Abstract

We study the interplay between autonomous transportation, carpooling, and road pricing. We discuss how improvements in these technologies, and interactions among them, will affect transportation markets. Our main results show how to achieve socially efficient outcomes in such markets, taking into account the costs of driving, road capacity, and commuter preferences. An important component of the efficient outcome is the socially optimal matching of carpooling riders. Our approach shows how to set road prices and how to share the costs of driving and tolls among carpooling riders in a way that implements the efficient outcome.
1 Introduction

The market for transportation will be transformed by three emerging technologies. Autonomous driving technology is the most radical of the coming changes, but there are two other emerging technologies that are less futuristic but potentially no less disruptive. The two other technologies are technology for time-sensitive tolls that can be charged for each road segment without slowing down cars and carpooling technology for seamlessly matching cars with multiple passengers. This paper explores the issue of designing efficient transportation markets powered by these three technologies.

Of course, neither tolls nor carpooling are new. However, the frictions currently associated with road pricing and carpooling are very high. These frictions are likely to decrease substantially in the future because of technological improvements.

In the case of tolls, the first generation of the technology involved human toll collectors charging a payment from each passing car, which had to stop to make the payment. The second (current) generation of toll technology (like E-ZPass and FasTrak) involves costly hardware at the points of toll collection. Both technologies are expensive to install and/or run, are thus limited to only a few major locations, and do not allow toll collection on most road segments. E.g., even in the major locations where toll collecting systems are installed, such as bridges, the tolls are often charged only to cars going in one of the two directions, which is not sufficient for efficient traffic management. Generally, implementing toll collection on only a small subset of roads may not be welfare improving, because traffic flows from those roads may spill over to other streets, worsening congestion there.

The third (next) generation of toll technology will reduce the cost of physical toll infrastructure by orders of magnitude, because of advances in GPS, mobile, and other related technologies. These technologies will make it feasible and practical to charge tolls systemwide, street intersection by street intersection, allowing regulators to keep roads toll-free during off-peak hours, and to set tolls high enough to keep traffic flowing during rush hour. Moreover, the ability to coordinate tolls on all the roads in the system together (rather than only on a small subset) will allow regulators to use the tolls as a powerful tool to optimize systemwide traffic, without worrying about “spillovers” from paid roads to free ones. Of course, technological constraints are not the only potential barrier to the adoption of systemwide tolls: commuters may worry about distributional consequences of such

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1 While adjusting the level of tolls in one direction makes it possible to control the overall flow of traffic, it does not allow the regulator to charge time-sensitive tolls in the opposite direction, and thus does not allow to spread traffic in that direction over time in an efficient pattern. To give just one example illustrating the high costs of the current technology, in 2007 the U.S. federal government earmarked over one billion dollars for installing a handful of tolls in just five pilot metropolitan areas (“Cities to Split $1.1 Billion For Traffic Proposals,” the Wall Street Journal, August 14, 2007, https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB118713672357497944).

2 Satellite-based systems are already in use in several European countries, where they are used to charge tolls on trucks for road usage. In 2016, the Land Transport Authority of Singapore announced plans to implement a satellite-based toll system for all motorists by year 2020 (“LTA to roll out next-generation ERP from 2020, NCS-MHI to build system for $556m,” the Straits Times, February 25, 2016, http://www.straitstimes.com/singapore/transport/ncs-mhi-to-build-islandwide-satellite-based-erp-for-556m).
tolls[^3] or about not benefiting from the toll revenue collected by the government[^4]. As we explain in Section 2.3, introducing systemwide tolls in the presence of frictionless carpooling technology helps substantially alleviate these concerns: the two technologies are complementary.

Carpooling is of course also an old “technology,” with a potentially large upside: putting two or three commuters in a car, instead of having them drive solo, would cut the number of cars on the road and the cost of transportation in half. Various government initiatives have promoted carpooling for over half a century, going back to World War II. Yet it still not widely used: according to the US Census Bureau, only around 9.3% of commuters in the US carpooled to work, compared to 76.4% who drove alone[^5]. Why will the future be different from the past? The answer is, again, technological progress. Perfect carpool partners travel along similar routes at similar times. For many people, there are many compatible carpool partners—however, these carpool partners change day to day, because schedules change. Until recently, it was too hard to find a good carpool partner, at least without advance planning, and too inconvenient to coordinate with him or her. This is starting to change. New mobile phone apps (e.g., Waze Carpool and Scoop) automate the process of finding suitable carpool matches with short detours and compatible travel times, and also keep track of user reputation, preferences, and patterns, and make it seamless for passengers to reimburse drivers for part of travel costs[^6]. The products are still in their infancy, available only in limited geographic areas, but they clearly demonstrate the potential of technology to substantially lower the frictions associated with carpooling, especially as the technology matures and the network of commuters who use it grows. So even if the rest of the technological landscape remained unchanged, the barriers to carpooling would drop, making it more attractive. But viewing technological progress in carpooling in isolation would present an incomplete picture of its potential.

In Section 2 we argue that there are strong interdependencies between improvements in the three technologies we mentioned: autonomous transportation, road pricing, and carpooling. Autonomous transportation makes both road pricing and carpooling more convenient and attractive. Road pricing and carpooling reinforce each other: the former makes the latter more attractive, and vice versa. These observations raise a variety of questions about the efficient design of transportation in light of these technological improvements and interactions among them. How should road prices be set? How should carpooling groups be determined? How much should each of the carpooling passengers pay (e.g., if one passenger is in the car for only a part of the ride, while another passenger is in the car for the whole ride—but the car had to make a small detour to

[^3]: E.g., in response to a proposal to introduce toll lanes on highway 580 in Orange County, state Assemblyman Allan Mansoor commented, “If you put toll lanes in, it’s a money grab. Who can afford $10 to $15? Seniors can’t afford it. Low-income families cannot afford it.” (http://abc7.com/news/politicians-oppose-oc-405-fwy-toll-lanes/234209/)

[^4]: In which case they may not benefit from having the tolls. E.g., in Vickrey’s (1969) canonical example, (homogeneous) drivers are indifferent between paying efficient tolls and waiting in traffic: they simply pay in dollars what they used to pay in time. The increase in social welfare comes solely from the fact that the time in traffic is a pure waste, while the collected tolls become government revenue. If the revenue is not used to benefit the drivers in any way, then their welfare is not improved.

[^5]: https://factfinder.census.gov/bkmk/table/1.0/en/ACS/16_5YR/S0801/0100000US

pick up the first passenger)? How should carpooling interact with road pricing (e.g., how should tolls paid by passengers depend on the number of riders in the car)? Our modeling framework in Section 3 is designed to address these questions.

The framework blends together ideas from coalition formation games (riders form coalitions to carpool and share costs) and competitive equilibrium (road prices are set at the level that clears the market). The framework naturally incorporates interactions between the two components: tolls impact which carpooling coalitions get formed; in turn, the carpooling coalition formation process impacts the demand for roads. Our main results in Sections 3.1 and 3.2 show how to achieve socially efficient outcomes in such markets, taking into account the costs of driving, road capacity, and commuter preferences. An important component of the efficient outcome is the socially optimal matching of carpooling riders. Our approach shows how to set road prices and how to share the costs of driving and tolls among carpooling riders in a way that implements the efficient outcome. We find that efficient market design for this setting can be “decomposed” into (i) road pricing by the road authorities (where road segments have positive prices only when they are at capacity, and are free otherwise) and (ii) unconstrained coalition formation in which groups of riders are allowed to arrange whichever carpooling trips they want, and can split the costs of those trips in any way they choose. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first paper that jointly characterizes efficient tolls and efficient carpooling arrangements.

