Civil and Ethnic Conflict in Historical Political Economy

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July 15, 2022

Abstract

Despite great falls in global poverty, civil and ethnic conflict remains tragically common. In this chapter, I examine the patterns of persistence and change in conflict around the world through the lens of historical political economy. I compare two important approaches for measuring the impact of contemporary ethnic differences on conflict: ethno-linguistic fractionalization and polarization. I highlight two aspects which I believe are crucial for understanding these impacts but remain relatively understudied in this literature: the role of organizational capacity within groups and complementarities between groups. I illustrate these relationships through the history of Hindu-Muslim relations in South Asia, as well as drawing on broader contexts. Finally I highlight some common pitfalls that arise from neglecting history when studying conflict, and promising directions for future research.

Keywords: Conflict, Civil War, Ethnic, Organizations, Historic, Legacies

1 Introduction

On 28th June 1989, Serbian President Slobodan Milosevic addressed a crowd of close to a million, almost all ethnic Serbs, at the site of a stark stone tower called the Gazimestan—or ‘hero place’. The occasion was the 600th anniversary of the great battle of Kosovo Pole, when Serbian knights, including their prince Lazar, had fallen fighting Ottoman forces. Within a year, Serbia would become part of the Ottoman empire. Six hundred years later, the great battle was invoked by politicians in speeches, and in processions and folk songs of remembrance, with ethnic Albanians referred to in “bestial or monstrous” terms [Vucetic 2021]. The next decade would witness the collapse of the multi-ethnic state of Yugoslavia, and Kosovo itself would experience a vicious civil war between ethnic Serbs and Albanians. The term “ethnic cleansing” would once again enter the vocabulary of Europe.

*This a longer version of a piece to be submitted to the Oxford Handbook of Historical Political Economy.

The list of those to thank for sharing their wisdom on this topic with me is long, but I am particularly grateful for discussions with Alberto Diaz-Cayeros, Alessandro Saia, Avner Greif, David Laitin, Dominic Rohner, Jared Rubin, Jessica Leino, Jim Fearon, Katia Zhuravskaya, Mark Koyama, Mohamed Saleh, Nathan Nunn, Rikhil Bhavnani, Resuf Ahmed, Moses Shayo, Steven Wilkinson, Susan Athey and Timur Kuran. I am also grateful to generations of students in my Political Development Economics class at Stanford. Thanks to Shuhei Kitamura for generously sharing his World Historical Battle Database V.11, and Sam Asher for excellent research assistance.
Commemorations at the Gazimestan continue to this day. They are not alone. Commemoration of past ethnic conflicts and their heroes continue in many charged, and now much less-charged environments around the world. Marches of the Protestant Orange Order through religiously mixed neighbourhoods of Ireland, on the anniversary of William of Orange’s victory at the 1686 Battle of the Boyne, have regularly been associated with conflict. Leaders of Pakistan invoke past raiders of northern India, like the 11th century Sultan Mahmud of Ghazni, when choosing names for their nuclear-tipped missiles. Since the early 20th century, nationalist leaders in Western India have memorialized, in print and monuments, the exploits of Shivaji Bhonsle, a Hindu Maratha chieftain who fought local Muslim Sultans as well as the Mughal empire. And though the Reconquista of Spain and expulsion of most Muslims occurred close to five centuries ago, medieval churches close to the former religious frontier between Christian and Muslim Europe still line the famous pilgrimage route, the Camino de Santiago, commemorating Santiago Matamoros: Saint James, “the Killer of the Moors”.

Despite great falls in the share of people living in poverty over the past century, we continue to live in a world with tragically high levels of conflict. Since World War II, two out of every five independent countries experienced at least one civil war that took at least 1000 lives (Fearon and Laitin 2014, pg 1). The total dead in all wars after 1945 is approaching ten million and all civil wars is approaching six million (Lacina and Gleditsch 2005, Pettersson 2021). According to the UN High Commissioner for Refugees, at the end of 2020, 82.1 million people around the world had been forcibly displaced due to persecution and conflict. With on-going wars in Ethiopia, Syria and Ukraine, these numbers continue to rise.

In this chapter, I examine the patterns of civil conflict around the world through a historic lens. I describe the patterns of persistence and change in conflict over time, and discuss the role that may be played by ethnic differences in these patterns. I compare two important approaches for measuring the impact of ethnic differences on conflict— including ethno-linguistic fractionalization and polarization. I highlight two areas that I believe are crucial but are still relatively understudied in this literature: the role of organizational capacity within groups and complementarities between groups, that can help explain some of the historical patterns. I illustrate these relationships by focusing on the history of Hindu-Muslim relations in South Asia, as well as drawing on broader contexts. Finally, I highlight some common pitfalls that arise from neglecting history when studying these phenomena, and promising directions for future research.

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1 On memorials on the Austrian-Ottoman frontier, see Ochsner and Roesel (2019).
2 See https://www.unhcr.org/en-us/figures-at-a-glance.html, accessed 2/22/2022. In contrast, the share of the world population living in extreme poverty fell from 74% to 10% between 1910 and 2015 Roser and Ortiz-Ospina 2013.
Figure 1: Battle-Related Deaths in Armed Conflicts, 1946-2020

Notes: Source: PRIO Battledeths Dataset (1946-2008); UCDP Battle-Related Deaths Dataset (2009-2020). For more detail, please see Petterson et al. 2021; Pettersen 2021; and Lacina & Gleditsch 2005.
2 Patterns of Conflict

As Figure 1 shows, the nature and intensity of conflict has changed over time since the end of the Second World War. Large scale conflicts between states, such as the Korean War, were replaced by civil conflict and proxy wars during the Cold War. The end of the Cold War and a period of US hegemony brought a dramatic reduction in conflicts with foreign interventions, though civil conflicts continued. The decline of US hegemony and the re-emergence of Great Power competition since 2010 has been accompanied with resurgence of foreign intervention supporting civil conflict within states.

Beyond the loss of life, the economic costs of conflict have been severe as well. De Groot, Alamir, Bozoli and Brück (2022) estimate that global GDP in 2014 would have been, on average, 12% higher if there had been no violent conflict after 1970, corresponding to gross costs of conflict of $12 Trillion and foregone gross benefits of $2.3 Trillion. Again, they estimate that the lion’s share of the loss ($ 9.1 Trillion) since 1970 comes from civil conflict rather than wars between states.

Regionally, too, the costs of conflict have not been evenly shared. Countries in Asia experienced the greatest losses in both relative and absolute terms in the last fifty years, followed by countries in Africa and Latin America. While Europe has, prior to recent events, been relatively unaffected, North America may have even benefited from the conflicts elsewhere, to the tune of $ 0.9 Trillion (de Groot et al., 2022.)

To what extent to these patterns of conflict show historical persistence? Figure 2 shows the locations of major battles around the world from the end of the Napoleonic Wars in 1815 to the end of World War 2 (top panel), overlaid on contemporary national boundaries. The bottom panel shows both major battles from 1945-2020, as well as a snapshot (in pink) of all battles from 2018-2020 in the Armed Conflict Location and Event Data (ACLED) project. As the Figure suggests, and consistent with the cost estimates above, there has been a dramatic shift in the locations of wars, both within and between continents and countries. The waves of battles experienced in the traditional battlefields in Europe prior to World War 2 largely subsided in the post-war era (with notable exceptions in the former Yugoslavia and, more recently, Ukraine). North America was the site of extensive violence as the United States expanded and then turned on itself in the 19th century. However, major battles have been rare since 1945. In Latin America, too, major battles have been relatively uncommon, replaced instead by extensive Cold War proxy insurgencies and later by drug-related violence (e.g. Dube.

