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What is This?
Using 1987 survey data of 988 bureaucrats in eight large cities, I examine the effect of the recent economic reform on the Chinese bureaucracy—the distribution of bureaucrats in different types of organizations, jobs, hierarchical positions, and bureaucratic compensation. The results show mixed characteristics of the Chinese bureaucracy in the partial reform where market and planning, competence and political loyalty, coexist. There is evidence of the continuing dominance of the party state on bureaucratic personnel management. On the other hand, significant changes took place in the selection criteria and, to a lesser extent, in the institutional structure, as evidenced in the promotion patterns and bureaucratic compensation. These results point to the evolving organizational basis of state socialism in the transition process.

**PARTIAL REFORM AND THE CHINESE BUREAUCRACY IN THE POST-MAO ERA**

XUEGUANG ZHOU  
Duke University

Only bureaucracy has established the foundation for the administration of a rational law.  

Max Weber

Once the political course is set, cadre becomes the decisive factor.  

Mao Zedong

Bureaucratic organizations have been the cornerstone of the Communist polity. Bureaucrats play a pivotal role in the operation of the redistributive socialist economy (Szelenyi, 1978): They administer the allocation of resources, implement state policies, and serve as the only stable institutional linkage between the state and society. In many respects, the bureaucratic apparatus is the Communist party state. With the collapse of the Communist system in the former Soviet Union and Eastern Europe and fundamental

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crises in other lingering Communist polities, the importance of the bureaucratic apparatus has not receded. As is evident now, bureaucrats bred in the old system still dominate the governance structure in these societies. Conceivably, transitions from state socialism must take place in the shadow, if not the active involvement, of the bureaucrats as part of the state socialist legacy.

The role of bureaucrats has been an important part of the emerging literature on the transition from state socialism (see Stark [1992] in the East European context, Lieberthal & Lampton [1992] and Shirk [1993] in the Chinese context). The expansion of market and the erosion of the socialist state as the redistributive center have a direct effect on the bureaucratic organizations. Szelenyi and Manchin (1987), for instance, found that Communist bureaucrats were actively involved in and benefited from market activities in Hungary. Nee (1991) reached similar conclusions in his study of rural China. However, in a recent study, Walder (1992) analyzed 1986 survey data of a Chinese city, Tianjin, and found that interorganizational hierarchy based on state socialist property rights still plays a critical role in social stratification. Lieberthal and Lampton (1992) argue that because of the decline of central authority, bureaucratic bargaining plays an even more important role in the Chinese decision-making process. These studies point to both the continuity and the evolution of the authority relationship, resource distribution, and the incentive structure in the Communist bureaucracy during this period of dramatic change.

In this study, I assess the current state of the Chinese bureaucracy in terms of the distribution of bureaucrats in different types of organizations, jobs, and hierarchical positions, and their compensation, based on a survey of 988 bureaucrats in eight cities in 1987. I will first review some unique features of the Chinese bureaucracy in contrast to the ideal type proposed by Max Weber. Based on recent studies of transitions from state socialism, I then focus on statistical analyses of the placement of bureaucrats in the reform era. Finally, the implications for understanding the evolving nature of the Communist state are discussed in light of these findings.

CHINESE BUREAUCRACY IN
A COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE

Max Weber’s (1946) pioneering work on bureaucracy has been the most important inspiration for contemporary studies of the bureaucratic phenomenon. In Weber’s vision, modern bureaucracy is an efficiency-driven and instrument-oriented organizational form in response to the development of a
capitalist economy, which "demands that the official business of the admin-
istration be discharged precisely, unambiguously, continuously, and with as
much speed as possible" (p. 215). Historically, in Weber's view, the rise of
modern bureaucracy was due to its "technical superiority" in managing
complex administrative tasks.

Since Djilas's (1966) seminal work on the new bureaucratic class, scholars
of state socialism have sought to understand the role of bureaucracy in these
societies. In the East European context, Konrad and Szelenyi (1979) and
Hirszowicz (1980) offered forceful critiques of the Communist "sovereign
bureaucracy." In China studies, Barnett (1967) pioneered the study of the
bureaucratic personnel system. In a broader context, Schurmann (1968)
provided an elaborate study of the organizational basis of the Communist
state. Scholars have examined various aspects of the bureaucratic system in
several political episodes (Boisot & Child, 1988; Harding, 1981; Lee, 1991;
These studies highlight the distinctive features of bureaucracy in the state
socialist context and provide the starting point of this study.

Formally, the state socialist bureaucracy is hierarchically ordered, man-
aged through administrative decrees, and staffed by full-time career bureau-
crats appointed by their superior authority. Bureaucrats make or implement
policies according to "documents" rather than arbitrary and personal judg-
ment. These features at least superficially fit Weber's notion of modern
bureaucracy. However, bureaucratic behaviors differ sharply across these
contexts. The fundamental difference between bureaucracies in the state
socialist and the capitalist polities is that the former is the "organizational
weapon" of the Communist party (Selznick, 1952) rather than a rational
administrative organizational form. In state socialist societies, bureaucracy
serves both as the administrative apparatus implementing state policies and
as political instruments in exerting state control over society. The nature of
the party state also leads to unique features of bureaucratic career patterns.
Below, I discuss two distinctive aspects of the Chinese bureaucracy: the
institutional constraints and the selection criteria.

INSTITUTIONAL CONSTRAINTS ON BUREAUCRACY

The structure of the personnel system in the Chinese bureaucracy reflects
the distribution of political power. The Chinese bureaucracy consists of
unique types of jobs that are not commonly observed in other non-Communist
contexts. These job types are structurally associated with differential political
power, career tracks, and hierarchical positions. Consider the following types
of jobs in Chinese bureaucracies.
Administrator (Xingzheng ganbu). This type of bureaucrat is closest to Weber’s notion of experts and specialists with the responsibility of managing administrative tasks. They include the manager of the firm, the director of the bureau, the president of the university, and so on.

Technocrat (Jishu ganbu). This group of bureaucrats consists of different kinds of professional experts, specializing in technical tasks. Their function is more or less equivalent to that of professional workers in other social contexts. Typically, technocrats do not have administrative responsibilities. They belong to the bureaucratic system mainly because professional workers in China are typically classified into the cadre system.¹

Politricrat (Zhenggong ganbu). This is a unique class of bureaucrats in the Communist political system. Politricrats are under the direct authority of the higher level party organization rather than the administrative office. Their main function in the organization is to ensure the implementation of the party-state policy, especially the political adherence to the party line. Belonging to this group are party secretaries in the workplace and other zhenggong ganbu such as cadres in charge of political education in universities, or party group leaders on the shop floor.

