Aristotle on Thises, Suches and the Third Man Argument

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Framework Questions

According to Aristotle, questions concerning the basic framework within which a science proceeds are radically different from questions concerning the nature, existence and attributes of various kinds within a science. The former are pre-scientific and can only be dealt with dialectically. Dialectic is not itself a science, yet it provides the "path to the principles of all inquiries" (Top. 101b4). These principles cannot be discussed within the sciences on pain of regress or petitio principii, since they are the prōtai, the "firsts," of everything within them (Top. 101a36-101b4). Thus, it could only be the business of dialectic and not of any science to consider whether we should speak of "thises" (tode ti) and "suches" (toionde) and whether there are substances and qualities and quantities (Phys. 185a27-8). In a science, on the other hand, we ask such questions as: "Does the sun suffer eclipse?" "What causes an earthquake?" "Are there centaurs?" and "What is man?" (An. Post. B.1).

Quine has pointed out that a radical distinction between framework questions and questions within the sciences is "of little concern ... apart from the adoption of something like the (Russellian) theory of types." Without some such theory, there will be no distinction in principle between such questions as "Are there properties?" and "Are there substances" on the one hand, and "Are there centaurs?" on the other. With the adoption of some such type theory, however, although we can't know in advance, for example, what particular species there are, we can know that whatever we come across in the world will be assignable to one of an antecedently determined number of categories, so the division will make sense. There will be fundamental segregations of expression and entities, and attempts to violate type distinctions will lead to absurdity and paradox.

In light of Quine's insight, it is perhaps not surprising to discover that a type distinction emerges early and remains fundamental throughout Aristotle's work. I owe notice of it to Terry Penner. It is the distinction between a this (tode ti) and a such (toionde or sometimes poion), as Aristotle sometimes puts it. I shall assume that it is the same distinction he has in mind in charging Plato with trying to turn universals (katholou) into particulars (e.g. Met. 1038b34-1039a2, 1040b23-31, 1041a4, 1053b9-24,
Thises are portrayed by Aristotle as substances, individual rather than common or universal, separate, the subjects of which species-forms and praedicata from other categories are predicated, the subjects of accidental change, prior to their attributes and modifications, determinate and, in at least most cases, capable of acting as efficient causes. For example, Socrates, Bucephalus and the First Mover are thises. Suches are common or universal, inseparable, not genuine subjects of change or predication, predicated of the thises, dependent, not able to act as efficient causes. They include the species and genera of substances as well as praedicata from non-substance categories. The contrast is drawn especially clearly using these terms at Soph. El 178b36, 179a8-10; Met. 1003a9, 1033b9ff., 1034a6, 1038b23ff., 34ff. 1039a32. See also Cat.3b10, An. Post. 71a20, 73b7; Phys. 191a12; De Caelo 278a12; GC 317b7-12, 21-22, 26-28, 31-33; De An. 402a27, 410a14, 416b13; Met. 1001b32, 1014a15-25, 1029a28, 1030a3-5, b11, 1033b19-23, 1038b24, 34-36, 1042b3, 1060b1, 21-22, 1069b11, 1070a9-30, 1086a25-b11, 16-27, 1087a18, 1089b23-25.

After mentioning some type distinctions in recent thought, I shall argue that understanding the this-such distinction as a distinction of logical type that is allied with these enables us to give a plausible account of Aristotle's response to the Third Man Argument, one which avoids the difficulties of some other important interpretations. I shall then indicate, more briefly, how reading the distinction in this way also helps to illuminate a number of otherwise perplexing passages. Such considerations constitute evidence for the correctness of so understanding it.

Type Distinctions in Some Recent Thinkers

When I say that in contrasting thises and suches as he does, Aristotle is forging a type distinction, I have in mind certain aspects of Russell's theory of simple types, given a realistic interpretation. These are, in particular, its assumption of the dependent, incomplete character of entities above the level of particulars and its strict prohibition of mixed types, the latter in contrast to some other set theories, of which Zermelo-Frankel's is perhaps best known. I do not mean to suggest that Aristotle developed all the paraphernalia of Russell's theory, which itself underwent a number of revisions. That theory involves a complex hierarchy, but it is not clear that in his talk of thises and suches Aristotle envisions more than two basic
types or levels. Thus, I prefer to speak of a type distinction rather than a full-fledged theory of types in Aristotle’s case.

Russell’s theory is often discussed in connection with the vicious circle principle, but Gödel has pointed out that it is, in fact, independent of that principle and of the rejection of self-reflexivity in general. Rather, the key idea on which Russell bases his theory of simple types is very similar to Frege’s view that what is predicated of particular objects is something incomplete, dependent, requiring supplementation, and thus radically different from those individuals. Frege speaks of functions and concepts as “incomplete” (unvollständig, ergänzungsbedürftig) or “unsaturated” (ungesättigt). Insofar as Frege’s distinction between concept and object does not suggest the elaborate baggage of Russell’s theory, the comparison of Aristotle with Frege may be more apt. At any rate, the core idea that the entities predicated of particulars, unlike particulars themselves, are incomplete and dependent is a significant feature in the work of each man. It is clearly also important in Aristotle’s thought about suches. For example, according to Aristotle, a quality is always a quality of something, but individual organisms are not similarly dependent on anything else.

Both Frege and Russell realize that difficulties arise when one wishes to speak about the incomplete entities. In response to a challenge by his contemporary Benno Kerry, Frege claims that a concept can never serve as more than a grammatical subject (thus committing himself to the truth of the paradoxical sentence “The concept horse is not a concept”). Russell expresses disagreement with Frege on this point in an appendix to The Principles of Mathematics (rev. ed., 1938). He (at least sometimes) believes that the incomplete entities can themselves serve as subjects about which assertions can be made, although never at the zero-level and thus never in conjunction with particulars, which are the fundamental logical subjects. In this respect, I believe that Aristotle is closer to Russell than to Frege. I take it that Aristotle assumes that in the statements, “Bucephalus is black” and “Black is [a] color,” “black” stands for the same entity, but that the second is viewed by him as somewhat analogous to what we now would call a sentence in second-order quantification. See Cat. 1-5. It is worth noting that Frege also remarks that even if such a view were correct, the “distinction between what can occur only as an object and everything else” would be “very important to recognize” (p. 44).

Because these entities are so radically different, what is predicated of individuals cannot itself function in reality and in scientific discourse alongside real individuals. What is predicated of an individual is not another individual, and failure to recognize this leads to difficulties. The
world is seen as so structured that particulars, which comprise one type, occupy a different level from what is predicated of them, another type. The types are compartmentalized in such a way as to prohibit mixed types and this regimentation is not a contingent matter.

It may be helpful also to look briefly at some informal discussions of type distinctions influenced by Russell's theory in order to get an idea how a distinction of logical type might be articulated apart from the formal apparatus accompanying the distinction of Russell. The compartmentalization just noted is often expressed as a prohibition against conjunction of certain terms or entities or against counting an item of one type with those of another.

Gilbert Ryle, for example, claims that "when two terms belong to the same category, it is proper to construct conjunctive propositions embodying them." In contrast, it is "absurd" to conjoin items of different logical types. To do this is to allocate mistakenly those items "to logical types to which they do not belong." (p. 16) Ryle gives a number of illustrations of such "illegitimate" conjunctions, some of which are especially apt for the purposes of this paper.

1. He speaks of the poor foreigner touring Oxford who innocently assumes it is "correct to speak of Christ Church, the Bodleian Library, the Ashmolean Museum, and the University, to speak, that is, as if 'the University' stood for an extra member of the class of which these other units are members. He was mistakenly allocating the University to the same category as that to which the other institutions belong." (p. 16)

2. He describes a child watching a military parade who asks when the division will appear. According to Ryle, "he would be supposing that a division was a counterpart to the units already seen" whereas, in fact, "the march-past was not a parade of battalions, batteries, squadrons and a division; it was a parade of the battalions, batteries and squadrons of a division." (p. 17)

3. "... A purchaser may say that he bought a left-hand glove and a right-hand glove, but not that he bought a left-hand glove, a right-hand glove and a pair of gloves." (p. 22)

4. It is "perfectly proper to say in one logical tone of voice"
   (a) There exist minds
   and to say in "another logical tone of voice"
   (b) There exist bodies
   but it is not proper, indeed it is nonsense to say
   (c) There exist both minds and bodies. (p. 23)
Ryle also often remarks of some $F$ which is allegedly of a different logical type from $a$ and $b$ that it is not a “third thing”, not “collateral” or “supplementary” to the others (pp. 16-17 *inter alia*). He makes the general claim, “To say that a term is of such and such a type or category is to say something about its ‘logical behaviour’, namely, about the entailments and compatibilities of the propositions into which it enters. We can only show that terms are not of one type by exhibiting their logical misbehaviour when treated alike.” (p. 123, “Plato’s...”)

P. T. Geach criticizes Quine for speaking as though we could try to list everything there is and claims, “No list can include ‘Jemima’ and ‘tabby’ side by side. ‘Jemima and tabby’ is senseless. We cannot make a list of kinds of entity, as if they were so many animal species. *Ens non est genus.*” Quine rightly responds in the same symposium, “Evidently Mr. Geach is impelled here by something like the Theory of Types.” (p. 158)

In “Complex and Fact” Wittgenstein remarks:

To say that a red circle is *composed of* redness and circularity, or is a complex with these component parts, is a misuse of these words and is misleading. (Frege was aware of this and told me). It is just as misleading to say that the fact that this circle is red (that I am tired) is a complex whose component parts are a circle and redness (myself and tiredness). Neither is a house a complex of bricks and their spatial relations; i.e. that too goes against the correct use of the word.

An illustration employed by Wilfrid Sellars in discussion of Geach’s article mentioned above suggests another way of exhibiting the distinction. One might claim it is true that

(a) There is something (namely playful) Jack and Sue both are
and it is true that

(b) There is something (namely that beach ball) Jack and Sue both throw
yet stoutly refuse to license the inference from these to

(c) We are talking about two things (namely playful and that beach ball) in (a) and (b)
and insist that (c) is nonsensical or ill-formed.

These ways of talking sound very much like Aristotle, and I suggest this is not a philosophical (nor an historical) accident. For example, he often claims that the form of a house is not another collateral element alongside the bricks and boards (see e.g. *Met.*Z.17 and H.2-3) and he refuses to countenance the idea that something could be formed from “a quantum and a quale and a substance,” insisting that “all that can be made out of the elements of a quantum is a quantum, not a substance” (*De An*. 410a20-22).
He inveighs against such conjunctions explicitly using the language of thises and suches. E.g., he complains that if, as the Platonic view of forms would require, "we are to be allowed to lay it down that a common predicate is a this and a single thing, Socrates will be several things, himself and man and animal, if each of these indicates a this and a single thing." (Met. B. 6. 1003a9-12)

We ought to wonder why Aristotle makes such philosophical moves. Why, for example, should we not say that Socrates, man and animal are three things or that Socrates and white are two, albeit the items are very different things? Apart from adherence to a type restriction of the relevant sort, Aristotle's repudiation of such claims is at least perplexing if not ridiculous or blatantly mistaken.