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3 de Groot et al. use panel fixed effects regressions, estimating both direct effects on countries involved in conflict and spillovers to others as well. They are aware that conflict is not randomly assigned and thus their measures may be biased. However they find it reassuring that their figures yield similar ballpark numbers to those employing synthetic controls and other estimation methods.

4 de Groot et al. (2022) estimate that in the absence of violent conflict, Iraq’s, Afghanistan’s and Myanmar’s GDP would have been, respectively, 228%, 190% and 116% higher in 2014. According to their estimates, China, India and Iraq faced the highest absolute costs of conflict ($ 3.3 Trillion, $ 1.6 Trillion and $1.1 Trillion respectively). In Africa, the top relative costs were experienced by Sudan (169%) and the Democratic Republic of Congo (116%).
Asia and Africa, in contrast, have continued to witness battles both big and small erupt in historically-peaceful locations, even while others reignite in well-trodden battlefields\(^5\). States, like Japan, that were among the most politically-fragmented in the world in 1868, with strong caste and clan identities, ceased to experience waves of civil conflict, even while their caste divisions diminished over time \cite{Jansen2000, Jha, Mitchener and Takashima}. But ethnically-diverse states like Indonesia, and those of South Asia, the Middle East and sub-Saharan Africa, experience them still. In these places, the clustering of violence-prone regions obscure post-war country boundaries, suggesting that forces that drive civil conflict do not necessarily respect national borders\(^6\). In contrast, relatively ethnically homogeneous states, like Vietnam, despite experiencing extensive war, have not faced a legacy of low-level violence subsequently.

Under what conditions, then, do historically-determined factors shape contemporary conflict? And how do they do so? We begin by looking at the role of ethnicity.

### 3 Ethnic Conflict

As \cite{Blattman and Miguel 2010} note: “Ethnic nationalism is popularly viewed as the leading source of group cohesion and inter-group conflict” (italics their’s). Yet, given all potential pairs of ethnicities within national borders, the share that actually engage in conflict with others tends to be small. \cite{Fearon and Laitin 1996} estimate that in 36 African countries between independence and 1979, there were 20 incidents of violence (or 0.03 incidents per country per year) between two subordinate ethno-linguistic groups. This implies a ratio of actual incidents of ethnic violence to all potential pairs of ethnic groups that could be in conflict in a country of 0.0005.

While conflict between two subordinate ethnic groups tends to be rare, larger ethnic groups are more likely to try to contest control of the state. \cite{Fearon 2008} observes that of 709 minority ethnic groups around the world that exceed 1% of the population\(^7\), at least 14.1% had engaged in “significant rebellion against the state on behalf of the group” between 1945 and 1998\(^8\). These shares are higher in Asia (30%) and the Middle East and North Africa region (27.1%).

\(^5\)See also \cite{Fearon and Laitin 2014, Besley and Reynal-Querol 2014} and \cite{Dincecco, Fenske and Onorato 2019}.

\(^6\)See \cite{Sambanis 2000, Sambanis and Schluhofer-Wohl 2009} on how partitions of groups via national borders often lead to inter-state conflict. \cite{Michalopoulos and Papaioannou 2016} further find more contemporary conflict in ethnic homelands in Africa divided by straight lines during the Congress of Berlin in 1885. Such boundaries can allow co-ethnics a safe haven or hinterland for regrouping and organization that facilitates insurgency \cite{Schram 2019}.

\(^7\)\cite{Fearon 2003} compiles a list of ethnic groups worldwide. Inclusion criteria include membership reckoned primarily by descent; members conscious of group membership; members holding distinguishing cultural features (e.g. language, religion); cultural features held to be valuable by the group; group having or remembering a “homeland”; a group sharing a collectively represented history; and the group being “stand alone” in the conceptual sense.

\(^8\)Similarly \cite{Fearon and Laitin 1996} find that there were 27 rebellions, 29 acts of irredentism and 52 civil wars in their sample of African countries, aimed at a government often controlled by one dominant ethnicity.
(a) Major Battles, 1815-1945

(b) Major Battles 1945-2020, and ACLED Battles 2018-2020

Figure 2: **Battles since Napoleon and since World War 2**
than in sub-Saharan Africa (11.8%) or the Latin America and Caribbean region (6.1%) (Fearon, 2008). Again, these patterns mirror the costs of conflict estimates above.

In a classic paper, Fearon and Laitin (2003) examine the determinants of the onset of civil wars between 1945 and 1999. They find that these wars are most common in poor, large, newly-independent states with rugged terrain and access to natural resources. These patterns, they argue, are factors that likely proxy for low state capacity and which also allow for easier insurgency. Strikingly, and in contrast, they find that the extent to which countries are riven by ethnic divisions, as measured by their ethno-linguistic fractionalization indices (ELF), is not related to the probability of civil war, once one controls for income.\footnote{The ethno-linguistic fractionalization index is 1 minus the Herfindahl Index of concentration. Formally it is: $1 - \sum_{i=1}^{N} s_{ij}^2$, where $s_{ij}$ is the share of ethnic group $i$ in country $j$.}

The method of measuring the extent of ethnic divisions does appear to matter, however, both theoretically and empirically. The ethno-linguistic fractionalization index can be interpreted as the probability that two randomly selected individuals are from different ethnic groups. In a series of papers, Esteban and Ray (1994), Montalvo and Reynal-Querol (2005), Esteban and Ray (2011) and Esteban, Mayoral and Ray (2012) take an alternative axiomatic approach. They develop alternative sets of measures of polarization based upon all potential antagonisms that individuals in a society might have with one another. These polarization measures incorporate a set of three features. First they argue that polarization should be higher the greater the distance or dissimilarity between groups, which they call alienation. Second groups should be more cohesive and identify more with one another when they are more similar to one another. Third is that size should matter: individuals or small groups should not matter for conflict as much as larger, significantly sized groups.\footnote{Formally, Esteban and Ray (1994) define total polarisation in society as the sum of all effective ‘antagonisms’. $P(\pi, y) = \sum_{i=1}^{n} \sum_{j=1}^{n} \pi_{i} \pi_{j} T(I(\pi_{i}), a(\delta(y_{i}, y_{j})))$ (1)\footnote{where $I : \mathbb{R}_+ \rightarrow \mathbb{R}_+$: is identification $a : \mathbb{R}_+ \rightarrow \mathbb{R}_+$: is alienation; a function of the distance between individuals $y, y'$: $\delta(y, y') = \|y - y'\|$ and $T(I, a)$ is an “effective antagonism” that is increasing in identification, alienation. Thus polarisation is a Bergson-Samuelson type addition of everyone’s antagonisms. They show that the Polarisation measure $P$ satisfies their features if and only if it has the form: $P(\pi, y) = K \sum_{i=1}^{n} \sum_{j=1}^{n} \pi_{i}^{1+\alpha} \pi_{j} |y_{i} - y_{j}|$ (2) for some constants $K > 0$, $\alpha \in (0, \alpha^{*}]$, where $\alpha^{*} \sim 1.6$. The measure would be a Gini coefficient if $\alpha = 0$. The measure would be ELF if $\alpha = 0, \delta = 1\forall i \neq j, 0$ otherwise, suggesting that identification does not matter.}\footnote{Their measure, which puts a strong weight on group identification ($\alpha = 1$): is $RQ = \sum_{i=1}^{m} n_{i}^{2}(1 - n_{i})$ (3)}}

