Curriculum Vitae

Nicola Bianchi
PhD Candidate
Department of Economics
Stanford University
579 Serra Mall
Stanford, CA 94305-6072

nbianchi at stanford dot edu


Ph.D. in Economics, Stanford University
Expected Completion: June 2015

M.Sc. in Economics, Università Bocconi, 2006-2009 (Summa cum Laude).
B.A. in Business, Università Bocconi, 2003-2006 (Summa cum Laude).

Research and Teaching Fields

Primary fields: Public Economics, Economics of Education.
Secondary field: Economic History.

Teaching Experience

2013-14, Teaching Assistant for Prof. P. Dupas, Stanford University, Econ 118 (Development Economics).
2012-13, Teaching Assistant for Prof. P. Dupas, Stanford University, Econ 118 (Development Economics).
2011-12, Teaching Assistant for Prof. C. Landais, Stanford University, Econ 101 (Economic Policy Analysis).

Relevant Positions

2010-12, Research Assistant for Prof. P. Moser, Stanford University.
2008-09, Research Assistant for Prof. V. Galasso, Università Bocconi.
2007-08, Research Assistant for Prof. P. Muliere, Università Bocconi.

Scolarships, Honors, and Awards

2014-15, Haley-Shaw Scholarship, Stanford Institute for Economic Policy Research.
2013-14, Outstanding TA Award, Stanford Economics (Econ 118).
2013-14, George P. Shultz Grant, Stanford Institute for Economic Policy Research. ($15,000)
2012-14, George P. Shultz Scholarship, Stanford Institute for Economic Policy Research.
2012-13, Graduate Research Opportunity (GRO) Award, School of Humanities and Sciences, Stanford University. ($4,500)
2009-11, Economics Department Fellowship, Stanford University.
2006-09, Bocconi Merit Award, Università Bocconi.

Professional Activities

Referee for American Economic Review.

Working Papers

The General Equilibrium Effects of Educational Expansion (Job Market Paper)

Compulsory Licensing - Did Licensing during WWI Discourage German Invention?

Joint with Joerg Baten and Petra Moser

This paper exploits an exogenous episode of compulsory licensing under the 1918 US Trading-with-the-Enemy Act (TWEA) to examine whether policies that weaken intellectual property rights can encourage innovation. We collect firm-level data set on nearly 80,000 German patents to examine changes in invention after the United States made German-owned patents subject to compulsory licensing in 1918. Baseline estimates indicate a 28 percent increase in patenting in response to compulsory licensing. Patent renewal data, as a measure for patent quality, suggest that only a small share of this increase was due to lower quality, strategic patents. Intent-to-treat regressions, which use German-owned US patents to measure exposure to licensing, imply a 22 percent increase. Firm-level data reveal a differential increase in entry into research fields with licensing. Firms whose patents were licensed applied for more patents in these fields after 1918. Taken together, these results indicate that compulsory licensing can promote innovation by increasing competition in research fields with licensing.

Research in Progress

STEM education and invention.