I want now to say a bit more about the particular sort of type restriction which I take Aristotle to be imposing with his talk of thises and suches, since it seems to me to differ in interesting ways from those of the more recent thinkers I have surveyed, although it shares the common elements I have already mentioned. 20

In some of the discussions of type distinctions most familiar to analytic philosophers, e.g. those of Ryle and Russell and others who react to them, it is assumed that any term grammatically predicated of items of different types must have a different sense in each of those predications. The difference in logical type of the subject items is seen as forcing this ambiguity. Thus, Ryle claims that "rising" has different senses in "The tide is rising," "Hopes are rising" and "The average age of death is rising" (p. 23). On Russell's theory every predicate has associated with it a limited range of significance. The predicate is true or false of all and only the entities in that range; it is not meaningful to predicate it of others. Any predicate which appears to be meaningfully predicated of objects at more than one level is actually ambiguous and represents different properties.

Some passages in Aristotle have been read as suggesting similar restrictions on ranges of significance of predicates. For example, G. E. L. Owen offers such an interpretation of an argument against Platonic forms in the Topics at 143b11-32. 21 The argument does not employ the terminology of thises and suches but is clearly relevant. Owen claims that in this passage Aristotle recognizes that a genus is not a proper subject of some predicates. In Aristotle's mind it is a length and not the genus length that must either have or lack breadth, according to Owen. In Topics A.15 Aristotle also offers a number of examples which have been taken to indicate that the same term must be ambiguous when applied to individual substances in contrast to secondary substances or items in non-substance categories. E.g.
Aristotle there seems to claim that "clear" as applied to a body signifies a colour but in regard to a note what is easy to hear (107a12-13) and that "sharp" is homonymous in signifying notes and solids or daggers (107a13-17, b23-25). Moreover, in his general discussion of change in Phys. III Aristotle emphatically denies that there is anything common to thises and the non-substance categories, in spite of appearances to the contrary (200b33-201a3). This may be thought to provide evidence for different senses of "motion" and of "change". Routley and Routley, for example, have argued that "full exclusiveness of categories is tantamount to systematic [typical] ambiguity used systematically," although they do not discuss Aristotle specifically. Moreover, the general characterization of change or motion given a few lines later seems to be viewed by him as a kind of schema to be filled in and applied analogically.

I do not believe that such passages provide conclusive evidence that every predicate meaningfully applicable to both thises and suches must be used in a different sense. There are a number of other instances with regard to which it would be implausible to try to argue that some predicate used by Aristotle of both thises and suches is used in different senses. For example, Aristotle makes a point of arguing in the De Caelo that the universe "must be counted among particulars" (278a10ff.) and in following passages he argues at length that it is also ungenerated. In Met.Z.8-9 (inter alia) he maintains that the form man is ungenerated. There seems no reason to believe that he has changed his mind about the truth, let alone the meaningfulness, of these two claims between the two works. Surely, it is unreasonable to hold that he believes that "ungenerated" is used in one sense of the universe and in another of the form man. Nor does the term seem to mark a framework notion to be invoked only in contexts outside and propaedeutic to the sciences. In a similar vein, he seems to assume at Cat.1b10-13 that "animal" is unambiguous in "Man is animal" and "Socrates is animal" where "man" must stand for the species or form (see below p.227). There is also some reason to believe that our "is" of identity is seen by the ancient Greeks, including Aristotle, as an "is" of predication. If so, it looks as if Aristotle will see both "man" and "Socrates" as capable of forming not only meaningful but true statements when inserted into the sentence frame "— is man" whereas on the Russell-Ryle view items of different types can never replace one another in the same sentence frame.

Are we then to conclude, after all, that Aristotle cannot be treating his distinction between thises and suches as a distinction of logical type? It would seem that if he is willing to accept the truth of claims of the form "a is F" and of the form "F is F" where F is unambiguous, he ought also to
license the inference to "a and F are F" and indeed to consider this claim not only meaningful but true. Nevertheless, we ought to be reluctant to give up the idea that he is employing a type distinction for, as we have already seen, some of his important assertions are strongly suggestive of such a distinction and it is very hard to see what other reason he might have for making them. Of course, he might simply be confused. I shall argue, however, that the fact that he regards some predicates as unambiguous in their application to thises and suches does not require us to draw this conclusion, although clearly it does indicate a notable divergence from Russell, Ryle and others.

In the first place, it may be noted that the problem that Ryle and others see with the conjunctions mentioned above cannot be simply a matter of the ambiguity of just any predicate term. With most predicates we readily resolve ambiguity without introducing distinctions of logical type. We can say "hot" has a different sense in "This crepe is hot" and "This pepper is hot". The words for "hot" in these two cases are different in Chinese, and we could subscript them in English as "hot\text{temp}\) and "hot\text{spicy}\). Not even Ryle, who is prone to find a category mistake under every bush, would say that in distinguishing these senses we are thereby supposing that the crepe and the pepper are of different logical types. It has been a common and damaging response to Ryle and Russell to supply terms that are intuitively clearly applicable without change of sense to items of allegedly different types, such as "is interesting" and "is thought about."

Ryle also does not claim that these conjunctions are mistaken because any predicate grammatically attributed to the items so conjoined must be ambiguous.\footnote{Ryle also does not claim that these conjunctions are mistaken because any predicate grammatically attributed to the items so conjoined must be ambiguous.} He says rather, with regard to case (1) for example, that the mistake lay in speaking as if "the University’ stood for an extra member of the class of which these other units are members" (p. 16).

We also sometimes find strictures on conjunction or counting being imposed without requiring that every predicate applicable to all the subjects in question be different in sense in those applications. For example, P. T. Geach urges that a predicate $P$ may sometimes be truly and unambiguously predicated severally of both $d$ and the members of a set $\alpha$ of $P$'s even though it makes "very good logical sense" to say that "we cannot infer that ‘$P$’ in the plural is predicable... of $d$ and the members of $\alpha$; for it depends on your set theory whether you allow there is such a set at all."\footnote{Geach also thinks that some medieval theologians would accept as true "God is wise" and "Plato is wise" yet disallow the inference from these to "God and Plato are wise," considering the latter ill-formed even though they apply to both.}
they would claim that when “just” and “wise” are said of God, “God really and truly is what we mean by ‘wise’ and ‘just’.”

Such considerations perhaps indicate that we need not leap immediately to the conclusion that Aristotle cannot be embracing a type distinction if we encounter some terms seemingly used unambiguously of thises and suches, even in non-framework contexts. Nevertheless, we are still left wondering how he can sensibly do this; since such a distinction requires transitivity of the relation being of the same type.

An important hint as to how Aristotle thinks of his type distinction comes in Alexander’s report of Aristotle’s response to the Third Man Argument, so I shall turn now to a consideration of that argument in the course of which further clarification and elucidation of the specific nature of Aristotle’s type distinction between thises and suches will emerge.

Constraints on the Interpretation of the Third Man Argument

Perhaps the earliest emergence of the distinction between thises and suches and certainly one of the most persistent and brilliant uses of it comes in Aristotle’s diagnosis of Plato’s susceptibility to the Third Man Argument (hereafter, “TMA”). Plato’s problem, Aristotle urges, stems from his attempt to treat suches as thises. This diagnosis is suggested by Alexander’s report of material from the Peri Ideon (In Met. 84.21-85.7), is offered explicitly in the Soph. El. at 178b36f., and is reiterated at Met. 1038b34-1039a3. It must, therefore, be given a central place in the analysis of Aristotle’s treatment of the TMA. Furthermore, any adequate interpretation of Aristotle’s response must be able to explain why he thinks his own theory of forms is not vulnerable to the TMA although Plato’s is. Finally, since Aristotle’s diagnosis is offered as a general account, one must try to understand it in a way which makes clear why Aristotle is confident that he will always be able to block regresses of the relevant sort, whereas Plato will not. I shall argue that in light of these requirements, a Pennerian interpretation offers the most plausible way of understanding Aristotle’s response to the TMA. That is, Aristotle is introducing a distinction of logical type so as to block the conjunction of individuals and common praedicata.

The generality requirement rules out what might seem to be an easy response to the TMA for Aristotle, especially if he holds that Plato is committed to literal self-predication: Aristotle surely does not believe that the form man is a man so he, like most of us, will consider the claim “Man is a man” in the TMA false. If it is, then the argument is unsound and that
is the end of the matter. But is it? The TMA is not offered as an argument only about man and individual men. Aristotle will not be satisfied to show that this argument works against Plato but not himself if there is another argument using the same schema which demolishes both his own and Plato's theories of forms. If he is taking the line suggested, then he should argue that no common praedicatum can be truly predicated of itself, but he does not. Unlike Russell, he employs no general strictures which would prohibit all such claims and he provides no indication that he thinks reflexive claims are illegitimate in every case.  

It is important to remember that Aristotle needs a general response to the TMA. The worry can be stated as follows: Aristotle believes that there are common praedicata which are other than the individuals of which they are predicated and that we can say true things about them, e.g. “The form man is not generated,” “Red is a color.” He also believes there are particulars and we can say true things about them. Now why can we not simply look around for a praedicatum that can be meaningfully and truly predicated both of some individuals and of some praedicatum with which we begin, perhaps not a horse (see Alexander, In Met. 81.2-5) or pleasing or, as just suggested, ungenerated or animal will do? Once we have it, we shall see that there must be some further common praedicatum (not a horse,?) in virtue of which we recognize that it is meaningfully and truly predicated of this new group, and so on, thus generating a regress, which although it does not involve the common praedicatum man is nevertheless the counterpart of the regress of the Third Man. Even if we cannot come up with some suitable praedicatum right now, how can we guarantee that the fatal claim can never be meaningfully and truly formulated? Why is Aristotle so confident that he can defuse not only the Third Man argument, but all such arguments?

The TMA in the Peri Ideon as Reported by Alexander

Alexander summarizes the assumptions leading to the TMA in the following passage:

The ‘third man’ is also proved in the following way: If that which is truly predicated of a number of things is also something other than the things of which it is predicated, being separated from them..., then there will be some third man. (Those who posit the Forms think they prove that this [praedicatum exists separately]; for according to them the reason why there is something, man-himself, is the fact that man is truly predicated of individual men, who are many, and other than these
individuals). For if the man that is predicated is other than the things of which it is predicated, and exists in its own right (κατ’ ιδιαν ἡπείρος) and if man is predicated both of individual men and of the Forms; there will be some third man in addition to individual men and the Form [of man]. And thus there will be a fourth man as well, which is predicated of this third man and of the Form [of man] and of individual men, and similarly a fifth; and this process continues ad infinitum.\textsuperscript{31}

The assumptions mentioned here as leading to the TMA are the following:

1. Man is truly predicated of a number of things
2. Man is other than those things of which it is predicated
3. Man exists in its own right
4. Man is predicated of the individuals and of the form

It should be noted that “is predicated of” must be taken in the same sense in each of its occurrences in order to generate the regress.

The listing of the third assumption is on the face of it strange, for it seems to be doing no work in the argument. However on the interpretation being advanced here it will turn out that Aristotle locates Plato’s critical mistake in this assumption.\textsuperscript{32} How might Aristotle think it enables him to block the unwanted conjunction of thises and suches?

A helpful hint comes from a remark of Gareth B. Matthews. After providing several contexts in which conjunctions alleged to be meaningless by Ryle turn out to be sensible and noting other difficulties with Ryle’s position, Matthews reflects in a footnote:

I wonder if Ryle doesn’t think of the prohibition against yoking a conjunction of terms of different categories to a single occurrence of the verb “to exist” as underlying the prohibition against mere conjunction. The idea would be that conjunctions, typically, stake out at least implicit existence claims in such a way that the conjunction of hetero-categorical terms would be a case of implicit syllepsis.\textsuperscript{33}

I shall not venture a judgment on the plausibility of Matthews’ conjecture as an interpretation of Ryle, but shall indicate how it might be helpful in trying to understand Aristotle.