Therefore, countries with many small ethnic groups, such as Tanzania, which score highly on the ELF measure, do not score as highly according to these polarization measures. Indeed, Montalvo and Reynal-Querol (2005) find that their measure of ethnic polarization, which is maximised at two similar sized groups, does correlate with ethnic conflict, even though ELF does not.\footnote{Their measure, which puts a strong weight on group identification ($\alpha = 1$): is $RQ = \sum_{i=1}^{m} n_{i}^{2}(1 - n_{i})$ (3)}
Esteban and Ray (2011) further consider the incentives for individuals from different groups to ‘invest’ in conflict. They suggest that winning a battle to control the state gives the dominant ethnic group two types of benefits: control over public goods and pure redistribution of resources. Public goods may have different benefits for different groups, but no group can be completely excluded. This contrasts with other resources that can simply be stolen by and shared within the ethnic group in charge.\footnote{where \(n_i\) is the share in group \(i\).}

They show that when a country’s population is large, rather than income inequality mattering (as measured by the Gini coefficient), the level of conflict will be determined by a convex combination of ethnic polarization and ethnic fractionalization, provided that groups have some sense of cohesion.\footnote{Formally: individual \(k\) in a group \(i\) (of \(m\) groups) chooses resources \(r_i(k)\) to maximise:
\[
\pi_i(k) = \sum_{j=1}^{m} p_j \lambda u_{ij} + p_i \left(1 - \lambda\right) r_i(k) 
\]
where \(n_i \equiv N_i/N\) (is the population share), \(\lambda\) is the public proportion of budget- the rest can be privately divided; \(u_{ij}\): public good utility to member of group \(i\) if group \(j\) chooses public good. \(c(r_i(k))\): cost of contributing to conflict. \(p_i = R_i/R\): probability that group \(i\) wins conflict based on share of resources expended, where \(R_i \equiv \sum_{k \in i} r_k(k)\). They show that, if there is no deviation between a group’s win probabilities and its population shares, they can construct a linear relationship between a ‘proxy’ for conflict and other factors. The proxy \(\hat{\rho}\) for equilibrium per-capita conflict is determined by a combination of the Gini \((G)\), Polarization \((P)\) and ELF \((F)\) measures as follows:
\[
\hat{\rho}^c(\hat{\rho}) = \omega_1 + \omega_2 G + \alpha [\lambda P + (1 - \lambda) F] 
\]
where \(\omega_1 = (1 - \lambda)(1 - \alpha)(m - 1)/N\), \(\omega_2 = \lambda(1 - \alpha)/N\) and \(\alpha\) is a measure of group “cohesion”, and the “distances” used to calculate \(P\) and \(G\) are the public goods utility losses \(\delta_{ij} = u_{ii} - u_{ij}\). Notice for \(N\) large, the Gini term disappears, and the conflict depends only on \(\alpha [\lambda P + (1 - \lambda) F]\). i.e. \(\alpha > 0\).}

Further the coefficient on polarization is significant and stronger than that on fractionalization. Thus, broadly speaking, ethnic conflict may be more about fighting over control over the public policies and the public goods states provide, rather than being purely over redistributive politics.\footnote{On how ethnic divisions lead to greater distance between the preferences of individuals and the median voter, undermining support for public goods, etc., see Alesina and La Ferrara (eg 2000), Alesina, Baqir and Hoxy (eg 2004), Alesina and La Ferrara (eg 2005). Related to this, Guarnieri (2022) points out that the cultural distance between ethnic groups and incumbent governments predicts conflict aimed at seizing control of public goods in sub-Saharan Africa. At the same time, Desmet, Ortuño-Ortín and Wacziarg (2017) use survey evidence to point out that there tends to be large variation in preferences and cultural differences even within ethnic groups. To deal with these tensions, powersharing arrangements, with representatives of different ethnic groups controlling particular ministries, has been a common approach in Africa and elsewhere. Mueller and Rohner 2018.}

These approaches have been very useful and informative in providing clues into the proximate causes of ethnic conflict, and civil conflict more generally. However, they also raise some
key questions. Under what conditions can ethnic divisions actually mitigate conflict instead of only yielding potential antagonisms? Which ethnic groups are better able to organize themselves and why? When and why do individuals choose to contribute to and fight for a nation or their ethnicity and caste instead of their class? These are all processes where ignoring the relevant historical contexts, as is unfortunately still fairly common in papers published in modern economics, can lead to very skewed answers about the reasons for and implications of ethnic conflict.

4 Elements from History: Complementarities and Organization

The British and Americans, as George Bernard Shaw observed, are two peoples separated by a common language. Languages, common or otherwise, can be learned and forgotten, or imparted to the next generation. Ethnic distinctions can be reified through segregation or mitigated through interaction (e.g. Bisin and Verdier, 2001). Thus treating ethno-linguistic distinctions between groups at any particular point of time as given, while perhaps being sensible when understanding short term, proximate phenomena, arguably makes much less sense when taking a longer historical perspective.

In fact, arguably, a key element of understanding the role of ethnicity from a historical perspective is that ethnicity is not just a label or category that leads to antagonism but, for different groups across history, one’s ethnicity has often been associated with particular economic and social endowments and opportunities. Historically, economic specialisation by ethnic groups has been common in many societies, with some forming endogamous units within which to transmit skills or endowments. This is often true of immigrant groups that bring economic and cultural links with their home regions and countries that can complement local communities (e.g. Ottaviano and Peri, 2005). However, even in societies where immigration is limited, vocational opportunities and choices often shape and are shaped by group identities.

These traditional links between ethnic identity and economic endowments creates the possibility for complementarity—the possibility of gains from exchange between ethnic groups—that can weaken the incentives for violence. However, it also generates another possible reason for ethnic conflict beyond the political ones already mentioned—economic competition.

Between nations, comparative advantages are often assumed, (see e.g. Polachek and Seiglie 2006), and the extent to which trade mitigates the incentives for war between two countries is shaped by how easily the bilateral trading relationship between the two can be substituted for by others (Martin, Mayer and Thoenig 2008). However, within countries, when individuals are geographically proximate and thus share many endowments, sustaining inter-group trade is often even more fragile. Particularly over long time horizons, individuals may face incentives to violently seize or, over long time periods, replicate one another’s production processes. This fragility of the gains from trade is accentuated when members of one group are more vulnerable in the sense that they are less capable of organizing violence. Under what conditions then can market exchange support peaceful coexistence and prosperity for vulnerable groups over time?
Jha (2018) considers a setting where individuals from two groups occupy a specific location. Members of these groups differ along two dimensions: their vulnerability (their capacity to organize violence) and their mobility (the quality of their outside options if they choose to leave). For example, indigenous groups, with their knowledge, skills and networks concentrated locally, may find leaving a location more costly than for immigrant groups, who may have retained endowments and ties elsewhere. Every period, individuals from these groups can choose to leave. If they stay, they can choose to produce a good and to target another with violence to seize their profits. In the case of vulnerable immigrant groups, Jha shows that over long time horizons, a peaceful co-existence equilibrium–a subgame perfect equilibrium with mixed populations, no agent having an incentive to leave, full production and no violence–exists if and only if locals and non-locals engage in economic activities that are weak complements, and for small populations, if and only if they engage in activities that are strong complements. If not, and instead the groups are in economic competition with one another, then over long time horizons, the strong will have an incentive to engage in violence against the vulnerable, not just to expropriate them, but also to induce them to leave, thereby reducing the future economic competition they face. In fact, for a strong local, for whom violence is cheap, a member of an immigrant group that competes economically will be a preferred target of violence relative to similarly weak individuals that compete from one’s own ethnic group, precisely because the better outside options make immigrants easier to induce to leave. Thus there is likely to be not just expropriative violence but ethnic violence.

