Africa in Conflict and Crisis:
Critical Perspectives on the Role of Conflict Diamonds and Oil
on the Livelihood of Sierra Leone and Nigeria
By Megan Jenkins and Eva Umoh
Violent and protracted civil wars in African countries such as Sierra Leone, Nigeria and Angola have demonstrated the role and contribution of how strategic minerals like diamonds and oil are fueling wars in Africa. In this paper we critically engage with the recent international focus on how both conflict diamonds and oil are fueling African civil wars. We argue that this kind of analysis simplifies the constructive interpretation of the root causes of African conflicts. Drawing from the comparative analysis of different conflicts in Africa, we surmise that the inadequate understanding of the fundamental causes of African conflicts has led to inappropriate international policy responses and ill-defined solutions in managing and resolving these civil wars.
From Conflict Diamonds to Profit Diamonds: An Analysis of African Conflict
by Megan Jenkins
“The conflict is not about ideology, tribal, or regional differences. It has nothing to do with the so-called problems of marginalized youths or as some political commentators have characterized it, an uprising by rural poor against the urban elite. The root of the conflict is and remains diamonds. The conflict in Sierra Leone is not a civil war, but a rebel war based on brutality, supported by regional, sub-regional, and international surrogates, and more importantly, financed by the illicit trade in Sierra Leone’s diamonds.”
- Ibrahim M. Kamara, Permanent Representative of Sierra Leone to the U.N. stated to the Council on July 5, 2000,
On May 11, 2000, the Security Council confronted one of the most serious challenges ever to face the United Nations. Secretary-General Kofi Annan briefed the Council in an emergency session, “As of this moment, several hundred United Nations peacekeepers – the great majority of them Zambians – are still being detained against their will in various parts of Sierra Leone.” The Revolutionary United Front (RUF) rebel forces in Sierra Leone abducted first fifty, then 300 U.N. peacekeepers and civilian personnel during early May 2000. The United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL) had arrived in November 1999 to oversee the Lomé Peace Agreement between the RUF and the Sierra Leone government. As the Secretary-General emphasized, “These are soldiers who came to Sierra Leone not as enemies, but as friends and peacemakers, under the terms of an agreement negotiated and signed by both parties, including Corporal Foday Sankoh on behalf of the Revolutionary United Front (RUF).
Illegal exports of diamonds have exacerbated the current civil wars in the African countries of Angola, Sierra Leone and the Democratic Republic of Congo, giving rise to the name "conflict diamonds." "Conflict diamonds" are the political, military, and economic building blocks for the rebel forces within these African countries. The wealth produced by trade in conflict diamonds has funded the forced displacement of more than 6.3 million African people over the last ten years. Though the focus of conflict diamonds is associated with African conflicts, the domestic and international dimensions of illegal diamond trading could conceivably occur in any conflict country with extractable diamond resources. The crucial element in defining these “conflict diamonds,” then, is the role played by illegal diamond trade in fuelling wars, and the unusual criminal network originating from areas controlled by forces or factions opposed to legitimate or internationally recognized governments.
Each year, over 250 million carats of diamonds are mined worldwide. Even in its peak years of production during the 1960s, Sierra Leone never produced more than 2 million carats annually (Zack-Williams 17). But a high proportion of Sierra Leone’s diamonds are gemstones of very high quality and value, and they are much sought after. During the 1970s and 1980s the Sierra Leone diamond industry fell prey to corruption and mismanagement and many of the country’s diamonds were exported illegally. Since 1991, the country has suffered war, terror and a deep, unrelenting humanitarian crisis, which has left it devastated. The war has curbed agricultural production drastically, cut government revenues from mining and seen the destruction of hundreds of schools, health clinics, and administrative facilities. Forced displacement has effected more than half the population estimated at 4.5 million. Between 20,000 and 75,000 people have been killed and thousands mutilated. The money used to fund Sierra Leone’s insurgents and their armament comes from the sale of one of the world’s most precious commodities – diamonds.