Our main results are established for an economy in which all cars are self-driving. The technical difference between a world in which all cars are self-driving vs. one in which some or all cars have human drivers is that carpool matching with self-driving is a one-sided matching problem, while with regular cars it is a two-sided one. Section 3.3 points out that our results can be adapted to a world in which some or all cars are conventional.

In Sections 4 and 5 we discuss various assumptions behind our modeling framework, as well as potential extensions and generalizations. In Section 4 we consider the issue of the potential economic gains from increased car utilization (as measured by the fraction of time each car is on the road). Perhaps surprisingly, these gains turn out to be relatively small—and, in particular, much smaller than the potential gains from increased utilization of seats within a car (by arranging carpools with multiple passengers traveling in the same car). This observation informs our modeling framework, specifically, the assumptions that the physical cost of a trip depends only on the characteristics of that trip, and that for a self-driving car, there is no cost of waiting between trips. Section 5 concludes with a discussion of other issues related to our model and potential extensions.

2 Technological Interactions

In this section, we discuss the interactions between the three emerging technologies mentioned in the introduction: autonomous transportation, frictionless carpooling, and improved road pricing. This discussion explains why a transportation market powered by these technologies needs to be studied in a unified framework. The framework itself is presented in Section 3. A reader interested
Figure 1: Technological influences

in our formal analysis can skip directly to that section.

Figure 1 illustrates influences between the technologies. The overall progress in information technology makes self-driving cars feasible, and, as discussed in the introduction, also brings about dramatic improvements in carpooling and road pricing. Autonomous transportation technology, in turn, makes carpooling and road pricing even more attractive, as we discuss in Sections 2.1 and 2.2. Finally, as we discuss in Section 2.3 next-generation carpooling and road pricing technologies are highly complementary and make each other more attractive.

2.1 The influence of autonomous transportation on carpooling

Carpooling can be viewed as a form of public transportation. Currently, the cost of drivers is a significant component of public transit costs. Because drivers’ time is expensive, public transportation uses large vehicles that make frequent stops, resulting in slow and often inconvenient service. By eliminating the cost of drivers’ time, self-driving technology will make public transportation much cheaper than it is today. Moreover, it will make public transit more convenient by enabling fewer stops and door-to-door transit at a reasonable cost. Carpooling will become much more attractive in the world of self-driving cars, blurring the line between solo driving and mass transit. Below we list various reasons for this impact of autonomous transportation on carpooling.

- No-hassle coordination: regardless of whether or not a rider carpool, the self-driving car has to know its destination and the possible routes, and so coordinating carpooling does not require effort on the part of riders.
- It is easy for an automated system to make carpooling matches in real time (i.e., when the car is already moving) and adjust its route accordingly. For a human driver to accept a ride request when the car is already moving could be inconvenient or unsafe.
• One of the key challenges in creating a carpooling platform is getting to a critical mass where on-demand carpooling is reliable enough to be practical. With transportation services powered by self-driving cars, this issue is resolved automatically.

• With several people sharing a ride, it does not have to be the case that the same person is the first one getting in the car and the last one getting out of it.

• Detours are much less costly: it costs much less to sit in the car as a passenger who is reading/sleeping/working while the car is making a five-minute detour than to drive during that time. Essentially, with driving, a five-minute detour costs the driver her regular wage for that period, while for a passenger in a self-driving car, the cost is lower.

• No need to depend on a potentially unreliable carpool driver.

• No-hassle payments. Social frictions are removed or reduced.

• People are reluctant to carpool in part due to the loss of flexibility: with conventional carpooling, the driver needs to commit to a departure time and the passenger needs to be ready at the agreed-upon time. With real-time carpooling that can be enabled by self-driving cars, it is possible to offer “asymmetric service”: the first passenger to be picked up pays a small premium so that the car can wait for her (so she can leave her house at any time during a certain time window). As the car starts moving, it can pick up other passengers along the route.

• Consistency of experience. E.g., no need to worry about being matched with an unsafe driver.

• Regular cars are built for families; they are not optimized for carpooling. Self-driving cars may be built with carpooling use in mind. The seating could then be arranged to maximize the comfort and privacy of passengers.

2.2 The influence of autonomous transportation on road pricing

With self-driving cars, intelligent systemwide road pricing also becomes more attractive, for the following reasons.

One reason is the potential equilibrium effect of autonomous transportation on road demand in the absence of road pricing. Without the need to drive, a rider’s disutility from spending a certain amount of time in traffic is substantially reduced: she can sleep, work, read, play videogames, and so on—i.e., engage in many of the same leisure or productive activities that she would otherwise do at home or at work. While individually attractive, this substantially reduced disutility from spending time in traffic may lead to highly undesirable equilibrium effects, with riders being much more willing to take trips during already congested times, and commute over longer distances. Riders would thus impose even higher negative externalities on others, with ambiguous overall effects on social welfare, despite the obvious individual benefits of the improved technology. The Tesla CEO
Elon Musk expressed a related concern that convenient and affordable autonomous transportation may lead to increased congestion: “A lot of people think that once you make cars autonomous that they’ll be able to go faster and that will alleviate congestion and to some degree that will be true. But … the amount of driving that will occur will be much greater with shared autonomy and actually, traffic will get far worse.” In such circumstances, intelligent systemwide road pricing becomes particularly valuable.

Another reason why self-driving technology makes road pricing more attractive is largely logistical, on the rider side. A passenger of a self-driving car already needs to enter her destination when she begins the trip, and it is convenient to present road prices at that moment, as well as let her choose among several options (e.g., a faster route vs. a cheaper one). Similarly, if the passenger’s departure time is flexible, the system can present her with various options to travel at a lower price at a different time. In other words, it is convenient to incorporate road pricing directly into the user interface for autonomous transportation. Note that various carpooling options are also easy to integrate into the same user interface, allowing the user to choose among various combinations of options.

The third reason is also logistical, but on the side of technological infrastructure. Since a self-driving car’s system must already have exact data on what route the car is taking, and at what time, that data can in principle also be used to compute tolls, at a very low marginal cost relative to the cost of developing the toll-collection infrastructure from scratch.

2.3 The complementarity between road pricing and carpooling

Finally, there is a strong complementarity between carpooling and road pricing. To illustrate this complementarity, consider the following simple example based on Vickrey (1969). There is one congested road, which is a “bottleneck.” Twice as many drivers want to go over that road during a certain period of time than the road can allow. Without any interventions, we get congestion, delay, and wasted time. To make the following example as transparent as possible, we assume that the cost of driving is zero—the only issue is congestion and delay.

- Suppose carpooling becomes very convenient: its disutility (vs. driving solo) is some small $\Delta > 0$. This has no effect on outcomes, because nobody has an incentive to carpool.

- Suppose there is no carpooling and tolls are set at the socially optimal level. To make the point particularly stark, suppose also that toll revenues are not spent in ways that benefit the drivers who pay these tolls. Vickrey (1969) then shows that with homogeneous drivers, none of the drivers are better off: they simply pay in dollars what they used to pay in time.

