Jared Moore and David Gottlieb
I perceive, and I find myself with a powerful impulse to believe. But I back up and bring that impulse into view and then I have a certain distance. Now the impulse doesn’t dominate me and now I have a problem. Shall I believe? Is this perception really a reason to believe? I desire and I find myself with a powerful impulse to act. But I back up and bring that impulse into view and then I have a certain distance. Now the impulse doesn’t dominate me and now I have a problem. Shall I act? Is this desire really a reason to act? The reflective mind cannot settle for perception and desire, not just as such. It needs a reason. (Korsgaard 1996, 93)
Discussion question: in your own life, have you had a desire or perception and then reflected on whether it was “really a reason”? What was that like? Have you had a desire or perception and immediately acted on it without ever reflecting on whether it was really a reason?
The remaining problem: why does our rational self-reflection lead us to morality?
“The reflective structure of the mind is a source of ‘self-consciousness’ because it forces us to have a conception of ourselves” (Korsgaard 1996, 100).
When you deliberate, it is as if there were something over and above all of your desires, something which is you, and which chooses which desire to act on.
This self-conception has normative content.
If I never show up for my lectures, I can’t think of myself as a teacher. But what if I miss just one?
You can stop being yourself for a bit and still get back home, and in cases where a small violation combines with a large temptation, this has a destabilizing effect on the obligation. You may know that if you always did this sort of thing your identity would disintegrate, like that of Plato’s tyrant in Republic ix, but you also know that you can do it just this once without any such result. (Korsgaard 1996, 102)
Discussion question: have you ever faced this kind of temptation with regard to any of your practical identities? Example (Jared): how many times can you insult a friend until you are a bully and not a friend?
What is not contingent is that you must be governed by some conception of your practical identity. For unless you are committed to some conception of your practical identity, you will lose your grip on yourself as having any reason to do one thing rather than another - and with it, your grip on yourself as having any reason to live and act at all. But this reason for conforming to your particular practical identities is not a reason that springs from one of those particular practical identities. It is a reason that springs from your humanity itself, from your identity simply as a human being, a reflective animal who needs reasons to act and to live. (Korsgaard 1996, 120–21)
Discussion question: can you give this up?
Discussion question: Does valuing my humanity rationally require me to value humanity in general?
Rationalists think there is something a rational agent cannot lack that makes it a moral agent. I.e.:
The research program this suggests for AI moral reasoning might include:
Small group discussion: do you think LLM chatbots have the kinds of abilities Kant and / or Korsgaard regard as the basis of moral reasoning? Are there any tests you could give a chatbot to explore this question? How else might you investigate it? If LLM chatbots don’t have the abilities that underlie moral thinking, can we think of AI systems that might?

If rationalism is true and:
If moral reasoning might emerge from more general reasoning abilities, maybe we could be pleasantly surprised by the moral commitments of intelligent aliens – or of our own super-intelligent AI.
Intelligence and final goals [i.e., ends] are orthogonal axes along which possible agents can freely vary. In other words, more or less any level of intelligence could in principle be combined with more or less any final goal. (bostrom-2012-the-superintelligent-will?)
An agent that is very intelligent but doesn’t share our ends could be dangerous to us. (Consider the paper clip maximizer.) Accordingly, Bostrom and others have thought it is important for us to think about whether it is likely that other intelligences will share any ends with us. Other moral reasoners might be more likely to share ends with us. (E.g., if Kant is right that the moral law requires treating all rational beings as ends in themselves.)
So it is very relevant to ask whether there are (1) general capacities that (2) intelligent agents are likely to have which (3) could emergently produce moral reasoning. Sentimentalism and rationalism give different kinds of answers about what we should expect those capacities to be.