One thing it suggests is that it is more important to look for some ambiguities than others. The proponents of type distinctions mentioned above emphasize that there can be no list of things that exist or that there is no genus of being, that individuals are not composed of their properties, that we cannot speak of two things where the items in question are of different types, that one is not a counter-part of the other. We have already noted that Aristotle makes very similar pronouncements. That is, he seems to be in agreement with the following. We may say truly
Socrates exists
Man exists
Socrates is other than man
but still not be able to infer
Socrates and man exist
presumably because “exists” is ambiguous or something close to that (see below pp. 220f.) so that the last claim is ill-formed.\(^{34}\) We may produce a similar chain with “one”, having “Socrates and man are two” as the inference that is not to be permitted. It is clear that Aristotle holds that “exists” and “one” are to be treated in the same way in such respects (see e.g. *Met.* 1003b23f.)

Bearing this in mind, let us pursue Matthews’ comment a bit further and as a first approximation spell out the thought about thises and suches as follows.

(1) Socrates is man
and
(2) Man is man
involve implicit existence claims in which “exists” is ambiguous. This may be brought out by reformulating them:

(1') Socrates exists this and is a man
(2') Man existssuch and is a man
Note that “man” and even the “is man” part of the claim need not be ambiguous in these expansions. Alternatively, one could claim that (1) and (2) entail respectively

(1'') Socrates existssuch
and
(2'') Man existssuch
It is surely plausible to suppose that Aristotle sees (1) and (2) and other such statements as somehow implicitly involving or as entailing existence claims. Charles Kahn has argued at length that the primary use of the verb “be” in ancient Greek is “as copula or sign of predication”, and that its existential use grows out of this as serving to express “*a condition regarded as implicit in the copulative use.*”\(^{35}\) Kahn cites many cases in pre- and extra-philosophical usage, which are clearly mixed copula-existential uses. Since *eimi* as well as many verbs of occurrence commonly do double duty in this way, it is understandable that Aristotle would not think it necessary explicitly to unpack (1) and (2) in the manner of (1’) and (2’).\(^{36}\) There is also evidence in Aristotle’s own works for his commitment to the thesis that existence claims are entailed by predicative ones. At *Categories* 13b18 he remarks, “Neither ‘Socrates is sick’ nor ‘Socrates is well’ is true if there is no
Socrates at all."37 It is well-known that his syllogistic assumes existential import for all the general terms employed in it. This can be seen, for example, in the view that "No man is musical" implies "No musical is man" and that, in turn, implies "Some musical is not man." In the Posterior Analytics he maintains that knowing what x is entails knowing that x is (B.7.92b4-5).38 There is no reason to suppose that in assertions about species, qualities, and other suches, he is not also taking for granted the usual existence claim, provided he believes they exist.39 (On this, see further pp. 220f. below.)

At this point, one anxious to push the TMA might object that even if such existence claims are to be assumed when (1) and (2) are true, they will make no difference to the argument. Aristotle might claim on the basis of them that Plato is committed to the meaningfulness and even the truth of the claim

Socrates and man exist

whereas it is his own view that such a claim is ill-formed. However, one need not formulate such a claim to make the argument go through. Since Aristotle is clearly capable of distinguishing the copulative use of "is" from its existential use, why not simply say that "Socrates is man" entails "Socrates exists\textsubscript{this}" and "Man is man" entails "Man exists\textsubscript{such}" and the truth of these claims is enough to warrant "Socrates and man are man"?

To see why Aristotle thinks he is not forced to make such a move, let us ask what implications he thinks would follow were one to fall into Plato's mistake of supposing man exists in its own right or, as we are now temporarily putting it, that man exists\textsubscript{this}. He indicates that the form man would then license very different inference patterns than it in fact does, so that we would be led into a variety of muddles. In those passages in which he accuses the Platonists of trying to make forms thises, he commonly draws out various unacceptable consequences of this assumption (sometimes in company with a few others). Besides those directly on the TMA, see e.g. Met. 1003a9, 1033b9ff., 1038b23f., 1039a1f., 1039a30, 1039a34, 1039b1-19, 1040a8-9, 1060b1-6, 1086b19-36; cp. GC 317b7-12, De An. 412a20-22. One of his most frequent complaints and one very much to the point here is that we would have to count it with other thises (Met. 1003a9 with Jaeger's emendation, 1038b23-33, 1039a5-6, Z.14, H.6, M.10). One substance would be two or more; substances would be composed of substances; forms would be able to constitute one part or element of some whole and would have such parts or elements themselves; the form animal, supposing it to consist of genus and differentiae, would be "divided against itself"; animal and two-footedness could only be related as things which
are “put together” or “in contact” or “mixed”, Socrates would be several things (himself, man, and animal). Aristotle labels such results absurd (atopos) and impossible (adunatos). He clearly regards the suggestion that Socrates and Callias and the form man might be counted together so as to constitute “several things” or “many things” both as a consequence of supposing forms are thises, i.e. exist independently, and as undeniably ridiculous and unacceptable. They do not form a group of which anything can be predicated. Thus, the first assumption of the TMA does not apply to them and the argument cannot go through. Man is truly predicated of individual men because they do constitute a number of things, but the sense in which each of them is one is different from the sense in which the one over these many is itself one, so it cannot be added to them.40

Perhaps another reason the third assumption seems initially superfluous is that even if one concedes that it could be used to block the regress where the subjects conjoined are thises and suches, it looks as if another similar argument could easily be generated with only suches as subjects, if the other assumptions remain intact. We are now in a position to see why this, too, will not do. The second assumption looks decidedly fishy under these circumstances. It may seem reasonable to insist that what is predicated of particulars should be different from them, but why should this be true in all cases of suches, especially the case in which a such is predicated of itself? If the second assumption is changed to take account of this, the argument will not go through. Aristotle can reasonably maintain that this reaction and subsequent alteration rest on the tacit recognition that suches do not exist in their own right, as basic subjects, i.e. that suches and thises are of distinct logical types.

In short, Aristotle can plausibly hold that the third assumption is at work in the TMA and that he, but not Plato, can block the argument at this point. I take it that (3) also captures a crucial part of what Aristotle finds objectionable about making forms separate.

**Senses vs. kinds**

In discussing how to understand the inclusion of the third assumption, I have been speaking as if Aristotle thinks that “exists” and “one” each have two different senses, and this requires some qualification. First, although I take the this-such distinction to be the fundamental division in Aristotle’s metaphysics, I have already indicated my belief that on the level of suches further categorial restrictions are imposed, so that e.g. “Five-foot” is a
meaningless answer to “Where is Socrates?” However, I cannot argue that here and even if I am wrong, it will not damage my present claim. I mention it only to indicate that I would more strictly subscript the second “exists” not simply as “exists such” but as “exists sec. sub.” and where the argument is put in terms of “large” as “exists quant.” and similarly for the other categories of being.

Second, this way of elaborating what lies behind Aristotle’s restriction may be misleading in so far as it is taken to suggest that Aristotle himself would put his point this way or that he makes an explicit distinction between sense and reference or has a well-developed theory of meaning, for he does not. It seems doubtful even that Greek terms such as σημαίνει and λέγεται πολλά, often glibly translated “means” and “has several meanings” or “is used in various senses” are correctly so translated. Nevertheless, putting his view about thises and suches this way is not without point. The substantive issue here can be approached by asking ‘What is the effect of claiming that something has to do with senses of terms as opposed to kinds of things?’ Or, more specifically, ‘What is the effect of saying that “exists” or “one” has different senses as opposed to holding that there are different kinds of existents or units?’

One important consequence of talking about senses instead of kinds, and the one to which I wish to direct attention here, is to remove certain questions or topics from the arena of scientific inquiry. It is commonly believed that matters of logic and semantics can and should be decided before doing natural science or ethics, for example. Conceptual confusions can and ought to be cleared up and sentences can and ought to be put in proper logical form in advance of the development of science. If an assertion taken literally is conceptually incoherent, one is safe in concluding that there is and could be no such natural unit or no such connection in extra-conceptual reality. This sort of idea is sometimes put by saying it is a mistake to treat a question or a distinction in the “conceptual order” as if it were in the “real order.” (I have heard both Thomists and phenomenologists make this and similar assertions, so the idea is not limited to analytic philosophers.) Thus, in his criticism of Cartesian dualism, Ryle claims that it is a “poor joke” to say “There exist both minds and bodies”. Mental processes and physical processes cannot be conjoined as subjects in the same science. We could not find out that mental states and processes are physical states and processes or vice versa, for even to raise the reductionist’s question is to “presuppose the legitimacy of the disjunction ‘Either there exist minds or there exist bodies (but not both)’” (CM, p. 22).

Unlike Ryle, some thinkers have not found the inability to formulate
within his theory general ontological claims and assertions that seem cen-
tral to the position, such as “Nothing is both a thought and a body” (for 
what is the sense of “is” here?) a point in its favor. It is also a common and 
severe criticism of Russell’s theory of simple types that one cannot formu-
late within the theory certain claims that ought to be not only meaningful 
but true if the theory itself is true. Some may still be convinced that 
“exists,” at least in its ordinary uses, has different senses, yet also want to 
make explicit or to raise questions about the short of claims mentioned. One 
possible move then is to resort to a theory of analogy. Another is to block 
off some area of discourse for such discussions and to treat it as funda-
mentally different from others. I have already mentioned Carnap as an 
example of this, with his basic distinction between “external” and “in-
ternal” questions of existence. The difference between the two sets of 
questions is decidedly not a matter of degree of generality, as Quine notes. 
Within the science a claim such as “There are substances” will be regarded 
as trivially true and established by a different means.

I have said that Aristotle seems somewhat similar to Carnap in this 
regard. It is not that we never find him saying such things as “Substance 
and quality and quantity are” or even “Whiteness will be different from 
what has whiteness” (see e.g. Physics B.2.184b25-3. 187a10). However, such 
remarks are found in places where he is concerned with the question of the 
basic principles and entities required for a science, with the “framework” 
within which it is to be conducted. (If this line of thought is on the right 
track, it also explains why Aristotle would not be bothered by the objection 
raised by Philoponus and Anselm that “is a species” can be “said of” man 
but not of Socrates. (See Cat. 5))

In all these cases, certain matters are removed from scientific inquiry, 
certain questions are settled and certain procedures determined for science 
in advance of its development. Furthermore, it is not just a matter of saying 
that one must, after all, begin with some set or other of assumptions, 
regardless of where one is going to end. Rather, they are sealed off from 
investigation within the sciences. It could not ever be discovered in any 
science that such claims are mistaken. It is these points I have in mind in 
suggesting that Aristotle treats thises and suches as if he thinks they exist in 
different senses. Whether or not the presence of these features in his 
treatment is sufficient by itself to establish that he literally believes there is 
a difference in senses of “exists,” they seem to me to capture what is 
important about such claims for my purposes. It is my contention then that 
Aristotle treats the this-such distinction as something knowable in advance 
of the development of the sciences that can be used as a tool for clarifi-
cation and correction of mistakes but is not such that any discovery within the sciences could call for its revision or indeed have any bearing on it. Mistakes or confusions concerning it are of an altogether different ilk from confusing a whale with a fish. The need for a universal, everlasting guarantee against the dangers of the TMA requires that the this-such distinction be taken as one of logical type and not merely as one of kinds of beings. The latter could not provide such security. Developments in science can show an alleged difference in kind to be incorrect. Type distinctions (supposedly) run no such risk. This feature crucially distinguishes distinctions of logical type (or category) from differences in kind.