These types of bureaucratic jobs are hierarchically ordered based on their associated political power. In the Mao era, politricrats had a much higher authority and occupied a higher social status because of their affiliation with the Communist party, whereas technocrats are characteristically subordinate at the lowest level. For instance, in industrial enterprises, the party secretary had the ultimate authority over major decisions in resource allocation, production, and personnel management.

Clearly, this is a major departure from Weber’s concept of bureaucracy. Weber made no effort to differentiate types of bureaucratic jobs. To Weber, bureaucrats are experts based on formal professional training. What characterizes bureaucratic jobs is the requirement of technical competence. In the same vein, contemporary studies of bureaucracy in industrialized societies rarely make an effort to distinguish types of bureaucratic jobs other than by their hierarchical positions, formal training, or technical differences (Blau, 1957; Crozier, 1964; Hall, 1968).

The second major departure is the hierarchies across organizations constructed by the Communist state. It is a familiar theme in Weber’s writing that depicts a hierarchical structure within the bureaucracy, where authority and the span of control are used for coordination and task management. But Weber

¹ In the Chinese practice, if a professional worker is involved in administrative work, he or she will be classified as xingzheng ganbu instead. For instance, the university president may be a professional, but his or her job belongs to the xingzheng ganbu category.
speaks little about the relationships among different types of organizations except for a vague distinction between public and private bureaucracies. This is not an intellectual oversight. In Weber’s time, there was little bureaucratic linkage among organizations across different spheres of social life. Even in the contemporary organization literature, linkages among organizations are mainly seen through resource dependency, market exchange, or interlocking through the board of directors, rather than by any direct hierarchical structure (Scott, 1992).

In contrast, Walder (1992) argued that the centralization of the party state has established direct bureaucratic linkages among formal organizations across different spheres of social life. Different types of organizations, even in different social and economic sectors, are structurally ordered in terms of their property-rights relationships to the state, which entail different socio-economic status and privileges. For instance, those state-owned organizations (state firms, governmental agencies) are directly financed by the government and enjoy better welfare programs. Those working in state sectors have higher income compared with those in the collective sector (State Statistics Bureau, 1990, p. 34). Recent studies have shown the persistent effects of organizational hierarchies on income distribution and welfare in urban China (Lin & Bian, 1991; Peng, 1992).

Because the allocation of resources in China is mainly through organizations, the placement of bureaucrats in different types of organizations greatly affects their well-being. Given the severe constraints on interorganization mobility, entry into different types of organizations is directly linked to different career tracks and opportunity structures. For instance, it is well known that those working in governmental agencies have access to better housing, better hospitals, and other privileges. In short, the distribution of bureaucrats into different types of organizations is perhaps the most important factor affecting bureaucrats’ life chances. In this light, three types of organizations are commonly distinguished in the Chinese context: governmental agencies, public organizations, and industrial organizations.

Governmental agencies (Zhengfu jigu) include ministries, commissions, and bureaus and offices at various levels of the Communist party and state bureaucracies. The Communist party and the administrative apparatus are interwoven at each level, both belonging to this category. These governmental agencies are state agents participating in the processes of decision making and policy implementation.

In the Chinese terminology, “public organizations” (Shiye danwei) are those nonprofit organizations in the public domain. They include educational and research institutions and organizations in the medical, publishing, broadcasting, and entertainment sectors. Although they are not the administrative
organs of the state, their linkages with the state can be seen in two respects: First, these organizations are financed directly by the governmental budget (S. Chen, 1992); second, the personnel systems in these organizations are under the same administration of the government as those in governmental agencies (Xu, 1992). For instance, educational institutions are financed by the central or local government, and their personnel system is directly subject to governmental regulations.

The third type is industrial organizations (Qiye danwei). These consist of enterprises in both the public and the private sectors, including manufacturing, processing, and other production firms. Organizations in the service sector are also included in this category. Until quite recently, this type of organization was the least privileged and had low social status in China.

Although these three types of organizations exist in different spheres of social life, they are hierarchically ordered in terms of their property-rights relationship to the state. Governmental agencies are at the center of the redistribution system and have the authority to supervise public and industrial organization within their jurisdiction. Both public and industrial organizations are subordinate in this structure, but the former have higher socio-economic status because they belong to the state sector, thereby enjoying special privileges in terms of salary structure, welfare, and other compensation. Within each category, organizations are further hierarchically differentiated with respect to their relationships to the central, provincial, or local government.

RECRUITMENT AND PROMOTION: THE SELECTION CRITERIA

A further contrast between the Chinese bureaucracy and its Weberian counterpart is the selection criteria used in recruitment and promotion. To Weber, the criterion for personnel selection and promotion is an unambiguous one: Competence or qualification in a specific task should be the main consideration to ensure efficient administrative management. Among other things, “the possession of educational certificates are usually linked with qualification for office” (Weber, 1946, p. 200). To a lesser extent, Weber also noted the use of seniority in promotion.

For the Communist state, however, the ultimate functions of bureaucracy are to ensure the adherence to the political course set by the Communist party and to implement state policies (Hirszowicz, 1980). Accordingly, the selection criteria are based less on meritocracy than on political loyalty. Often the emphasis on a bureaucrat’s political background is made at the expense of his or her administrative competence and burocratic efficiency (Harding, 1981; Lee, 1991). It is well documented that in the earlier period, the Communist party emphasized candidates’ family background and their
“revolutionary experience” (Lee, 1991). The criteria for recruiting Communist party members adopted by the party organization conference in 1962 explicitly stated, “recruit those activists with good family background, strong ideological stand and qualified requirements” (Z. Chen, 1991, p. 864). During the Cultural Revolution, the emphasis adopted by the radical leaders was “to recruit those proletarian activists with high revolutionary rebellious spirit, and actively engaging in the class struggles” (Z. Chen, 1991, p. 926). In this respect, the Chinese deemphasis on competence (educational certificates) was striking. Unlike the Communist states in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, which made a special effort to recruit intellectuals into the bureaucratic system (Konrad & Szelenyi, 1979), intellectuals were treated with suspicion and hostility during the Mao era in China. Those with higher educational levels were often the direct target of political purges, as evidenced in the instances of the anti-rightist campaign (MacFarquhar, 1960) and the Cultural Revolution (Tsou, 1986). The promotion pattern parallels that of recruitment. Those who followed the political line of the Communist party were rewarded through promotion and special privileges (Lee, 1991; Shirk, 1982; Walder, 1986).