- Now suppose we both have convenient carpooling and set socially optimal tolls. We then fully relieve congestion, all riders arrive at their most preferred times, and are now much better

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7 https://electrek.co/2017/05/01/tesla-network-elon-musk-autonomous-ride-sharing-vision/
8 Society is better off overall, because tolls are an efficient mechanism for raising revenues. A driver’s time in traffic is a social waste, while toll payments are an efficient transfer. However, as we stated above, drivers are no better off if toll revenues are used by the central authority in a way that does not benefit them.
off than they were before—even if all the revenue from tolls is simply destroyed. Moreover, even if only a fraction of drivers can carpool, they become better off, paying in dollars less than half of what they used to pay in time.\footnote{Hall (2017) discusses the difficulties of allocating toll revenue in ways that make all drivers better off, and also raises the question of whether tolls can make all drivers better off even if the revenue from tolls is destroyed. He shows that putting appropriate tolls on some of the lanes on a congested highway can lead to a Pareto improvement, by relieving hypercongestion on those lanes and thereby increasing those lanes’ throughput—which would in turn lead to fewer cars and a lower congestion level on the remaining free lanes. However, as Hall (2017) notes, “Obtaining a Pareto improvement […] comes at a cost. By only pricing a portion of the lanes, we leave the other lanes congested, with all the resulting social costs. That said, inasmuch as generating a Pareto improvement makes it politically feasible to implement tolling, then we are trading potential, but unrealized, welfare gains for actual welfare gains.” Our example shows that with carpooling, one may not need to face this trade-off: it may be possible to both obtain the first-best outcome and generate Pareto improvement for all commuters (relative to the congested status quo), even if all revenue from tolls is destroyed.}

Thus, deployed together, intelligent tolls and seamless carpooling operate as a “shock absorber” for times of peak travel demand: on average, there will be more riders in each car during times of peak demand than during off-peak hours. Note that both technologies are needed for this shock absorber to work well, and they reinforce each other. The presence of tolls makes carpooling more attractive, since it allows riders to share the costs of those tolls and thus pay less and travel closer to their preferred times—in contrast to the situation with congestion delays and without tolls, in which carpooling does not reduce any rider’s cost of waiting in traffic. A cost paid in the form of dollars can be shared among the carpooling riders and thus substantially reduced for each one of them individually, while a cost paid in the form of time spent in traffic cannot: each of the carpooling riders “pays” the full amount. Conversely, the presence of convenient, seamless carpooling makes tolls much more attractive politically, because it gives price-sensitive riders a feasible way to commute during their preferred times, and can make them substantially better off even if the revenue from tolls does not benefit them directly.

3 Model and Main Results

In this section, we present our model of a transportation marketplace with autonomous driving, carpooling, and tolls, and state and prove our main results. In Section 3.1, we present the model and the first result on efficiency. In Section 3.2, we present an auxiliary, “fractional” model of transportation, and prove results on existence and efficiency. In Section 3.3, we discuss to what extent our results are applicable to the world with human drivers.

3.1 Model and Efficiency

There is a finite set of riders $m = 1, \ldots, M$. There is also a finite set of road segments $s = 1, \ldots, S$. Each road segment $s$ identifies both the physical road segment that can be viewed as an “indivisible” road unit (e.g., a part of a freeway between two exits) and a specific time. Note that time is discretized and the same road at two different times is viewed as two distinct road segments. Each road segment $s$ has an integer capacity $q_s > 0$. 
A trip is a feasible combination of one or more riders and one or more road segments, and possibly other characteristics (which can encode a wide variety of options: e.g., which rider gets which seat, what type of car is used, and so on). There is a finite number $T$ of possible trips $t = 1, \ldots, T$.

Each trip $t$ has a non-negative physical cost $c(t) \in \mathbb{R}$ associated with it. This cost includes the physical cost of the resources associated with the trip: gas or electricity used; wear and tear on the car; etc.

Each rider $m$ has a non-negative valuation for every possible trip $t$ that involves him, $v_m(t) \in \mathbb{R}$. We assume that for each rider $m$, there exists an “outside option” that is represented by a trip that involves only one rider ($m$) and no road segments, gives rider $m$ the valuation of zero, and has the cost of zero. We also assume that for every trip $t$ and every subset of riders involved in trip $t$, there exists a trip $t'$ that involves exactly this subset of riders, involves the same segments as trip $t$, has cost $c(t') \leq c(t)$, and to every rider $m$ in the subset, gives valuation $v_m(t') \geq v_m(t)$. I.e., intuitively, we can drop any rider from a trip without increasing the physical cost of the trip and without making other riders worse off. Finally, we assume that each trip creates non-negative net value to its participants: $\sum_{m \in t} v_m(t) - c(t) \geq 0$, where “$m \in t$” denotes the riders who participate in trip $t$.

An assignment is a set of trips $A$ such that each rider is involved in exactly one trip in $A$ (some of these riders may of course be assigned to their outside option). Assignment $A$ is feasible if for each road segment $s$, the number of trips in $A$ that include road segment $s$ does not exceed its capacity $q_s$.

An observation about our modeling assumptions is in order. By definition, there is no traffic congestion in a feasible assignment. Obviously, in practice, setting tolls too low (e.g., at zero) can lead to traffic delays, as cars may have to wait in queues in order to pass through road segments that lack capacity to meet demand. However, for our purposes, we do not need to model traffic congestion, much like general equilibrium models do not need to model consumer response to shortages. Our assumptions say that as long as an assignment is feasible (i.e., the number of cars on each road segment does not exceed that segment’s capacity), the speed of cars on that road segment and hence each rider’s utility from a trip does not depend on the number of other cars using the same road segments. In other words, we implicitly assumed that when traffic congestion slows down the flow of traffic, the throughput of the road does not increase relative to maximum throughput that is attainable at speed limit. While this is of course an approximation, it is in fact largely consistent with the findings from the literature on traffic and road throughput. For high levels of traffic congestion, overall road throughput is actually reduced relative to throughput available at higher speeds (this phenomenon is known as “hypercongestion,” see [Walters (1961)], who calls this phenomenon “the bottleneck case,” and [Small and Chu (2003)]. Thus, at high congestion levels there is no trade-off between speed and throughput. For moderate levels of traffic, there is a trade-off between the speed of traffic and throughput, however, assuming this trade-off away is a reasonably accurate approximation of the real world traffic flows, which substantially
simplifies the analysis without losing much realism. For example, the highest possible throughput on highways is attained at speeds that are close to speed limits (Hall [1996] Varaiya [2005]). We further discuss this assumption in more detail in Section 5.

We now introduce monetary transfers in our model. First, a non-negative vector $p \in \mathbb{R}^M$ specifies the price paid by each rider $m$. If a rider $m$ is charged price $p_m$ and is assigned to trip $t_m$, his utility function is quasilinear in money:

$$U_m(t_m, p_m) = v_m(t_m) - p_m.$$  

Second, a non-negative vector $r \in \mathbb{R}^S$ specifies the tolls imposed by a regulator. Note that tolls are segment-specific (rather than route-specific): the cost of using a route is equal to the sum of the tolls for its individual segments. Note also that tolls are imposed on cars rather than on passengers, and so in particular are not affected by the number of passengers in a car. We discuss the possibility of more complex tolls that depend on the entire route or on the number of passengers after the proof of Theorem 1.

An outcome is a triple $(A, p, r)$ that specifies an assignment, the payments made by the riders, and the tolls imposed by the regulator. An outcome is feasible if the corresponding assignment $A$ is feasible. An outcome is budget-balanced if the sum of prices paid by the riders for their trips is greater than or equal to the sum of the total physical costs of those trips and the total tolls on the road segments involved in those trips. An outcome is stable if no coalition of riders can organize a trip by themselves (taking the physical cost of that trip and the underlying tolls as given) that would give each of them a strictly higher utility than what they are getting in the outcome.

The social surplus of assignment $A$ is equal to the sum of the valuations of all the riders from the trips to which they are assigned in $A$ minus the sum of the costs of the trips in $A$. Note that prices $p$ and tolls $r$ do not enter this calculation.

The regulator is interested in maximizing social surplus. Note that feasibility, stability, and budget-balancedness are not sufficient to guarantee that social surplus is maximized. For instance, if all tolls are set at a very high level, the outcome that assigns every rider to his outside option and charges him zero is feasible, stable, and budget-balanced – but is not in general surplus maximizing. Intuitively, the problem with such a high level of tolls is that it leaves roads underutilized: high tolls push riders away even from segments that have plenty of capacity. Our last condition rules out such a possibility. Formally, we say that an outcome is market-clearing if for every road segment such that the number of trips in $A$ that include it is less than its capacity, the corresponding toll is equal to zero.

