minidoka, ID</td>
<td>9515</td>
<td>0.112</td>
<td>0.526</td>
<td>0.210</td>
<td>0.836</td>
<td>0.161</td>
<td>0.597</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Topaz, UT</td>
<td>8566</td>
<td>0.155</td>
<td>0.779</td>
<td>0.185</td>
<td>0.741</td>
<td>0.149</td>
<td>0.538</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jerome, AR</td>
<td>8475</td>
<td>0.103</td>
<td>0.453</td>
<td>0.133</td>
<td>0.414</td>
<td>0.140</td>
<td>0.506</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rohwer, AR</td>
<td>8409</td>
<td>0.092</td>
<td>0.347</td>
<td>0.168</td>
<td>0.685</td>
<td>0.149</td>
<td>0.542</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Granada, CO</td>
<td>6916</td>
<td>0.142</td>
<td>0.681</td>
<td>0.155</td>
<td>0.624</td>
<td>0.182</td>
<td>0.673</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: WRA internment camp records and 1940 Census full count.

Notes: Economic composition of WRA internment camps and comparison with that experienced by Japanese Americans in 1940 West Coast (WA, OR, CA, and AZ) neighborhoods. (2)-Camp population in WRA records. (3)-Fraction of highly educated adult internees (educational attainment of some college or more). (4)-Fraction of West Coast Japanese Americans living in 1940 in a neighborhood with a lower share of highly educated adults than that in (3). (5)-Fraction of adult internees with previous professional or managerial occupations. (6)-Fraction of West Coast Japanese Americans living in 1940 in a neighborhood with a lower share of professional/managerial occupation adults than that in (5). (7)-Fraction of adult internees with previous white collar occupations (clerical, sales). (8)-Fraction of West Coast Japanese Americans living in 1940 in a neighborhood with a lower share of white collar occupation adults than that in (7). 1940 neighborhoods are groups of Census enumeration districts within a county as described in the text (see footnote 19), with average population of around 10,000 people.
### Table 3: JARP baseline summary statistics - 1st generation

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>not interned</th>
<th>interned</th>
<th>difference</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>female</td>
<td>0.320 (0.468)</td>
<td>0.336 (0.473)</td>
<td>-0.0160 (0.0386)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>year of birth</td>
<td>1891.7 (8.264)</td>
<td>1892.8 (8.062)</td>
<td>-1.185 (0.740)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>year arrival US</td>
<td>1912.6 (8.205)</td>
<td>1912.4 (7.022)</td>
<td>0.216 (0.593)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>education in Japan</td>
<td>8.126 (3.136)</td>
<td>8.059 (2.940)</td>
<td>0.0663 (0.247)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>education in US</td>
<td>1.088 (2.763)</td>
<td>0.797 (2.157)</td>
<td>0.291 (0.186)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Japanese neighborhood</td>
<td>0.129 (0.336)</td>
<td>0.273 (0.446)</td>
<td>-0.144*** (0.0360)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>owns dwelling</td>
<td>0.196 (0.398)</td>
<td>0.219 (0.414)</td>
<td>-0.0225 (0.0349)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>lives in California</td>
<td>0.249 (0.433)</td>
<td>0.784 (0.412)</td>
<td>-0.536*** (0.0340)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>lives in Washington</td>
<td>0.0608 (0.240)</td>
<td>0.135 (0.341)</td>
<td>-0.0738*** (0.0267)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>lives in Oregon</td>
<td>0.0221 (0.147)</td>
<td>0.0499 (0.218)</td>
<td>-0.0278 (0.0170)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>lives in Arizona</td>
<td>0.0110 (0.105)</td>
<td>0.00232 (0.0481)</td>
<td>0.00873* (0.00505)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>lives elsewhere</td>
<td>0.657 (0.476)</td>
<td>0.0290 (0.168)</td>
<td>0.628*** (0.0204)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Notes:** Computed using JARP survey. Difference in means significance levels: * 0.10 ** 0.05 *** 0.01. Neighborhood, dwelling ownership, and state of residence variables refer to the time period 1932-1941.
Table 4: JARP baseline summary statistics - 2nd generation