Before the outbreak of war, corruption and mismanagement were the main reasons why Sierra Leone was ranked by UN figures as one of the poorest countries in the world (UN Report 2000). Since 1991, the Revolutionary United Front (RUF) has fought to control Sierra Leone's rich diamond-producing areas. Since losing political power in February 1998, members of the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council (AFRC) and the RUF have been engaged in a war of terror against civilians in Sierra Leone. With no recognizable political platform, the AFRC/RUF is committing widespread and egregious atrocities against unarmed civilians in an attempt to regain power. Many thousands of Sierra Leonean civilians have been killed, mutilated, amputated, raped or otherwise terrorized by the AFRC/RUF from the period of February through June 1998 alone. An additional number, probably in the thousands, of men, women and children have been abducted by the AFRC/RUF for use as combatants, forced laborers or sexual slaves.
From Conflict Diamonds to Profit Diamonds: Tracing the Path through History
At first, the mining of Sierra Leone's diamond resources was a legal, economic endeavor. In 1935, De Beers' Sierra Leone Selection Trust (SLST) gained complete prospecting and mining rights for 99 years. However, Lebanese traders within Sierra Leone quickly discovered smuggling diamonds brought easy profits, and illicit mining and trading grew throughout the country. By the time a diamond rush began in the 1950s, the government gave up policing the diamond districts and foreign investors provided their own security. To crack down on the growing illicit diamond trade, however, the government tightened security between Kono, a large diamond district, and Freetown, the country's major exporting site. This increase in security caused smugglers to move illicit goods through Liberia, creating the illegal diamond pipeline between Liberia and Sierra Leone (Crenshaw 2).
From Freedom to Failure 1961-1991
After Sierra Leone gained independence from Great Britain in 1961, diamond smuggling became a political problem in addition to an economic problem. Siaka Stevens became Prime Minister seven years after independence in 1968. A populist, he quickly turned diamonds and the presence of SLST into a political issue, tacitly encouraging illicit mining, and becoming involved himself in criminal activities. In 1971, Stevens created the National Diamond Mining Company (NDMC) which effectively nationalized SLST (Reno 110). All important decisions were now made by the prime minister and his right hand man, a Lebanese businessman named Jamil Mohammed. From a high of over two million carats in 1970, legitimate diamond exports dropped to 595,000 carats in 1980 and then to only 48,000 in 1988. In 1984, SLST sold its remaining shares to the Precious Metals Mining Company (PMMC), a company controlled by Jamil. Stevens retired in 1985, handing over power to Joseph Momoh, who placed even greater responsibility in the hands of Jamil (Reno 117).
From the late 1970s to the early 1990s, aspects of Lebanon’s civil war were played out in miniature in Sierra Leone. Various Lebanese militias sought financial assistance from their compatriots in Sierra Leone, and the country’s diamonds became an important informal tax base for one faction or the other. Following a failed (and probably phony) 1987 coup attempt in Sierra Leone, Jamil went into exile, opening the way for a number of Israeli ‘investors’ with close connections to Russian and American crime families, and with ties to the Antwerp diamond trade.
The Revolutionary United Front rebel war began in 1991 and soon after, Momoh was replaced by a military government - the National Provisional Ruling Council (NPRC). Despite the change in government, however, RUF attacks continued. From the outset of the war, Liberia acted as banker, trainer and mentor to the RUF, although the Liberian connection was hardly new. With a negligible diamond potential of its own, Liberia’s dealings in stolen Sierra Leone diamonds have been a major concern to successive Sierra Leone governments since the great diamond rush of the 1950s (Campbell 37).
What was different and more sinister after 1991 was the active involvement of official Liberian interests in Sierra Leone’s brutal war - for the purpose of pillage rather than politics. By the end of the 1990s, Liberia had become a major centre for massive diamond-related criminal activity, with connections to guns, drugs and money laundering throughout Africa. In return for weapons, it provided the RUF with an outlet for diamonds, and has done the same for other diamond producing countries, fueling war and providing a safe haven for organized crime of all sorts (68).
