Stanford University Seal Alexander Wolitzky

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Curriculum Vitae

Research

Teaching

 

Contact Information:

Stanford University

579 Serra Mall

Room 244

Stanford, CA 94305-6072

Phone: (650) 721-2851

Email: wolitzky@stanford.edu

 

 

Working Papers

Mechanism Design with Maxmin Agents: Theory and an Application to Bilateral Trade, April 2014

Capital Taxation under Political Constraints (joint with Florian Scheuer), April 2014

Perfect Versus Imperfect Monitoring in Repeated Games (joint with Takuo Sugaya), April 2014

 

 

Publications

Communication with Tokens in Repeated Games on Networks
Theoretical Economics, forthcoming.

Cycles of Conflict: An Economic Model (joint with Daron Acemoglu)
American Economic Review, 104, 1350-1367 (2014).

Endogenous Institutions and Political Extremism
Games and Economic Behavior, 81, 86-100 (2013).

Cooperation with Network Monitoring
Review of Economic Studies, 80, 395-427 (2013).

Reputational Bargaining with Minimal Knowledge of Rationality
Econometrica, 80, 2047-2087 (2012)

A Search Cost Model of Obfuscation (joint with Glenn Ellison)
RAND Journal of Economics, 43, 417-441 (2012).

Career Concerns and Performance Reporting in Optimal Incentive Contracts
B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics (Contributions), 12 (2012).

Indeterminacy of Reputation Effects in Repeated Games with Contracts
Games and Economic Behavior, 73, 595-607 (2011).

The Economics of Labor Coercion (joint with Daron Acemoglu)
Econometrica, 79, 555-600 (2011).

Dynamic Monopoly with Relational Incentives
Theoretical Economics, 5, 479-518 (2010).

Fully Sincere Voting
Games and Economic Behavior, 67, 720-735 (2009).