Over long horizons, in particular, the source of complementarity for vulnerable group members has to be robust in the sense of being costly to expropriate or replicate, otherwise, others

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15See also Jha (2007, 2013) and Diaz-Cayeros, Espinosa-Balbuena and Jha (2022).

16Formally, Jha considers \( N \) producers within an economy with one of two labels: \( \{i \in \{\text{"local (l)"}, \text{"non-local (nl)"}\}\} \), and period discount rate \( \delta \in [0,1] \). Non-locals have better outside options: \( L_{nl} > L_l \equiv 0 \). Individuals are also endowed with armed strength, such that with vulnerable outsiders, \( s_l > s_{nl} \equiv 0 \), and vulnerable indigenous, \( s_{nl} > s_l \equiv 0 \). Jha considers a sector with two (potentially identical) goods \( j \in \{A,B\} \). WLOG, locals initially produce good \( A \) and non-locals good \( B \). Each period:(1) Individuals choose to stay or leave the economy, receiving outside option \( L_{nl} \) or \( L_l \). (2) If they stay, they can choose to produce one unit of good \( j \), receiving payoff \( \Pi_j \equiv P_j(N_j, N_{-j}) - C \) where \( N_j \) is the number of individuals producing good \( j \) and \( C \) is the fixed cost of producing. \( P_j(N_j, N_{-j}) \) is decreasing in the number of producers \( N_j \), and \( P_j(N_j, N_{-j}) \) is decreasing (increasing) in \( N_{-j} \) if goods \( A \) and \( B \) are substitutes (complements). (3) Following the choice to produce, each individual \( k \) can choose to target another with violence to attempt to seize the target’s profits from production or choose peace. For each potential aggressor-target pair, if both individuals choose peace, then both receive their own production \( \Pi_k \). If, however, an individual \( k \) chooses violence, the aggressor can try to seize the other’s profits, with success determined probabilistically based upon \( s_k, s_{-k} \).

17In the United States, for example, patterns of economic competition by different ethnic groups has been linked to race riots (eg Olzak, 1992; Christian, 2017; Esteban and Ray, 2008) provide an alternative but potentially complementary argument for why ethnic conflict is often salient over class conflict: there is complementarity between wealth and numbers in organizing violence. Rich members of an ethnic major population then prefer to invest resources to mobilize poor members of their community against minority members than face the alternative of redistributive class conflict. Relatedly, Glaeser (2005) presents a model where pro-redistribution politicians may send messages inciting hatred against ethnic minorities when the minorities are relatively rich, while anti-redistribution politicians may do the same when the minorities are relatively poor. More generally, given these incentives, media, particularly the radio but more recently social media as well, has proven effective at coordinating and mobilizing violence and ethnic hatreds (eg Adena, Enikolopov, Petrova, Santarosa and Zhuravskaya, 2015; Wang, 2021; Yanagizawa-Droti, 2012; Muller and Schwarz, 2020).
will have incentives to do just that. Such robust complementarities often exist for middlemen minorities, whose complementarity stems from access to external trading networks. Trading networks are intangible, thus impossible to expropriate, and when the networks are large, become difficult to replicate. Further, not only may there be incentives for reduced violence, there will also be incentives to invest in further complementary ‘institutions’ that may further reduce these incentives. These institutions may involve business, religious and philanthropic organizations that facilitate coordination and transfers within and between groups, or cultural norms and beliefs supporting trust, trustworthiness, and continued complementarity in new areas. These can survive even if the initial complementary inter-ethnic relationships have been undermined over time.\footnote{18}

But beyond this, over long time horizons, vulnerable group members need to be able to credibly threaten to withhold their complementary production in order to deter coercion of production or expropriative violence. For less mobile vulnerable indigenous groups occupying valuable economic niches, this has often proved difficult. And too often in Latin America, the Caribbean and sub-Saharan Africa, new access to trade has led to violence and forced labour instead (eg Nunn 2008, Dell 2010, Bobonis and Morrow 2014, Diaz-Cayeros et al. 2022). In contrast, vulnerable outsider groups, such as trading minorities, tend to be relatively mobile. By being so, they can also often credibly threaten to leave.\footnote{19}

The choice to remain or relocate is also a key question for networks of individuals over longer periods of time. Given the many ways that individuals, groups and societies can adjust to the threat of violence over time, the patterns of conflict we see today reflects the culmination of centuries of exogenous factors, including environmental, economic and political shocks, but also individual and group decisions, and their legacies. To understand contemporary civil and ethnic conflict, therefore, it helps to understand the logic of how environments prone to conflict are selected by historical factors. I now illustrate this drawing from the history of South Asia. This is a setting that not only covers close to one-quarter of the world’s population, but is also home to a rich history of housing immense cultural diversity. This history has been punctuated at times with horrific violence, even while nearby communities exhibit remarkable degrees of tolerance as well.

\footnote{18}On the relationship between complementarities and robust comparative statics, see Milgrom and Roberts (1990). On how complementary investments can generate momentum and persistence, see Milgrom, Qian and Roberts (1991) and Jha (2013). On institutions as sets of beliefs, norms and organizations that induce regularities of behavior and evolve over time, see Greif (2005) and Greif and Laitin (2004).

\footnote{19}Jha 2018 describes how, when their outside options are good, such as occurs with falls in barriers to immigration elsewhere, vulnerable outsiders that enjoyed robust complementarities, such as trading minorities in Indian Ocean ports, Europe and elsewhere, have been able to deter acquisitive dictators and others by threatening to leave and deny future trade. However, when the costs of leaving were high, these communities were more likely to see waves of pogroms instead. See also Diaz-Cayeros et al. (2022).
Figure 3: Hindu-Muslim Conflict over Time

Sources: Varshney and Wilkinson (2004), Jha and Wilkinson (2012), Jha (2013), Bhavnani and Jha (2022), Bharadwaj et al. (2008), Kitamura (2021) and Ahmed et al. (2022)
5 An Illustration: Hindu and Muslims in India

The fourteen centuries of interactions—many peaceful, yet too many violently conflictual as well—between Hindus and Muslims in South Asia can provide a valuable illustration of the historical forces that drive contemporary civil and ethnic conflict. Figure 3 provides a graphical overview of these relationships over four epochs.