We are now ready to state the first main result of the paper.

\[\text{From Varaiya [2005]: “There are 26,000 sensors buried under the pavements of California freeways. Every thirty seconds, those sensors send data to our computers here in Berkeley. The data tell us about the number of cars driving on that freeway and their speeds at that time. . . . We’ve already learned quite a lot from all those data. For example, we’ve found the error in the old belief that an average speed of 40 to 45 mph maximizes traffic capacity; we now know for a fact that maximum capacity occurs at around 60 mph.”} \]
Theorem 1 If an outcome \((A, p^A, r^A)\) is feasible, stable, budget-balanced, and market-clearing, then assignment \(A\) has the highest possible social surplus across all feasible assignments.

**Proof.** Suppose a different feasible assignment, \(B\), generates a higher social surplus than does assignment \(A\). Take any trip \(t\) in assignment \(B\), and all riders \(m\) involved in trip \(t\). Since by assumption outcome \(A\) is stable, this coalition of riders cannot benefit from organizing trip \(t\) by themselves, given prices \(p^A\) and tolls \(r^A\) in outcome \(A\). Thus, summing the utilities of all riders involved in trip \(t\), we get

\[
\sum_{m \in t} (v_m(t_m^A) - p_m^A) \geq \left( \sum_{m \in t} v_m(t) \right) - c(t) - r^A(t),
\]

(1)

where \(t_m^A\) denotes the trip in which rider \(m\) is involved under assignment \(A\), and, slightly abusing notation, \(r^A(t)\) denotes the sum of the tolls on the segments involved in trip \(t\) in outcome \((A, p^A, r^A)\).

Adding up equations (1) across all trips \(t\) in assignment \(B\), we get

\[
\sum_{m=1}^{M} v_m(t_m^A) - \sum_{m=1}^{M} p_m^A \geq \sum_{m=1}^{M} v_m(t_m^B) - \sum_{t \in B} c(t) - \sum_{s=1}^{S} r^A(s)k^B(s),
\]

(2)

where \(k^B(s)\) denotes how many trips in assignment \(B\) use segment \(s\).

Since outcome \((A, p^A, r^A)\) is by assumption budget-balanced, we have

\[
\sum_{m=1}^{M} p_m^A \geq \sum_{t \in A} c(t) + \sum_{s=1}^{S} r^A(s)k^A(s).
\]

Thus, equation (2) implies that

\[
\sum_{m=1}^{M} v_m(t_m^A) - \sum_{t \in A} c(t) - \sum_{s=1}^{S} r^A(s)k^A(s) \geq \sum_{m=1}^{M} v_m(t_m^B) - \sum_{t \in B} c(t) - \sum_{s=1}^{S} r^A(s)k^B(s).
\]

(3)

The social surplus of assignment \(A\) is equal to \(\sum_{m=1}^{M} v_m(t_m^A) - \sum_{t \in A} c(t)\), while the social surplus of assignment \(B\) is equal to \(\sum_{m=1}^{M} v_m(t_m^B) - \sum_{t \in B} c(t)\). To show that the former is greater than or equal to the latter, it is now sufficient to observe that \(\sum_{s=1}^{S} r^A(s)k^A(s) \geq \sum_{s=1}^{S} r^A(s)k^B(s)\), which follows from the market-clearing property of outcome \((A, p^A, r^A)\): for every segment \(s\) with \(r^A(s) > 0\), \(k^A(s)\) is equal to the capacity of segment \(s\), and is thus greater than or equal to \(k^B(s)\).

The above result has a number of implications for how to set efficient tolls. Until recently the only technology available for collecting tolls was to charge tolls per road segment. Thus, a technological constraint necessitated that tolls be additive, i.e., the toll for the entire trip is the sum of tolls, calculated per road segment, that the trip consists of. With technological advances made over the last decade, it will soon be possible to seamlessly charge time-dependent tolls for each
road segment and to even make these tolls non-additive. Examples of non-additive tolls include
discounting tolls for individuals with long commutes or discounting tolls for one of the routes
available to commuters who have a choice between two reasonable routes. How much economic
gain can be realized from charging non-additive tolls? The above theorem answers this question:
the efficient outcome can be implemented with simple tolls that are additive in road segments, and
hence, charging more complex, non-additive tolls does not generate any economic gain.

Another natural question is how tolls should depend on the number of people in the car. Theo-
rem 1 shows that efficient outcomes can be obtained with tolls that do not depend on the number of
passengers. This result depends on the assumptions that commuters have utility functions quasilinear
in money and that the social planner’s objective is to maximize the total social surplus. Relaxing
these assumptions (e.g., incorporating distributional considerations into the planner’s utility func-
tion) may change this conclusion (e.g., leading to discounted tolls to carpoolers if lower-income
individuals are more likely to carpool).

The above observations on the structure of tolls also depend on the assumption that the regu-
lator is able to set the tolls systemwide. If that is not feasible, and the regulator can only set tolls
on some set of segments, then the efficient toll structure may be more complex—but only if some
other segments (on which the regulator cannot set tolls) are congested.

3.2 Existence and Quasi-Outcomes

A feasible, stable, budget-balanced, and market-clearing outcome may fail to exist. For example,
suppose there are 101 commuters who want to travel from one town to another one. Each car can
fit two people, and the cost of the trip is $10, regardless of the number of travelers. Each traveler
has a disutility of $2 from carpooling. The road has plenty of capacity (e.g., more than 101 cars
can pass through it during the time desired by the commuters). In this market, a feasible, stable,
budget-balanced, and market-clearing outcome does not exist: each commuter would prefer to
carpool rather than riding on his own, but the total number of commuters is not divisible by 2.

To deal with the non-existence issue, we introduce quasi-assignments and quasi-outcomes, which
are “fractional” analogs of assignments and outcomes, respectively. We will show that feasible,
stable, budget-balanced, and market-clearing quasi-outcomes exist and are socially efficient. We
can then consider outcomes that are close to these socially efficient quasi-outcomes, and are thus
approximately efficient.

Formally, a quasi-assignment \( G \) is a vector in \([0, 1]^T\) that assigns a number in the interval \([0, 1]\)

\[11\] Many tolls in the US are discounted for carpoolers. Our paper does not imply that efficiency would be enhanced
if the discounts for carpoolers that are currently in place were removed. Currently, tolls are not set at the efficient
level—on most road segments there are no tolls (i.e., a zero toll) and on many road segments that have tolls, the
tolls are set below the market-clearing level (as evidenced by traffic congestion on those segments). In such cases,
discounting tolls for carpoolers is likely to be welfare-enhancing even without distributional considerations.

\[12\] Of course, our finding that efficient tolls do not depend on the number of passengers in the car does not at all
mean that carpooling and tolls are unrelated. As we discussed in Section 2.3, tolls and carpooling are complementary
and interdependent. With tolls, there is a stronger incentive to carpool. In turn, carpooling impacts the overall
demand for road segments, which then affects the level of efficient tolls.
to each trip $t$, such that for each rider $m$, the sum of numbers $G(t)$ over all trips $t$ that involve rider $m$ is equal to 1. (In particular, every assignment can be viewed as a quasi-assignment in which each $G(t)$ is equal to either 0 or 1.) The notion of social surplus for a quasi-assignment is generalized accordingly. The social surplus of quasi-assignment $G$ is equal to the sum of the valuations of all the riders from the trips to which they are assigned in $G$ minus the sum of the costs of the trips in $G$, both weighted by the masses of the trips in $G$. Formally, the social surplus of quasi-assignment $G$ is equal to $\sum_{t \in T} (\sum_{m \in t} v_m(t) - c(t)) G(t)$, where slightly abusing notation, we denote by “$m \in t$” all riders $m$ involved in trip $t$. Note that when $G$ is an assignment (i.e., all weights are zero or one), the definition of social surplus coincides with that of social surplus for an assignment.