In summary, on my reading of Alexander’s report of the TMA, to make the third assumption is to suppose that man, for example, is another individual, a basic logical subject, which can be ranged alongside Socrates and Callias and meaningfully counted with them as subject of further predications. If the this-such distinction is viewed as a distinction of logical type, this will be prohibited, so the regress will not be generated.

This reading need not imply that Plato supposed, or that Aristotle thought Plato supposed, that the form man was another flesh and blood individual. I am not convinced that Plato was ever committed to what has come to be called “literal self-predication” or that Aristotle thought Plato held such a view. According to this doctrine, a Platonic form is a transcendent, paradigmatic member of a class to which it gives its name. E.g. the Platonic form beauty is the one perfectly beautiful member of the class of beautiful things. The issue is vexed and I cannot go into it here. It is important for my purposes, however, to notice that the erection of a type distinction between individual substances and their forms is sufficient for Aristotle to block the TMA against his own theory. Moreover, a conviction on Aristotle’s part that Plato failed to draw such a distinction renders highly plausible his belief that Plato will be forced to succumb to the TMA, whether or not Plato thinks the form man is itself a man or the form large is itself some huge object.43

The TMA in De Sophisticis Elenchis

The interpretation I am advancing of Aristotle’s response to the TMA in the Peri Ideōn as reported by Alexander accords well with his treatment of it in the Soph. El. at 178b36-179a10.44 The passage is difficult, but this much seems clear.

Aristotle opens his discussion there by asserting that “man and every
common [praedicatum] do not signify a this” and he reiterates emphatically the claim that it is treating suches as thises, e.g. “agreeing that [man] is that which a this is,” that “makes the third man.” He draws the following moral from the argument, “It is apparent, then, that one must not grant that what is predicated in common of all is a this: rather it signifies either a quality or a relation or a quantity or something of this sort.” If we relate these comments to the assumptions listed in the Peri Ideôn, they are most naturally understood as explicating the third assumption. They do not seem to bear directly on any of the others. Aristotle again speaks of man as common and speaks generally of what is predicated in common of a number of things, so he is not repudiating the first assumption. He also does not deny but, on the contrary, emphasizes the second assumption. For example, no thises are predicated of anything (Cat. 1b3-5) so treating man as a this could hardly amount to illegitimately predicating man of itself.

His remarks do lend support to the suggestion that it is the third assumption which is crucial and that the this-such distinction ought to be seen as a distinction of logical type. The claim that man is not a this is linked to the idea that Callias cannot exist as man exists. He observes also that “it is not the isolating that makes the third man” (179a3) and that it will not “make any difference if one should say that what is isolated is not that which a this is but that which a quality is” (179a5-7). Nicholas White has suggested that the point of lines 179a3-10, which are plainly a retraction of 178b38-179a3 may be put by saying that

the mere contention that a certain expression stands for or picks out something is not yet to claim the existence of a thing which is subject to the Third Man Regress, whereas by its use of ekthesthai in 179a3, the earlier remark has hastily implied that this contention is already enough to pitch one headlong in the regress. In saying that the fatal plunge comes only when we treat the ekkeimenon as a “this,” Aristotle is plainly alluding to Plato’s view that what is picked out by, e.g., the general term “man” is a man, one more for the census takers to count. Aristotle wants to maintain that we can have an entity picked out by this word, so long as we assign it to the proper category and refrain from calling it a “this”.

Thus again we seem to have the idea that man and Socrates do not constitute a number of things. Suches can be singled out and thises can be singled out but we are not allowed to count them together. There is no group here for man to be predicated of.

That he is here treating the this-such distinction as a distinction of logical type is also suggested by his cataloging the TMA with fallacies due to verbal form. These are described by him as “fallacies that depend on expressing in a similar manner things which are not the same” (178a4-5).
The unwary listener gets into trouble because he thinks things said are similar, although they are not but appear so because of the expression (178a22-24). For example,

"Does a man tread upon what he walks through?" [Yes] "But he walks through a whole day." [The interlocutor] has mentioned not what he walks through but when he walks. (178b31-33)

In the TMA we are presumably misled by the grammar, according to which "man" and "Socrates" play the same role, into thinking man and Socrates really are on a par. However, in this case, the grammatical form does not reveal the logical form, as some recent philosophers might put it. The items are of different logical types, hence cannot be joined as equal partners in scientific discourse. "It is not possible that a this, Callias, should exist as man exists" (179a4-5), Aristotle confidently asserts. We do not know in advance of scientific investigation whether there are swans and centaurs, but we do know that a this cannot be a such nor a such a this. We may not yet have an account of man's essence, but we can be sure that it is a such, not a this. We can say now that we could not discover in any science that the species-form man is an individual.47 Thus, what he deems proper attention to logical grammar leads Aristotle to believe that he can block the TMA when it is aimed at his own theory of forms, whereas Plato's confusion of suches with thises makes his theory its victim.

These remarks should suffice to indicate that this interpretation of Aristotle's response to the TMA is a plausible one. Still, it is not the only way one might try to understand that response. Examination of the inadequacies of some other ways, which have prima facie plausibility, will bring to light further advantages of the present interpretation.

Two Non-Starters: Harmless Regresses and Separation

Although most philosophers now are inclined to tolerate some infinite regresses as harmless, there is little doubt that Aristotle would regard the regress engendered by the TMA as unacceptable. He frequently employs regress arguments himself against other views and he gives no indication that he views any infinite regresses as harmless.48 His aversion to them seems to be rooted in more fundamental epistemological, metaphysical and psychological claims, having to do with the general conviction that reality is knowable.49

One might alternatively suppose that the point of the this-such diagnosis
is simply to show that forms must be immanent, not transcendent. However, if we read the allegation that Plato thinks forms are thises and are separate merely as indicating that Platonic forms are off in some Platonic heaven (whereas Aristotelian forms of sensible objects do not exist apart from particular sensible substances), this will not be enough to get Aristotle’s own theory off the hook of the TMA. Inability to exist apart should not be confused with identity (and is not by Aristotle)\(^5\) and non-identity is sufficient to generate the dreaded regress of the TMA, if the other assumptions noted by Alexander are accepted. It is also clear from Aristotle’s criticisms of Eudoxus of Knidos, who brought the Platonic forms down to earth, so to speak, that he does not see his own theory as differing from Plato’s primarily over the question of where the forms are.\(^5\)

\*Non-Identity*

Observing that non-identity, with the other assumptions, is sufficient to generate the regress, one might be tempted to understand “exists in its own right” not as suggesting an independent assumption but as simply a further gloss on what has come to be called the Non-Identity Assumption and thus to locate Aristotle’s response to the TMA in his rejection of the second assumption listed above. On this reading, Aristotle is a nominalist and is claiming that Plato is wrong to think that “man” and other common predicate-terms stand for anything different from individual men, horses, etc.\(^5\) There is nothing more to the form man than individual men; only individuals really exist. However, Aristotle’s own remarks preclude this interpretation.

In his consideration of the arguments for the forms reported by Alexander, he does not say that they fail to show that there are some things besides perceptible particulars. On the contrary, he says that the arguments from the sciences and the one over many arguments do “tend to show that what is predicated in common is other than the particulars of which it is predicated” (Alex., *In Met.* 81.7-9, cp. 79.15-18). What they fail to show is that the common praedicata are Platonic forms (79.15-18 and 81.7-8). This view is reiterated at *An. Post.* 77a5-9. Moreover, in the *Metaphysics* as well as other works Aristotle not infrequently refers to universals or qualities, or seems to presuppose their existence (see *Cat.* 1b10-15, *De Int.* 7, *An. Post.* 1.27, *Phys.* 185b25-186a1, *Met.* 1003a8-9, Z.13, 1043b1).\(^5\) Robert Heinaman notes, for example, Aristotle’s claim at Z.13.1038b26 that if universals were substances, quality would be prior, and points out that he does not say non-being would be prior.
The passage just cited from the *Categories* shows clearly that Aristotle is not a nominalist at the time of its writing. He says,

...Man is predicated of the individual man and animal of man; so animal will be predicated of the individual man also — for the individual man is both a man and an animal (1b10-13)

In the assertion “animal is predicated of man” he is not referring to the individual man but to the species. That is, he is surely not saying “Animal is predicated of every individual who is a man.” That is a further inference which he draws in the next sentence. Thus, he clearly believes that the common praedicatum man exists and that we can say true things about it.54

*Owen’s Analysis of the TMA*

G. E. L. Owen thinks that Aristotle accepts the so-called Non-Identity Assumption early on in his career but later rejects it for the case of sortal predicates.55 Owen claims that Aristotle at first sees Plato’s failure to distinguish suches from thises as the major cause of his susceptibility to the TMA but later comes to view this diagnosis as an “over-simplification,” wrong because it suggests that “one account will hold good of all predicates,” and something Aristotle “could not propound ... as a final diagnosis” (p. 135, “Platonism.”)

There is very strong textual evidence against Owen’s claim. Aristotle decidedly does not stop giving this as his diagnosis of what gets Plato into trouble with the TMA. He offers it in exactly the same terminology in the heart of the mature *Metaphysics*. He says, “... no common predicate indicates a this but rather a such. If not, many difficulties follow and especially the ‘third man’” (1038b34-1039a1). Furthermore, in the surrounding chapters he makes extensive use of the this-such distinction in leveling other criticisms at the Platonists, which indicates that it remains very much alive in his thought. Still, a consideration of Owen’s analysis will help us to understand Aristotle’s diagnosis better and to see why he retains it.

According to Owen, Aristotle’s mature view of the TMA is as follows: No one account will hold good for all praedicata.56 The “Non-Identity Assumption” is to be accepted for common praedicata which belong accidentally to their subjects (i.e. for “weak predications” in Owen’s terms) but rejected in the case of essential predications (*kath’ hauta*, i.e. “strong predications”). What is called the “Self-Predication Assumption” is to be accepted in the latter case but rejected for the former. Thus, Aristotle has some means, though not the same means, of blocking the TMA in every case.
Marc Cohen has recently noted that Owen's analysis leaves one in "perplexity over the doctrine that has been attributed to Aristotle." Cohen points out that if Aristotle is being made to say that Socrates and Callias are both literally identical to the species-form man, then he will be forced to identify Socrates and Callias. If, perhaps to avoid this difficulty, he is being made to say that different items — say man$_1$ and man$_2$ — are predicated of each, he will be unable to say what they have in common. Recall, however, that Aristotle speaks of man as common. In my opinion, the blatant implausibility of both these moves makes it unlikely that Owen would develop his claim in either of these ways.

Owen alleges that "perplexities" resulting from the rejection of the Non-Identity Assumption for strong predication lead Aristotle to the view that "the primary subjects of discourse cannot be individuals such as Socrates, who cannot be defined, but species such as man" (p. 137). It is not altogether clear how we are to interpret this claim. What precisely are we to suppose Aristotle changes his mind about?

Perhaps the fundamental distinction between subjects and what is predicated of them comes to be seen as bogus, and he gives up his commitment to "levels," as Owen sometimes puts it. Appropriately fleshed out, this could well represent a wholesale return to Platonism, but one for which it would be very hard to glean textual support and one which it is doubtful that Owen would wish to attribute to Aristotle. The latter would then also be in difficulty with the TMA.

