Finance and Political Institutions
have analyzed how various legislative institutions affect public policy
outputs such as expenditures and budgeting. The institutions I have
studied include districting and legislature size, legislative
professionalism, and term limits. Much of this research employs
empirical strategies designed to identify the causal effects of these
institutions on fiscal outcomes.
find links to publications in this research
Gabor, Neil Malhotra, Raymond Lee, and Andrew Healy. In press. "The
Effect of Distributive Politics on Electoral Participation: Evidence
from 70 Million Agricultural Payments." Political Behavior.
Keele, Luke, Neil Malhotra, and Colin
McCubbins. 2013. “Do Term Limits
Restrain State Fiscal Policy? Approaches for Causal Inference in
Effects of Legislative Institutions." Legislative
Studies Quarterly. 38(3): 291-326.
Elis, Roy, Neil Malhotra, and Marc Meredith.
2009. “Apportionment Cycles
as Natural Experiments." Political
Analysis. 17(4): 358-376.
Malhotra, Neil. 2008. “Disentangling the
Relationship between Legislative
Professionalism and Government Spending." Legislative
Studies Quarterly. 33(3): 387-414.
Chen, Jowei, and Neil Malhotra. 2007. “The
Law of k/n: The Effect of
Chamber Size on Government Spending in Bicameral Legislatures." American Political Science Review.
Malhotra, Neil. 2006. “Government Growth and
Professionalism in U.S. State
Legislatures." Legislative Studies
Quarterly. 31(4): 563-584.