The market economy and the redistributive socialism lead to two distinctive patterns of bureaucracy. In industrialized societies, formal training and competition in the labor market are the main institutional mechanisms in the distribution of bureaucrats across organizations. In the Chinese bureaucratic system, however, the role of bureaucrats and their socioeconomic status depend heavily on both the policy orientation of the top leaders with respect to the selection criteria and the institutional constraints. Formal training and competence are often decoupled from the distribution of bureaucrats across types of organizations and jobs. It is commonplace, for instance, to find a bureaucrat with technical training holding a politicrat job in a governmental agency or a bureaucrat with no formal training serving as the head of a technical department. The Chinese expression Waihang lingdao neihang (the incompetent commands the competent) vividly captures this widespread phenomenon in the Mao era.

To sum up, institutional constraints and selection criteria are the two critical conditions shaping the characteristics of the Chinese bureaucracy. Together they generate a variety of bureaucratic career patterns. Historically, the selection criteria experienced frequent fluctuations because of the shifting orientations of state policies; in contrast, the institutional constraints had been stable in the Mao era. For our analytical purpose, we can perceive the effects of the selection criteria and the institutional constraints in a sequential order: The criteria of recruitment affect the probability of entry into different types of jobs and organizations, which in turn offers different opportunity structures.
to the bureaucrats, leading to differential patterns of promotion and compensation attached to these bureaucratic positions. The general pattern can be summarized in Figure 1.

**Figure 1: Bureaucratic Career Patterns**

**CHINESE BUREAUCRACY IN TRANSITION: ARGUMENTS AND HYPOTHESES**

The economic reform in post-Mao China has been the most dramatic experiment to shift away from the socialist redistributive economy. The process of reforming the Chinese bureaucracy started shortly after the initiation of the economic reform in 1978 (Document Office, 1986). Scholars of state socialism began to examine the processes and consequences of this transition. Nee’s (1989) market transition theory proposes two fundamental changes: First, the expansion of market alters the relative power structure between the producers and the redistributors; second, it provides different incentive structures and opportunities. Szelenyi (1988) studied the economic reform in Hungary that led to the enbourseoisation and the expansion of the private sector. These changes have substantially undermined the traditional state socialist polity. The issue related to this study is as follows: To what extent does this transition process affect the bureaucratic system in China?

There are two main sources of bureaucratic reform in China. The first one is the adoption of new cadre policies by the post-Mao leadership in an effort to overcome bureaucratic inertia and resistance to the economic reform policy. Under the new cadre policies, old bureaucrats are forced into retirement (Manion, 1992); educational qualification, competence, and their support for the cause of economic reform have been emphasized in recruitment and promotion (Lee, 1991). These efforts point to a process of transition from
the traditional Communist political instrument to an efficiency-driven rational administrative apparatus. The second and more profound process is the structural changes induced by the economic reform. The emergence of a market economy has altered the power and incentive structure of organizations and jobs in the bureaucratic system. The decentralization of resources has also weakened the redistributive power of the state apparatus; industrial enterprises gained more autonomy, and especially authority in resource and incentive allocation.

It should be emphasized, however, that the transition in China is characterized by a partial reform process in which planning and market, the party state, and an emerging civil society coexist and compete. To examine their impacts on bureaucratic patterns, one must bear in mind the unique features of the Chinese reform. Unlike those in the former Soviet Union and some Eastern European societies, the Chinese reform has been initiated and carried out by the party state and its bureaucratic organizations (Shirk, 1993). Until the prodemocracy movement in 1989, the legitimacy of the Communist party had not been seriously challenged (China Institute of Economic System Reform, 1988). In the same vein, the bureaucratic reform is a conscious effort by the reform leadership to overcome the resistance of the old generation of bureaucrats and to staff more competent bureaucrats for the purpose of implementing state policy. These policies are designated to reform and, at the same time, “to strengthen the party leadership.”

In this light, it is instructive to make a distinction between the process of reforming bureaucracy and that of reforming the state socialist economy. These two processes parallel each other but are underlined by different mechanisms. The former is by and large a political process controlled by the state, whereas the latter is more or less affected by market mechanisms. However, the economic reform inevitably affects the Chinese bureaucracy by altering the institutional conditions surrounding it, producing consequences unintended by the state.

SELECTION CRITERIA

Among the sets of institutional constraints on the Chinese bureaucracy, the one that is most susceptible to change is the shifts of selection criteria. The new cadre policies implemented during the post-Mao era signaled a significant change in emphasizing bureaucratic efficiency and rationalization. It was also one of the earliest items on the agenda of the post-Mao leadership. Starting in 1980, the new leaders adopted a series of policies and mobilized the bureaucratic apparatus to recruit and promote a large number
of bureaucrats along with the process of retiring the old generation (Xu, 1992, pp. 72-85).

At the same time, however, the Communist state is at the center of the reform and dominant in personnel management. As a result, the new selection criteria emphasize both competence and political loyalty. This is evident in the guideline issued in 1983 by the Organization Department of the Party Central Committee, which established four criteria regarding cadre recruitment and promotion: revolutionary stand, youth, education, and specialization (geminghua, nianqinghua, zhishihua, zhuanyehua). The central principle underlying the recently proposed civil service system is that “the party commands cadres” (Xu, 1992, p. 87). The major difference is that now the support for the new reform policy is seen as the criterion of political loyalty. If these new cadre policies were successfully carried out, the distribution of bureaucrats should reflect the mixed selection criteria, which emphasize both bureaucratic competence and political loyalty.

The test of the first part of this argument is straightforward. I use respondents’ education as the measure of qualification. Educational level can be seen as an indicator of competence for the bureaucratic job. With the emphasis on qualifications in the new cadre policy, we would expect to find the following:

Hypothesis 1. More highly educated bureaucrats are more likely to work in high-status organizations, have higher status jobs, and receive better compensation.

The fact that the party state is still in the dominant position and that it is in control of personnel management suggests that both governmental agency and politician jobs are still favored in the placement of bureaucrats among different types of organizations and jobs. In this light, Hypothesis 1 implies that bureaucrats with higher educational levels are more likely to be recruited into governmental agencies and politician jobs.

The second part of my argument is that political loyalty still plays a significant role in the selection criteria. I use the length of Communist party membership as an indicator of the political criterion. Party membership has been one of the most important political factors in social stratification in China. And the continuing dominance of the party state implies that party membership should still be the main political standard:

2. For instance, when the Party general secretary Hu Yaobang was purged in 1987, Deng Xiaoping put his protege Zhao Ziyang, then the premier, into the general secretary position, arguing that the party secretary position is more important than the administrative position as the premier.
Hypothesis 2. Senior party members are more likely to work in higher-status organizations, have higher-status positions, and receive better compensation.