Figure 3(a) depicts the deciles of the length of time a South Asian region was under Muslim rule from the beginnings of Islam to the death of the last great Mughal emperor, Aurangzeb, in 1707 (see Jha (2013)), along with the incidence of major battles prior to the formal establishment of the British empire in India in 1858 (from Kitamura (2021)). Figure 3(b) shows the Muslim population share in a district in the last colonial census (in 1942) and the incidence of Hindu-Muslim riots between 1850 and the beginning of India’s first mass movement for Independence—the Khilafat or Non-Cooperation Movement in 1919. Figure 3(c) shows the pattern of riots when the movement ended in 1922 to 1950. Finally, Figure 3(d) shows the post-Partition (1950) Muslim share and incidence of riots in Independent India, from 1950-2019. Comparing these different epochs makes clear that there are a number of key patterns of both striking continuity, but also of important changes, over time.

5.1 Complementarities and Competition as drivers of conflict

Incentives for tolerance and, unfortunately, for conflict as well, have shaped Hindu-Muslim interactions from many centuries: Muslims came to South Asia both as traders and as conquerors. As conquerors, as early as 712, Arab Muslims landed an amphibious force that secured an early beachhead in Sind, at the mouths of the great Indus River. Muslim rule and, with it Muslim patronage and faith, spread from major Muslim cities (see squares for the locations of mint towns in Figure 3(a)). A great raid in 1026, by the Sultan Mahmud of Ghazni, led to the destruction of the temple port-city of Somnath and a perception by contemporaries, such as Alberuni, who accompanied Mahmud on the raid, of lasting inter-ethnic hatreds.

Somnath remains a touchstone for modern religious mobilization, with L.K. Advani, then leader of the BJP, beginning his Rath Yatra from Somnath (Blakeslee, 2018). And Somnath is not alone. As Figure 3(a) also shows, multiple invasions from Afghanistan, many descending into the Indian plains via the Khyber Pass, led to great battles being fought along the old trade routes that

\[\text{Alberuni (1030), writes (pg 22):}\]

Mahmud utterly ruined the prosperity of the country, and performed there wonderful exploits, by which the Hindus became like atoms of dust scattered in all directions, and like a tale of old in the mouth of the people. Their scattered remains cherish, of course, the most inveterate aversion towards all Muslims. This is the reason, too, that Hindu sciences have retired far away from those parts of the country conquered by us, and have fled to places which our hand cannot yet reach, to Kashmir, Benares and other places. And there the antagonism between them and all foreigners receives more and more nourishment both from political and religious sources.
linked India to the great marts and Silk Routes of central Asia.

Yet, the first and most enduring interactions between adherents of the new religion of Islam and the existing peoples of the subcontinent was through peaceful trading relationships. Arab Muslim traders came to South Asian ports as early as the seventh century with horses, frankincense and access to Middle Eastern markets for South Asian spices and artisanal products. Though a vulnerable minority group in areas far from the nearest Muslim army, these traders provided access to markets across the Middle East, East and northern Africa and southeast Asia to local Hindus in the natural harborages that would become the ports of medieval South Asia (see triangles in Figure 3(a).) They could also credibly threaten to leave any specific port for others, cutting off its trade, should they be targeted with violence (Jha, 2013, 2018). Even the authorities of the re-built Somnath temple would invite traders from Hormuz to settle on the temple lands and build a mosque, aware of the gains they would bring from trade (Thapar, 2004).

Both locals and traders faced incentives to develop organizations and norms that would reinforce trust and trade between groups. These have persisted into the modern period, despite the attenuation of Muslim overseas trade advantages with increased European intervention. Jha (2013) shows (and consistent with Figure 3(b)), former medieval trading ports that emerged at medieval natural harbors experienced five times fewer Hindu-Muslim riots between 1850-1950. They were also less likely to experience ethnic cleansing of their Muslim populations during the Partition (Jha and Wilkinson, 2012) (Figure 3(c)), and continued to show less violence after Indian independence as well, including during the Gujarat riots in 2002 (Jha, 2013, 2014) (Figure 3(d)).

These erstwhile medieval ports, despite being somewhat poorer having lost their trade, continued to enjoy greater Muslim populations into the modern period. Further, the effects of a medieval trading legacy on reducing violence were stronger in places where Muslims and Hindus were closer in population share to one another. As described above, these are where one might expect greater polarization and violence, not less. However such effects are again consistent with the logic of complementarity: in environments with ethnic specialization in economic spheres, members of larger minorities are more likely to compete with each other, increasing the gains across ethnic lines. Indeed, household level evidence from 2003 shows that Muslims in these communities remained specialized in complementary economic activities. Further, they closed the wealth gap with Hindus relative to other urban Muslims. Further, unlike other urban Muslims, Muslim households in former medieval ports were as likely as Hindus to vaccinate.

22Dincecco, Fenske, Menon and Mukherjee (2021) find that districts that experienced more conflict due to their proximity to the Khyber Pass, tend also to be more developed today.

23One single battlefield—on the plains of Panipat, 50 miles north of Delhi—witnessed three decisive battles, in 1526, 1556 and 1761. The first, a battle between Afghans, some of Mongol descent, would lay the foundations of the Mughal Empire, while the second and third pitted different Muslim and Hindu coalitions. With rising nationalism, such historical battles have increasingly become a popular motif in Indian cinema too. See, for example, Singh (2021).

24Again, such increases in minority wealth might lead one to predict more violence, not less, given the additional spoils to be had. See Mitra and Ray (2010, e.g.) for an interpretation along these lines.
their sons against polio, an important indicator of contemporary inter-ethnic trust (Jha, 2013). These patterns were also not accompanied by increased assimilation or secularization of identity, but rather greater religiosity, as measured by participation in religious organizations. Religious and other civic organizations instead played an important role in preventing events that might have triggered violence from escalating into broader religious rioting (Varshney, 2002).

In contrast, other towns, particularly those where Hindus and Muslims had no incentives for inter-ethnic trade and instead had historically competed for patronage, developed ‘institutionalized riot systems’: organizations, often led by local political leaders, who sought to gain from such religious mobilization (Brass, 2003). These towns not only witnessed regular ethnic violence, but were particularly prone to doing so when the incumbent state governments, who controlled the police, faced lower competition, and thus less need to accommodate and protect Muslim vote blocks (Wilkinson, 2004).

5.2 Capacities for Organizing Violence

Historical conflict also entrenched itself in specific ways in colonial policy, that would have lasting consequences for different groups in South Asia to organize along ethnic lines. The British East India Company faced fierce resistance at different times during its attempt at expansion. However, one of its gravest challenges came from within the ranks of its own troops. Led by veterans of the British East India Company’s wars, the Uprising of 1857 would see regiments of Hindu and Muslim soldiers revolt and unite instead under the banner of the reluctant, and unfortunate, last Mughal, Bahadur Shah Zafar.26

The British would cease to recruit from the United Provinces and Bihar, the traditional recruiting areas of the rebellious Bengal army of 1857. Instead, they adopted a pseudo-scientific theory of martial races for military recruitment (Streets, 2004). Depending on phrenology, meat consumption as well as drawing on those that, ironically, did not revolt in the Uprising, the British classified different caste and religious groups as martial, and then sought to recruit specifically from those groups (see dashed areas in Figure 3). These differential recruiting policies would create important differences both within and between regions in the ability of members of different ethnic groups to organize themselves and threaten violence that would have dramatic effects on inter-ethnic relations in the aftermath of the two world wars (Jha and Wilkinson, 2012).