A quasi-outcome is a triple $(G, u, r)$, where $G$ is a quasi-assignment, $r \in \mathbb{R}^S$ is a vector of non-negative tolls (one per segment), and $u \in \mathbb{R}^M$ is a vector that specifies the utility of each rider $m$. Utility $u(m)$ pins down the payment that rider $m$ would need to make for any trip $t$ in which he is involved and which has a positive weight $G(t)$. Note that the definition of a quasi-outcome implicitly implies that rider $m$ is indifferent among all positive-weight trips in which he is involved.

A quasi-assignment $G$ is feasible if for each segment $s$, the sum of $G(t)$ over all trips $t$ that involve segment $s$ is less than or equal to capacity $q_s$. A quasi-outcome $(G, u, r)$ is feasible if the quasi-assignment $G$ in it is feasible. A quasi-outcome $(G, u, r)$ is market-clearing if for every “underutilized” road segment $s$ (i.e., a segment for which the sum of $G(t)$ over all the trips $t$ that involve it is strictly less than its capacity), the toll $r(s)$ is zero. A quasi-outcome $(G, u, r)$ is stable if it is not possible to organize a trip $t$ that makes all the riders involved in it strictly better off than they were under $(G, u, r)$ (taking the physical cost of trip $t$ and the corresponding tolls as given). Formally, a quasi-outcome $(G, u, r)$ is stable if for every trip $t$, $\sum_{m \in t} u(m) \geq \sum_{m \in t} v_m(t) - c(t) - r(t)$. Finally, a quasi-outcome $(G, u, r)$ is budget-balanced if the sum of payments of all the riders for their trips, weighted by the weights $G(t)$ of those trips, is greater than or equal to the sum of the physical costs of those trips and the total tolls on the road segments involved in those trips, both again weighted by $G(t)$: $\sum_{t \in T} \sum_{m \in t} (v_m(t) - u(m)) G(t) \geq \sum_{t \in T} (c(t) + r(t)) G(t)$.

We are now ready to state and prove the second main result of the paper.

**Theorem 2** There exists a feasible, stable, budget-balanced, and market-clearing quasi-outcome. Any such quasi-outcome is socially efficient.

Our model blends together elements of matching and coalition formation theory (e.g., the notion of stability) with elements of Walrasian equilibrium theory (e.g., the notion of market-clearing tolls) that interact in a subtle way: the coalitions (i.e., trips) that get formed depend on the tolls—while the tolls that need to be set to clear the market in turn depend on how coalitions get formed (and thus how much demand there will be for various segments).

To handle this interdependence, the first step of our proof is to map our economy into an auxiliary one that can be analyzed in the standard competitive equilibrium framework. We then observe that the auxiliary economy has a competitive equilibrium. Finally, we show how to translate the competitive equilibrium of the auxiliary economy into a feasible, stable, budget-balanced, and market-clearing quasi-outcome.
Proof of Theorem 2.

Step 1  We begin by introducing an auxiliary economy. The consumers in this economy are new agents called “trip organizers.” There are $T$ types of those agents, one type for each trip in the original economy. There are two trip organizers of each type. (Any other number greater than one would also work; we only pick two for concreteness.)

The goods in this economy are the $M$ riders and the $S$ road segments from the original model. The supply of every “rider good” is equal to one, and the supply of every “segment good” is equal to the capacity of the corresponding segment. Price vector $\rho \in \mathbb{R}^{M+S}$ assigns a price to every good in the economy. We restrict prices to be non-negative.

Consumers (i.e., trip organizers) in this auxiliary economy can consume bundles of goods $b \in [0,1]^{M+S}$. Note that consumption of any good can be any number between zero and one. The key building block in the model is the utility function of the consumers. Specifically, given a price vector $\rho$, the utility of a consumer of type $t$ for a bundle of goods $b$ is equal to $\tilde{U}_t(b, \rho) = \tilde{V}_t(b) - \rho^T b$, where

$$\tilde{V}_t(b) = \left( \sum_{m \in t} v_m(t) - c(t) \right) \times \min_{g \in t} b(g).$$

The expression in parentheses is the surplus from trip $t$ (i.e., the sum of the utilities from the trip obtained by the riders involved in it, minus the physical cost of the trip). The expression outside of the parentheses is what fraction of the trip “can be organized” if one has access to bundle $b$: it is the minimum of $b(g)$ over all goods (riders and segments) $g$ involved in $t$. Note that we implicitly assume free disposal: goods not involved in trip $t$ do not affect the valuation, and goods involved in $t$ that are available in an amount greater than $\min_{g \in t} b(g)$ also do not affect the valuation.

Step 2  We have now defined the auxiliary economy. We did not specify the initial allocation of goods, because it does not affect equilibrium prices, due to the quasilinearity of utility functions. We next turn to the question of the existence of a competitive equilibrium. Crucially, in the auxiliary economy, consumers’ preferences are convex: for each consumer, the expression in the parentheses in equation (4) is a constant, and so the utility function is linear in money and Leontief in other goods. Thus, for ever vector of prices $\rho \geq 0$, for any consumer, the set of optimal consumption bundles given prices $\rho$ is convex.\footnote{Note that the convexity of consumers’ demand sets is due to the fact that they are allowed to consume fractional bundles. If they could only consume integer quantities, the demand sets would not be convex, and the equilibrium would not necessarily exist. In essence, allowing for fractional bundles “convexifies” our original economy in a similar way as how considering economies with a continuum of agents convexifies non-convex preferences in models of large markets going back to the the classical sequence of papers in the Journal of Political Economy (Farrell 1959; Rothenberg 1960; Bator 1961; Koopmans 1961) and subsequent literature on the topic (see, e.g., Aumann 1964, 1966; Shapley and Shubik 1966; Starr 1969; Azevedo et al. 2013, and Azevedo and Hatfield 2015). Note, however, that simply considering a continuum of agents at a finite number of transportation nodes would not result in an appropriate framework for our setting. In such a model, every agent would have a continuum of perfect carpooling partners, with the framework thus essentially assuming away the key question of carpool matching: all partners in a given carpool will have identical origins and destinations. By contrast, in practice, much richer types of carpooling arrangements need to be accommodated. Our framework makes it possible to study such arrangements.} In the rest of the proof, using standard fixed-point arguments,
we will show that this economy therefore has a competitive equilibrium: a set of prices \( \rho^* \geq 0 \) and an allocation of bundles of goods \( B^* \) to the consumers such that the total amount of goods allocated is equal to the initial aggregate endowment, and such that each consumer is allocated an individually optimal bundle given the prices.

Specifically, let \( \tilde{V}^* = \max_{t \in T} \left( \sum_{m \in t} v_m(t) - c(t) \right) \) denote the largest possible surplus from any trip, and define set \( W \subset \mathbb{R}^{M+S} \) of possible price vectors as \( W = [0, \tilde{V}^* + 2T]^{M+S} \). Define the tâtonnement correspondence for price vectors \( \rho \) in \( W \) as follows. Take a price vector \( \rho \in W \). For each consumer, pick an optimal bundle given this price vector \( \rho \), and let \( D \in \mathbb{R}^{M+S} \) be the sum of these bundles. Let \( Q \in \mathbb{R}^{M+S} \) denote the available supply of all items (1 for riders and \( q_s \) for road segments). Define the tâtonnement price adjustment function \( \tau(\rho, D) = \max\{0, \rho + (D - Q)\} \): price \( \rho \) adjusts by the amount of excess demand, but is restricted to remain non-negative. Note that for all \( \rho \in W \) and all corresponding \( D \), we also have \( \tau(\rho, D) \in W \). \[14\]

We now define the correspondence \( \varphi \) from \( W \) to \( W \) as follows: for every \( \rho \), \( \varphi(\rho) \) is the set of price vectors \( \rho \in W \) such that for some profile \( B \) of bundles that are optimal for consumers given price vector \( \rho \), for the sum of those bundles \( D \), we have \( \rho = \tau(\rho, D) \).

