UNORGANIZED INTERESTS AND COLLECTIVE ACTION IN COMMUNIST CHINA*

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I explore how the institutional structure of state socialism systematically transforms individual behavior into collective action in China. State monopoly of the public sphere fosters and reproduces large numbers of individual behaviors with similar claims, patterns, and targets. The state bureaucratic apparatus at the workplace also generates similar discontents and links them with national politics. The "large numbers" phenomenon provides the basis for the formation of collective action. The institutional arrangements also induce frequent state policy shifts and alternative modes of mobilization, providing the opportunity for collective action. Finally, individual behaviors based on unorganized interests tend to converge in the same direction and assume a "collective" character — that is, they are often causally defined as "collective action" in this particular institutional structure. The phenomenon of "collective inaction" is discussed in the same vein.

The popular uprisings in China and Eastern Europe in 1989 are recent examples of the "power of the powerless" in state socialist societies. However, the current literature on collective action, which emphasizes organizing capacity, resource mobilization, and interest articulation, is ill-prepared to account for such events under state socialism. In typical socialist states, society consists of unorganized interests that contrast with the organizational apparatus of the state. China, for example, evidenced minimal autonomous organizing efforts prior to the outbreak of the 1989 pro-democracy movement. The lack of strategic maneuvering and the prevalence of conflicts among student leaders illustrate the unorganized nature of the movement. Nonetheless, within a short time, millions of people across the nation poured into the streets. The participants cut across the boundaries of work units, localities, and social groups. And the 1989 pro-democracy movement, although the most spectacular, was by no means an isolated event. Instances abound of mass mobilizations initiated by the Chinese state that eventually went beyond state control and became a challenge to the state.

How can we explain collective action based on the unorganized interests in the state socialist context? I examine the link between the institutional structure of state socialism and collective action in China. My central theme is that the formation and outbreak of collective action are rooted in the particular institutional structure of the state-society relationship. I argue that collective action in China is less a process of purposive and rational organizing than an aggregation of large numbers of spontaneous individual behaviors produced by the particular state-society relationship. Although individuals are unorganized, their actions in pursuit of their own self-interests tend to convey similar claims, share similar patterns, and point to the state, i.e., they "converge" into collective action.

THE CHINESE POLITY AND THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION

Marx ([1852] 1963) argued that the French peasants of the nineteenth century shared the same economic situation and had the same political demands. But the lack of communication and organic links among the peasants led to isolated and unorganized interests; peasants formed "a class of itself" but not "a class for itself." More than a century later, Chinese citizens are far more organically integrated into the national system and more interrelated with each other than were the French peasants. In terms of self-organization,
however, the Chinese are no better than the French peasants. Studies of the Chinese polity have found the unique dual institutional structure of the state-society relationship: strong organizational control over society by the state and the systematic positive incentives for compliance offered by the socialist economic institutions. From the metropolis to rural areas, social life in China has been organized by the state bureaucratic system (Parish and Whyte 1978; Whyte and Parish 1984). Accompanying the state organizational apparatus are political sanctions like political labeling, monitoring, and campaigns that systematically repress and deter opposition to the state (White 1989). Thus, the Communist state has effectively monopolized the resources for social mobilization and denied the legitimacy of any organized interests outside its control.

At the same time, “the positive incentives offered for compliance” (Walder 1986, p. 6) in the so-called “unit-ownership system” (danwei suoyouzhi) ties workers to their workplaces, peasants to their villages, and individuals to their “work units.” Work units function not only as the state apparatus of political control, but as redistributing agencies in which rewards and opportunities are linked to individuals’ political attitudes and loyalty. One consequence of this institutional structure is the prevalence of the clientelist system “in which individual members of subordinate social groups pursue their interests not by banding together for coordinated group action, but by cultivating ties based on the exchange of loyalty and advantage with individuals of higher status and power” (Walder 1987, p. 47). In contrast to “civil society,” in which autonomous groups are formed and interests articulated through the political process, its counterpart in China can best be labeled “subordinate society.” The populace constitutes society, but does not constitute an organized political force countervailing the state.¹

Of course, state penetration of society is not complete or always successful. Indeed, in most Communist societies, there are some private realms, such as “the second economy” in Hungary and the free market in China. During the era of economic reform in China, state political control over society has weakened considerably. The emergence of the private sector has provided social space outside the realm of immediate state administrative control. This intermediate civil structure has facilitated lateral interaction among individuals and social groups, but by and large, these private realms are either closely monitored by the state or too narrow to escape state dominance. The emerging elements of a civil society are far from the organized interests commonly perceived in the collective action literature.

To students of collective action, particularly those who take a “resource mobilization” approach, the Chinese polity appears to present formidable obstacles to collective action opposing the state. If the success of collective action depends on the strategy adopted, the extent to which interests are organized (Gamson 1968) or on a social movement “industry” (Zald and McCarthy 1987), China is a puzzle. The absence of organized interests makes it impossible to identify stable interest groups or to find some systematic distribution of rewards or sanctions that would motivate individuals to join in collective action. The dual institutional structure — organizational control and positive incentives for compliance — has severely limited, if not eliminated, collective action based on organized interests. Collective action outside state control has invariably met with a state crackdown, and the state has kept the cost of organized resistance high. Furthermore, positive incentives based on work units have eroded the basis for social mobilization by encouraging individuals to pursue personal interests through privileged access and particularism rather than through collective action. As Walder (1986, p. 19) argued, the Chinese state has an “extraordinary ability to prevent organized political activities even from reaching the stage of collective action.”

However, to understand mass mobilization in China, the logic of collective action cannot be uncritically accepted from a literature that has been largely built on non-Communist (mainly Western) experience. Two assumptions embedded in various theories of collective action seem particularly problematic in this regard: (1) that there is a separation between public realms and private realms; and (2) that individual activities

¹ The recent finding of a pluralistic decision-making process — negotiation, bargaining, and compromise among formal groups — is less relevant to society proper. Because these formal groups are based on, or are part of, the state bureaucratic organization, they are closer to the state system than to society. Recent studies of groups in Chinese politics concurred that social groups in China are not autonomous “interest groups” (Goodman 1984; Falkenheim 1987). Shue (1988) noted the cellular features of Chinese society, which helped locals resist central authority. However, she focused on the withdrawal of isolated and local interests from the macropolitical process rather than on collective action across local boundaries.
in the private realm involve market-like transactions.

Olson (1965) suggested that when individuals calculate the costs and benefits of participating in collective action, they compare the option of participation with the opportunity cost incurred by deferring the pursuit of individual interests without collective action. This assumption is spelled out by Hirschman (1982), who held that the separation of the private and public realms leads to cycles of involvement in collective action. When individuals find that their self-interests can be satisfied by engaging in activities in the private arena, they are unlikely to participate in collective action. On the other hand, frustrations and dissatisfactions over issues in the public realm often lead to changes in individuals’ preferences that push them to collective action. The private sphere thus offers an exit from public life and hence from collective action.

The presence of a market economy also reduces the probability of collective action. The basic feature of market transactions is an equilibrium between supply and demand among individuals engaged in market activities. Individuals enter the private arena with divergent demands and preferences. Given individuals’ rational calculations, transactions tend to produce a market-like solution to their self-interests. In terms of political analysis, this is a process through which individuals’ pursuit of their self-interests will compensate each other so that collective action is impossible or unnecessary. Thus, individual behavior in private realms is commonly seen as being outside the scope of collective action research.

