Jared Moore and David Gottlieb
We previously framed sentimentalism …
We can operationalize both sentimentalism and rationalism more precisely in terms of arguments.
If rationalism is true and:
Intelligence and final goals are orthogonal axes along which possible agents can freely vary. In other words, more or less any level of intelligence could in principle be combined with more or less any final goal. (bostrom-2012-the-superintelligent-will?)
Williams defends a version of Hume’s position that reason is the slave of the passions. His “internal reasons theory” position is similar to how we have characterized sentimentalism in terms of arguments. His “external reasons theory” is similar to that characterization of rationalism. But they might not overlap perfectly.
Williams helps capture the Humean idea that, for someone to be motivated by an argument, the argument must appeal to a motivation (a passion) they already have.
A statement with a content like, “A has a reason to ϕ,” where A is an agent and ϕ is an action. The connection between rationality and reason statements might be, “A rational agent does what they have most reason to do.”
On the internal reason interpretation, a reason statement can only be true of A if A has some motive which counts in favor of ϕ-ing. We’ll call the collection of an agent’s motives their “subjective motivational set,” S.
On the external reason interpretation, a reason statement can be true even if A has no motives in S that count in favor of ϕ-ing. It would then follow that
Reason statements are only ever true if interpreted internalistically. All external reason statements are either false or meaningless. It would then follow that, for all A, ϕ, A is never rationally required to ϕ unless there is something in their S that counts in favor of ϕ-ing.
Williams explicitly takes aim at rationalism in his critique of external reason statements.
[T]he external reasons statement itself will have to be taken as roughly equivalent to, or at least as entailing, the claim that if the agent rationally deliberated, then, whatever motivations he originally had, he would come to be motivated to ϕ. (109)
Compare what we said above:
If rationalism is true, then there is a moral argument that every rational being must accept (i.e., that it would be irrational not to accept).
Moral approval is an “agreeable” feeling. Moral disapproval is an “uneasy” feeling.
An action, or sentiment, or character is virtuous or vicious; why? because its view causes a pleasure or uneasiness of a particular kind. … We do not infer a character to be virtuous, because it pleases: But in feeling that it pleases after such a particular manner, we in effect feel that it is virtuous.
What’s the difference Hume is getting at?
We make moral judgments when we like or dislike someone’s actions or character without thinking about whether it’s good or bad for us in particular.
Nor is every sentiment of pleasure or pain, which arises from characters and actions, of that peculiar kind, which makes us praise or condemn. The good qualities of an enemy are hurtful to us; but may still command our esteem and respect. ’Tis only when a character is consider’d in general, without reference to our particular interest, that it causes such a feeling or sentiment, as denominates it morally good or evil.
For as the number of our duties is, in a manner, infi- nite, ’tis impossible that our original instincts shou’d extend to each of them, and from our very first infancy impress on the human mind all that multitude of pre- cepts, which are contain’d in the compleatest system of ethics. Such a method of proceeding is not conformable to the usual maxims, by which nature is con- ducted, where a few principles produce all that variety we observe in the uni- verse, and every thing is carry’d on in the easiest and most simple manner.
Think of Smith as starting from where we leave off with Hume. Hume says: moral approval and disapproval are certain pleasures and pains. Smith will tell us more about which pleasures and pains, how they are inculcated in us, and how they produce familiar moral judgments.
In a nutshell: moral judgments are feelings of sympathetic agreement – feeling the same way others do. We develop our moral sense because of the pleasure we find in sympathizing with each other, and of sympathizing in turn with that pleasure, and so on.
“Perfect concord” between a person’s emotions and a spectator’s sympathy is apprehended as (morally) appropriate:
When the original passions of the person principally concerned are in perfect concord with the sympathetic emotions of the spectator, they necessarily appear to this last just and proper, and suitable to their objects. …
To approve of the passions of another, therefore, as suitable to their objects, is the same thing as to observe that we entirely sympathize with them; and not to approve of them as such,is the same thing as to observe that we do not entirely sympathize with them. The man who resents the injuries that have been done to me, and observes that I resent them precisely as he does, necessarily approves of my resentment. The man whose sympathy keeps time to my grief, cannot but admit the reasonableness of my sorrow. (20)
Can you think of counterexamples to this?
What does it feel like when someone seems to have a very different feeling about something than you would or do?
Do you have sensations in your body? Pleasant, unpleasant? What are they like?
What do you think about the person in question?
To account for the sympathy we feel for the moral suf- fering that is common to all members of our species, we need to go back to the cause of our private sympathies [ … ] Each person finds herself, for all necessities— her well- being and life’s comforts— in a particular dependence on many others [ … ] This particular dependence on a few individuals begins in the crib; it is the first tie binding us to our fellow creatures. (de Grouchy, letters, quoted in (buckner-2023-rational-machines?), 305)
Because of our early experience of dependency, our early experience of action is mediated through our caregivers. The baby doesn’t feed itself but rather modulates its relationship with its caregiver to get fed.
The predicament of dependency also makes the infant finely attuned to the emotional states of its caregivers. Importantly, this attunement is present before the infant develops a concept of itself and others as separate beings.
Infants start out coupled in de- pendency with their caregivers; as developmental psychologists have observed, it is only later— via an important cognitive milestone— that they manage to think of themselves as separate beings. Newborns do not even have a developed body schema that would allow them to de- termine where their body ends and the caregiver’s begins …. Infants thus noninferentially share the joys and sorrows of their caregivers, because they are not yet capable of drawing a distinction between their own body and the body of their caregiver in the first place. (buckner-2023-rational-machines?)
Smith argues that we use sympathy because we cannot literally feel the pains and pleasures of others. De Grouchy suggests that we can literally feel the pains and pleasures of others.
Can AI systems figure out other people’s beliefs and desires?
Can AI systems be said to have motivations?
Yes, largely under the heading of “theory of mind”
There’s some quibbiling about the kind of architecture needed: whether a system has to be “born with it” (a symbolic architecture in some form) or whether this can be learned (an empiricist or “learned” approach).
We’ll talk about the evolutionary and psychological evidence for these things more in week five
What counts as having a motivation?
What kind of (AI) architectures might we use here?
We’ll talk about this more in week 6 but it also relates to identity and selfhood which we’ll discuss in week 4