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Philosophy of Mind - Phil 132
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Philosophy 132 UC Berkeley Philosophy Department Professor: Paul Skokowski Summer Semester, 2013 MThF, 10am-12:30 pm Room TBA Office: Moses 144 Office Hours: TBA GSIs: Caitlin Dolan -- cedolan {AT} berkeley{D0T}edu Jackson Kernion -- jacksonkernion {AT} berkeley{D0T}edu Texts: |
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Chalmers, Philosophy of Mind: Classical and Contemporary Readings
(Chapter references below are to Chalmers unless otherwise noted.) |
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This is a preliminary schedule and will change. Introduction, Dualism and Epiphenomenalism Week 1, Thursday May 30th: |
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Overview of Course Content, Schedule, Assignments and Grading Descartes, Meditations, Ch. 1 Descartes, Passions of the Soul, Ch. 2 Skokowski, One Philosopher is Correct (Maybe). Australasian Journal of Logic, 2010, 9(1). |
| Week 1, Fri May 31st: |
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Malebranche, The Search for Truth Leibniz, The Nature and Communication of Substances (from: New System, and Explanation of the New System) Huxley, On the Hypothesis that Animals are Automata, Ch. 3 Smullyan, The Unfortunate Dualist, Ch. 4 |
| Logical Positivism and Behaviorism |
| Week 2, Monday June 3rd: |
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Schlick, Positivism and Realism Ryle, Descartes' Myth, Ch. 5 |
| Week 2, Thursday June 6th: |
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Carnap, Psychology in Physical Language, Ch. 6 Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, Sec. 293 |
| Mind-Brain Identity Theories |
| Week 2, Friday June 7th: |
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Hobbes, Of Sense Putnam, Brains and Behavior, Ch. 7 Place, Is Consciousness a Brain Process?, Ch. 8 |
| Week 3, Monday June 10th: |
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Smart, Sensations and Brain Processes, Ch. 9 Feigl, The Mental and the Physical, Ch. 10 |
| Functionalism |
| Week 3, Thursday June 13th: |
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Putnam, The Nature of Mental States, Ch. 11 Review for Mid-Term |
| Week 3, Friday June 14th: |
| * * Mid-Term Exam -- In Class * * |
| Week 4, Monday June 17th: |
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Armstrong, The Causal Theory of the Mind, Ch. 12 |
| Week 4, Thursday June 20th: |
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Searle, Minds, Brains, and Programs Lewis, Psychophysical and Theoretical Identifications, Ch. 13 Block, Troubles with Functionalism, Ch. 14 |
| Mental Content, Intentionality and Propositional Attitudes |
| Week 4, Friday June 21st: |
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Brentano, The Distinction between Mental and Physical Phenomena, Ch. 44 Dretske, A Recipe for Thought, Ch. 46 Dennett, True Believers, Ch. 52 |
| Week 5, Monday June 24th: |
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Churchland, Eliminative Materialism and the Propositional Attitudes, Ch. 53 Paul and Patricia Churchland, Intertheoretic Reduction: A Neuroscientist's Field Guide Putnam, The Meaning of "Meaning", Ch. 54 |
| Consciousness |
| Week 5, Thursday June 27th: |
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Nagel, What is it Like to be a Bat?, Ch. 25 Jackson, Epiphenomenal Qualia, Ch. 28 Block, Concepts of Consciousness, Ch. 24 |
| Week 5, Friday June 28th: |
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Chalmers, Facing up to the Hard Problem of Consciousness, Journal of Consciousness Studies, 2(3): 35-40, 1995. Tye, M., Colors and other "Secondary Qualities" Skokowski, I, Zombie |
| Week 6, Monday July 1st: |
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* * FINAL EXAM -- In Class* * |
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| paulsko{AT} stanford{D0T}edu --- Cordura Hall 127, Stanford University, Stanford, CA, 94305-4101 |