Both above assumptions fail miserably in the Chinese context. The boundary between public and private arenas, if it exists, does not prevent state intervention into the individual’s everyday life. “The penetration of the state into all realms of life did not extend a public sphere so much as negate it, for without attachment to the party or one of its subsidiary organizations no particular individual could make claims with any general validity” (Stark and Nee 1989, p. 22). Moreover, students of comparative politics have noted “the importance of the nonmarket economy in shaping a pattern of social and political relationships unlike those that have been elucidated for capitalist states” (Perry 1989, p. 581), and the role of the Communist state in forging particular forms of mass mobilization (White 1989). These considerations point to a link between the institutional structure of state socialism and collective action based on unorganized interests.

AN INSTITUTIONAL APPROACH TO COLLECTIVE ACTION

Organized or unorganized, people everywhere pursue their interests and resist what they perceive as injustices. To explore the causal link between individual behavior and the collective outcome, researchers classify these behaviors as purposive action versus spontaneous response, organized interests versus unorganized interests, and everyday forms of resistance versus open protests. Collective outcomes are explained in terms of their purposiveness, leadership, organizational resources, and the circumstances surrounding them.

At a deeper level, however, institutional structure specifies the stable patterns of the state-society relationship, the interconnectedness among social groups, and the channels and directions of political input. In this respect, recent research on the formation of nation-states and collective action provides important insights. An emerging theme from these studies is the close association between the expansion of the nation-state on the one hand and the increasing scale of interest articulation, organizing capacity, and social mobilization on the other. Tilly (1986) argued that the rise of a capitalist economy and the modern state in the nineteenth century produced the “proletarianization” of society, engendered widespread discontent, and transformed local conflicts and revolts to the national level. Skocpol (1979) emphasized the link between crises and the dynamics of social mobilization. She argued that social mobilization often occurs when the state experiences crises and cannot effectively control political resources. This creates new opportunities for bottom-up mobilization. Birnbaum (1988) directly linked the types of regimes with variations in collective action and empirically examined this causal model in different polities. Though his studies were confined to Western Europe and North America, his findings strongly suggested that collective action cannot be fully understood without incorporating the state into the theoretical models (Tarrow 1986). The state socialist redistributive system produces a sharp division of interests between the state bureaucracies as “redistributors” and other social groups as the “immediate producers” (Szelenyi 1978). Thus, the institutional structure of state socialism provides the starting point to approach collective action phenomena in China.

Institutional structure circumscribes both the solution space and channels of political input.
Apparently similar political and social phenomena may have quite different implications in different institutional contexts. For example, Birnbaum (1988) found that trade unions in the United Kingdom and the United States prefer to reach agreement directly with employers in a contractual setting because the institutional structure does not provide for state intervention. In France, on the other hand, collective agreements do not exist, and recourse to the state and the courts is often necessary (p. 78). In the same vein, it is important to understand the political significance of local grievances in the workplace and conflicts among social groups by examining how they are interconnected and where they are channeled in the Chinese institutional setting.

The nature of collective action is defined by the particular institutional structure, which specifies the legitimacy of forms of political participation. The Communist state claims a monopoly of the public goods and denies the legitimacy of interests at the individual level. An important consequence is that any behavior outside state control is seen as a challenge to the state. As Havel (1985) observed: “Anything which leads people to overstep their predetermined rules is regarded by the system as an attack upon itself. And in this respect it is correct: every instance of such transgression is a genuine denial of the system” (p. 30). When these behaviors appear in large numbers, they constitute collective defiance against the state.

Tilly (1986) emphasized the importance of the existing repertoires that constrain the types of collective action and the availability of opportunities. Changes in the repertoires of collective action are often the result of the evolving state-society relationship. As Dyson (1980) pointed out, the state “represents not only a particular manner of arranging political and administrative affairs and regulating relationships of authority but also a cultural phenomenon that binds people together in terms of a common mode of interpreting the world” (p. 19). An examination of the particular state-society relationship can help us understand how the repertoires of collective action are maintained and shared among individuals across local and organizational boundaries.

I use the dichotomy between the market economy and state socialism as ideal types and choose this comparative framework for the purpose of theoretical exposition. From an institutional perspective, the capitalist market economy and the state socialist redistributive system represent two distinct modes of state-society relationship. One fundamental difference between the two is that, in the capitalist market economy, organized interests outside the state exist and are legitimate. In the Chinese context, on the other hand, if interests are organized, they are based on the state organizational apparatus and hence are not autonomous; if interests are independent of the state, they are often unorganized. State monopoly of the public sphere reduces the private space in which individuals can pursue their self-interest through market-like transactions. Consequently, individual behaviors, even in pursuit of self-interest, are unlikely to lead to a market-like solution. That is, although unorganized, the demands and behaviors of individuals are nonetheless structured by the institutional constraints that connect individuals, social groups, and the state.

INSTITUTIONAL STRUCTURE AND COLLECTIVE ACTION IN CHINA

In studying the popular uprisings in France and England during the transition to a capitalist economy between the eighteenth and the nineteenth century, Rudé (1981) observed:

This was still a period when popular attachment and antipathy tended to focus not so much on causes and institutions as on individual heroes and villains. As the crowd had its heroes, like Wilkes, Lord George Gordon, Marat, or the semi-mythical Rebecca, so it had its clearly identifiable villains in the shape of the individual employer, merchant, forester, baker, landlord, or official; and such men became the natural targets of its vengeance when wages were cut, prices were high, the harvest failed, or traditional rights were threatened. (pp. 240–41)

Piven and Cloward’s (1977) account of the “poor people’s movement” in the United States after World War II revealed a similar picture:

People experience deprivation and oppression within a concrete setting, not as the end product of large and abstract processes, and it is the concrete experience that molds their discontent into specific grievances against specific targets. Workers experience that factory, the speeding rhythm of the assembly line, the foreman, the spies and the guards, the owner and the paycheck. They do not experience monopoly capitalism. (p. 20)

Obviously, a market economy presents particular obstacles to collective action because it produces a complex stratification system and a structure of fragmented grievances and discontents. The presence of private spheres and market transactions also provides a wide range of alternatives
for pursuing self-interest without resorting to collective action. Within this market context, the collective action literature has emphasized the ways in which incentives, resources, and organizations affect individuals’ choices between private spheres and public spheres and between market solutions and political solutions. In recent years, students of collective action have pointed to the importance of “the critical mass” — a group of individuals that takes the initiative in pursuit of public goods (Oliver 1980; Oliver, Marwell and Teixeira 1985). The roles of leadership, cumulative involvement, and the prospects for success then alter the incentives of the latent group and attract more people to participate (Granovetter 1978; Chong 1991).

In contrast, I contend that the very institutional structure of state socialism that prevents organized interests facilitates collective action based on unorganized interests. Central to my argument is the proposition that the institutional structure of state socialism reduces the barriers to collective action by producing “large numbers” of individuals with similar behavioral patterns and demands that cut across the boundaries of organizations and social groups. The creation and reproduction of these “large numbers” of individuals provide the basis for social mobilization on a broad scale.

My second proposition is that the institutional structure of state socialism also provides a direct link between the workplace and the state and influences the direction of the local demands: Once the opportunity is given, large numbers of discontented individuals in workplaces tend to converge in the same direction — toward the state. Even conflicts between social groups and workplaces tend to be directed toward the center for solutions. These instances of discontent may not be based on common interests, nor are they necessarily consistent with each other; but they often take a collective form because of their similar patterns and targets.

Finally, the opportunity for collective action is embedded in the state-society relationship. The use of political campaigns and mass mobilizations by the Communist state to deal with its bureaucratic and economic problems enables individuals to articulate their interests through their responses to state policies. State policy shifts have thus induced spontaneous individual behaviors across workplaces and localities at the same time, leading to collective action. In brief, the institutional links impose structure and organization on these otherwise unorganized interests, allowing them to “act together” and converge into collective action challenging the state.