25 Elsewhere too, ethnic identification, to some extent at least, is affected by political incentives and considerations. Groups that are political complements are more likely to be tolerant, while those that compete politically are less likely to support inter-marriage (Posner, 2004). Ethnic identification also appears to be heightened prior to elections (Eifert, Miguel and Posner, 2010), and may respond to status considerations as well, (e.g. Greif and Laitin, 2004; Shayo, 2020). However, Jha (2013) finds that the local protective effects of historic inter-ethnic complementarities on reducing Hindu-Muslim riots in the towns of democratic India are particularly pronounced in the run-up to elections, and in states with fewer effective parties and thus lessened political incentives to protect minorities.

26 Seen by some as the only symbol capable of unifying an ethnically and religiously diverse subcontinent, Zafar would die in exile in Rangoon, his burial site effaced to prevent it from being a rallying point for future revolt.

27 Based upon the martial race handbooks of the Indian army— see Jha and Wilkinson (2012).
Counter to a narrative of primordial hatreds, while Hindu-Muslim riots did occur, they were relatively uncommon prior to World War I. As noted above, this was particularly true in erstwhile medieval ports, but riots were relatively rare more generally as well (Figure 3(b)). However, this changed with a dramatic surge and spread in Hindu-Muslim riots between the world wars (Figure 3(c)). The ability to organize was crucial. British promises of autonomy for its Indian provinces in exchange for support during the First World War were replaced instead by extensive crackdowns on public assembly and press freedom after the war. This was particularly the case in the heavily recruited Punjab province, which witnessed a massacre of unarmed civilians at Jallianwala Bagh in 1919. The period that followed saw the first major mass mobilizations in South Asian politics, mobilizing Muslims, Hindus and others \(^{28}\). Planned in part as a means of showing inter-religious solidarity, these movements sowed the organizational seeds of a wave of ethnic violence when they ended instead \(^{28}\).

Another shock to the capacity of different groups to organize in South Asia came with the Second World War. Undivided India mobilized 2.5 million troops, the largest volunteer army in world history, and 3% of its adult male population. Its 268 infantry battalions would serve in fronts as diverse as the jungles of Burma, the deserts of north Africa and the mountain fortifications of Italy. Indian veterans would return home to a subcontinent on the brink of Independence and the prospect of Partition. Partitioning the sub-continent into a Muslim-majority and a Hindu-majority state had been seen as a viable potential political compromise to ward off ethnic conflict. Instead, the Partition deteriorated into a humanitarian tragedy. One of the greatest forced migrations in world history, it saw the displacement of close to 14.5 million individuals. 3.4 million individuals went ‘missing’ - unaccounted for in the 1951 censuses due to death or religious conversion \(^{29}\).

Yet, contemporary leaders did not anticipate either the scale nor the location of the violence that ensued \(^{30}\) However, the gravest ethnic cleansing during the Partition of South Asia did not happen where it was expected (see a comparison of the Muslim population share in 1942 (Figure 3(c)) and in 1951 (Figure 3(d))). Overall, the average district share of Hindus and Sikhs in what would become Pakistan and Bangladesh, and Muslims in

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\(^{28}\)The *Khilaafat* movement aimed to mobilize Sunni Muslims in order to pressure the British government to protect the position of the Ottoman Sultan, the Caliph of Sunni Islam, who had been on the losing side of the First World War. The Indian National Congress, now under Mohandas Gandhi’s leadership, mobilized in coordination with the *Khilaafat* movement, but also to pursue greater freedoms at home.

\(^{29}\)Bhavnani and Jha (2022) measure the effects of a subset of these protests due to the nearly 8,000 mile rail tour of India conducted by the Prince of Wales in 1921-22. The Prince’s itinerary had been pre-planned in 1918, as a symbol of gratitude for India’s contributions to World War I, and before the unrest in the aftermath of the war. They compare districts where the Prince visited to other potential stops on his route, and find that the probability of a non-violent protest increased during his visit in these districts by 28 percentage points. Further those districts, though not prone to religious violence before his visit, would see a commensurate rises in the probability of a Hindu-Muslim riot between 1922 and 1950.

\(^{30}\)For example, in November 1945, Field Marshal Claude Auchinleck, the Commander of the Indian Army predicted that “the principal danger areas are likely to lie in the United Provinces, Bihar and Bengal” (Mansergh 1976 Vol 5., pg.576-78). And indeed, these were the provinces which had experienced relatively more Hindu-Muslim riots over the past two decades.
what would become India fell by close to a third – from 13.8% to 9% by 1951 (Bharadwaj et al., 2008).

In this crisis environment, the war had an important impact in shaping the ability of different groups to mobilize along ethnic lines. Jha and Wilkinson (2012) present a simple framework to understand the relationship between ethnic shares, organizational capacity and the nature of ethnic cleansing in this environment. The framework suggests first that there will be less ethnic cleansing or co-ethnic immigration in two types of districts: those with very small minorities and those with unorganized majorities. In the former case, the minority poses little threat, and gains to the majority from immigration or cleansing in terms of securing future political control or personal spoils are low. Larger minority groups make for more attractive targets of violence, and particularly when they face organized majorities, the chances of widespread ethnic cleansing rise commensurately.

However, the framework suggests that even if the majority is organized, relatively large but organized minority groups may escape violent ethnic cleansing. These groups can not only deter violence through organization, they can also mobilize and move in its anticipation. Facing greater costs of violence in such cases, majorities might be more likely to foster co-ethnic immigration than engage in ethnic cleansing. The tragic bottom-line prediction of the framework is that the worst environment for violent ethnic cleansing are those where organized majorities encounter large but unorganized minorities. It turns out that British recruitment and deployment practices made this setting all-too-common during the Partition of South Asia.

Jha and Wilkinson (2012) exploit a shock to the organizational capacity of different groups due to the Second World War. Though recruited from specific caste groups in different districts, the battalions of India’s line infantry were, by design, trained and equipped to be interchangeable when assigned to combat. This made logistics easier and the army better able to redeploy rapidly in response to foreign action, including the surprise entry of Japan into the war. Consistent with this, Jha and Wilkinson (2012) show that the resultant average combat experience of battalions from different Indian districts are unrelated with pre-war conditions, particularly controlling for the timing of their deployment.

However, things were very different just after the war, during the Partition. Each additional month of average combat experience of troops increased both the ethnic cleansing of targeted minorities (by around 17,000 people per district) and the fostering of co-ethnic immigration (by around 8,150 people per district). Further, both of these effects increase with the pre-war initial minority share, and when members of the religious majority received the combat experience. In contrast, districts where the minority received combat experience witnessed less

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31 See Jha and Wilkinson (2012) for the example of the highly organized Sikh community in Lyallpur, a district where Sikhs were a large minority and whose troops had seen extensive service in the Second World War. With strong defensive preparations, violence was rare in the district in the run-up to Partition, but once it was discovered that the district fell well within the borders of Pakistan, the Sikhs, organized and protected by ex-servicemen, mobilized mass columns to migrate across the Indian border.

32 Indeed a 1923 report on the Indianization of the army makes clear this imperative: “No risks must be taken and every unit must be interchangeable and fit for war.” (IOL Mil. Dept Temp No. 309, 1923), italics added. See also Cage, Dagorret, Grosjean and Jha (2021).
ethnic cleansing and fewer Partition-related deaths.