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>not interned</th>
<th>interned</th>
<th>difference</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>female</td>
<td>0.456 (0.499)</td>
<td>0.485 (0.500)</td>
<td>-0.0292 (0.0246)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>year of birth</td>
<td>1924.2 (9.680)</td>
<td>1924.0 (8.300)</td>
<td>0.214 (0.468)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>high school or more</td>
<td>0.862 (0.346)</td>
<td>0.886 (0.319)</td>
<td>-0.0231 (0.0366)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>college or more</td>
<td>0.257 (0.439)</td>
<td>0.202 (0.402)</td>
<td>0.0549 (0.0462)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Japanese neighborhood</td>
<td>0.190 (0.393)</td>
<td>0.180 (0.384)</td>
<td>0.00964 (0.0208)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>occ: professional, technical</td>
<td>0.0845 (0.279)</td>
<td>0.0549 (0.228)</td>
<td>0.0296 (0.0237)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>occ: manager, administrator</td>
<td>0.0634 (0.245)</td>
<td>0.127 (0.334)</td>
<td>-0.0638** (0.0305)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>occ: clerical, sales</td>
<td>0.141 (0.349)</td>
<td>0.212 (0.409)</td>
<td>-0.0711* (0.0385)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>occ: craftsmen, operative</td>
<td>0.134 (0.342)</td>
<td>0.125 (0.331)</td>
<td>0.00911 (0.0326)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>occ: laborers, service</td>
<td>0.148 (0.356)</td>
<td>0.0748 (0.263)</td>
<td>0.0731** (0.0284)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>occ: farmers</td>
<td>0.430 (0.497)</td>
<td>0.406 (0.492)</td>
<td>0.0231 (0.0482)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>lives in California</td>
<td>0.296 (0.457)</td>
<td>0.767 (0.423)</td>
<td>-0.470*** (0.0220)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>lives in Washington</td>
<td>0.0746 (0.263)</td>
<td>0.132 (0.338)</td>
<td>-0.0572*** (0.0165)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>lives in Oregon</td>
<td>0.0262 (0.160)</td>
<td>0.0511 (0.220)</td>
<td>-0.0249** (0.0106)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>lives in Arizona</td>
<td>0.0323 (0.177)</td>
<td>0.00407 (0.0636)</td>
<td>0.0282*** (0.00513)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>lives elsewhere</td>
<td>0.571 (0.495)</td>
<td>0.0465 (0.211)</td>
<td>0.524*** (0.0152)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

N 537 1758 2295

Notes: Computed using JARP survey. Difference in means significance levels: * 0.10 ** 0.05 *** 0.01. Neighborhood, occupation, and state of residence variables refer to the time period 1932-1941.
Table 5: Effect of internment on income - DiD estimates

(a) Baseline

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>CH + JP</th>
<th>CH only</th>
<th>JP only</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>( \hat{\beta} )</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(1)</td>
<td>(2)</td>
<td>(3)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>[556.56^{***}]</td>
<td>482.47^{***}</td>
<td>515.42</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(149.11)</td>
<td>(151.45)</td>
<td>(336.45)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td>no</td>
<td>no</td>
<td>no</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Location</td>
<td>no</td>
<td>no</td>
<td>no</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>( \bar{Y}: \text{int};post )</td>
<td>4416</td>
<td>4416</td>
<td>4416</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% change</td>
<td>14.4</td>
<td>12.3</td>
<td>13.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Observations</td>
<td>27006</td>
<td>25804</td>
<td>17585</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(b) Education