The “Large Numbers” Phenomenon

By incorporating all citizens into its webs of organizational control, the Communist state can effectively extract resources to fulfill the leadership’s ambitions of economic development and political control. Two important consequences for the state-society relationship follow. First, the Communist state eliminates the traditional intermediate strata between the state and society — it directly links each citizen with the state and thus reduces all social groups to a similar structural position subordinate to the state and its bureaucratic organizations. In state-owned enterprises, workers’ wage grades, promotion opportunities, financing for housing construction, health insurance, etc., are decided by the ministries in Beijing. Although local collective enterprises, or private enterprises in recent years, are not under the administrative control of the state, they nonetheless are subject to direct state intervention. For instance, in 1988, the central government limited the organizational purchasing power of state enterprises and government agencies as well as collectives and rural organizations with over 200 employees. For organizations that employed fewer than 200 workers, an “indirect control measure” required their supervising agencies to set up quotas (Renmin Ribao 16 Oct. 1988). In the countryside, as Oi (1989) noted, “after eliminating landlords and collectivizing agriculture, the state for the first time stepped directly into the struggle with peasants over their harvest” (p. 227). Even in the reform era, when state control reached its lowest point in the last 40 years, the peasants’ well-being is still keenly affected by state policies on price control, material supplies, and above all, the stability of reform policies.

Second, state policies tend to penetrate the boundaries of social groups and organizations and affect all individuals simultaneously. Mass mobilization and resource transfers across sectors subject different social groups to the same state policy vibration, i.e., individuals and groups tend to be mobilized simultaneously through their vertical links with the state. For example, the

2“Organizational purchasing power” (shehui jitchuan goumaiti) is a Chinese term that refers to non-production-related expenditures (welfare, subsidies) in the work units.
Great-Leap-Forward Campaign in 1958 was initiated by the Communist state to increase steel production. To achieve its goals, the state mobilized not only workers in the steel industry, but also intellectuals, workers in other industries, and even peasants in the campaign. As a result, the ensuing disaster spread over the countryside and other sectors as well (Chang 1976). In a centralized polity, state policies designated for a specific area tend to affect individuals in other areas as well. The 1987 antibourgeois campaign was launched by the state to deal with liberalism in "ideological and political areas." However, peasants and workers were also put under political pressure and responded by withholding their market activities (Renmin Ribao 10 Oct. 1987).

As a result, even without a conscious articulation of interests, individuals and social groups tend to exhibit a spontaneous articulation of behavior in response to state policies.

In the Chinese context, the similarity of the links between social groups and the state exerts a much stronger effect on individual behaviors than do local within-group conditions. The institutional structure constrains individuals' choice-sets and opportunities and thus narrows the directions and types of claims generated in society. Moreover, this similarity in structural dependency and vulnerability to the rhythms of state policies implies that social groups in China not only live in a similar political and economic environment but also tend to share similar life experiences. It is not surprising, then, that these macropolitical conditions have produced similar behavior patterns among individuals across the boundaries of workplaces and localities. Chinese scholars use the "swarms of bees" metaphor to describe this phenomenon (Dong and Zhang 1987). Like bees that always swarm, similar individual behaviors in China are also present in large numbers.

This is in sharp contrast to the formation of interest groups in other institutional contexts. Studies of the rise of professionalism in the United States and Western Europe, for instance, have demonstrated that the formation of interest groups is often driven by competition in the labor market. Interest groups strive to establish their own identities and boundaries and differentiate themselves from each other (Larson 1977; Freidson 1986). Consequently, the boundaries of social groups, occupations, and organizations lead to different paces of change and different rhythms in absorbing external shocks.

The "large numbers" phenomenon is reinforced by the state organizational apparatus in the workplace (danwei). The recent literature on China emphasizes that the local bureaucracy not only exerts political control against interest articulations outside the state, but also generates fragmented and organization-based interests (Walder 1986; Oi 1989; Shue 1988). Indeed, the bureaucratic apparatus effectively prevents the formation of autonomous organized interests and perhaps also diffuses many potential protests at the local level. However, the workplace does not prevent the penetration of the state into its boundaries, nor does it lessen the tension between the state and social groups. On the contrary, the bureaucratic apparatus in the workplace facilitates the "large numbers" phenomenon by (1) directly linking local grievances to national politics, and (2) creating similar bureaucratic problems and breeding similar dissatisfactions across organizations. This leads me to the institutional arrangements in the workplace, especially the role of local bureaucrats in linking local conflicts and the central state.

In the Chinese setting, bureaucrats at the local level acquire their authority and legitimation from the state and they act as state agents, interpreting and implementing state policies. In addition to its supervising agencies, the government often sends work teams directly to local enterprises or villages to inspect and implement state policies (Burns 1988). In this context, the ability of local bureaucrats to solve local problems is constrained by the state. During a wave of reform in 1984, managers in 55 factories in Fujian Province cosigned an appeal to the provincial government for authority to appoint their own managerial assistants and to decide on bonuses in the workplace (Renmin Ribao 30 Mar. 1984). This well-

3 The Great-Leap-Forward campaign, aimed at "rushed growth" of steel production, was the immediate cause of the disaster of the 1959 to 1962 period in rural China. During this period, the rural labor force was sent to participate in steel production, leaving the autumn harvest untended. The advocacy of a "Great-Leap-Forward" also led to a rushed adoption of the People's Commune during the same period, which accelerated the disaster.

4 I use the concept of "workplace" in the sense of the Chinese concept danwei, which includes not only factories for the workers, but also universities for students and faculty, hospitals for doctors and staff, and villages for peasants, etc. Although these danwei differ in their social functions, they are the basic organizations that individuals belong to and depend on for resources and where the state exerts control over individuals on a daily basis.
publicized story shows the depth of the state’s penetration into the workplace at the time: Through its bureaucratic apparatus, the central government controlled not only workers’ wage levels, but also the internal managerial and incentive structures. Perhaps more important is that the central government had the ultimate authority in meeting these demands — a few weeks later, the central government instructed its local agencies to allow managerial autonomy along these dimensions. This is not an isolated example. As late as 1988, the central government instructed its local agencies to intervene in agricultural production in rural areas (Nongmin Ribao 28 July 1988). Laba’s (1986) observation of the Polish workplace fits the Chinese context as well: “The political controls of the Leninist state are so direct, so unmasked, that they generate a critique of state power within the workplace” (p. 66).

Bureaucrats are not merely state agents, they also have their own interests (Djilas 1966; Hirszowicz 1981). Bureaucrats as a “new class” tend to exhibit similar behavioral patterns across different workplaces and localities, a tendency that is reinforced by an institutional arrangement that grants bureaucrats monopolistic power at the local level (Zhou 1989). Thus, bureaucratic problems, which are pervasive, also exhibit the “large numbers” phenomenon and cut across organization boundaries (Harding 1981; Lampton 1987).

The double identity of local bureaucrats as state agents and as a class suggests a link between the workplace and the state. Although grievances and discontent tend to be engendered in the workplace, they are often attributed to constraints imposed by the central government. Conflicts within bureaucrats in the workplace are unlikely to be solved at the local level, because local bureaucrats have a monopoly on power and, normatively, they are state agents. Consequently, once the opportunity is presented, these instances of discontent tend to go beyond the boundaries of the workplace and to be directed toward the state. This argument is consistent with the 40 years of Chinese political history in which antibureaucratism has been an effective weapon used by the state to mobilize people across organizations and localities (Whyte 1980). The collective defiance during the Hundred Flowers period and the 1986 student demonstrations were triggered by widespread bureaucratic problems at local levels.

