Curriculum Vitae

Nicola Bianchi
PhD Candidate
Department of Economics
Stanford University
579 Serra Mall
Stanford, CA 94305-6072

nbianchi at stanford dot edu

Education

Ph.D. in Economics, Stanford University
Expected Completion: June 2015

M.Sc. in Economics, Università Bocconi, 2006-2009 (Summa cum Laude).
B.A. in Business, Università Bocconi, 2003-2006 (Summa cum Laude).

Research and Teaching Fields

Primary fields: Public Economics, Economics of Education.
Secondary field: Economic History.

Teaching Experience

2013-14, Teaching Assistant for Prof. P. Dupas, Stanford University, Econ 118 (Development Economics).
2012-13, Teaching Assistant for Prof. P. Dupas, Stanford University, Econ 118 (Development Economics).
2011-12, Teaching Assistant for Prof. C. Landais, Stanford University, Econ 101 (Economic Policy Analysis).

Relevant Positions

2010-12, Research Assistant for Prof. P. Moser, Stanford University.
2008-09, Research Assistant for Prof. V. Galasso, Università Bocconi.
2007-08, Research Assistant for Prof. P. Muliere, Università Bocconi.

Scolarships, Honors, and Awards

2014-15, Haley-Shaw Scholarship, Stanford Institute for Economic Policy Research.
2013-14, Outstanding TA Award, Stanford Economics (Econ 118).
2013-14, George P. Shultz Grant, Stanford Institute for Economic Policy Research. ($15,000)
2012-14, George P. Shultz Scholarship, Stanford Institute for Economic Policy Research.
2012-13, Graduate Research Opportunity (GRO) Award, School of Humanities and Sciences, Stanford University. ($4,500)
2009-11, Economics Department Fellowship, Stanford University.
2006-09, Bocconi Merit Award, Università Bocconi.

Professional Activities

Referee for American Economic Review.

Working Papers

The General Equilibrium Effects of Educational Expansion (Job Market Paper)

Compulsory Licensing - Did Patent Violations during the Great War Discourage Invention?

Joint with Joerg Baten and Petra Moser

This paper examines whether the US decision during World War I to violate enemy-owned patents - through compulsory licensing - discouraged invention. Estimates from a new data set of German patents indicate a 28 percent increase in invention. Controls for patent quality suggest that only a small share of the increase was due to lower quality, strategic patents. Firm-level data suggest that compulsory licensing facilitated competitive entry into fields with licensing. Firms whose patents had been licensed began to patent more in research fields with licensing. The increase in patenting was strongest for fields with low levels of pre-existing competition.

Research in Progress

STEM education and invention.