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>CH + JP</th>
<th>CH only</th>
<th>JP only</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>( \hat{\beta} )</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(1)</td>
<td>(2)</td>
<td>(3)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>[761.80^{***}]</td>
<td>707.40^{***}</td>
<td>551.17</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(179.83)</td>
<td>(184.05)</td>
<td>(400.10)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td>yes</td>
<td>yes</td>
<td>yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Location</td>
<td>no</td>
<td>no</td>
<td>no</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>( \bar{Y}: \text{int};post )</td>
<td>4217</td>
<td>4217</td>
<td>4217</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% change</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>20.2</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Observations</td>
<td>23965</td>
<td>22780</td>
<td>15316</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(c) Location

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>CH + JP</th>
<th>CH only</th>
<th>JP only</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>( \hat{\beta} )</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(1)</td>
<td>(2)</td>
<td>(3)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>[387.16^{**}]</td>
<td>362.83^{**}</td>
<td>349.85</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(151.18)</td>
<td>(152.35)</td>
<td>(369.92)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td>no</td>
<td>no</td>
<td>no</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Location</td>
<td>yes</td>
<td>yes</td>
<td>yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>( \bar{Y}: \text{int};post )</td>
<td>4416</td>
<td>4416</td>
<td>4416</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% change</td>
<td>9.6</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>8.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Observations</td>
<td>27006</td>
<td>25804</td>
<td>17585</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(d) Education and location

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>CH + JP</th>
<th>CH only</th>
<th>JP only</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>( \hat{\beta} )</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(1)</td>
<td>(2)</td>
<td>(3)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>[601.42^{***}]</td>
<td>583.30^{***}</td>
<td>478.33</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(183.22)</td>
<td>(183.74)</td>
<td>(432.49)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td>yes</td>
<td>yes</td>
<td>yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Location</td>
<td>yes</td>
<td>yes</td>
<td>yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>( \bar{Y}: \text{int};post )</td>
<td>4217</td>
<td>4217</td>
<td>4217</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% change</td>
<td>16.6</td>
<td>16.1</td>
<td>12.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Observations</td>
<td>23965</td>
<td>22780</td>
<td>15316</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Point estimates and bootstrap standard errors of the DiD coefficient of Equation 5 in the text, varying the choice of control group and regressors. * 0.10 ** 0.05 *** 0.01. Dependent variable is annual total income in 1950 dollars. All specifications control for age and birthplace. Observations weighted by person weights and labor supply. Education is a dummy variable controlling for high school completion. Location controls for time-invariant fixed effects of 5 U.S. partitions as described in the text. Males, 1896-1924 birth cohorts who worked at least 26 week during the past year. Specifications controlling for education exclude 1920-1924 birth cohorts. Columns (1) include Japanese in continental U.S. and Chinese in the West Coast (AZ, CA, OR, and WA). Columns (2) exclude Japanese with zero probability of internment. Columns (3) exclude Chinese. \( \bar{Y}: \text{int}\;post \) is average total income for internees in 1950-60. % change computed as \( \frac{(\bar{Y}: \text{int}\;post) - \hat{\beta}}{\bar{Y}: \text{int}\;post} \times 100 \).
Table 7: Intergenerational income correlation: OLS estimates

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Linear</th>
<th>Quadratic</th>
<th>(1)</th>
<th>(2)</th>
<th>(3)</th>
<th>(4)</th>
<th>(5)</th>
<th>(6)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Parents’ income</td>
<td>Parents’ income</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0.0946***</td>
<td>0.1266***</td>
<td>0.0920***</td>
<td>0.1344***</td>
<td>0.1259***</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.0343)</td>
<td>(0.0338)</td>
<td>(0.0401)</td>
<td>(0.0390)</td>
<td>(0.0390)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Parents’ income × internment</td>
<td>Parents’ income × internment</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>-0.0541</td>
<td>-0.0687*</td>
<td>-0.0620</td>
<td>-0.0808*</td>
<td>-0.0821*</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.0410)</td>
<td>(0.0405)</td>
<td>(0.0475)</td>
<td>(0.0460)</td>
<td>(0.0452)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Parents’ income²</td>
<td>Parents’ income²</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0.0072</td>
<td>-0.0225</td>
<td>-0.0236</td>
<td>(0.0361)</td>
<td>(0.0349)</td>
<td>(0.0346)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.0431)</td>
<td>(0.0408)</td>
<td>(0.0392)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Parents’ income² × internment</td>
<td>Parents’ income² × internment</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0.0250</td>
<td>0.0354</td>
<td>0.0374</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.0431)</td>
<td>(0.0408)</td>
<td>(0.0392)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: Dependent variable is log annual family income at time of interview. JARP second generation respondents. Income computed as midpoint of reported income bracket. Parents’ income also measured in JARP survey as midpoint of reported brackets. Parents’ income residualized of age, internment, and year of interview effects. Internment equals one if respondent reports having been interned in a WRA camp. Demographic controls include sex of respondent and a quadratic in age. Education control is a dummy indicating high school attainment of respondent. Robust standard errors clustered at the family (parent) level. * 0.10 ** 0.05 *** 0.01.
Appendix - Additional Figures and Tables