Importantly, the organizational capacity derived from war also had different effects in districts with a history of inter-ethnic complementarity as well. Districts with medieval ports not only witnessed significantly less ethnic cleansing during the Partition, those that received a positive shock to organizational capacity from the war were even more likely to retain their vulnerable minority populations. Despite the great blood-lettings experienced by mixed populations in many districts of South Asia during the Partition, these medieval port towns, the focus of institutions of tolerance born from centuries of inter-ethnic complementarities, remained oases of peace.

6 Complementarities and Organizations Elsewhere

Inter-ethnic complementarities, competition and shocks to the organizational capacity of different groups have played important roles in shaping the propensity for ethnic conflict, assimilation, and peace, not just in South Asia.

In Europe, an important literature has examined the determinants of anti-Semitic violence and pogroms over time. Johnson, Koyama and Jedwab (2017) find that Jewish communities in Germany that provided complementary services to locals were also less likely to experience pogroms in the wake of the Black Death (1348-1353). Becker and Pascali (2019) show that in German Protestant jurisdictions where usury laws were relaxed during the Reformation in the 16th century (and thus Protestants could compete with Jews in finance) Jews faced increases in ethnic violence against following these reforms. In contrast, in Catholic areas, usury proscriptions were maintained, Jews retained complementarity in financial services, and they also faced less subsequent ethnic violence. Grosfeld, Sakalli and Zhuravskaya (2019) look at ethnic violence against Jews in the Pale of Settlement between 1800 and 1927. They find that political instability raised ethnic violence against Jews in the Pale of Settlement, where they provided complementary services, while crop failures and other short-term economic shocks that were not accompanied by political instability did not have these effects. Voigtländer and Voth (2012) find that in Hanseatic towns, where Jews arguably enjoyed complementary trading relationships, anti-Semitism did not persist through to the Nazi period, particularly when compared to other towns that experienced anti-Jewish pogroms during the First Crusade. Benbassa and Rodrigue (2000) point to the complementarity between the Sephardic Jewish migrants to Ottoman Salonica as a reason that it remained the most tolerant place for Jews for centuries.33

Africa has been a focus of much of the literature on ethnic conflict. But here too, there appears to be evidence that inter-ethnic complementarities and their legacies may play a role in mitigating local violence. Montalvo and Reynal-Querol (2021) examine the relationship between economic growth (as measured by changes in nightlight luminosity) and ethnic fractionalization

33See also Mazower (2005).
when one varies the size of the grid-cells at which these are calculated. They find a positive relationship between growth in nightlight intensity since 2013 and fractionalization for grid cells that extend up to 1.5°. The positive relationship between the two for small grid cell sizes is remarkably robust, and appears to correlate strongly with the presence of markets for trade at the intersection of ethnic homeland boundaries. However, the beneficial effects of fractionalization diminishes, and disappears, as the cell sizes get large. The paper argues that these patterns reflect the presence of the enhanced growth potential generated by local ethnic specialization and inter-ethnic complementary exchange at interfaces between ethnic groups. This potential upside of diversity becomes less pronounced over large geographical space, where other factors may have offsetting effects.

McGuirk and Nunn (2021) find that previous inter-ethnic complementarities can break down with climate change. Pastoral groups in sub-Saharan Africa would previously arrive on agricultural lands after harvest, providing valuable services by feeding on stubble and providing manure. However, climate shocks have led them to arrive prior to harvest, breaking these complementarities and leading to increased conflict.

In Latin America, Diaz-Cayeros et al. (2022) use a rich set of primary sources, including Aztec tribute rolls and early 16th century censuses, to reconstruct the fate of 1,093 indigenous settlements (altepetl) that existed in the historic core of Mexico. They show that the extent of the complementarity and non-replicability of goods produced by indigenous communities at the time of the Spanish Conquest of the Americas can explain which communities were more likely to survive the subsequent coercive violence and pandemics that led the average population to fall by 95% between 1548 and 1646.34

As in the medieval ports of South Asia and the markets of Africa, complementarities also appear to lead to organizational legacies in the Andes of Peru. Artiles (2022) examines the role of altitude differences in generating complementary relationships within ethnic groups as well as across them, once they were forced to co-habit with one another in newly established parishes by the Spanish, a process called the reducciones.35 She finds that ethnic groups that spanned more climatic zones historically developed more inclusive organizations - unions- and better modern development outcomes. She finds that the intersection between ethnic groups are also interfaces that lead to the development of markets.36

34 They compare pre-Columbian producers of a good complementary to Atlantic trade— the indigenously domesticated cochineal insect that yielded prized red dye— whose production was hard to transplant or monitor, to other indigenous products: gold (easy to monitor and therefore coerce), cacao (easy to transplant) and quetzal feathers (valued by the Aztecs but not as much internationally). They find that indigenous settlements that produced cochineal at the time of the Conquest were 13 percentage points more likely to continue to exist in 1790, and enjoyed populations 1.7 times larger at the end of the colonial period. In contrast, settlements producing cacao and gold before the Conquest, while both surviving twice as long as otherwise similar settlements in the records, show no population advantages by the end of the colonial period. Producers of quetzal feathers for the Aztec court saw the greatest declines. These complementarities and challenges in monitoring enabled cochineal-producing communities to enjoy improved outcomes for the indigenous, and women producers in particular into the modern era [Diaz-Cayeros and Jha, 2016].

35 Ethnic groups are traced using a remarkable dataset on parish records of individuals sharing the same surname going back to the 17th century.

36 In contrast, Dippel (2011) finds that, when distinct Native American bands were forced into the same
Organizational legacies can stem not just from complementarities in producing physical products, but from broader environments where there are complementarities in joint effort. Cooperation within and between groups can emerge when they would benefit from managing situations where different individuals can hold up one another, such as upstream and downstream economic activities (Williamson, 1985), actual streams and watersheds and other common pool resources (Ostrom, 1990), as well as to organize and deal collectively with shared risks (Wade, 1988).

Organizational legacies may also be sustained over long periods of history. For example, Moscona, Nunn and Robinson (2020) compares the incidence of ethnic conflict among sub-Saharan African ethnic groups that are organized around segmentary lineages to nearby groups that are not. They find ethnic groups with segmentary lineages experience more civil conflicts between 1997-2014. Further these conflicts tend to be longer in duration, larger in scale, and more likely to be influenced by fluctuations in rainfall. An intriguing question raised by this work is where do these types of clan-like organizations emerge from, and to what extent are they shaped by past conflicts.

As we have seen in South Asia, organizational capacities can emerge from more recent exogenous shocks, including war deployments and colonial practice, as well. Fearon and Laitin (2014) examine whether “contemporary armed conflict has deep historical roots”. They compare the incidence of conflicts in countries after World War 2 to the nature of conflicts in the nineteenth and early twentieth century. Fearon and Laitin note that within regions, specifically Asia, the Middle East and Africa, groups that were mobilized to fight the colonial powers were more likely to fight against other groups after independence. Given that the British transplanted their martial race theories of recruitment to their African colonies as well, the organizational legacies of war visible in South Asia may have played an important role in shaping patterns of violence among Africa’s independent states as well.

More recently, the disbanding of the highly experienced Sunni majority Iraqi military by the United States, without providing alternative paths to employment, or carefully considering how such groups might find insurgency attractive in a fledgling majority-Shia democracy, is likely to reservation, this had a major negative impact on income more than one hundred years later. The legacy of forced integration—accounting for a remarkable 30% of per capita income—remains dormant for many years and emerges mainly in the 1990s, when the US permitted greater autonomy to reservation councils. The contrast between Dippel’s findings and Artiles may potentially be due to a lack of economic complementarity but enhanced political competition between groups in the former.