In view of the political context in China, the above hypothesis should be qualified. In the 40-odd years of Communist rule, there has been frequent political turbulence marked by shifting standards in recruiting party members. As a result, the political value of party membership varies depending on the specific period in which a member was recruited. For instance, those recruited during the Cultural Revolution are now seen as politically unreliable for the reform policy, and there have been systematic efforts to discredit them in the post-Mao era (Z. Chen, 1991). Also, the older generation of the cadres has vested interests in the socialist redistributive system, which granted them the authority in resource allocation. An important part of the bureaucratic reform is to recruit individuals who are supportive of the reform policies into the party and to replace the older generation of bureaucrats in the leadership position (Manion, 1992). This consideration suggests a cohort effect:

Hypothesis 3. Compared with earlier cohorts of the party members, the cohort recruited in the post-Mao era is more likely to work in higher-status organizations, have higher-status positions, and receive better compensation.

It should be noted that using party membership to predict the distribution of bureaucrats in types of organizations and jobs introduces an empirical difficulty. It is possible that the bureaucrats were recruited into the Communist party after, rather than before, they were allocated into specific organizations and jobs. For instance, those allocated into governmental agencies and politicrat jobs may have a higher probability of being recruited into the Communist party than those in other organizations or jobs. Accordingly, some hypotheses above are expressed as a relationship of covariation rather than (necessarily) a causal relationship. Nonetheless, my substantive considerations in the preceding discussion remain the same after allowing for such possibilities.

STRUCTURAL CONSTRAINTS

In contrast to the shifting policy orientations, the structural constraints of bureaucratic organizations have been stable historically and slow to change even in the reform era. Partly, this is due to the belated timing of urban reform, which had not started until 1984. More important, these structural constraints
are the core of the state redistributive system and the power basis of the party state. Although the top leaders have adopted a series of policies to introduce market mechanisms, they strongly resisted attempts to alter the property rights of the state enterprises (Hua, Zhang, & Luo, 1988).

Recent studies suggest that the structural constraints discussed above persist even in the reform era. Analyzing 1985 survey data, Lin and Bian (1991) showed the central role of organizational hierarchies in socioeconomic status attainment in urban China. Walder (1990) demonstrated that workers in state enterprises still enjoyed higher incomes compared with those in nonstate enterprises in a 1986 survey. Peng (1992) also found continuing effects of state organizations on wage distributions in the urban sector. All of these findings suggest that we would expect to observe the continuing effects of structural constraints on bureaucratic placement and compensation. Hence, I propose:

**Hypothesis 4.** Compared with other types of organizations and jobs, bureaucrats in governmental agencies and holding politicrat jobs are more likely to be in higher positions and have higher compensation.

On the other hand, the 10-year economic reform has affected the bureaucratic system in some fundamental ways. The weakening of the redistributive state has eroded the power base of governmental agencies. Also, the new emphasis on economic performance has given rise to the importance of expertise in the decision-making process, leading to shifts in the hierarchical orders among bureaucratic jobs. Consider income and housing in bureaucratic compensation. There is ample evidence that the economic reform has a significant impact on income distribution. Those who rely on fixed income, especially those working in the government or nonprofit public organizations, have experienced a relative decline in earnings compared with those in the industrial and private sectors, where the limit on bonus distribution is no longer in place. Walder (1990, p. 152) found that industrial enterprises contribute significantly to bonus distribution. On the other hand, housing construction is part of the state investment structure, which has been tightly controlled by the central government and has experienced little change during this period. Therefore, I expect to find differentiating impacts of the hierarchical orders of organizations and jobs on income and housing in the recent economic reform:

**Hypothesis 5.** In terms of bureaucratic compensation, income is more susceptible to market reform than is housing allocation.
I want to add a cautionary note here. The preceding discussion is based on considerations of the impact of the recent reform on the Chinese bureaucracy. The ongoing reform process makes it extremely difficult to evaluate the extent to which the changes have occurred and their particular effects on the Chinese bureaucracy. Therefore, the hypotheses developed here should be seen as a preliminary attempt to establish some baseline to examine the impact of the economic reform on the Chinese bureaucracy. Moreover, because of the lack of systematic evidence on the Chinese bureaucracy in the Mao era, the extent to which the findings in this study reflect the effects of economic reform should be assessed carefully. I will return to this issue in the Discussion section.

RESEARCH DESIGN

DATA, VARIABLES, AND MEASURES

The data are based on a survey conducted jointly by the China Social Survey Institute and the China Institute of Economic System Reform in 1987. A sample of 988 bureaucrats was interviewed in eight large cities in China (Beijing, Tianjin, Shanghai, Guangzhou, Wuhan, Chongqing, Harbin, and Shenyang). The respondents were selected according to a stratified random sampling procedure that used a systematic sample technique to draw households from the residential blocks in the chosen cities. The original purpose of the survey was to gather information on cadres’ attitudes toward the blueprint of political reform proposed in the 13th Communist Party Congress in 1987. In addition to questions about the respondents’ political attitudes, the survey collected information on bureaucratic jobs and compensation of the respondents.3

The variables on types of organization and types of jobs are based on the questions that asked the respondent to identify which type of organization and job he or she worked in at the time of survey. The three types of organizations are governmental agencies, public organizations, and industrial organizations. The three types of jobs are administrators, politicians, and technocrats.

Information on bureaucratic rank is at two levels: (a) the chu level or above, and (b) the ke level or below. In the Chinese administrative system,

3. The research institutions that conducted the survey were disbanded after the 1989 student protests. The information on sampling and the purpose of this survey is based on an interview with a senior researcher who was in charge of the social survey.
Table 1
Frequency Distribution of Bureaucrats in the Sample

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type of organization</th>
<th>N</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Governmental agency</td>
<td>317</td>
<td>32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public organization</td>
<td>135</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Industrial organization</td>
<td>523</td>
<td>54</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type of job</th>
<th>N</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Politicrat</td>
<td>344</td>
<td>35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Administrator</td>
<td>545</td>
<td>56</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Technocrat</td>
<td>86</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Hierarchical positions</th>
<th>N</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ke level</td>
<td>650</td>
<td>67</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chu level</td>
<td>325</td>
<td>33</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| Total N               | 975 |

...the ke level and those below are seen as the lower level cadres, whereas the chu levels are seen as the middle level cadres. Beyond the chu level, there are ju and bu levels. However, the two levels included in this study, ke and chu, represent the majority of the cadres in the Chinese bureaucracy. The respondents in this sample belong to the low- and middle-level officials who are at the frontier of the policy implementation process and who are in direct contact with ordinary citizens. The distribution of bureaucrats in the different types of organizations, jobs, and ranks in the sample is described in Table 1.