Owen says that species rather than individuals become the "primary subjects of discourse". It seems unlikely that he is suggesting only that Aristotle comes to think that species are the subjects of discourse although they are still not the fundamental logical or ontological subjects. If "subjects of discourse" means only that species rather than individuals are the grammatical subjects of the various sciences or even that the traits of individuals which are of interest to science are those they possess qua being of a certain species, it is hard to see why this should be thought to be a new view. It is already set forth in the Posterior Analytics. See e.g. 1.4.73b26-74a4, 8, 24.85a20-b22.

I think it more probable that Owen means that Aristotle comes to believe that he has been mistaken about who the real individuals, the real logical subjects, are. They are not ordinary organisms, such as Socrates and Bucephalus, but species-forms, such as man and horse. It should be noted that this change of mind alone does not extricate Aristotle's own theory of forms from the claws of the TMA. The distinction between individuals and what is predicated of them remains, so without further changes the TMA
may be expected to recur at new levels, since the species is not identical with its genera.

Perhaps the reasoning which leads Aristotle to his new view of the primary subjects is envisioned as proceeding along the following lines. Aristotle is at first content to say, "While it is true that largeness is other than Socrates, it is not the case that man is. Man is just what Socrates is. Thus, Self-Predication but not Non-Identity holds in the case of "Socrates is man". However, Aristotle cannot rest easy with this response for, after all, he does not believe that Socrates is literally identical with man, yet he does think that man exists. Thus, so long as he continues to hold that "Socrates is a man" represents a case of strong predication, he will be in trouble. That is, he will be accepting both the Self-Predication Assumption and the Non-Identity Assumption for some predications, namely those in which a species-form is predicated of an individual, and the regress will ensue. This is possible because the Non-Identity Assumption is neither the contradictory nor the contrary of strong predication, where that is understood in such a way as to allow both "Socrates is man" and "Man is man" as examples. Since Aristotle himself uses man as an example of that which is other than the things of which it is predicated, it seems unlikely that he intends the Non-Identity Assumption to hold only for accidental predication. Thus, non-identity is more plausibly understood as the denial of literal identity or something close to that, but strong predication is a looser notion than literal identity, at least usually. Perhaps Owen imagines Aristotle then continuing, "What is essentially predicated of Socrates is different from Socrates, but what is essentially predicated of man in the TMA, namely man, is not other than man. Thus, if we allow 'Socrates is man' to be an essential predication, the regress follows, but if we do not and if only 'Man is man' represents an essential predication, it does not follow."

On this view, it turns out in the end that the only strong or essential predications are those in which a species-form is said to be literally identical with itself. Then either (a) all others are predications of accidents, or (b) since Aristotle continues to call such predications as "Socrates is a man" essential (\textit{kath" hauta}) predications (e.g. in \textit{Met.Z.4}), some predications are accidental and others such as "Socrates is a man" are disguised ways of saying that the species-form is identical with itself. On the first alternative, the "is" of strong predication collapses into the "is" of identity. Aristotle thinks Plato equivocates on "is" in "Man is man" and "Socrates is man" and so doesn't realize that "Socrates, Callias and man are each man" represents a fallacious inference without which the TMA will not suc-
On the second alternative, the "is" of strong predication again becomes the "is" of identity.

Even apart from the apparent implausibility of reading "Socrates" as referring to the species-form man in the second case, these alternatives have drawbacks. Cohen has noted that if the Self-Predication Assumption is understood in this way, it is hard to understand why it should not be applied to other things as well, but in Met.Z. 6 he seems to deny that it can be. Cohen mentions pale man, for example. One might also wonder about other standard examples of common praedicata, such as white or large. This is a relevant objection to Owen because he takes the TMA as leading to the Z.6 thesis that each thing is identical with its essence. However, Owen’s claim that reflections on the proper response to the TMA lead Aristotle to the Met.Z.6 thesis is open to question since Aristotle himself never says this. If one denies the connection Owen wants to make, then it would seem to be open to Aristotle to admit that such entities as pale man and large are identical with themselves, i.e. to accept a version of self-predication which holds for these entities as well.

One who is skeptical about the alleged connection between the TMA and Met.Z.6 or about limiting essential predications to assertions of identity might well believe that the TMA can more easily and plausibly be circumvented simply by qualifying the non-identity assumption (2) so that it reads "What is predicated truly of a number of individuals is other than any of those individuals." Then both "Socrates is man" and "Man is man" continue to represent cases of essential or strong predication, but in the latter case the predication of man does not require the postulation of a further entity because the qualified non-identity assumption is not applicable to the species-form.

This move does indeed block the regress, but one needs to ask what might ground such a qualification of the non-identity assumption. Granted that the praedicatum and the sort of predication are the same in both "Socrates is man" and "Man is man," what justifies setting off man from Socrates and Callias in this way? Is it not the conviction that man is not an individual, but rather is an entity of a different logical type and so may appropriately, indeed must, be treated differently?

Two further objections to the development of Owen's interpretation just offered are worthy of note: (1) it makes species-forms instead of individual organisms the basic logical subjects in the sublunar realm, and (2) it seems to depend on distinguishing the "is" of identity from other senses.

With regard to (1), it seems very doubtful that Aristotle comes to view species-forms in this way, for a number of reasons. First, as noted, Aristotle
diagnoses Plato’s susceptibility to the TMA at Met. 1038b34-1039a2 in precisely the same terms he used in the Soph. El. At the time the earlier work was written he surely believed that ordinary organisms, such as Socrates and Bucephalus, were the logical subjects of the sublunar world. If he has changed his mind in such an important way on who the thises are, it would be surprising and misleading to use the same terminology here without further explanation. Second, Aristotle does not, even in later works, talk much about traits of living species. Rather, he mentions traits which belong to individuals because they are of such and such a species or kind. E.g. he very rarely discusses locutions such as “Man is a species” or “Animal is unchanging.” He far more commonly says such things as “Man is (a) biped” or “Man is literate” but he surely does not believe the species-form man has two feet or reads (e.g. Met.Z.12, cp. An.Post.85a20-b22). He has in mind traits of individuals and this suggests that he continues to think of them rather than the species themselves as the basic subjects. Third, he consistently regards it as the primary task of the natural scientist to explain generation and change (Phys. 185a12-14) and a major, repeated criticism of Platonic forms is that they are useless for this. Two of his complaints are (a) that Platonic forms do not and could not reasonably be thought to act intermittently, but change and generation are intermittent (Met.992a24-25, GC 335b18-24) and (b) that in each case of change and generation in the sublunar world we see at work a factor other than a Platonic form, namely a sensible particular, often implanting a form repeatedly while continuing to maintain its own identity (GC 335b18-24, Met.987a29-988a13, 991b3-9, 1080a5-9). There seems no reason to suppose that he thinks his own species-forms would be immune from the first of these criticisms (see e.g. Met.1039b23-27). At Met.988a34-b3 the fact that those who believe in (Platonic) forms recognize that the forms are not the source of movement is given as a reason for saying the Platonists came closer than others of his predecessors to stating essence or formal cause (ti ēn einaí). If the Aristotelian forms of sensible substances were efficient causes, the fact that something is not an efficient cause could scarcely be given as a reason for thinking it comes closer than other things to being an Aristotelian essence or form. He also continues to affirm that sensible particulars are the moving causes of change and generation (Met.Z.7-9, 1039b20ff., 1071a13-23). One might object that this is an irrelevant consideration because it is not moving causes but formal causes which are the primary logical subjects in the sublunar ontology of his mature metaphysics. If so, one wonders why this particular dissatisfaction with Platonic forms should continue to be voiced. Moreover, when one looks at
his own mature treatment of generation and change and the role played by sublunar formal causes in these processes, it emerges that they must be suches, not thises, to play that role, as I shall argue briefly below.\textsuperscript{63}

The second objection to Owen's understanding of Aristotle's reasoning as construed above has to do with the fact that it seems to depend on distinguishing the "is" of identity from other senses. There is no independent reason to think that Aristotle or any other early Greek singled out the "is" of identity as a meaning or use distinct from its predicative uses, as Charles Kahn has argued at some length in his book on \textit{The Verb Be in Ancient Greek}.\textsuperscript{64} Gregory Vlastos has also independently provided evidence for this.\textsuperscript{65}

Kahn's point has bearing on the TMA in another way as well, as Penner has independently noted. It makes it very likely that it does not bother Aristotle, as it does us, to say that man can be said of both the individual man and the species-form. He is then, at least sometimes, operating with a different notion of predication from ours, but to decree \textit{a priori} that he must be limited to our standard notion is questionable in any case and the more so in light of Kahn's finding. This means that Aristotle would not balk at accepting as premises, "Man is man" and "Socrates is man" in the argument, without finding "man" equivocal and while supposing "man" refers to the species-form in all its occurrences in these two premises. These are both examples of self-predication, and Aristotle accepts a self-predication assumption for both individuals and species-forms.

I would urge that this is the interpretation of "self-predication" best supported by Aristotle's texts. Aristotle himself employs locutions such as "predicated of itself" and does this in such a way as both (a) to supply independent evidence that he accepts the two premises just mentioned, and (b) to support a link between self-predication and essential predication, at least in the category of substance. See e.g. \textit{Top.}103b36, \textit{An. Post.}83b17-24, cp. \textit{Top.} 154a16-18, \textit{Cat.} 1b10-15, 3a33-b9. This way of understanding "predicated of itself" jibes much better with Aristotle's treatment of \textit{kath' hauta} or essential predication than taking it to be identity.

\textit{An Alternative Interpretation}

One who accepts the interpretation of self-predication just offered might then be tempted to suspect that the non-identity assumption becomes, in turn, linked with accidental predication. I shall urge that this temptation should be resisted.

How might the ideas that the self-predication assumption is closely tied
to essential predication and the non-identity assumption is closely tied to accidental predication be used in responding to the TMA? It will help us to be clear on this if we formulate two versions of the TMA:

I

1. Polydamas and Polycleitus each are man.
2. What is truly predicated of a number of things is other than the things of which it is predicated.
3. Man is man.
4. Polydamas, Polycleitus and man each are man.
5. Then, by 2, there is a third man in virtue of which 4 is true. Etc.

II

1. Polydamas and Polycleitus each are large.
2. What is truly predicated of a number of things is other than the things of which it is predicated.
3. Large is large.
4. Polydamas, Polycleitus and large each are large.
5. Then, by 2, there is a third large in virtue of which 4 is true. Etc.

On the interpretation now under consideration, the Aristotelian response to I will differ from that to II. In response to I, Aristotle will deny 2, where man is predicated of itself and of Polydamas. The claim will be that man is not “other than” Polydamas and man, where this is to be explicated as “Man is predicated accidentally neither of Polydamas nor of man.” The regress will not occur since premise 2 is rejected. In response to II, Aristotle will deny that large is predicated in the same sense of Polydamas and large. It is predicated essentially of the latter, but accidentally of Polydamas and Polycleitus, so the fourth premise involves an equivocation and the regress again will not be generated.