Different, even conflicting, interests among localities or social groups in China are embodied less in lateral competition than in their similar vertical demands made on the state (Chen 1990, p. 51). Perry (1985) documented numerous instances of collective violence and feuds in rural villages that clearly show that the state and its local governments treated local conflicts as a threat to the governability of the state (p. 190). In one case of clan fighting in Hainan in 1981, the local Party Committee “dispatched a work team of more than 600 state cadres, public security police, militiamen, and PLA soldiers” to solve conflicts among villages (Perry 1985, p. 180). The absence of institutional arrangements allowing different social groups to settle their own disputes means that these competing interests cannot be dealt with in a market-like transaction. Rather, the state must intervene to provide political solutions. Thus, divergent local interests and conflicts, at a higher level of analysis, share similar behavioral patterns that either directly make political demands or indirectly generate political pressure on the state.

Group conflict during the Cultural Revolution provides an illuminating example. Although this episode is complicated, it is clear that the conflicts among social groups during this period were constructed by the Communist leaders (White 1989). As a result, the disputes were ultimately referred to the center for solutions and thus created political pressures on the top leaders. During this period, all these groups demanded that the Maoist leaders recognize their “seizure of power” (Tsou 1986). Because the top leaders failed to reconcile the conflicting demands, these demands represented a challenge to the leadership’s authority. This was evidenced by the repeated but unsuccessful appeals for alliance by the Maoist leaders. The political pressures resulting from group conflicts changed the course of the Cultural Revolution (Wang 1988). Mao Zedong originally estimated that the Cultural Revolution would last for three months. However, the acceleration of factional and local conflicts could not be contained even by Mao Zedong himself and he was forced repeatedly to postpone the deadline.

Opportunity for Collective Action

Collective action depends on opportunities. In the context of unorganized interests and state political control in China, why do “large numbers” of discontented individuals emerge across localities and organizational boundaries?

The asymmetry between a strong state and a weak society under state socialism suggests that opportunities for collective action are more often
provided by the state and state policy shifts than are created by conscious organizing efforts on the part of society. Ironically, institutional arrangements in China have intermittently provided such opportunities. Collective action has often grown out of political campaigns initiated and organized by the state or has stemmed from cleavages created by the relaxation of state political control.

The Chinese political process is characterized by frequent policy shifts that alternate between bureaucratic implementation and political campaigns. Focusing on the earlier period of the Soviet Union, Arendt (1958) first argued that the constant shifts of power centers and offices were intrinsic to a totalitarian regime based on the absolute power of the leadership and the structurelessness of the state. More recently, China scholars attribute this phenomenon to the organizational failures of state socialism. State dominance over society depends on a huge bureaucratic apparatus. The state's monopoly of power is duplicated at the lower levels of the bureaucratic system. State policies are transmitted through documents and only local bureaucrats have access to these documents and the authority to interpret them (Oksenberg 1974). Thus, local bureaucrats can manipulate state policies to serve their own interests. The emphasis on political loyalty rather than competence leads to, as Harding (1981) observed, "a stifling conformity among officials, a reluctance to take independent initiatives, a low level of technical and managerial skills, and disillusionment and cynicism at the frequent shifts in official line" (p. 375). Consequently, two types of organizational failures emerge: (1) systematic bureaucratic deviations in implementing state policies; and (2) an accumulation of incompetent bureaucrats, which reduces the state capacity (Lampton 1987; Whyte 1980). Moreover, the bureaucratic system cannot adequately deal with these organizational failures because the structure of upward accountability creates close ties and personal loyalties between local bureaucrats and their immediate supervisors. As a result, the state often adopts alternative modes of mobilization, usually political campaigns, to remedy bureaucratic problems.

As Arendt (1958) argued, mass mobilizations are a core characteristic of the totalitarian movement. In China, political campaigns serve the purposes of the leadership by mobilizing resources to achieve the state's ambitious political and economic goals (Townsend 1967) or to respond to crises in other areas (Zhou and Wang 1991). Mass mobilization has been adopted to deal with economic shortages, to enhance economic development, and to support factional struggles within the leadership. In the economic arena, for example, the Great-Leap-Forward Campaign of 1958 mobilized human resources from other sectors to increase steel production. In the political arena, the most dramatic example is the Cultural Revolution in which Mao Zedong mobilized millions of students, workers, and peasants to attack his opponents and the bureaucratic organizations. In part, this accounts for the state's occasional relaxation of political control, and tolerance and even support for individual initiative.

The response of individuals and social groups to state policy shifts provides clues to the outbreak of collective action in China. As Tilly (1978) argued, "the general effect of sustained repression is not to build up tensions to the point of a great explosion, but to reduce the overall level of collective action" (p. 228). In fact, the "positive incentive for compliance" in China encourages and even forces individuals to take part in state-initiated campaigns and respond to shifts in state policy (Burns 1988). The politics of life chances are highly significant in state socialism (Whyte 1985; Walder 1986). Shifts in state policy either affect individuals' lives directly, or indirectly signal the impending dangers or opportunities, with severe consequences for those who fail to adapt to these dramatic changes. As a result, individuals must be keenly aware of these signals and respond accordingly. However, individuals' responses to shifts in state policy do not suggest adherence to the political line set by the state. Participating in state-initiated political campaigns provides an opportunity for individuals and groups to pursue their own agendas and exploit new opportunities (Harding 1981; Shirk 1982). State-initiated political campaigns provide opportunities for unorganized groups and individuals to act together.

So far, my discussion has been confined to what I call institutionalized collective action — the collective action was initiated by the state and participants followed the rules of the game and employed legitimate institutional channels. Moreover, individuals took part in these campaigns more as spontaneous and adaptive responses to state policies rather than as self-conscious organizing efforts. The sources of shifts in state policy may vary — factional conflicts in the Cultural Revolution, bureaucratic problems in the Hundred Flowers period, or mobilization for eco-
nomic development in the 1980s — but as long as these opportunities are offered, individuals’ behavior tends to go beyond state prescribed boundaries and take the form of collective action.

Another type of collective action, uninstitutionalized collective action, refers to protests and displays of open defiance that are not initiated by the state — they bypass legitimate institutional channels to directly challenge the state. This type of collective action was especially salient during the economic reforms of the last decade, e.g., the student demonstrations in 1986 and the pro-democracy movement in 1989. Unlike collective action in the pre-reform era, social protests in the 1980s were not initiated by the state. For instance, student demonstrations in 1986 and the pro-democracy movement of 1989 both defied warnings and threats of repressive measures by the top leaders. The participants made explicit demands on the state and in both cases, there were open confrontations with government officials, police, or the army. In many respects, the social protests of the 1980s resembled collective action in other social contexts.

The emergence of open protest is rooted in the new opportunity structure created by recent economic reforms in China. In the economic reform after 1978, the state relaxed its policy of political control and introduced market mechanisms in the allocation of resources (Nee 1989). The reform facilitated lateral communication across localities and group boundaries, and some freedom of expression was tolerated. These reform measures created two conditions that facilitated collective action: (1) The relaxation of political control lowered the fear of repression and hence reduced the expected cost of participating in collective action; and (2) political and economic resources were decentralized and, indirectly, were made available for the mobilization of collective action.