The correspondence \( \varphi \) satisfies all the requirements of Kakutani’s fixed-point theorem: Set \( W \) is a non-empty, compact, and convex subset of \( \mathbb{R}^{M+S} \). Correspondence \( \varphi(\rho) \) is non-empty and convex for all \( \rho \in W \). Finally, correspondence \( \varphi(\rho) \) has a closed graph. \[15\] Thus, by Kakutani’s fixed-point theorem, correspondence \( \varphi \) has at least one fixed point. Take a fixed point \( \rho^* \in \varphi(\rho^*) \) and a profile \( B^* \) of consumer-optimal bundles with aggregate demand \( D^* \) such that \( \rho^* = \tau(\rho^*, D^*) \). Then the pair \( (\rho^*, B^*) \) constitutes a competitive equilibrium. \[16\]

**Step 3** Take any competitive equilibrium of the auxiliary economy, \((\rho^*, B^*)\). Observe that in this equilibrium, the utility of every consumer is zero. This is because, by construction, there is an “excess supply” of trip organizers: we have two of them for each trip \( t \). At the same time, we only have enough riders for at most one trip of type \( t \). Thus, the only way to have market clearing is to either have trip organizers be indifferent between organizing their trips (given the prices) and not organizing them, or having them strictly prefer not organizing the trips. Since no trip organizer will be losing money in a competitive equilibrium (because they can always choose to consume the

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14By construction, \( \tau(\rho, D) \) is non-negative. For every good \( g \) with \( \rho_g \leq \tilde{V}^* \), \( \tau(\rho, D)_g \leq \tilde{V}^* + 2T \), because there are \( 2T \) consumers in the economy and each consumer demands at most one unit of good \( g \), so excess demand for good \( g \) cannot be greater than \( 2T \). Finally, for every good \( g \) with \( \rho_g > \tilde{V}^* \), the demand from every consumer is zero, and so \( \tau(\rho, D)_g \leq \rho_g \leq \tilde{V}^* + 2T \).

15Take any sequence of pairs of prices \((\rho_k, \tilde{\rho}_k)\) such that for every \( k \), \( \rho_k \in \varphi(\rho_k) \), and such that \( \lim_{k \to \infty} (\rho_k, \tilde{\rho}_k) = (\rho^*, \tilde{\rho}^*) \). For each \( k \), take a profile \( B_k \) of consumers’ bundles of demands such that for the corresponding aggregate demand \( D_k \), we have \( \tau(\rho_k, D_k) = \tilde{\rho}_k \). Since each bundle belongs to the compact set \([0, 1]^{M+S}\), and there is a finite number \( 2T \) of bundles in each profile, the sequence of profiles has a subsequence that converges to a limit, \( B^* \). By the continuity of consumers’ demand functions, for the aggregate demand \( D^* \) that corresponds to the profile of bundles \( B^* \), we have \( \tilde{\rho}^* = \tau(\rho^*, D^*) \), and so \( \tilde{\rho}^* \in \varphi(\rho^*) \).

16Strictly speaking, this is not necessarily a competitive equilibrium according to the canonical definition, which requires that the markets for all goods clear. In our case, for goods with zero prices, supply can exceed demand. For the purposes of our proof, this difference is immaterial.
empty bundle and get the utility of zero), their utilities must be exactly zero.\footnote{In other words, if there is a trip organizer whose utility in the equilibrium \((\rho^*, B^*)\) is strictly positive, he must have demand 1 for each rider involved in his trip – and so will the other organizer of the same type. Thus, the demand for each of the riders involved in their trip will be at least 2, while the supply of each rider is 1, and so demand exceeds supply, which cannot happen in equilibrium.}

This observation allows us to go from a competitive equilibrium in the auxiliary economy to a feasible, stable, budget-balanced, and market-clearing quasi-outcome in the original one, as follows. For each segment \(s\), its toll \(r^*(s)\) in the original economy is set equal to the competitive equilibrium price \(\rho^*(s)\). Likewise, for each rider \(m\), the utility \(u^*(m)\) in the original market is set equal to \(\rho^*(m)\). To construct the quasi-assignment \(G^*\), take first all riders \(m\) whose utility \(u^*(m) = \rho^*(m)\) is greater than zero. See to which types of trip organizers, and in what quantities, these riders were allocated under \(B^*\). These will be the measures of trips of these consumers in quasi-assignment \(G^*\). Finally, for riders whose utilities are zero, assign them to their outside options with such measures that the aggregate mass of trips in which they are involved is equal to 1.

The resulting quasi-outcome is feasible by construction: in the competitive equilibrium \((\rho^*, B^*)\), the aggregate demand for each segment \(s\) does not exceed its supply, \(q_s\), and thus the same is true for quasi-assignment \(G^*\). To see that the quasi-outcome is budget-balanced, we need to show that \(\sum_{t \in T} \sum_{m \in T} v_m(t) - u^*(m) \geq 0\). Rearranging the terms, we get \(\sum_{t \in T} G^*(t) \geq 0\), which follows (with equality) from the fact that for each of the segments \(s\) for which the aggregate demand is equal to their capacity; for the road segments whose supply exceeds demand, prices are zero.

Thus, we have constructed a feasible, stable, budget-balanced, and market-clearing quasi-outcome, completing the proof of the existence part of the theorem. We conclude with an observation that in this quasi-outcome, the implied payments paid by every rider for every trip that he takes is non-negative, i.e., for every trip \(t\) with \(G^*(t) > 0\) and every \(m \in t\), we have \(u^*_m \leq v_m(t)\). This property follows from the assumption that one can “drop” riders from a trip without increasing the physical cost of the trip and without making other riders worse off.

\footnote{In the auxiliary economy, there are two trip organizers of each type \(t\). For the construction of quasi-assignment \(G^*\), the relative allocation of rider \(m\) between these two consumers does not matter; the only quantity that matters is the total allocation of rider \(m\) to the consumers of type \(t\). Note also that if in equilibrium, two riders with positive utilities are allocated to a consumer of type \(t\), they will be allocated with the same masses, because of the Leontief form of trip organizers’ utility functions. Thus, for determining the measure \(G^*(t)\) of trip \(t\) in the quasi-outcome, it does not matter which positive-utility rider \(m \in t\) is used.}
Step 4 The proof of efficiency of any feasible, stable, budget-balanced, and market-clearing quasi-outcome is analogous to the proof of Theorem 1. Take any such quasi-outcome \((G^A, u^A, r^A)\), and take any feasible quasi-assignment \(G^B\). The social surplus of quasi-assignment \(G^A\) is equal to 
\[ \sum_{t \in T} (\sum_{m \in t} v_m(t) - c(t)) G^A(t). \]
This expression, by the budget-balancedness of quasi-outcome \((G^A, u^A, r^A)\), is greater than or equal to 
\[ \sum_{t \in T} G^A(t) (\sum_{m \in t} u^A(m) + r^A(t)) = \sum_{m \in M} u^A(m) + \sum_{t \in T} G^A(t) r^A(t). \]

Next, by the stability of \((G^A, u^A, r^A)\), for every trip \(t\) we have \(\sum_{m \in t} u^A(m) \geq \sum_{m \in t} v_m(t) - c(t) - r^A(t)\). Rearranging the terms and aggregating across trips in \(G^B\), we get an upper bound for the social surplus of quasi-assignment \(G^B\). Specifically, 
\[ \sum_{t \in T} (\sum_{m \in t} v_m(t) - c(t)) G^B(t) \leq \sum_{t \in T} G^B(t) (\sum_{m \in t} u^A(m) + r^A(t)) = \sum_{m \in M} u^A(m) + \sum_{t \in T} G^B(t) r^A(t). \]

The last step of the proof is to observe that \(\sum_{t \in T} G^A(t) r^A(t) \geq \sum_{t \in T} G^B(t) r^A(t)\), because by the market-clearing of quasi-outcome \((G^A, u^A, r^A)\), we have \(r^A(s) > 0\) only for segments \(s\) that are utilized to full capacity under quasi-assignment \(G^A\).