Figure A1: Asian immigration to the U.S., by decade


Note: From 1820-67, figures represent alien passengers arrived at seaports; from 1868-91 and 1895-97, immigrant aliens arrived; from 1892-94 and 1898-2001, immigrant aliens admitted for permanent residence. From 1892-1903, aliens entering by cabin class were not counted as immigrants. Land arrivals were not completely enumerated until 1908.
Figure A2: Removal notice

WESTERN DEFENSE COMMAND AND FOURTH ARMY
WARTIME CIVIL CONTROL ADMINISTRATION
Presidio of San Francisco, California
May 9, 1942

INSTRUCTIONS TO ALL PERSONS OF
JAPANESE ANCESTRY
Living in the Following Area:

All persons of the following areas in California State Highway No. 2 (Angeles Crest Highway), north of the north of State Highway No. 2, all persons within the area bounded by the

Pursuant to the provisions of Civilian Exclusion Order No. 34, this Headquarters, dated May 9, 1942, all persons of Japanese ancestry, both alien and non-aliens, will be evacuated from the area by 12 o'clock noon, P.W.T., Friday, May 15, 1942.

Instructions to All Persons of Japanese Ancestry

1. Give advice and instructions on the evacuation.

2. Provide services with respect to the management, leasing, sale, storage or other disposition of most kinds of property, such as real estate, business and personal equipment, household goods, boats, automobiles and livestock.

3. Provide temporary residence elsewhere for all Japanese in family groups.

4. Transport persons and limited amount of clothing and equipment to their new residence.

The Following Instructions Must Be Observed:

1. A responsible member of each family, preferably the head of the family, or the person in whose name most of the property is held, and each individual member of the family, will report to the Civil Control Station at X (address), on May 15, 1942.

2. Those persons who are unable to carry their belongings with them must report to the Assembly Center at Y (address), on May 15, 1942.

3. Refugees must carry with them on departure for the Assembly Center, the following property:

   a. Bedding and linens (to mosquito) for each member of the family.

   b. Toilet articles for each member of the family.

   c. Extra clothing for each member of the family.

   d. Sufficient knives, forks, spoons, plates, bowls and cups for each member of the family.

   e. Essential personal effects for each member of the family.

4. All items must be securely packed, tied and plainly marked with the name and address of the owner. The name and address will be recorded in accordance with instructions obtained at the Civil Control Station. The size and number of packages is limited to that which can be carried by the individual or family group.

5. No pets of any kind will be permitted.

6. No personal items and household goods will be shipped to the Assembly Center.

7. The United States Government will provide food, clothing and other necessary items for the duration of the evacuation. The Government will provide transportation to the Assembly Center for all persons of Japanese ancestry.