However, the discontinuity between the Mao era and the reform era should not be overdrawn. The institutional arrangements that created the “large numbers” phenomenon have not fundamentally changed. The state remains at the center, initiating reform through a top-down process (Davis and Vogel 1990). The basic characteristic of the decentralization process was that power was “granted” to local authorities by the state, and thus can be, at least normatively, withdrawn by the state (Yan 1991). Hua, Zhang, and Luo (1988) documented the major reform decisions made by the central government during the 1978 through 1988 period. They showed that, despite the decentralization efforts, the state played a decisive role in promoting its policies. The difference, as one delegate to the People’s Congress put it, is that before the reform, local governments and representatives demanded money and resources from the central government, whereas now they demanded (special privileged) policies from the central government (Renmin Ribao, overseas ed., 4 Apr. 1992). Not surprisingly, although the state monopoly has eroded considerably, the “large numbers” phenomenon still prevails and, more important, political pressures generated by the reform process are still directed toward the state. Thus, uninstitutionalized collective action resembles institutionalized collective action in many ways.

TWO CASE STUDIES

To illustrate my arguments, I examine two cases of collective action in some detail.

Institutionalized Collective Action: The Hundred Flowers Period

In 1957, after a period of economic reconstruction, nationalization, and collectivization campaigns that began in 1949, the Chinese Communist state had consolidated its territorial control and had completed the nation-building process. At the same time, the bureaucratic system had overexpanded and administrative problems loomed large (Harding 1981, pp. 87–115). In addition, popular revolts in Hungary and Poland during this period challenged the legitimacy of all Communist states. Incidents of conflict between the populace and bureaucrats at the local level were also reported (Mao [1957] 1977a).

In this context, the Communist Party adopted a “rectification campaign” to correct its bureaucratic problems. Mao Zedong identified subjectivism, bureaucratism, and sectarianism as major problems within the Party. In February, Mao signaled the beginning of the Hundred Flowers period in a speech in which he declared “let a hundred flowers bloom and a hundred schools of thought contend” and that “long-term co-existence and mutual inspection” were the long-term state policy for handling contradictions among the people (Mao [1957] 1977a). He also advocated open criticism of the problems in the Communist Party.

Intellectuals at first were reluctant to respond for fear of repression. On April 30, Mao invited
leaders of the democratic parties and intellectuals not affiliated with any political parties to discuss the Communist Party’s rectification and welcomed their criticisms. From May 6 to June 3, the Communist Party’s Ministry of United Front organized a series of meetings to gather criticisms from non-Communist Party members, most of whom were intellectuals. Encouraged by the leadership’s attitude, many individuals openly criticized problems within the Communist Party. In a few weeks, criticisms from different sectors, workplaces, and localities poured out.

Several characteristics of this episode are worth noting. First, the criticisms were clearly individuals’ spontaneous responses to state advocacy. Except for some gatherings of senior members of the democratic parties in Beijing that were encouraged by the Communist Party, there is no evidence that the criticisms were coordinated or organized by autonomous interest groups. Numerous accounts of this period indicate that most participants acted on the basis of appeals from top leaders. For instance, some university students were later purged simply because they criticized heads of Communist Party branches in their departments or in the university. In an interview, a professor who was purged during this period recalled that, at the invitation of the Party secretary in his department, he wrote an article supporting the Communist Party’s “Hundred Flowers” policy and warning that subjectivism, bureaucratism, and sectarianism, if not corrected, would lead to national disaster. As he put it: “Those were the same words the top leaders used when they advocated the rectification campaign.”

Second, not only intellectuals but social groups such as managers, doctors, civil servants, and religious groups, responded with complaints and demands (MacFarquhar 1960). Official published materials reveal non-Party members criticizing the Communist Party’s monopoly of power, doctors complaining of bureaucratic coverups of medical malpractice (Guangming Ribao 3 May 1957), students questioning the procedures for electing student representatives (Guangming Ribao 26 May 1957), and writers demanding creative freedom (Wenxue Yanjiu (5) 1957). Open criticisms from peasants and workers were less frequent and their expressions of discontent took other forms. For instance, according to a report by the official media, 13 workers’ strikes or “troublemaking” incidents occurred in one year in Guangdong Province alone. In the countryside, over 10,000 households withdrew from the cooperatives in Guangdong Province during the same period (New China News Agency 14 May 1957 as quoted in MacFarquhar 1960, p. 234).

The common characteristic of these incidents is that critics across different workplaces and localities raised similar criticisms. The centralized political system produced large numbers of similar bureaucratic problems across localities and large numbers of individuals with similar experiences and dissatisfactions. These criticisms, while differing in specifics, all demanded that the Communist Party correct local bureaucratic problems and relax its political control over society. The link between local bureaucratic problems and the central state was clearly perceived. As two students in a teachers’ college in Shenyang put it: “The main source of bureaucratic problems lies in the central government. If we don’t eliminate these problems at their roots, they will emerge again” (Shenyang Ribao 10 June 1957).

The collective nature of these spontaneous and large-scale criticisms exceeded the state’s expectations. On May 15, 1957, less than three months after he declared the Hundred Flowers policy, Mao Zedong charged that these criticisms were a concerted effort by counter-revolutionaries to overthrow the Communist Party (Mao [1957] 1977b). On June 8, the Party launched its Anti-Rightist Campaign. Those who criticized the Communist Party were labeled “rightists” and “conflicts” between rightists and the state were declared “contradictions between the people and the enemies” rather than “contradictions among the people.” In a few months, over 400,000 “rightists” were purged nationwide.

This episode is an example of institutionalized collective action, i.e., the Communist state mobilized the masses to deal with the state’s bureau-
ocratic problems. However, even though the participants clearly were unorganized and followed the stated rules of the game, their remarkably similar criticisms and demands and the political pressures put on the state followed the pattern of collective action. Consequently, they were seen as a challenge to the state and were severely repressed.

Uninstitutionalized Collective Action: Student Demonstrations in 1986

Near the end of 1986, China was full of frustrations, expectations, and excitement. The frustration stemmed from difficulties in carrying out economic reforms. In 1986, China entered its eighth year of economic reform. In the initial three years, China experienced the most rapid agricultural growth in its history. Encouraged by this economic miracle, the state extended reform to the industrial sector in urban areas in 1984. It soon became clear that the political system was the biggest obstacle to urban reform. Bureaucratic interference and corruption led to economic stagnation and engendered mass grievances.

On the other hand, expectations were high. In an effort to overcome these difficulties, the Communist leadership, especially Deng Xiaoping, advocated political reform. On June 28 and September 13, 1986, Deng Xiaoping instructed the Politburo to consider political reform in order to enlist mass support for economic reform and to overcome bureaucratism (Document Office of the Party Central Committee 1986). Inspired by these signals, in the summer of 1986, heated discussions occurred among intellectuals on the problems of the current political system and prospects for political reform. Articles, debates, and proposals appeared in newspapers, professional journals, and public forums.7

While talk of political reform was in the air, university students could wait no longer. The apparent willingness of the state to consider political reform released long-suppressed tensions in society. On December 5, 1986, students at China Science and Technology University in Anhui Province took to the streets to protest invalid election procedures in a local election and to demand political reform and democratic procedures. The government realized the potentially explosive nature of this event and on December 8, 1986, an editorial in Renmin Ribao warned that political reform must proceed according to the Communist Party’s blueprint. But it was too late. That same month, student demonstrations took place in Shanghai, Beijing, Nanjing, Wuhan, Hongzhou, Shenzhen, and other large cities. In many places, students confronted police and local officials in defiance of the government’s chilly warning.8

Eyewitness accounts and media reports noted the spontaneity of participation and the participants’ lack of organization and clear goals. For example, students at Fudan University mobilized after a group of students from a nearby university marched to Fudan and asked Fudan students to join them. One student organizer at Fudan recalled: “We [classmates] were all excited about what was happening. Someone posted an announcement that there would be a demonstration the next day. We discussed it during lunch and decided we would prepare banners and join the demonstration.” In a few days, students from all major universities in Shanghai were participating in the demonstrations. The unorganized nature of the protests was also reflected in their lack of sustained mobilization and lack of coherent demands (Wasserstrom 1991). On December 18, just a few days after the first outbreak, students returned to their classrooms in spite of some student organizers’ calls for a boycott of classes (Schell 1988, p. 230).