In the above example with 101 commuters, there are many feasible, stable, budget-balanced, and market-clearing quasi-outcomes. They all involve only trips that have two riders who carpool, and each rider’s cost for every trip that he takes with a positive weight is equal to $5. Of course, a “non-fractional” outcome with such properties does not exist, due to integer constraints. However, there are outcomes that are close: the ones that involve 50 pairs of carpooling riders, and one rider who commutes solo. The social welfare in this outcome is close to the upper bound provided by the feasible, stable, budget-balanced, and market-clearing quasi-outcomes.

Note that the machinery developed in this section can be used to compute both efficient tolls and prices for shared transportation in self-driving cars.

3.3 The world with human drivers

The model with carpooling and the main results (Theorems 1 and 2) can be easily adapted to a world in which some or all of the cars have human drivers. Each trip now needs to specify which (if any) of the people involved is the driver (with the rest being passengers), and we also need to make some minor modifications to our modeling assumptions. E.g., the price paid by the driver may be negative (i.e., his passengers pay him for the ride) or positive (when, e.g., he drives solo and needs to pay tolls). But the essence of the model remains the same.

However, our model and results do not apply to a world with professional drivers (i.e., taxis, Uber, Lyft, and so on). The reason for this distinction is that in the world with professional drivers, we can no longer assume that the cost of a trip only depends on the characteristics of the trip itself. In that world, a professional driver’s idle time of waiting for the next trip is costly, and someone needs to cover that cost. In such a world, the costs of trips are interdependent: the tighter can the trips be scheduled (i.e., the lower is the idle time of professional drivers), the lower is the average cost per trip. At first glance, it may seem that the economics of trip costs are similar in the case of self-driving cars: tighter scheduling of trips leads to a higher utilization of cars, which in turn leads to a lower per-trip cost. However, as we show in the next section, in the case of self-driving cars:
cars the savings from higher utilization are likely to be very small (in particular, much smaller than the per-trip costs that depend solely on a trip’s characteristics), allowing us to abstract away from them in our framework.

4 Cost Structure

In this section, we discuss the cost structure of transportation. Specifically, we focus on the question of when and whether higher utilization (i.e., increasing a car’s annual mileage and thus decreasing its idle time) leads to substantial cost savings. We start out by presenting our results and numerical examples, and then discuss their implications for our analysis and other related considerations.

4.1 Model and results

Our model of costs is deliberately very simple, to make the logic and takeaways as transparent as possible. We make the following assumptions. A car costs $C$ and dies after $N$ miles or $A$ years, whichever comes first. The annualized real interest rate is $r$. A car is driven $K$ miles per year; its utilization rate is thus proportional to $K$. Fuel (or electricity), maintenance, and insurance are variable costs, $m$ per mile.

We define the cost per mile, $G$, as the number such that the present value of all costs of owning and operating a car over its lifetime is equal to the present value of the flow cost $G$ over all the miles driven by the car. For example, if the interest rate is zero, then $G$ is simply the total cost of owning and operating the car over its lifetime divided by its lifetime mileage.

Proposition 1 For $r > 0$, the cost per mile $G$ is equal to $m + \frac{Cr}{K(1-e^{-rT})}$, where $T = \min\{A, \frac{N}{K}\}$.

For $r = 0$, the cost per mile is $G = m + \frac{C}{KT}$.

Proof. Note that $T$ is the age at which the car will die. The present value of all costs of owning and operating a car over its lifetime is therefore equal to

$$C + \int_0^T mKe^{-rt}dt. \quad (5)$$

The present value of the flow costs $G$ is equal to

$$\int_0^T GKe^{-rt}dt. \quad (6)$$

The result of the proposition follows immediately from equating expressions (5) and (6).

Note that there is no discontinuity at $r = 0$ (because $\lim_{r \to 0} \frac{r}{1-e^{-r}} = \frac{1}{T}$).

Corollary 1 If $r = 0$ and $N < AK$ (i.e., the real interest rate is zero and cars die from usage rather than old age), an increase in annual mileage yields no cost savings.
Proof. If $AK > N$, then $T = \frac{N}{K}$. If, in addition, $r = 0$, then $G = m + \frac{C}{N}$. For any $K' > K$, we also have $AK' > N$, and thus (for $r = 0$) $G' = m + \frac{C}{N}$. Thus, if the real interest rate is zero and the utilization rate is high enough so that the car dies from usage, the cost per mile does not change as the utilization rate increases. ■

To get a sense of the magnitude of savings from increasing car utilization, let us now consider an example with parameter values that roughly match a typical American car.

Example 1 Suppose a car dies after $N = 200,000$ miles or 15 years, whichever comes first. A new car costs $C = $30,000. The real interest rate is $r = 3\%$. The variable cost is $m = 30\text{¢}$ per mile (which includes gas, maintenance, and insurance).

The following table reports cost per mile $G$ as a function of annual mileage $K$.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Annual mileage</th>
<th>5,000</th>
<th>15,000</th>
<th>25,000</th>
<th>35,000</th>
<th>45,000</th>
<th>55,000</th>
<th>65,000</th>
<th>75,000</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Cost Per Mile</td>
<td>79.67¢</td>
<td>48.20¢</td>
<td>46.87¢</td>
<td>46.32¢</td>
<td>46.02¢</td>
<td>45.83¢</td>
<td>45.70¢</td>
<td>45.61¢</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Savings from increasing mileage by 10,000</td>
<td>39.50%</td>
<td>2.75%</td>
<td>1.17%</td>
<td>0.65%</td>
<td>0.41%</td>
<td>0.28%</td>
<td>0.21%</td>
<td>0.16%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note that tripling the annual mileage from an unusually low 5,000 to a more typical 15,000 leads to savings of close to 40%. The savings are considerable because increasing utilization means getting more miles out of the car over its lifetime. However, tripling the annual mileage again to 45,000 (which corresponds to a utilization rate of about 15%) leads to an additional reduction in the per-mile cost of driving of less than 5%. Unlike many other types of capital, the returns to increased utilization of cars rapidly diminish because cars usually do not “die of old age”: most of the wear comes from the mileage driven. (Note that the probability of damaging or losing a car in an accident is also proportional to mileage.) If a car dies from mileage, the gain from increased utilization is not from the additional miles but rather from the “time value of driving a mile.” Thus, with low interest rates, beyond a certain point there is very little gain from increases in utilization.

4.2 Implications and discussion

While the results in Section 4.1 are elementary accounting calculations, they have important implications for the structure of the transportation market.

First, consider the commonly shared view that with the advent of self-driving cars, personal car ownership will become too expensive relative to the much cheaper use of “Transportation-as-a-Service” (TaaS) providers, and will largely disappear\(^\text{19}\). Our calculations suggest that this...
view may not materialize. Consider a typical consumer—someone who drives 15,000 miles a year (corresponding to an approximately 5% utilization rate) and lives in an area where parking is free and readily available. For this consumer, the efficiency gain from switching away from car ownership to using a TaaS fleet with three times higher utilization rate is less than 5%. Such a consumer may easily choose to forgo this modest cost saving in favor of various benefits of personal car ownership, such as, e.g., having a tennis racket or golf clubs in the trunk. Of course, for other consumers (e.g., those who live in areas where parking is very costly or those who drive very little), it would make sense to use TaaS. Our framework in Section 3 naturally incorporates both models and allows them to co-exist.