**Figure A3:** Location of the 10 internment camps

![Map of the United States with locations of internment camps](image)

**Figure A4:** Diorama of Manzanar camp, CA

*Note: Diorama created by Robert Y. Hasuike, Lance Matsushita, Dennis Masai, and Jerry Teshima. Japanese American National Museum (2017).*
Figure A5: Mess hall

Figure A6: Location of former internees who changed state of residence

Note: 1st and 2nd generation JARP respondents. Main state of residence in 1946-52 for former internees who changed state of residence with respect to 1932-41. The darker bar portions indicate the fraction of those who had been interned in their new state of residence. Camp of internment is only observed in JARP for 1st generation respondents. For the purposes of this Figure, I assign 2nd generation respondents the camp in which their parents were interned.
Figure A7: Japanese and Chinese population
Males, 1896-1924 cohorts, West Coast

Note: Total count of individuals of Japanese or Chinese race in each Census year. Includes males, born between 1896 and 1924, residing in the states of Washington, Oregon, California and Arizona. Excludes potential international migrants using migration and place of birth questions from the 1950 and 1960 Censuses. 1950 and 1960 are samples of the full Census, so these figures are computed using person weights for those years.
Figure A8: Occupational income score trends

Note: Average occupational income score in 1950 dollars, by likelihood of internment. Likely interned are those Japanese with estimated probability of internment greater than .75. Not likely interned are those Japanese with estimated probability of internment less than .25. These two groups include 92 percent of the Japanese sample. Probability of internment estimated as explained in the text. Chinese residing in West Coast States (CA, WA, OR, and AZ). Labor supply weights are used. Male, 1896-1924 birth cohorts in 1930, and 1940 Census.
Figure A9: Residual income distribution, 1940

Note: Kernel density and average (vertical lines) of residual income in 1940 Census. Residuals from a regression of annual total income on birthplace dummies, a quadratic of age, and a high school completion dummy. Includes males, born between 1896 and 1924. Labor supply weights are used. West Coast refers to California, Washington, Oregon, and Arizona. Other refers to remaining continental U.S.

Figure A10: Occupational distribution, 1940

Note: Proportion of each group in each occupational category in 1940. Labor supply weights are used. Includes males, born between 1896 and 1924. Labor supply weights are used. West Coast refers to California, Washington, Oregon, and Arizona. Other refers to remaining continental U.S.
**Figure A11:** Mean probability of internment by state and Census year

Note: Average estimated probability of internment for individuals of Japanese origin in different Censuses and states of residence. Probability of internment estimated as explained in the text.

**Figure A12:** Home ownership rate, interned and not interned Japanese Americans

Note: 1st generation JARP respondents. Home ownership rate for interned and non-interned respondents at different points in time. 95% confidence intervals computed using robust standard errors from regressing a dummy for home ownership on an internment dummy.
### Table A1: Effect of internment on log income - DiD estimates

#### (a) Baseline

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>CH + JP</th>
<th>CH only</th>
<th>JP only</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(1)</td>
<td>(2)</td>
<td>(3)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>( \hat{\beta} )</td>
<td>0.1368*</td>
<td>0.1114</td>
<td>0.1838*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.0765)</td>
<td>(0.0782)</td>
<td>(0.1000)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td>no</td>
<td>no</td>
<td>no</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Location</td>
<td>no</td>
<td>no</td>
<td>no</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>( Y: \text{int, post} )</td>
<td>4482</td>
<td>4482</td>
<td>4482</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% change</td>
<td>14.7</td>
<td>11.8</td>
<td>20.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Observations</td>
<td>26271</td>
<td>25116</td>
<td>17015</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

#### (b) Education

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>CH + JP</th>
<th>CH only</th>
<th>JP only</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(1)</td>
<td>(2)</td>
<td>(3)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>( \hat{\beta} )</td>
<td>0.2409**</td>
<td>0.2187**</td>
<td>0.2463*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.1057)</td>
<td>(0.1084)</td>
<td>(0.1495)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td>yes</td>
<td>yes</td>
<td>yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Location</td>
<td>no</td>
<td>no</td>
<td>no</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>( Y: \text{int, post} )</td>
<td>4274</td>
<td>4274</td>
<td>4274</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% change</td>
<td>27.2</td>
<td>24.4</td>
<td>27.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Observations</td>
<td>23333</td>
<td>22182</td>
<td>14830</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