The Abidjan Accord
In March 1996, Ahmad Tejan Kabbah, a former U.N. official, was elected president of Sierra Leone. The rebels warned Sierra Leoneans not to vote by chopping off people’s hands, but 60 % of registered voters still voted. The Kabbah government and the RUF signed a peace agreement in Abidjan, Cote d’Ivore in November 1996 (UN Report 2000). The Abidjan Accord called for an immediate end to the fighting and established a Commission for the Consolidation of Peace. Another military coup of unpaid army officers, led by Major General John Paul Koroma, followed in May 1997 and ruined the agreement. Kabbah fled to Guinea and Koroma, invited the RUF to join the government in a rule marked by atrocities, looting and a national shutdown of all commerce and banking. In February 1998, ECOMOG forces led by Nigerians stormed Freetown in retaliation to an RUF rebel attack, regained Freetown, and returned President Kabbah to office.
The Lomé Agreement
On July 7, 1999, President Kabbah and RUF leader Foday Sankoh signed the Lomé Peace Agreement. Following six weeks of talks in Lomé, the capital of Togo, the RUF, and the Sierra Leone government signed the agreement, which called for a ceasefire in exchange for RUF amnesty and participation in a government of national unity. Articles I and II called for a ceasefire and outlined plans to monitor the ceasefire with the government of Sierra Leone, RUF, and The Economic Community of West African States Cease-Fire Monitoring Group (ECOMOG). The Lomé Agreement recognized the RUF as a legal political party, enabled members to hold public office and allowed the RUF to join the government of national unity through cabinet appointments. Article VI reaffirmed the role of the Commission for the Consolidation of Peace. The agreement assigned Foday Sankoh as Chairman of the Strategic Minerals Commission, which supervises the management of national diamond assets. The agreement granted a free and absolute pardon to the RUF (Article IX), brought the group into the government, and solidified RUF control of the diamonds. Despite these overwhelming RUF gains, the desperate need for an agreement overrode Kabbah’s reluctance to sign on these terms. After President Kabbah signed the agreement, the Security Council prepared to send troops as peacekeeping missions require this type of commitment to peace from the parties.
Throughout the nine-year civil war, fighting has been concentrated in and around the diamond districts. RUF leaders were keenly aware that whoever controls the diamond mines controls Sierra Leone, and profits from smuggled diamonds funded its attack. Since the civil war began, Sierra Leone has suffered complete desolation. It is wholly dependent on outside support from Great Britain, Nigeria and South Africa's security forces. Sierra Leone's own army is corrupt; its soldiers are nicknamed "Sobels," rebels by day, soldiers by night.
Members of the AFRC and the RUF, the rebel alliance in Sierra Leone, have been committing gross human rights violations since February 1998, when they were ousted from power by the ECOMOG. Since that time, the scale and grotesque nature of the AFRC/RUF attacks have set this round of violence against civilians apart from others in Sierra Leone's seven-year history of devastating armed conflict.
From Conflict Diamonds to Profit Diamonds: A Framework for Conflict Prevention
“We must spare people the ordeal of war, mutilations and death for the sake of conflict diamonds.”
- Martin Chungong Ayafor, Chairman of the Sierra Leone Panel of Experts
The horrific atrocities in Sierra Leone have heightened the international community’s awareness of the need to cut off sources of funding for the rebels in order to promote lasting peace in the country. Such devastation also illustrates the fact that these civil wars are not only about greed and strategic minerals, but essentially about fundamental political, economic and socio-cultural grievances.