The respondent is asked whether he or she is a Communist party member and if so, his or her “years of party membership.” To examine the differential cohort effects, I create a set of dummy variables indicating three cohorts of party membership:

1. Cohort 1: those recruited before the Cultural Revolution (before 1966). These party members were recruited according to the criteria that emphasized political loyalty and obedience to the cause of the Communist party.
2. Cohort 2: those recruited during the Cultural Revolution (1966 to 1976). This cohort was recruited during the period of political radicalism and was often associated with the ultraleftism in opposition to the current reform policy.
3. Cohort 3: those recruited after the Cultural Revolution and in the era of economic reform (1977 to 1987). This cohort was recruited using the new criteria, which emphasize education, competence, and support for economic reform.
Nonparty members—those who are not party members—are used as the reference category.

Both years of party membership and the dummy variables for the cohort effects are included in the regression models in the form of a spline function to examine their (possible) nonlinear relationship. The effect of party membership is the combination of the effect of membership tenure and that of the cohort to which the respondent belongs.

Respondents' education is based on their self-reported level of education in one of the five ordinal categories: illiterate, elementary school, junior high, high school, and college and above. Some of these categories coincide with types of jobs (for instance, most of the technocrats in our data had a college education). To avoid multicollinearity problems, I converted these ordinal categories into a continuous variable, years of schooling, in the following way: illiterate = 0; elementary school = 6; junior high = 9; high school = 12; college or above = 16. Because the Chinese educational system evolved considerably in the last 4 decades, the variable for years of schooling used here is an approximate measure of the years needed to receive the corresponding diploma.

I use two variables to measure bureaucratic compensation: income and housing space. In the original questionnaire, the income variable is the per capita family income (total income divided by family size). For my research purpose, it would be ideal to examine the respondent's personal income. Because of the lack of such information, I use the per capita family income as a proxy for the respondent's personal income, assuming that the two are consistent. The second variable measures the per capita family housing space (in square meters). Housing space is the most scarce resource and certainly one of the most important indicators of the standard of living in urban China.

In addition, I include age and gender in the model estimation. Respondent's age is used as a measure of his or her work experience. Table 2 provides the descriptive statistics for the variables included in the statistical analysis.

MODELS AND METHODS

In this study, I examine four aspects of the bureaucratic structure in sequence: (a) the distribution of bureaucrats in different types of organizations, (b) the distribution in different types of jobs, (c) the placement of bureaucrats in hierarchical positions, and (d) the determinants of bureaucratic compensation. The dependent variables in the first three sets of analyses are categorical in nature, whereas those in the last analysis (income and housing
Table 2

Descriptive Statistics of the Variables

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variables</th>
<th>Definition</th>
<th>N</th>
<th>Mean</th>
<th>SD</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td>Year of schooling</td>
<td>985</td>
<td>13.26</td>
<td>2.93</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age</td>
<td></td>
<td>985</td>
<td>40.13</td>
<td>9.66</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yrparty</td>
<td>Years of party membership</td>
<td>988</td>
<td>10.50</td>
<td>10.78</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Log(income)</td>
<td>Annual per capita family income</td>
<td>976</td>
<td>6.62</td>
<td>.41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Log(housing)</td>
<td>Per capita family living space</td>
<td>988</td>
<td>1.83</td>
<td>.98</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cohort 1</td>
<td>1 = Joined party before 1966</td>
<td>178</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cohort 2</td>
<td>1 = Joined party in 1967-1976</td>
<td>249</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cohort 3</td>
<td>1 = Joined party after 1976</td>
<td>297</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nonparty member</td>
<td></td>
<td>264</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

space) can be treated as interval variables. Accordingly, I employ two types of models in the statistical analysis.

For the categorical variables in the first three sets of analyses, I use a logistic linear regression model, which estimates the effects of the covariates on the probability of the respondent’s being in a specific category as compared with the reference category. The types of organizations and of jobs consist of three categories. Although one can analyze each pair of the categories separately, I adopt a multinomial logistic model, which estimates the multiple outcomes simultaneously.

For the analysis of bureaucratic compensation, I adopt the conventional multivariate linear regression model. I use the logarithms of income and housing space as the dependent variables. My preliminary analysis found evidence of heteroscedasticity in the data. As a result, I adopt the White estimator, which corrects for the standard errors based on the adjusted covariance matrix (Greene, 1993, p. 391).

RESULTS

My presentation of the results is structured as follows. I proceed in sequence to examine patterns of distribution of bureaucrats in types of organizations and jobs. Then I analyze the placement of bureaucrats in hierarchical positions and subsequent bureaucratic compensation, taking into consideration the institutional constraints of organization and job characteristics.
Table 3

Multinomial Logistic Regression of Distribution of Bureaucrats Across Organizations and Jobs

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Covariates</th>
<th>Type of Organization</th>
<th>Type of Job</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Government</td>
<td>Public</td>
<td>Politicrat</td>
<td>Technocrat</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intercept</td>
<td>-1.903***</td>
<td>-1.325*</td>
<td>-2.879***</td>
<td>-3.289***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gender (1 = male)</td>
<td>.419**</td>
<td>.270</td>
<td>-.055</td>
<td>-.087</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age</td>
<td>-.040***</td>
<td>-.021*</td>
<td>-.028***</td>
<td>.011</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td>.117***</td>
<td>.085**</td>
<td>.144***</td>
<td>.118**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yrparty</td>
<td>.061***</td>
<td>.025</td>
<td>.059**</td>
<td>-.029</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cohort 1</td>
<td>.056</td>
<td>-1.706</td>
<td>.975</td>
<td>-.926</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cohort 2</td>
<td>.520</td>
<td>-1.140*</td>
<td>1.287***</td>
<td>-.769</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cohort 3</td>
<td>.824***</td>
<td>-.977***</td>
<td>1.214***</td>
<td>-.713*</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note. "Industrial organization" and "administrator" are the reference categories for types of organizations and jobs; "nonparty member" is the reference category for cohorts.

*p < .10; **p < .05; ***p < .01.

DISTRIBUTION IN TYPES OF ORGANIZATIONS AND JOBS

The Distribution in Types of Organizations

The first two columns of Table 3 report the statistical results for types of organizations. Here, I use "industrial" organizations as the reference category. The reported coefficients are the effects of the corresponding covariates on the log-odds that a bureaucrat will be in that specific type of organization as compared with being in industrial organizations. To interpret the findings, I will transform the coefficients into the corresponding effects on the probability of being in a particular category, as compared with the reference category. As for the control variables, the probability of a male working in governmental agencies is .11 higher than for a female ($b_{gender} \cdot p (1 - p) = .419 \cdot .5 (1 - .5) = .11$). The negative effects of age suggest that those working

4. It appears that age, education, and yrpary are correlated and may cause multicollinearity problems. To explore such a possibility, I conducted a multicollinearity test based on the conditional number. The conditional number among the three variables is 7.59—well below the conventional threshold (20) that indicates potential multicollinearity problems (Greene, 1993, p. 269).