Although demonstrations in different areas were triggered by different local incidents, they all converged on the same issues. In Anhui Province, student demonstrations broke out to protest the violation of election procedures when a local Party office tried to impose its candidates on the students. In Shanghai, demonstrations were triggered by the abuse of students by police in a public place (Nineteenth Feb. 1987, pp. 74–76). In Shenzhen, demonstrations protested high tuition (Schell 1988). Even in Shanghai, different demands were made during the demonstrations. For instance, the initial demands at Fudan University included complaints about dormitory conditions and food quality among others (Schell 1988; Wasserstrom 1991). Diverse as these complaints were, student demonstrations quickly converged on a demand  

7 Many publications on political reforms appeared during this period. Interested readers can refer to Renmin Ribao, Guangming Ribao, Jiefang Ribao, and Xinhua Yuebao for mid-1986 for details.

8 My discussion here is based primarily on published eyewitness accounts, news reports in Chinese journals in Hong Kong, and interviews in the summer of 1987 with student participants from Fudan University.
for the central government to speed up political reforms and correct bureaucratic problems.

The general atmosphere of political reform created by top leaders had provided the basis for the mobilization of students at different campuses and localities. These demonstrations actually supported the top leaders’ reform efforts. As one student explained: “We were responding to the call last July by Deng Xiaoping for political reform. We are impatient that in spite of all the newspaper articles advocating mass participation, nothing concrete has yet been done to allow us a say in government affairs” (Schell 1988, p. 213).

Nonetheless, the Party leadership saw the demonstrations as a challenge to Party rule and interpreted them as “riots” (naoshi) inspired by “bad elements.” In response, the government took strong political measures to suppress the student demonstrations. General Secretary Hu Yaobang was forced to resign; three famous intellectuals who advocated political reform were purged; the president and a vice president of China Science and Technology University, where the student demonstrations began, were replaced and the university administration reorganized. In the meantime, a nationwide Anti-Bourgeois Campaign was launched. The Communist Party organized mass criticisms of Western liberalism. Within one month, major Party newspapers published numerous editorials and commentaries to motivate this campaign (Xinhua Yuebao Jan. 1987).

Although they occurred 30 years apart, these two instances of collective action share some similarities. In both cases, participants were motivated by shifts in state policy rather than by their own organizing efforts. Political control at the workplace and fragmented interests based on formal organizations did not prevent collective action across these boundaries. On the contrary, bureaucratic problems at the local level were the immediate cause of collective action. But these criticisms and protests quickly moved from local issues to the center and threatened the Communist state.

The puzzles of the 1989 pro-democracy movement can be understood in a similar manner. Wide participation in the movement cannot be accounted for by either common interests or organizational efforts. On the eve of the 1989 protests, Chinese society was highly differentiated; inequality generated tensions among social groups (Davis and Vogel 1990). Even university students were divided (Chen 1991). Just a year earlier, the President of Beijing University lamented that students had lost their enthusiasm and become apathetic (Zhongguo Qingnianbao 4 Apr. 1988). Although there were a few informal dissident groups among the students at Beijing on the eve of the 1989 events and the members of these groups were actively involved in the social protests, there is no evidence that these groups initiated, or were capable of mobilizing and organizing such large-scale open confrontations. In fact, the original student representatives of the Independent Student Alliance of Beijing Universities, established during the protest, included no members of these dissident groups (Shen 1990).

Nonetheless, the institutional structure created interconnections among individuals and social groups. Individuals from various social groups and organizations—victims of the reforms, such as workers and cadres in state-owned enterprises, as well as beneficiaries of the reforms, such as private entrepreneurs—joined the demonstrations. Although participants may not have shared a common interest, they shared a common enemy. The central state and its policies engendered widespread discontent among students, workers, cadres, and other social groups. Though demands varied across social groups (Strand 1990), it was the central position of the state as the cause of, and the solution to, social problems, that was the basis for the articulation of behaviors among these participants.

In most instances of collective action in China, students and intellectuals were the main participants. In part, this can be attributed to the relative homogeneity of the intelligentsia, but it also reflects the sensitivity of intellectuals and students to shifts in state policy. The distance between the intelligentsia and other social groups was not as great as it appeared. For instance, although only students participated in the 1986 demonstrations, citizens reportedly cheered the student demonstrators and provided them with food and clothing (Ninetith Jan. 1987, pp. 17–20). These actions resembled citizen support for students at the beginning of the 1989 demonstrations, just before they joined students in demonstrations. This suggests that the prompt state crackdown interrupted the emerging mobilization of these nonstudent groups in the 1986 episode.

In examining the patterns of collective action in China, I have focused on its causal link with the institutional structure of state socialism. However, microconditions are also important—resources, organizing capacity, leadership, incentives, personal networks, and existing repertoires of collective action also play important roles.
There is evidence of mobilization across universities during the 1986 and 1989 student demonstrations. Informal channels of communication were available through personal networks, travelers, hearsay and, in recent years, foreign broadcasts. The mobilization of student protest was also based on existing repertoires of collective action such as patriotic symbols, the big character posters (dazibao), and work units. These symbols and forms can be traced to the May Fourth movement of 1911 and the Cultural Revolution. Furthermore, the 1989 pro-democracy movement clearly reflected the profound social changes that had occurred during the ten-year economic reform that undermined the capacity of the Communist state. Whether the reform process can continue and whether it will lead to fundamental changes in the patterns of collective action remain to be seen.

COLLECTIVE INACTION AS A FORM OF COLLECTIVE ACTION

Thus far, I have considered collective action in the form of open defiant behavior. However, collective action under state socialism also includes noncompliance, apathy, and pessimism among the populace (Townsend and Womack 1986; Mason, Nelson, and Szklarski 1991). Certainly, these forms of resistance are not unique to Communist society — they have been documented in many other social contexts (Scott 1985; Colburn 1989).

I would argue, however, that in the institutional structure of state socialism, noncompliance and apathy assume a collective character and have a special political significance. I label this phenomenon collective inaction.

Collective inaction may take different forms: a lack of enthusiasm for participating in state-initiated political campaigns, absenteeism or inefficiency in the workplace, evasion of public duties, and the emergence of subcultures opposing the official ideology. Some of these behaviors are more visible than others and may well be seen as “action” rather than “inaction,” such as looting of crops and animal slaughter. But their common characteristic is that they are individual-based and take the form of escape from state control rather than open confrontations. This type of behavior has minimal symbolic visibility:

When they are practiced widely by members of an entire class against elites or the state, they may have aggregated consequences out of all proportion to their banality when considered singly. (Scott 1989, p. 5)

In a market economy, problems resulting from noncompliance and inefficiency at the workplace do not assume a collective character beyond the local boundary and a set of complicated economic layers absorbs their impacts. For instance, inefficiency in the American automobile industry has been suggested as a major source of its competitive disadvantage. However, the cost of inefficiency in the workplace is shared by company owners, consumers, and, indirectly, the state, through declines in tax revenues. Furthermore, the adverse impact of inefficiency at the national level may be partly alleviated by the successes of other industries. Even when discontent spans social groups, it tends to be directed to multiple targets with multiple demands.