Leading companies within the diamond industry assure the world that they are not dealing in conflict diamonds. Yet, sales of diamonds mined in rebel-controlled territories in places like Angola and Sierra Leone continue to the present day. Last July, a meeting of the World Diamond Congress in Antwerp took place to discuss how best to ensure that all diamonds can be confidently labeled as "conflict-free" (Tam 32). De Beers, the largest company present, called on the World Diamond Congress to introduce a standard documentation process for all importing countries that would require a true statement of origin of all stones, rather than simply a declaration of provenance. If adopted, this practice would curb the laundry of diamonds from Sierra Leone through such countries as Liberia, Togo, Zimbabwe, Congo, Ivory Coast, and Burkina Faso, where they are currently mined and then being admitted to major cutting and export centers with few questions asked. De Beers has already implemented these measures to halt the flow of conflict diamonds, guaranteeing that all diamonds it sells are conflict-free and it has developed internal rules to control the flow of conflict diamonds (Crenshaw 5).
Such declarations, while welcome, are largely symbolic unless the diamond industry as a whole, in collaboration with diamond mining, cutting, exporting, and importing countries, establishes a system that can force the trade in conflict stones out of business, or greatly reduce its profits. Such a system will require a comprehensive, global system of transparency for establishing origin, legitimate export and import centers, customs and excise regimen in importing countries, and international inspection of diamond packets.
The international debate generated by conflict diamonds and the complicity of the diamond industry has brought to the forefront the dilemma between the protection of legitimate diamond trade and how to stop diamonds from financing wars. The response of the diamond industry, led by De Beers which controls about 60% of the US $7 billion a year world market for uncut diamonds, is to champion the campaign against conflict diamonds. De Beers, however, argues that the estimate for conflict diamonds is only a mere 4% of the total global diamond production (Crenshaw 3). The World Diamond Council, in collaboration with governments has organized a series of international conferences in an attempt at self-regulation. The fear of consumer backlash seems to be the driving force for the proactive stance taken by the diamond industry. The objective has been to build a consensus on the need for an international certification scheme for rough diamonds.
The rationale underpinning this kind of response to African conflict is based on the need to reduce the profitability of war to the stakeholders by denying access of conflict diamonds to the world market. It becomes evident that the focus on conflict diamonds provides a useful entry point for the international community in terms of responding to African conflicts. It is therefore not surprising that the response of the international community has been to impose a UN ban on the purchase of conflict diamonds in war-torn societies and the establishment of an international certification scheme to regulate the illegal diamond trade. But these kind of international responses are not ending the wars in Africa. Even the global certification scheme is fraught with practical difficulties because such a certificate would only possibly show where diamonds were bought not where mined. Furthermore, gems are too small, portable and easy to hide. The porous nature of African borders would create serious difficulties in terms of implementation. Another crucial obstacle is how to balance the economic interests of the diamond producing and importing countries. Even more, the UN ban and international certification scheme are solutions conceived from outside of Africa, and therefore, a reflection of an external, top-down approach to preventing and resolving African conflict is not feasible.
Nigeria and the Oil Crisis: An Analysis of African Conflict
by Eva Umoh
The civil conflicts that arise from the tension between natural resource industries and minority groups in many African countries have contributed to the continued economic disparity between these developing countries and other resource rich countries outside of Africa. As a case study, the discord between many of Nigeria’s ethnic minority groups and its oil industry, which is often manifested as tension between these groups and the Nigerian government, has resulted in significant revenue losses, a loss of lives, and general civil unrest over the past two decades. Issues of rightful ownership over oil-rich land, claims against oil companies and the government over an apparent disregard for regional development, and general antagonistic relationships between locals and industry representatives and security forces continue to fuel this discord. There have been legal attempts and organized efforts at ameliorating these tensions but as yet, there have been no long lasting remedies. Through a close inspection of the history of the oil industry in Nigeria, its development, and the claims made by the varying interests, possible resolutions can be proffered to address Nigeria’s problems and those of other African countries with similar disputes.