This appealing interpretation does not at bottom present a satisfactory alternative to the Pennerian view. First, as already noted, it seems doubtful that “other than” in the non-identity assumption is to be explicated in terms of accidental predication. Aristotle does sometimes use locutions such as “one thing said of another” to describe predications of accidents (e.g. An. Post. 73b5, 83b24) and surely he does not believe that man is predicated accidentally of Socrates — man is part of the ti esti of Socrates. Nevertheless, man is also explicitly said to be a “common” praedicatum
and “other than” the things of which it is predicated in the *Peri Ideôn* and *Soph.Et.*, as has been observed above, and see also *Cat.1b10-12* and *Met.Z.11.1037b4-5*. Aristotle thus seems committed to asserting that the common praedicatum man is other than what it is predicated of and that “Socrates is man” and “Man is man” represent cases of self-predication. However, if he accepts both non-identity and self-predication in some cases, he cannot be blocking the TMA as suggested, given the need for a general response. It is still open to him, however, to block it by introducing a distinction of logical type between thises and suches. This can be seen either as directed at the conjunction of Polydamas and Polycleitus with the common praedicatum man in the fourth step of the argument or as surfacing in a qualification of the second step that would make it read: “... is other than the individuals (but not the common praedicata) of which it is predicated.” Either way thises and suches cannot be treated as if they were on a par.

Another consideration that casts doubt on the interpretation presently being discussed is that when Aristotle mentions the TMA, he gives no indication that he thinks two different responses are required. Both early and late he insists that the difficulty is treating suches as thises. This will be readily understandable if, contra Owen, the essential-accidental distinction is not seen as somehow in tension with or superseding, but rather as resting on the this-such distinction, which is viewed as a distinction of logical type. It should be clear that this is the case for the view of the essential-accidental distinction I am advancing. On my view this involves a division of kinds of predication of praedicata, all of which are predicated of ordinary individuals – Socrates, Callias and Bucephalus. Both his essence, which is predicated essentially of Socrates, and his accidents, which are predicated accidentally, are suches. Thus, this distinction continues to rely on the more fundamental division between thises and suches, between logical subjects and that which is predicated of them, and both man and white are other than Socrates.66

The claim that all common praedicata are suches may still seem a bit dubious with regard to essences. I shall argue briefly in the next section that, by Aristotle’s lights, there is good, independent reason to insist that the forms must be of a different logical type from the thises they inform.

*Thises and Suches in Another Criticism of Plato’s Forms*

Other passages in addition to those on the TMA provide evidence for the
hypothesis that the this-such distinction is used as a type distinction by Aristotle.

A second criticism of Platonic forms already noted, which recurs at a number of places in the corpus, is that they cannot provide an adequate account of the being, generation and change of sensible particulars. Aristotle also continues to hold throughout his career that it is one of the primary tasks of a good theory of nature to give such an account (GC 335b18-24, Met. 987a29-988a18, 991b6-8, 992a24-28, 1071a19-21, 1080a5-9 and see 1038b26-29 with 1039a14-16). It is sometimes held that it is the existence of the forms apart from perceptibles in some Platonic heaven which renders them useless in accounting for generation and change. However, this is questionable and, at any rate, there is more to it than this, as can be seen by asking: Could this difficulty with Plato's theory of forms be resolved by bringing Platonic forms down to earth, so to speak, and conjoining them with some parcel of material? Aristotle's answer is a resounding "No!" The sensible individuals which we see being generated, changing and perishing cannot be analyzed as composites of such a sort. Why not? If the forms man, animal, white, knowledge, etc. were themselves individuals, as they are on Plato's theory, then even if their existence were immanent, the unity of ordinary, sensible particulars would be destroyed. "If we are to be allowed to lay it down that a common predicate is a this and a single thing, Socrates will be several things — himself and man and animal, if each of these indicates a this and a single thing" (Met. 1003a9-12). If sensible particulars were to contain Platonic forms, which remained individuals (theses) themselves, the effect would be to eliminate these particulars as real natural units. They would presumably be mere collocations. However, on Aristotle's view biological organisms are paradigmatically one. The task of the natural scientist is not to question but to understand and to explain their unity (De An. 412b6-7). Granted this paradigmatic unity, the forms transmitted in generation must be suches and the individuals which are generated, change, reproduce and perish are this-suches (Met. Z.8. 1033b19-1034a5).

In accordance with these views, although we can speak abstractly of suches exerting a causal effect on other suches, only theses can be real efficient causes (Met. 1071a17-23). Any explanation which seems to cross these lines must be capable of further analysis. For example, strictly speaking, it is not the building art which builds the house but the builder (De An. 408b11-13) and it is not fear which causes the blood to run cold but changes in certain bodily parts (De An. 408b9-11, cp. An. Post. 94b23f., Gen. An. 789b8-15).
Aristotle is sometimes lauded for his recognition of the inadequacy of "low-level" materialism to account for biological phenomena, which are highly organized. It should be noted, however, that Aristotle is not simply urging the need for abstract entities in science. He shows himself aware of doing something different in that he argues explicitly against other non-materialist positions in biology and psychology. It will not be sufficient, for example, to bring in abstract entities which differ from concrete ones in being immaterial, and can work alongside them or in the stead of some of them as efficient causes. Thus, Aristotle raps accounts of the soul which portray it as what moves and is "directly" moved (De An. A.3.406a1-b9).

In short, in this second important and recurrent criticism of Platonic forms and in his own closely related account of efficient causality, we see again Aristotle's insistence on what amounts to a distinction of logical type between thises and suches.

Thises and Suches Elsewhere

A careful reader of Aristotle will note that, unlike Ryle and some others interested in logical grammar, he does not usually label as "nonsensical" claims in which the grammar would suggest that a type violation has occurred. That is, he does not employ an explicit true-false-nonsense trichotomy, and this may be thought to tell against the interpretation I am advancing.

A closer inspection of Aristotle's procedure in the face of such claims shows it does not. He makes a more subtle move, which is at least first cousin to the employment of such a trichotomy. He simply treats claims in which the grammar would indicate that a type violation has occurred as if they cannot be taken as saying what they literally seem to be saying. They are not yet in proper logical form. One can say truly, not nonsensically, "The large is [a] log" because one is not really saying what the grammar suggests, but rather "The log is large" (An. Post.83a2f.).

This procedure crops up repeatedly in the corpus in Aristotle's treatment of individual substances vis-à-vis nonsubstances and substantial kinds. For example, in Cat.5 he claims that it is a distinctive mark of substance that while remaining numerically one and the same it is capable of admitting contraries. Thus, after a sunburn we may truly say, "The man was pale and is now dark" and infer that there is something, referred to by the grammatical subject, such that it once was pale and is now dark. However, neither "The color used to be white but is now black," uttered while
contemplating a child's dirty sock, nor "The musical was pale and is now dark" can be understood along the same lines, according to Aristotle. The latter is not a claim that there is something, namely musicality, which was once pale and is now dark, but that some man who is musical was pale and is now dark. From the former we cannot infer that there is something, namely the color, which was once white and is now black, but the claim must be analyzed as "The sock was once white and is now black."

This sort of maneuver is by no means limited to the logical works, of course. However, it is noteworthy that it occurs there, for as noted above, Aristotle regards logic as propaedeutic to the sciences (see e.g. Met.1005b2-4). This move then has the effect of specifying that we could not discover in any science that colors or musicality are substances. That is why I say it is first cousin to the overt adoption of a true-false-nonsense trichotomy. As noted earlier, to label something "nonsensical" amounts to stipulating that it lies outside the preserves of scientific investigation. The idea is that if an assertion is conceptually incoherent, one is safe in concluding that there is and could be no such natural unit without even looking at nature. The insistence in advance of scientific investigation that some sentences cannot be in proper logical form and should be put in such form before one uses them in a science is surely of this ilk.

The view that suchses cannot be sensibly conjoined with individual living substances or the elements of which they are composed remains in later works. In the Metaphysics, for example, Aristotle insists that the form man is not another individual to be set alongside Socrates (see e.g. Met.Z.13.1038b34ff.) or not another element to be set alongside his material components and conjoined with them. The syllable is not its letters plus their juxtaposition. The form of a house is not another collateral element alongside the bricks and boards (see Met.Z.17 and H.2-3). There must be something besides the matter, something which is neither an element in the whole nor a compound (Met.H.3.1043b10-13), but it cannot be said, for example, that "flesh is fire and earth and something still further, so that the process will go on to infinity" (Met.Z.17.1041b20-21).

Aristotle often suggests that suchses and thisses provide answers to different questions or figure in different sorts of explanations. Only an account of its form can tell us what a substance is, for example (see e.g. De An. 403a29-b6). Form and individuals cannot be conjoined as subjects in scientific explanation. We can have a science which takes thisses as its basic subjects and another science which treats suchses as if they were subjects, but not one in which both are basic subjects. Suches can appear in a science of thisses, but when they do, they will appear in predicate position, so to
speak. The situation is analogous to taking as subjects in higher-order quantificational logic what are predicates or properties in first order logic. There may be a science which numbers swans among its basic subjects and another in which whiteness is taken as one of the subjects. There will not be a science of swans and whiteness. Whiteness may well appear in the science of swans but it will appear as an attribute of swans. Furthermore, the science of whiteness will always be parasitic on sciences of substances. (See Met. Γ. 2-3).

I conclude that the this-such distinction is best interpreted as a distinction of logical type.\textsuperscript{73}

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NOTES


2 It was Penner who first suggested to me that Aristotle’s this-such distinction should be seen as a distinction of logical type. Much of what I shall have to say here, especially about the Third Man Argument, has grown out of reflecting on Penner’s interpretation of Aristotle’s response to that argument as he developed it in a graduate seminar on Aristotle. Although the detailed arguments which follow are my own and I bear responsibility for what is said here, this should not be allowed to obscure my considerable indebtedness to him. I have been repeatedly stimulated by his insights and have learned a great deal from him in numerous discussions about Plato and Aristotle over the last six years.

Penner notes that he received independent confirmation of his line on the this-such distinction from Evert Beth’s The Foundations of Mathematics (Amsterdam: North-Holland, 1959). In the section on “The Theory of Logical Types” Beth remarks:

I cannot be suspected of attributing excessive weight to the authority of Aristotle, but it seems to me significant that the Stagirite’s distinction (in his Categories 5, 2a11) between individuals as primary substances and species as secondary ones can be interpreted as constituting the first, rudimentary, form of the theory of types. (p. 498)

I have found no single article more suggestive and illuminating with regard to this problem in Aristotle that Gottlob Frege's “On Concept and Object”. This was originally published as “Über Begriff und Gegenstand,” Vierteljahrschrift für wissenschaftliche Philosophie XVI (1892), pp. 192-205 (English title “On Concept and Object”); it is translated in P. Geach and M. Black (eds.) Translations from the Philosophical Writings of Gottlob Frege (Oxford: Blackwell, 1960). Cp. Wilfrid Sellars' “Grammar and Existence: A Preface to Ontology” in Science, Perception and Reality (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1963), pp. 247-281, see p. 265n. A number of other helpful papers will be mentioned below.
Aristotle does not always use "para" as indicating independent existence or separation, although he often does. Gail Fine has pointed out that he "allows his own universals to be hen para ta polla" at An. Post. 100a7, and that "para" is sometimes used non-pejoratively "to express some sort of difference between universals and particulars" ("The One Over Many", The Philosophical Review LXXXIX (1980), pp. 200-201n.6. See also H. F. Cherniss, Aristotle’s Criticism of Plato and the Academy (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1944), p. 77n.56).

I shall use "praedicata" in this paper for the non-linguistic counterparts of linguistic predicates.