State socialism is a directly opposite case. In the institutional structure of state socialism, the state’s monopoly over the public sphere means that noncompliance directly challenges state authority, affects the state’s extraction of resources, and threatens its governance capacity. Collective inaction emerges when state policies shift toward political repression and tighter control. During periods of repression, open protests are severely punished and individuals protect themselves by resorting to invisible forms of resistance rather than open defiance. Collectively, these forms of resistance put enormous political pressure on the state, challenging its legitimacy and constraining its capacity to implement policies. In this light, the “large numbers” of noncompliant behaviors resemble collective action.

Although it is difficult to document instances of collective inaction, several studies shed light on this phenomenon. Skinner and Winkler (1969), in a study of state agricultural policies during the 1950s and 1960s, found that peasants’ indifference toward state policies and their collective resistance inhibited the state’s capacity to implement its policies and forced the state to abandon old policies and take a different direction. Zweig (1989) examined the peasants’ resistance over collective land in the 1960s and 1970s and reached similar conclusions. Townsend and Womack (1986, pp. 265–69) also recognized this type of behavior as a distinctive type of interest articulation.

Perhaps the most spectacular example is the change in agricultural productivity that occurred during the reform. The collectivization of agriculture before 1979 deprived peasants of their lands and the policy met with tacit resistant behaviors like free-riding, low productivity, evasion of farm duties. The pervasiveness of the resistance constituted collective inaction and its
cost was clearly reflected in a stagnation of agricultural production. During the 1971 through 1978 period, when the peasants were under the commune system, the annual growth rate in gross value of agricultural output was 4.3 percent (Perkins 1988). During the reform era, when collectivization was abandoned and private households leased the land, the growth rate jumped to 7.5 percent during the 1980 through 1982 period, and 13.0 percent from 1982 to 1986. As Perkins (1988) noted, "the growth of such key inputs as mechanical and electric power and chemical fertilizer all increased at rates no higher and in most cases lower in the 1979–85 period as contrasted to the 1965–78 period" (p. 612). Clearly, these high growth rates in agriculture are attributable mainly to human factors, "particularly the release of energies connected with private household output" (p. 612). It is evident that collective inaction in agriculture before the reform era had a devastating effect on the capacity of the state to extract resources.

Even in the reform era, collective inaction frequently occurred. For instance, in the spring of 1989, 150,000 workers in the coal industry in Shanxi Province refused to return to work after the Chinese Spring Festival to protest the shortage of grain supplied by the state. This action reduced coal production by around 400,000 tons per day and disrupted production in other industries (Chen 1990, pp. 130–31). On January 4, 1988, a report appeared on the front page of Renmin Ribao entitled "Workers' Enthusiasm in the Workplace Reached Its Bottom Low." The report presented the results of a social survey conducted by the National Workers Union in which only 12 percent of the 210,000 workers surveyed agreed that their work energies were fully utilized.

In some instances, collective inaction directly affected state policy. For example, in 1987, when the Communist Party launched the anti-bourgeois campaign to repress student demonstrations, individuals sensed the impending political repression and policy shifts. Peasants cut the trees they were growing and slaughtered pigs they were raising in fear that they would be confiscated by the state. Enterprises withheld production and investment because of the possibility that the autonomy granted to them by the government might be revoked (Chengming Mar. 1987, pp. 19–21). Although similar responses may occur in a market economy, the difference is that the Chinese were responding to political uncertainty rather than market uncertainty and their behaviors were directly translated into political pressure. A speech by then Acting General Secretary Zhao Ziyang represents an effort to change the course of the political campaign:

If the current [reform] policy is interpreted as the result of bourgeois liberalism, it will create great uncertainty among the people. If production is unattended, commercial activities disrupted, forest destroyed and pigs killed, who can shoulder all these responsibilities? (Renmin Ribao 10 Oct. 1987)

Clearly, collective action in the Chinese context manifests itself not only through open resistance and demonstrations, but also in more subtle forms of noncompliant behavior that fall outside the conventional scope of collective action. Unlike other social contexts, however, in China these forms of resistance share the characteristics of collective action. In a sense, collective inaction is an invisible "sit-in" in the Chinese political context. Its message is loud and clear, even without symbolic actions.

In a capitalist market context, as Hirschman (1982) noted, the dichotomy between the public and private arenas allows individuals to shift between public and private realms and between collective action and the pursuit of self-interest. In state socialism, on the other hand, shifts of individual involvement are more likely to be between collective action and collective inaction. Whether individuals strive for the public good or pursue their self-interests, their behaviors assume a collective character and challenge the state monopoly.

**DISCUSSION**

I have examined collective action in China by contrasting state-society relationships in the capitalist market economy and the state socialist redistributive system. These ideal types highlight how the unique features of state socialism lead to collective action based on unorganized interests. The Chinese experience is not an isolated case — collective actions based on unorganized interests have also occurred in the market economy. The student protests in France in the 1960s and 1986 emerged spontaneously rather than through careful organization (McMillan 1992; Wilsford 1988). Protests by blacks in the early period of the U. S. civil rights movement also were not a result of conscious organizing efforts. What conditions foster these similar types of collective action in different social contexts?

According to Hirschman (1982), one cause of this phenomenon is market failures that shrink
the private realm where individuals can pursue their self-interests and alter their preferences, thereby pushing individuals into the public arena. In a study of the poor people’s movement during the Great Depression, Piven and Cloward (1977) made similar arguments. The political and social bases of racial prejudice and discrimination rendered any market-like solution impossible, setting the stage for the rise of the civil rights movement. Under these circumstances, collective action may occur with or without conscious organizing efforts. The maintenance and expansion of collective actions, however, depend heavily on leadership, organizations, and the evolving political process (McAdam 1982).

Another contributing factor is the increasing concentration of power that accompanied the rise of the nation-state and redefined the boundaries of the public and private realms. “As capitalism advanced, as national states became more powerful and centralized, local affairs and nearby patrons mattered less to the fates of ordinary people” (Tilly 1986, pp. 395–96). These evolving state-society relationships led to fundamental changes in the forms and channels of political input from society. Wilsford (1988) attributed student protests in France to the dominance of the state apparatus there: “For the French state, by dealing high-handedly with its opponents, cut them off from normal avenues of political negotiation. In doing so, it forces its opponents to exit normal politics” (p. 152). The student demonstrations of the 1960s in the United States were interconnected in a similar manner — they were a collective response to the federal government’s foreign policy and its intervention in higher education.

The emergence of new social movements in Western Europe also illustrates this point. In contrast to the traditional organizational base of social movements, scholars have observed the emergence of social movements since the 1970s that arise from a diffuse and fluid social base and cut across group boundaries and traditional political arenas (Dalton and Kuechler 1990). This pattern of social mobilization is mainly the result of the rise of welfare state in industrialized societies which has blurred and widened the boundaries of the political (Maier 1987). The state’s penetration into social life has linked diverse social issues and political arenas and prepared a broader base for interest articulation. Clearly, changes in the repertoires of collective action and forms of social mobilization reflect an evolving state-society relationship.

The absence of a market and the prevalence of the state in social life do not necessarily entail collective action in the Chinese context. The redistributive economic system in China places individuals under the organizational control of the state. The lack of organized interests limits the effectiveness of leadership, personal networks, communication, and mobilization. Furthermore, the track record of the state’s repressive measures against collective action makes the cost of participation high. Why does collective action occur under these adverse conditions?

An institutional perspective sheds light on this puzzle. Although unorganized, collective action in China is systematically structured by the particular type of state-society relationship. The Communist state and its institutions have fostered interconnections among otherwise unorganized interests by generating “large numbers” of discontented people, by linking local discontent with national politics, and by a mobilization policy that periodically incorporates social groups in the political process. Thus, collective action is unwittingly “organized” by the Communist state.