5. Because of the nonlinear nature of the logistic model, one needs to evaluate the effect of the covariates at a fixed point. Let P represent the probability of being in a particular category. We note that $(d P)/(d x_i) = b_i \cdot P(1 - P)$ (Hanushek & Jackson, 1977, p. 189). We can select a certain probability level and evaluate the effect of $x_i$ on $P$ at that point. An often-used probability level is $P = .5$, at which point the logistic function is steepest and the effect of $x_i$ is the largest. The effects on the probability discussed in the text are all evaluated at the .5 probability level.
in governmental and public organizations tend to be younger than those in industrial organizations.

I use education and party membership to indicate two different selection criteria. With respect to education, as I hypothesized, bureaucrats with higher educational levels are more likely to work in governmental agencies and public organizations, compared with those in industrial organizations. One additional year of education increases the probability by .03 and .02, respectively, of being in governmental agencies and public organizations as compared with industrial organizations. To interpret these results another way, bureaucrats in governmental agencies and public organizations have higher educational qualifications as compared with those in the enterprises. This pattern seems quite consistent with our observation of the institutional practice in China. Until quite recently, college graduates have been mainly assigned to jobs in governmental and public sectors rather than in industrial organizations.

The next set of covariates introduces the effect of political background on the distribution of bureaucrats in different types of organizations. The length of party membership significantly increases the probability of being in governmental agencies, whereas there is no significant difference between public and industrial organizations. One additional year of party membership increases the probability by .02 of being in the governmental agencies as compared with industrial organizations. If we take a closer look at the cohort effects, the results show that only those who joined the Communist party in the post-Mao era have a significantly higher probability (.21) of working in governmental organizations; those who joined the party in the Mao era (cohorts 1 and 2) have no significant difference as compared with the cadres without party membership. As for public organizations, in contrast, the second and the third cohorts (1966 to 1976, 1977 to 1987) have a significantly lower probability (.29 and .24, respectively) of working in public organizations compared with the nonparty members. This pattern seems to indicate that the recruitment of bureaucrats into the party in the reform era occurred mainly in the governmental and industrial sectors.

The distribution of bureaucrats in these three types of organizations is marked by the characteristic of a partial reform: Both competence and political standard are highly significant selection criteria. In this regard, the hierarchical structure among organizations does not have substantial changes: Governmental agencies tend to acquire bureaucrats who are more competent in terms of educational qualification and more reliable in terms of their affiliation with the Communist party, whereas the difference between public and industrial organizations is much less substantial. The cohort effects tell a more interesting story. The significant effect of the third cohort is quite
consistent with the new cadre policy adopted during the economic reform. It shows the successful effort of the leadership to recruit these reform-oriented bureaucrats into the party and to place them in the powerful governmental agencies.

The Distribution in Types of Jobs

The third and fourth columns of Table 3 report the logistic estimates of the probability of the bureaucrat's taking a specific type of job, compared with the "administrator" job as the reference category. The patterns of the effects are very similar to those in the distribution of bureaucrats across organizations.

Education increases the probability of being a politician and technocrat, as compared with being an administrator. One additional year of education increases the probability of being a politician by .04 and of being a technocrat by .03. That is, these two types of bureaucrats have higher qualification, measured by educational level, as compared with the reference category of the administrator. The positive effect of education on being a technocrat is intuitive, as formal training is often the prerequisite for holding a technical job. It is puzzling, however, that politicians also have higher educational levels compared with the administrators. This finding seems to imply that the reform leaders have made an effort to replace the older generation of party bureaucrats with the more educated generation. Those now working in politician positions are more educated and competent. This pattern is quite different from the Mao era, when politicians characteristically were of low competence and high political loyalty (Harding, 1981).

As I expected, political background, in terms of the tenure of party membership, increases the probability of being a politician but has no significant effect on the probability of being a technocrat. This pattern suggests, understandably, that politicians have the strongest association with the Communist party. Also notice that both the second and the third cohorts have a significantly higher probability of working as politicians (.32 and .30 higher in probability compared with nonparty members) than as administrators. The significant effect of the second cohort indicates that a large proportion of politicians comprises those who joined the party during the Cultural Revolution. This may indicate a source of bureaucratic resistance to reform and a potential danger of returning to the political radicalism of the 1960s.

Again, the distribution of bureaucrats in types of jobs shows the dominant role of the party state in the placement of bureaucrats. The politician job is clearly at the highest position according to the new selection criteria: The
more competent and more politically reliable bureaucrats are more likely to be in this type of job, whereas there is no significant difference, except for education, between the administrative and the technocrat jobs. This finding raises questions about the role of politicrats in the post-Mao era. Does the existence of more educated politicrats suggest an evolving nature of the Communist party? Or does it suggest the emergence of a new and more competent bureaucratic class identified with the interests of the Communist party?

**DISTRIBUTION OF HIERARCHICAL POSITIONS AND BENEFITS**

In Weber’s (1946) view, the pursuit of officialdom is motivated by the tenure in office and socioeconomic status. In the socialist redistributive system, bureaucratic positions are associated with benefits, prestige, and privileges (Szelenyi, 1978). In the next set of analyses, I examine the determinants of bureaucratic promotion and benefits.

**Bureaucratic Rank**

I first estimated a logistic regression model of the distribution of bureaucrats in hierarchical positions. The dependent variable is the probability of being at the chu or higher level as compared with the lower rank of ke level. The results are reported in column 1 of Table 4.6

The two basic factors, qualification and seniority, are both highly significant in bureaucratic promotion. Seniority, as measured in age, significantly increases the probability of being in the higher rank. One additional year of seniority increases the probability of being in the higher position by .01. Education is also highly significant: An additional year of education increases the probability by .05 of being in the higher rank. This pattern suggests some similarities to Weber’s (1946) original observation on the determinants of bureaucratic promotion.

Political standard shows some interesting patterns. In general, seniority in party membership contributes significantly to the probability of promotion.