At Cat. 3b10-23, poion instead of toionde is used for "such." One might be tempted to take toionde as intended to cover the omitted category of quality at Soph. El. 178b36, but the praedicatum in question is man, which is presumably not a quality. Moreover, Terry Penner has noted that Boethius’ early sixth century A.D. translation also omits quantity, and the categories are listed in an unusual order here at a9-10, so probably "such" is the better translation.

Aristotle is not altogether consistent in his terminology. He sometimes uses "such" for the category of quality alone, e.g. at Met. 1089a12-24. He also sometimes speaks of the form as a "this" (Met. 1017b24, 1042a29, 1049a35, 1070a11, 13) where he is emphasizing that matter is a less definite substratum than an ordinary organism. What he seems to have in mind in these passages is more carefully put at De An. 412a7-10 where form or essence is said to be "that precisely in virtue of which a thing is called a 'this'".


In his 1908 paper Russell derives his hierarchy of types of propositional functions from a hierarchy of types of propositions, which has come to be known as the ramified theory of types because the type of a function depends both on the types of its arguments and the types of its apparent variables. Quine has pointed out that the latter is an unnecessary addition, and attributes Russell’s ramification as "due to his failure to distinguish between propositional functions as notations and propositional functions as attributes and relations" (W. V. O. Quine, “Introduction” to the 1908 paper in van Heijenoort, op. cit., pp. 150-152). It is now widely recognized that Russell was unclear about whether he was assigning types to objects or to notations.

Kurt Gödel provides the following succinct summary of the theory of simple types:

By the theory of simple types I mean the doctrine which says that the objects of thought (or, in another interpretation, the symbolic expressions) are divided into
types, namely: individuals, properties of individuals, relations between individuals, properties of such relations, etc. (with a similar hierarchy for extensions), and that sentences of the form: 'a has the property \( \varphi \)', 'b bears the relation \( T \) to c', etc. are meaningless, if a, b, c, R, \( \varphi \) are not of types fitting together. Mixed types (such as classes containing individuals and classes as the class of all classes of finite types) are excluded. (p. 218n.)


8 It is clear from Quine’s immediately preceding remarks as well as the subsequent development of his point that the aspect of Russell’s theory of types which he wishes to emphasize in the remark quoted on p. 1 also is the prohibition of mixed types. E.g. Quine says, “[Carnap] is thinking of languages which contain fundamentally segregated styles of variables before any definitional abbreviations; and he is thinking of styles of variables which are sealed off from one another so utterly that it is commonly ungrammatical to use a variable of one style where a variable of another style would be grammatical. A language which exploits this sort of basic compartmentalization of variables is that of Russell’s theory of logical types.” (p. 208)

9 Beth has noted that even in mathematical theories, “As a rule, we do not apply the entire hierarchy of logical types; in most cases, only a small number of logical types do actually occur” (loc. cit.). Michael Dummett also points out that in his hierarchy of levels of expressions, which is very similar to Russell’s, Frege believes that “it will probably be necessary to consider only some quite small finite number of types of expressions” (p. 49, Frege’s Philosophy of Language (New York: Harper and Row, 1973). It is perhaps not surprising then that Aristotle does not develop a more complex hierarchy. I leave the investigation of the question of how many levels Aristotle may in fact be committed to for others. It does seem clear that he would not permit an infinite number, given his antipathy to infinite series. I believe that his “categories of being” also represent categorial or type distinctions of a sort. However, they seem not to be levels in an ascending hierarchy but more like parallel slices at the level of suches that are perpendicular to the line separating suches from thises. The category of substance must be given special treatment. The development of these ideas is outside the scope of the present paper.


11 See Frege, “On Concept and Object”, op. cit. and see “Function and Concept”, also in Geach and Black. It should perhaps be noted that “concept” here does not have its usual mentalistic associations. Sellars remarks that Peter Geach’s “properties are essentially the same sort of thing as Frege’s concepts” (p. 258, op. cit.) and Geach, “On What There Is” Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume XXV (1951).

This comparison with Frege may be immediately open to suspicion in light of Frege’s important criticism of the subject-predicate distinction in Aristotelian logic. There are fundamental differences between traditional logic and modern quantification logic in this regard. E.g. Russell notes that “Traditional logic regarded the two propositions ‘Socrates is mortal’ and ‘All men are mortal’ as being of the same form; Peano and Frege showed that they are utterly different in form” (Our Knowledge of the External World (New York, 1960), p. 40.) For one plausible explanation of how Aristotle had a distinction
like Frege's distinction between concept and object and yet opened the way to "the corruption of logic", see P. T. Geach, "History of the Corruptions of Logic" in Logic Matters (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1972), pp. 44-61.

12 It has often been pointed out that Frege developed a hierarchy of functions which is very much like Russell's theory of simple types even before the discovery of Russell's paradox. He did not, however, elect "to regiment his classes in levels corresponding to those of his attributes", as Quine puts it. On the resemblance to Russell's theory and the similarity of their philosophical motivations, see Dummett, op. cit., p. 51; Gödel, op. cit., p. 227; Richard L. Mendelsohn, "Frege on Predication" in Midwest Studies in Philosophy Vol. VI (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1981) pp. 69-82, esp. p. 73; W. V. O. Quine, "On Frege's Way Out" Mind LXIV (1955), pp. 145-159, reprinted minus appendix in E. D. Klemke (ed.) Essays on Frege (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1968), pp. 485-501.


14 I have found Wilfred Sellars, "Grammar and Existence: A Preface to Ontology" in Science, Perception and Reality (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1963), pp. 247-281 very helpful in thinking about these matters. For a defense of the view that "black" does not have the same referent in the two claims above, see Russell Dancy, "On Some of Aristotle's First Thoughts about Substances" The Philosophical Review 84 (1975), pp. 338-373.

15 Concept of Mind (London: Hutchinson and Co., 1949), p. 22. Although Ryle speaks of linguistic entities here, his discussion makes it clear that his major concern is with extra-linguistic items. He wants to use the notion of a category mistake to disarm the mind-body problem. Ryle's category theory includes more than just a distinction between particulars and what is predicated of them, but that is the part of it with which we shall be mainly concerned. See also "Plato's Parmenides", Mind (1939), reprinted in R. E. Allen (ed.) Studies in Plato's Metaphysics (New York: Humanities Press, 1965). References are to the reprint.

16 "On What There Is", op. cit., p. 135.


18 Sellars, op. cit.

19 This sort of restriction can be neatly expressed in modern quantificational logic, by the use of different variables for quantification over different types.

20 Jonathan Barnes prodded me to expand on this point.


They do not discuss Aristotle specifically. I owe notice of this article to Gary Matthews.

23 If anything, some seem to provide somewhat better evidence that there are mutually exclusive parallel categories at the level of suches. However, this is a subject which is best reserved for another paper.

24 This example was called to my attention by Jonathan Barnes. Cp. De Caelo 280b1-13.

25 See Kahn, The Verb Be in Ancient Greek (Dordrecht, Reidel, 1973), pp. 372n. and 400f. and see below pp. 35ff.

26 I take it he does believe they have different senses although some claims seem to allow room for doubt even of this. E.g., he says, "Most of the questions which can be asked about aches, tickles and other sensations or feelings cannot be asked about our likings and dislikings, our enjoyings and detestings" ("Pleasure" in Dilemmas (Cambridge University Press, 1964), p. 58, italics mine.)

27 See Kahn, The Verb Be in Ancient Greek (Dordrecht, Reidel, 1973), pp. 372n. and 400f. and see below pp. 35ff.

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29 "Aristotle on Conjunctive Propositions" in Logic Matters, op. cit., pp. 13-27, originally published in Ratio V (1963). Geach sees the relevance of this sort of point to the Third Man Argument and notes that he has argued elsewhere that

the back of the Third Man Argument in the Parmenides could be broken even if we conceded that the term "great" can be truly predicated of great itself (auto to mega) and also truly predicated of the many great things (ta polla megala), provided that we denied the license to infer from this that "great" in the plural (megala) can be truly predicated of great itself and the many great things together (auto to mega kai talla ta megala may not be rightly called polla megala or panta megala). Perhaps Plato intended us to take this way out of his paradox. (p. 119)

28 "The Third Man Again," Philosophical Review 65 (1956), reprinted in R. E. Allen (ed.) Studies in Plato's Metaphysics (New York: Humanities Press, 1965), pp. 265-277. I do not agree with Geach's suggestion in the last quoted sentence nor with a number of other aspects of his treatment of the argument in the Parmenides, but I cannot go into that here. See Vlastos' reply to Geach in the Allen volume on the point that Plato could not have had the view of separation Geach suggests.


30 See W. V. O. Quine, "Truth by Convention" in Ways of Paradox (op. cit.) for further reasons for not employing such strictures. Although some writers on Plato or Aristotle assume all cases of literal self-predication must be false, others maintain that the truth or falsity of self-predication claims cannot be decided in advance but must be tested in each case. C. C. W. Taylor, for example, takes the latter position (Plato, Protagoras, trans. Taylor (Oxford, 1976), p. 112 n. on 330c2-7) and chides R. Robinson for taking the former in Plato's Earlier Dialectic 2nd ed. (Oxford, 1953), p. 234.

31 My translation is based on one made by my colleague Wm. E. Dooley, S. J. The text
used is that edited by Dieter Harlfinger in Walter Leszl, *Il 'De Ideis' di Aristotele e la Teoria Platonica delle Idee* (Florence: Olschki, 1975). We read *tous* following AC, instead of *ton*, as in O. at 1. 85.1. We have transposed *all' ei touto* (1. 27) in order to make clear that this remark is a conclusion to the protasis at 11. 22-23 rather than to the long intervening parenthesis at 11. 24-27 in Harlfinger's text. We see no reason to question his punctuation.

32 An objection from Jonathan Barnes convinced me of the need to discuss this more carefully than was done in an earlier version of this paper.


36 Kahn claims that “we never — or hardly ever — find a Greek sentence which is literally of the form ‘There is an x which is F’” (p. 281).

37 William Jacobs has challenged this view of these particular lines in “Aristotle and Nonreferring Subjects” *Phronesis* XXIV (1979), pp. 282-283. Jacobs claims also that Aristotle’s position is the stronger one that the relation between the truth of predicative sentences and the existence of extra-grammatical subjects is that of presupposition, which this passage as standardly interpreted would tell against.


38 In B. 8 he also maintains the converse, i.e. knowing that x is entails knowing what it is. This very difficult chapter is helpfully discussed by Jonathan Barnes in *Aristotle’s Posterior Analytics*. Clarendon Aristotle Series (Oxford, 1957), pp. 208-211, and by Suzanne Mansion, *Le Jugement d’existence chez Aristote* (Louvain: Éditions de l’Institut Supérieur de Philosophie, 1946), pp. 183-198.

39 It is interesting to note also that in post-Homeric existential uses of *eimi* Kahn has discerned two “existential forms” that clearly have a role to play in the natural language prior to, or independent of, philosophical speculation” (p. 307). The first is for individuals, the second for events, properties, and states of affairs. Kahn remarks that the differences between the two forms “are so marked that one might almost be inclined to say that the two sentence types illustrate distinct senses of ‘existence’,” (p. 307) but does not take a definite stand on this matter.