Consider the role of formal organizations. It has been argued that factories, communes, and universities are part of the state organizational apparatus whereby the Communist state exercises control through political pressures and economic incentives. In the student demonstrations in 1980s, university authorities discouraged students from participating. The government also threatened workers through Party branches at the workplace (Stavis 1988, p. 105). However, workplaces and universities are places where personal ties and social networks are formed (Calhoun 1989). When opportunities open up, they provide a channel for social mobilization, as evidenced in the 1989 pro-democracy movement. In this light, the workplace is a social space where individuals share similar interests and similar experiences and interact. It is also a political space where discontent against the state and local bureaucrats is bred and accumulated. In time, it becomes an organizational basis for mobilization of its members in pursuit of their interests.

Moreover, in the instances of collective action I consider, participation was either mobilized by the state directly or induced by state policy. During the Hundred Flowers period, for instance, the state took great pains to motivate individuals to participate in the anti-bureaucratism campaign. Student demonstrations and student attacks on bureaucratic organizations in 1986 were also
prompted by the call for political reform by the top leaders. In such an institutional setting, individuals may start with diverse targets and demands, but they tend to converge in a common direction owing to the centralized polity and opportunity structure. Regardless of participants’ motivations, the large number of criticisms directed toward the state and open protests are causally defined as collective action. Even tree-cutting and pig-killing in rural areas that are within the private realm take a “collective” form to challenge the state and state policies.

Communist practices in China also generate and maintain the repertoires of collective action. Several scholars have noted similarities between the student protests of the 1980s and other social movements in Chinese history (Strand 1990; Wasserstrom 1991). The student protests of the 1980s repeatedly invoked the imagery of the May Fourth movement of 1911, whose patriotic symbols legitimized participation. Students also drew on memories of the Cultural Revolution, which provided forms of organization and mobilization. For instance, big character posters were displayed on campuses; student organizers in Beijing sent representatives to other cities to mobilize fellow students; workers joined by holding banners of their work units — all these actions were remarkably similar to actions adopted during the Cultural Revolution. Interestingly, both sources of the actions were created and maintained by the Communist state: The Communist state celebrates the May Fourth movement annually as a symbol of patriotism, and the Cultural Revolution and other mass mobilizations were also initiated and organized by the state. The centralized political system creates a cultural context in which the repertoires of collective action are maintained and shared by individuals across organizations and social groups.

Outbreaks of collective action are triggered by shifts in several important parameters: Political controls are relaxed, individuals are encouraged to participate in the political process, lateral communication networks are activated, and cleavages open owing to factional conflicts at the top. During such episodes, individuals are encouraged by the state to “speak out.” Thus, the populace becomes aware of widespread discontents, which in turn promotes further participation in this process. More important, such a political process must persist long enough to affect individuals’ incentives and perceptions of risk. Because the simultaneous emergence of these conditions is rare, collective action in China is infrequent.

Obviously, the collective actions discussed here differ in many aspects from collective actions in other social contexts. Because they are less “purposeful,” they could be termed “aggregates” of individual behavior or “crowd behavior.” However, the transformation of individual behavior into collective action discussed here is too systematic, structurally embedded, and politically significant to be treated merely as a circumstantial outcome. The large number of individual responses is rooted in the nature of the state-society relationship and reproduced in everyday activities. These responses are part of the political process, both as product and as input. They should be treated as “collective” because they are perceived and responded to as such by the state, and because they affect the political process as collective actions rather than as unorganized interests.

RETHINKING THE STATE-SOCIETY RELATIONSHIP UNDER STATE SOCIALISM

In concluding, I assess the relevance of my arguments to collective action in other state socialist societies and reconsider the state-society relationship in state socialism in light of my arguments.

Although I have focused on China, the issues and mechanisms involved are more general and are rooted in the patterns of state-society relationships typical of state socialism. In developing these ideas, I have benefited greatly from studies of the Soviet Union and Eastern European politics where the “large numbers” phenomenon has also been observed. Griffiths (1971) found a “parallel articulation of behavior” cutting across formal groups in the Soviet Union. More recently, Bunce (forthcoming) used the concept of “homogenization” to characterize the basis for spontaneous interest articulation in Eastern European countries. The direct link between the state and the workplace has been most evident in the Soviet Union and in Eastern European contexts (Laba 1986). Political campaigns and mass mobilizations have occurred frequently in the Soviet Union (Viola 1987) and Eastern Europe (Hankiss 1989). Studies of mass resistance — instances of “collective inaction” — and its political effects on state policies have also emerged in recent years (Scott 1989).

Hankiss (1989) examined the mobilization process in Hungary and found that shifts in state policy toward openness created the opportunity for society to mobilize and challenge the state. Even in Poland before the birth of Solidarity in
the 1980s, workers’ uprisings exemplified collective action based on unorganized interests. For instance, workers’ strikes in 1976 occurred in more than 100 factories throughout the nation on the day the Polish government announced its price reform program. Bernhard (1987) showed that these strikes were immediate responses to state policy rather than carefully organized efforts. There were noticeable differences in the participants’ demands across sectors and regions. The unorganized nature of the strikes is also indicated by their short duration: They lasted one day and ended when the government withdrew its price reform policy. The basic features of the institutional arrangements and state-society relationships discussed here have direct implications for understanding collective action in other state socialist societies.

Of course, the arguments developed here cannot be applied in a wholesale manner in other contexts. The state’s capacity to monopolize the public arena, the rhythms of shifts in state policy, and the resources available to society vary in different contexts, which may introduce different dynamics and forms of resistance. For instance, the civil structures outside state socialism varied across Eastern European societies, which then led to different paths of transition (Stark 1992). These conditions have substantial effects on the state-society relationship. The patterns of strategic maneuvering in the Solidarity era in Poland clearly show an alternative collective action based on organized interests (Staniszkis 1984).

Early studies of contemporary Communist politics have focused on the state and its organizational apparatus. These studies attributed changes in state policy to factional conflicts among the top leaders. This focus on organizations and interest articulations meant that workers, peasants, and intellectuals were treated as categorical groups and ignored (Skilling 1971). Furthermore, these studies often attributed collective action based on unorganized interests to policy mistakes by the leadership or as circumstantial outcomes (MacFarquhar 1960; White 1989). With the exception of studies of the Solidarity movement in Poland, the role of unorganized interests has been neglected in the analysis of political processes in state socialist societies.

Under state socialism, society is organizationally weak compared to the state apparatus. Political demands in such a context are not generated by the formation and shifting of interest groups typical of a liberal representative polity. Nor are these demands embodied in different organizations striving to obtain state licensing for privileged access to resources typical of a corporatist system. However, collective action in a society of unorganized interests plays a critical role in the political process. The impact of collective action is revealed in its timing. Collective action based on unorganized interests is largely a response to the state and to state policies. It tends to occur when the state shifts policy. This is when the state is “weak” — owing to leadership changes, fragile coalitions, or a lack of confidence in its new orientation. This type of collective action resembles social mobilizations prompted by the breakdown of the state (Skocpol 1979).

Collective action based on unorganized interests has been crucial in the erosion of the Communist state; it also underlies the dynamics of reform cycles in Communist regimes. Collective action has disrupted state policies, weakened the state organizational apparatus, limited the state’s capacity to implement policies, and undermined its ability to govern. Ultimately, the collective resistance of the populace forced the Communist states of China and Eastern Europe to undertake the reforms of the 1980s that led to popular uprisings in 1989.

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