nbianchi at stanford dot edu
Ph.D. in Economics, Stanford University
Expected Completion: June 2015
M.Sc. in Economics, Università Bocconi, 2006-2009 (Summa cum Laude).
B.A. in Business, Università Bocconi, 2003-2006 (Summa cum Laude).
Primary fields: Public Economics, Economics of Education.
Secondary field: Economic History.
2013-14, Teaching Assistant for Prof. P. Dupas, Stanford University, Econ 118 (Development Economics).
2012-13, Teaching Assistant for Prof. P. Dupas, Stanford University, Econ 118 (Development Economics).
2011-12, Teaching Assistant for Prof. C. Landais, Stanford University, Econ 101 (Economic Policy Analysis).
2010-12, Research Assistant for Prof. P. Moser, Stanford University.
2008-09, Research Assistant for Prof. V. Galasso, Università Bocconi.
2007-08, Research Assistant for Prof. P. Muliere, Università Bocconi.
2014-15, Haley-Shaw Scholarship, Stanford Institute for Economic Policy Research.
2013-14, Outstanding TA Award, Stanford Economics (Econ 118).
2013-14, George P. Shultz Grant, Stanford Institute for Economic Policy Research. ($15,000)
2012-14, George P. Shultz Scholarship, Stanford Institute for Economic Policy Research.
2012-13, Graduate Research Opportunity (GRO) Award, School of Humanities and Sciences, Stanford University. ($4,500)
2009-11, Economics Department Fellowship, Stanford University.
2006-09, Bocconi Merit Award, Università Bocconi.
Referee for American Economic Review.
Joint with Joerg Baten and Petra Moser
This paper exploits an exogenous episode of compulsory licensing under the 1918 US Trading-with-the-Enemy Act (TWEA)
to examine whether policies that weaken intellectual property rights can encourage innovation.
We collect firm-level data set on nearly 80,000 German patents to examine changes in invention after
the United States made German-owned patents subject to compulsory licensing in 1918.
Baseline estimates indicate a 28 percent increase in patenting in response to compulsory licensing.
Patent renewal data, as a measure for patent quality, suggest that only a small share of this increase was due to lower quality, strategic patents.
Intent-to-treat regressions, which use German-owned US patents to measure exposure to licensing, imply a 22 percent increase.
Firm-level data reveal a differential increase in entry into research fields with licensing.
Firms whose patents were licensed applied for more patents in these fields after 1918.
Taken together, these results indicate that compulsory licensing can promote innovation by increasing competition in research fields with licensing.
STEM education and invention.