A closely related point is that beyond a fairly minimal utilization level, it is cheap for self-driving cars to wait for a good nearby match with a rider or a group of riders, instead of repositioning the car after a trip. This observation drives a key feature of our model in Section 3 that the cost of a car trip only depends on the characteristics of that trip and not on the characteristics of other trips in the system (if a car needed to be repositioned by a substantial distance from the end of one trip to the beginning of the next one, or if waiting after the end of one trip until the beginning of the next one was expensive, then the costs of trips would not be “separable”).

Proposition 1 implies that car-sharing platforms cannot deliver significant reductions in the cost per mile relative to a typical personal car. For the relevant parameter range, the returns to increased utilization are modest. This is in contrast to the airline industry, in which increasing utilization is a high priority. The reason for this difference is that at 20,000 miles a year (which corresponds to less than a 7% utilization rate), cars die after about 10 years, while airplanes can last for decades at much higher utilization rates. If car manufacturers find a way to build cars that can last for 20 years at double-digit utilization rates, just like planes do, then increasing utilization will become a priority for TaaS fleet operators. Since self-driving cars can be utilized more intensively than regular cars, automakers will have a stronger incentive than before to build more durable cars. If and when cars become significantly more durable than they currently are, the economic

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Twenty-five years from now, the only people still owning cars will be hobbyists, hot-rodders and flat-earth dissenters. Everyone else will be happy to share.”

Similarly, in a Bloomberg Television interview in November 2017, Jeff Holden, the chief product officer at Uber, said: “Our view is that individual car ownership is something that will go away because it is very inefficient. Individual owners use a car only 4 percent of the time, while with ride sharing a vehicle can be on the road 80 to 90 percent of the time. When you get to those kinds of utilizations what you see happen is prices go way down. So why would you own your own car? It’s just a hobby at that point. It just doesn’t make sense.”

20 Calculations similar to those in Section 4.1 show that in areas where parking is very costly, the economic benefit of shared mobility (aside from that from carpooling, discussed below) is likely to come primarily from saving on the cost of parking rather than from getting more value out of the car.

21 In most metropolitan areas, traffic flows are not perfectly balanced: e.g., in the mornings more cars are coming from suburbs to the downtown than in the opposite direction, and vice versa in the evenings. It is possible to increase the utilization rate at the cost of having cars drive empty miles to get to high-demand areas. In light of our calculations, even if it were possible to triple the utilization rate at the cost of increasing the number of “empty” miles by 5% of the total number of miles driven, such a trade-off would not be economically valuable.

22 Indeed, in order to cover the overhead of operating the platform, car-sharing fleets such as Zipcar, Getaround, and Car2Go charge a significant premium relative to the cost per mile of a personal car. These car-sharing platforms create economic value not because of more intensive use of a car, but because of the more intensive use of the parking spot that the car occupies. For this reason, car-sharing platforms appear to succeed in areas where parking is scarce.
gain from increasing utilization may become significant, and so the economics and structure of the transportation industry would also change.

There is another possible reason why car utilization may be more important than our example suggests. We assumed that over the relevant time horizon, the cost of cars in real dollars remains constant. Outside of the steady state, during times when the cost of making a car is expected to decline, the cost decline can be incorporated into the model by increasing the interest rate parameter by the expected annual cost reduction of self-driving cars. During the times when the real price of new cars is expected to decline rapidly, increasing utilization may lead to significant cost savings.

We conclude this section by highlighting the distinction between two ways of thinking about “increasing car utilization.” One way is increasing the percentage of time the car is being used—and that is the usual interpretation, and the one we considered in this section. The other way, which we emphasize in Sections 2 and 3, is increasing the number of car seats that are utilized at the times when the car is driving. As we have seen, doubling (or even tripling) the number of miles a typical car is driven in a year reduces the cost per mile by less than 5%. In contrast, doubling the average number of riders in the car reduces the cost per passenger by 50%. Thus, the potential economic benefits of carpooling (higher seat utilization) are an order of magnitude greater than the economic benefits of increasing the fraction of time each car is being used—even before we count the positive externalities that carpoolers impose on other drivers by reducing traffic.

5 Concluding Remarks

We conclude with several remarks on our framework and results and their potential extensions and generalizations.

One simplifying assumption in our model is that as long as the number of cars on a road segment is below the segment’s capacity, the speed of the flow does not depend on the number of cars. In other words, as long as the number of cars trying to go on a road segment is at its capacity or below, there is no additional benefit to anyone from trying to reduce that number further (by further raising the tolls, or by other means). As we discussed in Section 3.1, this approximation is very accurate for highways: the maximum throughput is achieved at speeds close to the speed limit. For cities, the relationship between the number of cars and traffic speed is more gradual. However, as in the case of highways, the key consideration for efficient traffic management is to keep the demand for travel below the level of hypercongestion, where both the speed of traffic and overall throughput drop. This is the approach that our framework naturally incorporates. This approach, while only an approximation of full social welfare maximization, has an important advantage that it can be implemented based purely on data on traffic flows, without having to estimate or make judgments about riders’ preferences. And implementing this approach would already be a major improvement over the status quo. So we view this approach of focusing on the optimization of the overall flow of traffic (as opposed to incorporating much more intricate utility trade-offs between speed and flow)
as the right first step for systemwide toll systems. Having said that, we should point out that our framework also easily allows the regulator to implement more flexible traffic management policies. While a traffic regulator cannot artificially increase the capacity $q_s$ of segment $s$, he can of course artificially decrease it to any lower level $q_s' < q_s$. And our framework allows the same street to have different capacities at different times of day. So if a regulator believes that at certain times and on certain roads, it would be optimal to have traffic flows that are lower than those roads’ physical capacities, our framework is flexible enough to accommodate this objective.

Another simplifying assumption made in our paper is that matches among carpooling partners can be made frictionlessly. In other words, we implicitly assume that riders have access to a platform that makes it easy to organize carpools. How such platforms will operate and compete is an open question for future research.

Next, our model allows for time-varying demand for transportation, and accommodates time-sensitive tolls. However, it assumes that demand fluctuations are known. A natural question is how the model would change in a world with uncertainty, with unpredictable fluctuations in transportation demand or road capacity. While the analysis of this question is beyond the scope of this paper, we note that in many locations, traffic is quite predictable, occurring with regular patterns (e.g., morning and evening commute times on weekdays). Thus, even if we restrict attention to deterministic (but time-sensitive) tolls, and set the tolls in accordance with those regular patterns to ensure that traffic flows freely a high fraction of the time, this deterministic policy may capture much of the potential upside (relative to fully flexible stochastic tolls that adjust to demand and supply fluctuations in real time).

Also, the presence of uncertainty raises the question of how much information should be disclosed to commuters. Das et al. (2017) consider a model of congestion with solo drivers and no tolls, and show that under uncertainty, suppressing some information may improve overall social welfare and mitigate congestion. We leave to future research the analysis of the interplay between agents’ information sets, tolls, and carpooling in the presence of uncertainty.

We would like to conclude with a word of caution. Our paper proposes a “market solution” to the question of designing an efficient transportation system: road prices are set by the regulator at the market-clearing level, and a free coalition-formation market allows any groups of carpooling partners to form. However, it is important to keep in mind that not all “market solutions” are created equal: not every market solution would achieve an efficient outcome, or even get close to it. For instance, privatizing roads and then letting road operators set prices freely would not work: the revenue-maximizing profile of tolls may be very different from the efficiency-maximizing one. Our approach proposes a market-based solution that does achieve a socially efficient outcome.

\[23\text{In addition to being technically easier to implement, this approach is also more straightforward to communicate to the public, and may thus be more politically feasible.}\]
References