40 It should perhaps also be mentioned that Aristotle is suspicious of conjunction generally and, as Geach has argued, seems not to have a proper understanding of conjunctive propositions (see “Aristotle on Conjunctive Propositions,” *op. cit.*). He claims at *Soph. El.* 176a that to ask “Are Callias and Themistocles musical?” or “Are Coriscus and Callias at home?” is, in each case, to ask two questions to which it is not correct (orthon) to demand a single answer, even if the answer is the same in each case. “For it is possible for it to be true to answer even countless different questions when put to one, all
together with either a ‘Yes’ or a ‘No’, but still one should not answer them with a single answer: for that is the ruin of discourse (anaireitai to dialegesthai)” (176a10-12). Such an answer would be given only by an unwary disputant who “does not see what the consequence is” (17-18). An example of such a consequence is given earlier on (168a12-16) in an illustration that is said to be subject to genuine refutation. “Suppose a man were to grant that white and naked and blind are said similarly of one and many” (168a12-13). He claims that in such a case “Whenever, then, one thing can see while another cannot, they will either both be able to see or else both be blind; which is impossible” (168a15-16). Geach thinks that filling out the missing premises will leave Aristotle with “a perversely ingenious argument” (p. 19) that depends on his failing to perceive the difference between predicating “have not sight” severally or collectively of a set (p. 20). This seems unlikely since Aristotle explicitly notes this difference in a remark perhaps significantly placed right before mention of the TMA. Perhaps Aristotle’s point is rather that if indeed such things were “said similarly” of the pair, Socrates and Callias, and of Socrates, then inferences would follow that don’t, inferences to claims that are sensible and true of Socrates but do not follow in the case of the pair, Socrates and Callias. For example, when we know Socrates is of the nature to have sight, we can correctly infer that he is blind or sighted but not both, but we can make no such inference of the pair, which is not a particular. Note that Aristotle does not claim that the terms or properties predicated are homonymous.


I am indebted to Mike Byrd for helping me to get clear on the idea that it is the notion that a single predicate can generate an infinite series of predicates that Plato and Aristotle find so troublesome.

44 It is now generally agreed that the argument to which Aristotle is referring in this passage is the same one quoted above from Alexander’s report in the Peri Ideōn and not the one mentioned by pseudo-Alexander in his commentary on the passage (In Soph. El. 158.20-26). See e.g. G. E. L. Owen, “Dialectic and Eristic in the Treatment of Forms” op. cit. p. 111n.2.

45 On “isolation”, see Alexander, In Met. 124.9-125.4 on A.9.992b9-12.

That Aristotle should make such a claim about species forms is especially ironic, since modern biology has found that the counterparts of Aristotelian species are, after all, individuals. David Hull has argued this at length. See e.g. "Are Species Really Individuals?" Systematic Zoology 25 (1976), pp. 174-191, and "A Matter of Individuality" Philosophy of Science 45 (1978), pp. 335-360.

On the contrary, he seems to believe that if it can be shown that a position leads to an infinite regress, that is evidence that the position is incorrect. See e.g. An. Post. 81b33ff.; Phys. 209a23-25, 210b22-27, 256a17-19, 21-29; De Caelo 300b15-17; De An. 425b15-17; Met. 210b22-27, 256a17-19, 21-29; De Caelo 300b15-17; De An. 425b15-17; Met. 994a1-b31, 1030b35, 1032a2-3, 1060a34-36, 1070a2-4; E.N. 1094a20.

See e.g. An. Post. 71b6-8, 82b34-83a1, 100a9-13; De An. 417b23-24, 424al-2, 425b26-27, 429a14ff., 431al-2; Met. 1005b35-1006a1.

See e.g. Met. Z.11.1037b4-5. The point there will hold whether or not sameness is some looser relation than identity. Aristotle clearly believes that organisms do not exist apart from but also are not identical with their species-forms.

Gail Fine has reminded me that one could deny NI without being a nominalist. However, that is one natural way to take such a denial and some Aristotelian claims could plausibly be construed as those of a nominalist. G. E. L. Owen may be suggesting that this was an early Aristotelian view when he says in passing that Plato "cluttered the scene with other individuals which were fictions" ("The Platonism of Aristotle", Proceedings of the British Academy LI (1965), p. 134). However, he may mean that the belief that suches are individuals is fictitious and not that suches do not exist at all.

I owe some of these references to Robert Heinaman.

On this passage see also above p. 213.


I am assuming that Owen has in mind not simply terms but also what they introduce.


That Owen thinks literal identity is involved here is also suggested by his claim that worries about rejecting the Non-Identity Assumption for essential predications lead Aristotle to argue that "if we take away any primary subject of discourse (kath' hauto legomenon) and say just what it is, we must be producing a statement of identity, an equation which defines the subject" ("Platonism," op. cit., pp. 136-137).

The latter seems to be M. J. Woods' view of "Socrates is a man," as Cohen also notes. See Woods, "Problems in Metaphysics Z.13" in J. Moravcsik, Aristotle (New York, 1967).

Such a reading of the TMA was suggested by Manley Thompson in discussion of another paper.

This was drawn to my attention by Alan Code.

Alan Code has suggested such a move in passing, although it does not represent his own view.

See pp. 237f. below. He does sometimes use the term "primary" or "primary substance" for a form or essence in the Metaphysics (1032b1-2, 1037a5, b1-2), but this is hardly decisive.

I do not mean to suggest in the comments just made that Aristotle views sensible, particular organisms as the fundamental logical subjects in his ontology as a whole, for I do not believe that. Very briefly, they cannot fill this role because they have matter. The role must be filled by immaterial thises. This feature of sensible substances also suggests a
further reason for the unsuitability of their forms for playing that part. Aristotle suggests one cannot say what these things are without bringing in their matter. He emphasizes that the objects of study in natural science are unlike those in mathematics which are "separable in thought," insisting, for example, that "flesh" and "bone" and "man" are defined like "snub nose", not like "curved" (Phys. 194a4-12, cp. Met.Z.4, 11.1037a21-b7, De An.403a25-26, P.A.642a11-18.) I have found it helpful to compare these remarks of Aristotle with the way a modern geneticist answers the question "What is a gene?" He does not say simply, "It is adenine, thymine, guanine, cytosine, deoxyribose sugar and phosphate" for these can be present in the cell without constituting a gene, nor does he say "It is a double helix" for the arrangement alone is also not sufficient to make something a gene. That is, both the materials — especially the four base pairs — and their arrangement must be mentioned in any account of what the gene is that will be regarded as adequate. For further qualifications see Steven O. Kimbrough, "The Reduction of Genetics to Molecular Biology," Philosophy of Science (forthcoming). Gareth B. Matthews has noted that Aristotle's discussion of mechanical toys as models for animal movement (MA 701b1f.) and as models for reproduction (G.A. 734b10f) suggests that Aristotle would not be willing to call artificial mechanisms living, and that he accepted with most others in the ancient world the separation of living things and mechanisms. (See Matthews, "Consciousness and Life" Philosophy 52 (1977)). Aristotle's fundamental division between the arts and the natural sciences also lends some support to this, for if he envisions man as a machine (albeit a very complex one), why not a single science of automata? Met.Z.11.1036b4-6 might seem to suggest physiology is irrelevant, but I would argue that Aristotle is there more concerned to make the point that the form is an organizational rather than a material entity. In the same chapter Aristotle maintains that "animal" cannot be defined without reference to the parts' being in a certain state (1036b25-30) and the parts, indeed the whole organized body, is the matter of man, according to Aristotle. Aristotle's position here may stem in part from his broad notion of the soul as coextensive with life. In contrast, we tend to equate consciousness with a mind whose functioning is transparent to itself and capable of being neatly marked off from physiological accompaniments. (On this, see further Charles H. Kahn, "Sensation and Consciousness in Aristotle's Psychology" in J. Barnes et al. (eds.) Articles on Aristotle.4 (Duckworth, 1979) and Matthews, op. cit.) Thus, I take it there is a real disagreement between Aristotle and such recent thinkers as Jerry Fodor and Hilary Putnam on the issue of whether one can have a science of the form of natural beings which does not also deal with their matter in a manner which goes beyond merely noting that the form must be embodied in some suitable stuff. Since, besides being dependent, organizational entities, natural forms so essentially involve matter, they are not sufficiently definite to be fundamental logical subjects.

Penner has suggested a related piece of evidence that Aristotle does not change his mind in the manner Owen suggests. At Z.16.1040b26-1041a5 and E.N.1096a34-b5 Aristotle reiterates another earlier criticism of the Platonists (see Met.B.2.997b12ff.). He suggests that the Platonists are right in thinking both that if the forms are substances, they must be separate and that there must be some separate, imperishable substances. However, they are wrong in trying to make the "one-over-many" into such substances by speaking of "man-himself" and "horse-himself". The implication seems to be that they should have looked for other separate, imperishable substances and that these will be these. Aristotle comments in concluding this section, "Clearly, then, no universal term is the name of a substance."
Charles H. Kahn, *The Verb Be in Ancient Greek* (Dordrecht: Reidel, 1973). Kahn argues that the so-called “is of identity” cannot be distinguished grammatically in Greek from the copula or “is of predication” (see pp. 372n. and 400f.). It is also worth noting that the Polish logician Lesniewski employs a relation of singular predication represented by an epsilon, in which “x ε y” may take as true substitution instances both “Socrates is Socrates” and “Socrates is wise”. Kahn discusses Lesniewski’s work briefly on pp. 4-7.


Contra Owen on Aristotle’s view of predication, see also now Hermann Weidemann, “In Defence of Aristotle’s Theory of Predication”, *Phronesis* XXV (1980), pp. 76-87, which came to my notice only after this section was written.

Aristotle criticizes Anaxagoras as well as Eudoxus along these lines. See *Met.* 989b3-4 with 991a14-19, *Phys.* 188a7-9, *GC* 327b15-22; Alexander, *In Met.* 98.10-12.

Martha C. Nussbaum has recently argued convincingly that this is the position of Aristotle with regard to some very problematic cases in the *De Anima* and the *De Motu* which are not mentioned here. See Essays 3 and 5 in her *Aristotle's De Motu Animalium* (Princeton, 1978).

See e.g. Nussbaum, *op. cit.* Essay 1.

Sometimes he does seem to do this, but it is not clear that the passages need be so understood. E.g. at *Phys.* A.2.185a28f. he describes Melissus’ claim that all things are quantity as “absurd” (*atopos*) and at *An. Post.* A.22.83a33 he dismisses the Platonic forms as mere “chirpings” (*teretismata*, the sounds made by people who sing without uttering sentences). Cp. [Probl.] ΙΘ.10.918a30. I owe this reference to Jonathan Barnes.

I raised this objection in Penner’s seminar and the line of reply in the next two paragraphs stems from his response. He has applied the same idea in an interesting and insightful way to the work of Wittgenstein and others. Marc Cohen has independently made the claim about logical form in the *An. Post.*, and I believe the sunburn example is also due to him.

It should be noted that it does not follow from this that in the sentence given “the musical” is an alternative description to “the man” and refers to the same entity. I believe that Aristotle does not share our views on alternative descriptions. On this see Gareth B. Matthews, “Accidental Unities” forthcoming in M. Schofield and M. Nussbaum (eds.) *Language and Logos: Studies in Honor of G. E. L. Owen* (Cambridge, 1982).

For an important problem which Aristotle runs into here see n. 63 above and see my review of Nussbaum, forthcoming in *International Studies in Philosophy*.

I am grateful to Terry Penner, Jonathan Barnes and Gail Fine for comments on earlier drafts of this paper and to Wm. E. Dooley, S. J., for helpful discussion of a number of points.