#### (c) Location

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>CH + JP</th>
<th>CH only</th>
<th>JP only</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(1)</td>
<td>(2)</td>
<td>(3)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>( \hat{\beta} )</td>
<td>0.0988</td>
<td>0.0838</td>
<td>0.1669*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.0741)</td>
<td>(0.0775)</td>
<td>(0.1010)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td>no</td>
<td>no</td>
<td>no</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Location</td>
<td>yes</td>
<td>yes</td>
<td>yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>( Y: \text{int, post} )</td>
<td>4482</td>
<td>4482</td>
<td>4482</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% change</td>
<td>10.4</td>
<td>8.7</td>
<td>18.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Observations</td>
<td>26271</td>
<td>25116</td>
<td>17015</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

#### (d) Education and location

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>CH + JP</th>
<th>CH only</th>
<th>JP only</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(1)</td>
<td>(2)</td>
<td>(3)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>( \hat{\beta} )</td>
<td>0.1986*</td>
<td>0.1879*</td>
<td>0.2376</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.1031)</td>
<td>(0.1071)</td>
<td>(0.1509)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td>yes</td>
<td>yes</td>
<td>yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Location</td>
<td>yes</td>
<td>yes</td>
<td>yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>( Y: \text{int, post} )</td>
<td>4274</td>
<td>4274</td>
<td>4274</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% change</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>20.7</td>
<td>26.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Observations</td>
<td>23333</td>
<td>22301</td>
<td>14830</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Note:** Point estimates and bootstrap standard errors of the DiD coefficient of Equation 5 in the text, varying the choice of control group and regressors. * 0.10 ** 0.05 *** 0.01. Dependent variable is log annual total income in 1950 dollars. All specifications control for age and birthplace. Observations weighted by person weights and labor supply. Education is a dummy variable controlling for high school completion. Location controls for time-invariant fixed effects of 5 U.S. partitions as described in the text. Male, 1896-1924 cohorts. Specifications controlling for education exclude 1920-1924 birth cohorts. Columns (1) include Japanese in continental U.S. and Chinese in the West Coast (AZ, CA, OR, and WA). Columns (2) exclude Japanese with zero probability of internment. Columns (3) exclude Chinese. \( Y: \text{int, post} \) is average total income for internees in 1950-60. % change computed as \( (\exp(\hat{\beta}) - 1) \cdot 100 \).
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Hours worked</th>
<th>Weeks worked</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>CH + JP</td>
<td>CH only</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(1)</td>
<td>(2)</td>
<td>(3)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Baseline</td>
<td>0.53</td>
<td>0.52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.81)</td>
<td>(0.83)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td>1.89*</td>
<td>1.93*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(1.02)</td>
<td>(1.04)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Location</td>
<td>0.95</td>
<td>0.92</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.81)</td>
<td>(0.84)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education and location</td>
<td>2.25**</td>
<td>2.29**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(1.00)</td>
<td>(1.04)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: Each cell corresponds to a different regression. Point estimates and bootstrap standard errors of the DiD coefficient of Equation 5 in the text, varying the choice of control group and regressors. * 0.10 ** 0.05 *** 0.01. In columns 1-3 the dependent variable is hours worked last week (week prior to each year’s Census). In columns 5-6 the dependent variable is weeks worked last year. Both hours and weeks in the Census are originally intervalled (WKSWORK2 and HRSWORK2). I assign each individual the midpoint of his hours/weeks interval. All specifications control for age and birthplace. Observations weighted using person weights. I include observations with dependent variable greater than zero. Education is a dummy variable controlling for high school completion. Location controls for time-invariant fixed effects of 5 U.S. partitions as described in the text. Male, 1896-1924 cohorts. Specifications controlling for education exclude 1920-1924 birth cohorts. Columns 1 and 4 include Japanese in continental U.S. and Chinese in the West Coast (AZ, CA, OR, and WA). Columns 2 and 5 exclude Japanese with zero probability of internment. Columns 3 and 6 exclude Chinese.