6. There are some ambiguities in the data for conducting this set of analyses. First, technocrats are not ranked in the data set; second, the questionnaire groups party secretaries and politicrats in industrial organizations together. Based on my observation of the bureaucratic practice in China, I classified technocrats into the ke level and those party secretaries in industrial organizations in the chu rank in the statistical analysis. To examine the consequences of possible misclassification, I estimated separate models without these questionable cases in my exploratory analysis. The results in these analyses are very similar to those reported in column 1 of Table 4.
Table 4
Distribution of Bureaucratic Ranks and Economic Benefits

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Covariates</th>
<th>Rank</th>
<th>Log(Income)</th>
<th>Log(Housing)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Intercept</td>
<td>-6.829**</td>
<td>6.112***</td>
<td>1.390***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gender (1 = male)</td>
<td>-.137</td>
<td>.063</td>
<td>-.043</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age</td>
<td>.050**</td>
<td>-.003</td>
<td>.012***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td>.187***</td>
<td>.019**</td>
<td>-.010</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yrparty</td>
<td>.068**</td>
<td>.014*</td>
<td>-.006</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cohort 1</td>
<td>.353</td>
<td>-.044</td>
<td>.232</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cohort 2</td>
<td>.330</td>
<td>-.301**</td>
<td>.025</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cohort 3</td>
<td>.979***</td>
<td>-.112</td>
<td>-.013</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Government</td>
<td>-1.280***</td>
<td>.043</td>
<td>.338***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public organization</td>
<td>-1.419***</td>
<td>-.067</td>
<td>.270*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Politicrat</td>
<td>2.303***</td>
<td>-.049</td>
<td>-.031</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Technocrat</td>
<td>-12.442</td>
<td>.259</td>
<td>-.038</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rank</td>
<td>.124**</td>
<td>.667</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

N = 969          | 969      | 969

Note. The analysis of rank is based on a logistic regression model; the analysis of income and housing is based on linear regression models. Ke is the reference category for rank; "nonparty member" is the reference category for cohorts; "industrial organization" and "administrator" are the reference categories for types of organizations and jobs.

*p < .10; **p < .05; ***p < .01.

However, only those recruited into the party in the reform era (the third cohort) have a significantly higher probability of being in higher positions. The probability for the third cohort to be in the chu level is .24 higher than for the cadres without party membership, whereas there is no significant difference between those who joined the party in the Mao era and the nonparty members. That is, those reform-oriented cadres recruited in the post-Mao era tend to be promoted into higher positions in the current bureaucratic apparatus. This pattern shows the success of the reform leadership in replacing the older generation of bureaucrats with those in support of the current reform policy.

The next set of the covariates introduces the institutional conditions. The results show some mixed results. Cadres in governmental agencies and public organizations have a lower probability of being in the higher position than those working in industrial organizations. This may result from the rapid expansion of cadres in governmental and public sectors over the years (Xu, 1992). On the other hand, as I expected, politicrats have a significantly higher probability (.58) of being in the higher rank than those in administrative jobs, suggesting the continuing dominance of the party state.
Economic Benefits

I now turn to examine the determinants of two aspects of bureaucratic compensation: income and housing space. I estimated separate models for these two dependent variables using multivariate regression analysis. Columns 2 and 3 of Table 4 report the estimated coefficients of the covariates. The standard errors are adjusted for heteroscedasticity according to the corrected covariance matrix.

For the set of control variables, gender again plays no significant role. Seniority has no significant effect on income but significantly increases housing space.

The effects of the covariates on income and housing show two distinctive patterns. As for the selection criteria, education contributes significantly to income but has no significant effect on housing space. Income increases with years of party membership, indicating the privileges attached to political background. It is interesting that the second cohort has a negative effect on income. The net effect of political affiliation is the combination of the effects of both years of party membership and the cohort to which one belongs. Those who joined the party during the Cultural Revolution (the second cohort) in fact have lower income compared with the nonparty members, other things being equal. For instance, a cadre who joined the party in 1970 would benefit from his party membership by .238 (17 years of membership • .014 of the yparty coefficient). However, this magnitude is not large enough to offset the negative cohort effect (−.301) for him. There is no significant cohort effect for those in the first and the third cohorts. Political background, on the other hand, has no significant effect on housing allocation.

The most interesting determinants of bureaucratic compensation are related to the structural conditions. With respect to income, types of organizations have no significant effects. Nor do types of bureaucratic jobs. This pattern is consistent with our observation on the urban reform in China. The cadres who rely on fixed income, especially bureaucrats in the governmental agencies and public organizations, experience a relative deterioration in the standard of living as compared with those in the industrial sector, who are granted the authority in resource allocation and bonus distribution. These results suggest that in terms of income distribution, those higher status organizations and jobs do not enjoy better compensation.

The pattern for the distribution of housing space is markedly different. Being in governmental agencies and public organizations significantly increases one's housing space, compared with those in industrial organizations. But there is no difference among different types of bureaucrats. These findings seem consistent with Walder's observation that the flow of resources
(such as housing construction) is largely through formal organizations and that governmental agencies and public organizations enjoy better welfare programs than those in other types of organizations. Clearly, the redistributive system still plays a critical role in the distribution of the most scarce resource in urban China, a privilege not substantially altered by the current economic reform. The distinctive patterns of income and housing distribution clearly reflect uneven paces of institutional changes in the transition process.

**DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION**

As Mao Zedong and his successors knew too well, Chinese bureaucrats play a decisive role in making and implementing state policies. Historically, various attempts were made to reform the Chinese bureaucracy in line with the party’s political course (Harding, 1981; Whyte, 1980). In the post-Mao era, the economic reform has been accompanied by the top leaders’ efforts to transform the cadre system. Viewed in the context of transition from state socialism, these reform measures can be seen as a process of transforming the Chinese bureaucracy from being a political instrument to a rational administrative apparatus.

To what extent do the patterns found in the above analyses reflect changes in the economic reform? The lack of systematic data on the distribution of bureaucrats in the Mao era makes it difficult to provide an adequate assessment. However, some recent and scattered evidence sheds light on this issue. If one examines the data on the recruitment of Communist party membership (which is more available and closely related to the selection and promotion of bureaucrats), one finds strong evidence that political criteria played a significant role in the Mao era. By the end of 1964, the party members represented 15.3% of the employees in the industrial and transportation sectors and 15% in the public and educational sectors, and only 2.2% among college students (Zhao, 1987, p. 360). The emphasis on political criteria was exacerbated during the Cultural Revolution. In a model factory set up by the Maoist leaders in 1970, 69% of those in charge of the party branches were replaced by “the activists who firmly stand on the side of the Mao’s revolutionary line” (Z. Chen, 1991, pp. 934-935). The distribution of party members by the end of the Cultural Revolution clearly reflected the impact of these selection criteria. According to Lee (1991, pp. 256-292), before the 1982 to 1984 reform period, only 13% of the technocrats were party members and only 14% had received a college education among the bureaucrats at several important levels of the governmental agencies (directors and deputy directors of provincial bureaus, municipal and county leaders). In 1979, even in the
municipal government of Shanghai where the labor force was the most educated, the proportions who had a college education were only 8.2% of the cadres in personnel offices, 7.7% in the legal offices, and 6.4% in the taxation and business administration offices (Xu, 1992, p. 220).