Indeed, looking at China, Dincecco and Wang (2018) gather data on clan books over a 1000 year period. They find that the books, that served the purpose to identify and record members, tend to increase the most in times and places that experienced the most conflict. Dincecco and Wang (2018) argue that this is because the value of the clan was accentuated in times of conflict, causing greater investment in clan administration.

Similarly, Besley and Reynal-Querol (2014) use the Brecke data to examine if conflicts in Africa between 1400 and 1700 are predictive of post-independence conflict at the country and 120km2 grid cell level. They find that there is some persistence (but at the country level it is driven by two extreme outliers—Angola and Ethiopia). See also Dincecco et al. (2019) and Jha and Wilkinson (in progress).
go down in history as an avoidable error that proved to have tragic human and material costs.

7 Implications for Studying the Effects of Conflict and Identity

Thus not only in South Asia but elsewhere around the world, patterns of complementarity, competition and differential organizational capacity are arguably commonplace in shaping the propensity for civil conflict both in specific locations and, in interaction with changing political incentives, at specific moments of time. However, much of the literature that studies the effects of conflict and identity remains largely ahistorical.

In South Asia, for example, a number of intriguing papers find that the incidence of religious riots in a district in early childhood correlates with the likelihood that bank managers engage in religious discrimination in the provision of loans (Fisman, Sarkar, Skrastins and Vig, 2020), judges do so in bail decisions (Bharti and Roy, 2022), or that contemporaneous religious riots heighten ethnic identities and change food consumption for taboo foods such as beef and pork (Atkin, Colson-Sihra and Shayo, 2021).

These studies present informative conditional correlations on important sets of issues. However, taking the historical political economy perspective suggests some fruitful directions for taking these types of research going forward. As we have seen, in South Asia, for example, districts prone to ethnic riots are not randomly assigned. Instead they are the result of centuries of historical processes that shape the continued presence (or absence) of ethnically mixed communities, social norms (or a lack thereof) of inter-ethnic trust and tolerance, and underlying market conditions that make certain ethnic groups more able to integrate economically and shape local supply chains. The timing of violence also tends to reflect local political polarization and electoral incentives to protect minorities. Thus rather than being an exogenous shock, riots, together with discrimination, and identity salience, all arguably reflect differences in longer-term institutions that manifest themselves at specific times due to local political and economic incentives.

A potentially valuable path forward for papers that study conflict, and others that seek to examine the effects of race riots in the United States, conflict in Africa, etc., then is to take the history seriously, gathering data on the underlying inter-ethnic economic and organizational arrangements that might drive conflict propensities particularly in interaction with changing political contexts over time, and assess how these might also bias, explain or generate heterogeneous patterns in the measured effects.

Another increasingly popular approach in the study of contemporary conflict is to take a conflict zone and generate a synthetic control by weighting the trends in different unaffected areas in order to match specific trends in the conflict zone prior to the onset of the conflict (Abadie, 2021).

The common practice of adding fixed effects to control for these historical factors does not account for differing trajectories over time and different propensities to respond to economic or political factors in specific periods.
As usual, a key question is whether the weighted sum of the different non-conflict regions that is used as the synthetic control really does evolve along a similar path as the conflict zone would have done. Again this might be more plausible if the candidate regions shared similar features in the relevant historical dimensions mentioned above that might also affect performance. Choosing weights on candidate regions to create a synthetic control that matches the conflict zone over a broader set of relevant historical, ethnic composition and other cultural and political factors described above rather than solely the standard economic production function of labor, capital and human capital may increase its plausibility. Similarly, checking that the vector of weights of the control does not load heavily on only a few control regions that are very far in terms of relevant historical and cultural characteristics from the conflict zone would improve both the estimate’s plausibility and the robustness as well.

A third common approach is to use regression discontinuity designs, including geographical ones across old borders, to study the effects of institutional and cultural differences. In a number of important cases, these borders were shaped by repeated and constant conflict and raiding between empires, kingdoms and ethnic groups. Such persistent conflicts may themselves be the effect of factors inducing economic or political competition, or may have direct effects, separate from broader institutional and cultural differences that induce a lack of development and trust locally. Comparing regression discontinuity estimates measured right at a historically contested border with estimates that leave out different buffers along the border can help assess sensitivity to these issues.

A related regression discontinuity approach is that of using close political elections to identify the effects of having winners from a particular identity versus losers. Based as they are upon such local comparisons, these studies also have naturally been ahistorical for the most part. Yet, when individuals tend to vote along ethnic lines, close electoral races may accentuate the incentives for ethnic cleansing in places with historical inter-ethnic competition and organizational differences, even while they may lower them in areas with inter-ethnic complementarity. Thus rather than winners being as good as random, their identities can highly predictable by the nature of these historical factors, and particularly so in close races where the incentives for ethnic cleansing and intimidation may be the highest. Checking for

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41 For example, in their classic paper, Abadie and Gardeazabal (2003) seek to measure the effects of terrorism on the Basque country, but choosing weights \( W \) on \( J \) other Spanish regions to resemble the Basque country before terrorism, i.e.: \( \min_{w \in W} (X_1 - X_0 W)'V(X_1 - X_0 W), \text{s.t.} w_j \geq 0, \sum_j w_j = 1 \), where \( X_1: (K \times 1) \) is a vector of pre-terrorism values of \( K \) economic growth predictors (eg human capital, sectoral shares, investment ratio), \( X_0: (K \times J) \) is a matrix of those values for each of \( J \) control regions (e.g. Catalonia, Galicia etc), \( V: \) is a diagonal matrix (non-negative) weighed to place importance on different predictors. They choose \( V \) to best approximate the trend of real GDP in Basque country in the 1960s.

42 Interestingly, there is a measurable incumbency advantage appearing in very close US Congressional elections (Caughey and Sekhon, 2011, Grimmer, 2011) but less evidence for incumbency differences in non-US elections (Eggers, Folke, Fowler, Hainmueller, Hall and Snyder, 2013).

43 For example, Jha (2014) finds that in the Gujarat elections that followed the 2002 religious riots, there appears to have been no strong incumbency effect for candidates for the incumbent BJP party seen by many as complicit in the violence. Yet, even in these close races, the probability that the winner of the 2002 election was from the BJP was heavily influenced by the nature of historical incentives. Relative to other close races, the BJP was less likely to win in medieval ports following the riots, and significantly more likely to win in medieval
balance in close races on historical factors that shape incentives for conflict as well as the more conventional incumbency measures can again help add confidence around political regression discontinuity designs as well.

8 Concluding Remarks

Though we continue to live in a world with tragically high levels of conflict, taking a historical perspective offers both hope and directions to pursue, both for research and for policy. Conflicts do not seem to be as primordial as they are some times portrayed. Instead, many places that once encountered a lot of civil and ethnic conflict have enjoyed lasting peace. Even in countries and regions where conflict remains common, studying their historical roots suggest that they can be mitigated through economic approaches, and shaped by novel organizational structures. Rather than a world of mutual antagonisms shaped by ethnic and cultural identities, historical cultural factors may also provide avenues to mitigate contemporary conflict as well.

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