According to the official statistics published in recent years, considerable changes have occurred during the recent bureaucratic reform. At the end of 1983, the personnel system of governmental agencies at the provincial and prefecture levels was restructured in line with the new cadre policies. The average age of provincial leaders was reduced from 62 to 55, and the proportion of leaders with a college education increased from 20% to 43%. At the prefecture level, the average age was reduced from 58 to 50, and the proportion having a college education increased from 14% to 44%. By September 1984, a further nationwide restructuring of the county (chu)-level leadership was completed. The proportion of county-level cadres holding a college education increased from 10.8% to 45% (Research Group of Party History, 1991, pp. 373-374, 379). According to a recent report, during the 1983 to 1992 period, more than six million of the veteran cadres were retired. During the same period, more than 260,000 young cadres were promoted to the county level of the hierarchical positions. Among these, 64.3% have a college education and 52.3% are less than 45 years old (Renmin ribao, Oct. 16, 1992). The patterns of the distribution of bureaucrats found in this study seem quite consistent with the reported official statistics.

The most salient feature of the Chinese bureaucracy is the mixed effects of both the old institutional structure and the new mechanisms introduced in the economic reform. This is especially evident in that both education and party membership contribute significantly in the placement of bureaucrats into different types of organizations and jobs. The basic hierarchical structure among bureaucratic organizations and jobs persists in the reform era. Bureaucrats in governmental agencies tend to be more competent and more politically reliable. Politicrat jobs are also staffed with better educated and politically loyal bureaucrats, as compared with those in industrial organizations. These results indicate that governmental agencies and politicrat jobs still enjoy higher political status in the state’s placement of bureaucrats.

These findings also shed light on the extent and the limitations of the impact of the economic reform on the Chinese bureaucracy. Changes in policy orientation are more rapid than those in the institutional structure. For instance, the new cadre policy was adopted soon after the economic reform in 1978, but the institutional change in the urban sector did not occur until 1984. These varying paces of change and the characteristics of partial reform are reflected in their effects on the bureaucratic system. The distribution of bureaucratic compensation is an illuminating example. There is no significant
variation in income among bureaucrats across different types of organizations and jobs. In contrast, governmental agencies and public organizations still enjoy privileges in housing allocation. This pattern seems consistent with our knowledge of the processes of economic reform in China. Income distribution has been most sensitive to the economic reform during this period. However, the basic structure of administrative allocation of housing has been by and large intact.

What do these findings tell us of the current state of the Chinese bureaucracy and the potential direction of change in China’s future? A general observation can be made that the party state still exerts a strong control on bureaucratic personnel management. The distribution of bureaucrats and their promotions reflect the existing redistributive institutional structure. Compared with the ideal bureaucracy that Weber (1946) had in mind, the Chinese counterpart is still dominated by the party state and is far from the efficiency-driven organizational form based on a rational legal system.

Viewed against the background of traditional Communist practice, however, the changes that the Chinese bureaucracy has undergone are impressive and substantive. For instance, although political affiliation is still crucial in bureaucratic placement, the post-Mao leadership has successfully established its bureaucratic base by replacing the older generation of bureaucrats with those bureaucrats recruited into the party in the reform era, who presumably tend to identify themselves with the cause of the current reform. The new cohort also tends to be promoted into higher positions. An implication of these statistics is that there is an increasing proportion of bureaucrats in power who are the beneficiaries of the current reform and who become the power basis for the continuation of reform.

The emphasis on educational qualification in the new cadre policy is an important step toward the rationalization of bureaucracy. Educational qualification emerges as a highly significant factor in bureaucratic placement and is closely connected with bureaucratic promotion and compensation (income). These findings may seem conventional in another context. However, the recruitment and promotion of bureaucrats in China had long been dominated by criteria that emphasize political loyalty at the expense of administrative competence. The sustained recruitment and promotion of bureaucrats with high educational levels may lead to fundamental changes in the composition of the Chinese bureaucracy and its future course of evolution.

More important, the role of bureaucrats has substantially increased in the reform era. There are several factors that contributed to this trend. First, as contributors to the book edited by Lieberthal and Lampton (1992) have shown, during the reform process substantive power in resource allocation
has been transferred from the central government to local governments and the work units. In particular, the heads of the work units have been granted the authority in allocating a large proportion of the retained profits. Second, the erosion of the central authority has greatly reduced the institutional constraints on local bureaucrats. In 1984, the Central Committee of the Communist party reduced the scope of its personnel offices. As a result, two third of the cadres previously under the direct control of the central government are now governed by the local governments. Third, the authority structure within the work units has also undergone substantial changes. For instance, under the new “managerial responsibility system,” the managers (administrators), instead of the party secretaries, are now given higher authority in decision making in industrial organizations, and the role of politicos has declined.

These new features of the Chinese bureaucracy raise an important issue: Will these bureaucrats, more competent and vital, become the vested interests of the ruling Communist party? Or can they eventually become the forces that will lead to the transition of the party state to a democratic polity, as some recent transformations of Asian authoritarian regimes have shown? There is no adequate information to assess these possibilities. However, if the recent political events are any indication, they suggest that the bureaucratic organizations are indeed taking the second road: Large numbers of bureaucrats and party members participated in the 1989 social protests. The paralysis of the bureaucratic apparatus forced the Communist leaders to resort to the military. The subsequent efforts by the conservative leaders to roll back economic reform were fiercely resisted by bureaucrats at various levels. The sample in this study is drawn from eight large cities in China, where bureaucrats tend to be more educated, better trained, and more susceptible to the reform policies. Therefore, this analysis can be seen as a first approximation of the future trend of the national bureaucratic system.

Weber (1946) saw modern bureaucracy as the cornerstone of a market economy and argued that “only bureaucracy has established the foundation for the administration of a rational law” (p. 216). Although the Chinese bureaucracy is far from the rational-legal model envisioned by Weber, it is surely moving away from being the “organizational weapon” at the disposal of the Leninist party state. The success of the transition from state socialism to a market economy depends to a great extent on the evolution of the existing bureaucratic organizations. The zigzags of the Chinese reform experience make one especially cautious about predicting the long-term impact of the changes we found in this study. The extent to which the Chinese bureaucracy can change within the structure of the party state is also unclear. Nonetheless,
these findings cast doubt on the traditional models of Communist bureau-
cracy and suggest that we need to reevaluate the evolution of the party state
and its organizational basis in the current reform process.

REFERENCES


Xueguang Zhou is an assistant professor of Sociology at Duke University. His research interests include the state-society relationship and the dynamics of social stratification in contemporary China. In addition, he conducts research on the role of the state in occupational structure and practice in the United States. His recent publications appeared in American Sociological Review and American Journal of Sociology.