The years from 1907 to 1914 marked the beginning of the first major oil exploratory work in Nigeria by the Nigerian Bitumen Corporation, a Nigerian auxiliary of the German company. However, their experiences were short-lived and by 1914 the company was forced to abandon all initiatives due to the onset of the First World War. At the end of the war, the company was not granted permission by British authorities to resume work as British companies were given priority over any future work (Frynas, Oil in Nigeria 9). In 1938, the Shell d’Arcy Petroleum Development Company of Nigeria and the British Petroleum Company (BP) acquired the first license by the English colonial government to begin exploration of the entire mainland of Nigeria. The following years included major investigations of the land and it was discovered by 1946 that southern Nigeria had the most potential for oil yield. Consequently in 1951, Shell-BP limited their work to 58,000 square miles in a region of southern Nigeria which spanned from the eastern boarder of Dahomey over the Niger delta to a portion of the Cameroons and was able to boast of a monopoly over all of the most favorable oil-yielding structures (Schatzl 1).
Shell-BP expanded its activities and began the commercial production of crude oil by 1957. Until 1962, Shell-BP singly controlled all of the oil-rich land territory and even with the arrival of competitors, most non-British, such as Mobil (originally Socony-Vacuum), Elf (originally SAFRAP), Agip, Chevron (originally Gulf), Tennessee (also known as Tenneco), and Phillips Petroleum Company, Shell-BP continued to have hold of the entire oil market in Nigeria. Thus began the international influence over oil production in Nigeria. These companies were forced to choose from territory considered undesirable by Shell-Bp. However in spite of this growing interest in Nigeria’s oil economy, from an international perspective; Nigeria’s oil production was not substantial. For example in 1960, Nigeria’s share of the crude oil production to the world market was only .09% and held only .85% of the total world reserves in 1965 (although it represented a sustainable portion of Africa’s oil production and reserves) (Schatzl 23, 30). Even so, in these initial years the appeal of Nigeria’s oil industry was not based on production levels, but rather on Nigeria’s potential for future success.
The most lucrative oilfields in Nigeria - Bomu, Imo River, Umuechem, Korokoro, Okan, Olomoro, Obigbo North, and Uzere West – were under production (Schatzl 24). However, rights over the oil resources in Nigeria’s offshore, known as the continental shelf, were open. Consequently, all interested companies, including Shell-BP, competed equally for concession licenses in this region. Chevron and Mobile were among the most successful in oil production in the continental shelf and consequently, surpassed Shell-BP in this region (Frynas, Oil in Nigeria 12). This partially explains while many of the conflicts between minority groups and the oil companies largely include Shell, which occupies most of the onshore oil fields in densely populated regions.
It becomes apparent that this change in the influence of the different international oil companies depends largely on legal arrangements, specifically licensing rights. Obi and Soremekun have characterized these legal arrangements over the oil industry into three distinct historical phases. Understanding these historical phases offers some insight into the legitimacy of the claims made by the varying interests in the conflicts. The first phase includes the years between colonization and the end of the 1960s (which extends beyond Nigeria’s independence in 1960). In this period, the role of the Nigerian government was largely limited to the collection of tax and rent from the foreign oil companies and the government did not directly intervene in the running of exploration or production of fields. (Frynas, Oil in Nigeria 29). Although initially, “in order to start exploration, development, or production activity in Nigeria”, the oil companies needed the permission of the Nigerian Government. Until 1959 the Federal Minister of Mines and Power made the concessionary agreements individually with each company, after which, the contracts became standardized by the Mineral Oil Ordinance (Schatzl 77).
The Nigerian Civil War from 1967 to 1970 marked the second phase. The perception of the oil industry changed within the Federal Government as the role of Nigeria’s oil industry became more apparent and consequently its involvement heightened. In 1971, Nigeria joined OPEC, Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries, and initiated efforts to increase indigenization and nationalization methods. As a result, government influence increased in the incoming years and by 1979, the government owned 60% of all the major international oil companies with the exception of Ashland and Tenneco; furthermore, in 1979 BP was nationalized. From the perspective of local communities, these changes had little practical effects at the local levels as most international companies retained control over operations. In Oil in Nigeria, Frynas writes, “While the government formally commands the joint ventures with its ownership equity, the foreign oil companies control the day-to-day operations of the joint ventures.” (33)
After the formation of the Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation (NNPC) the government threatened further nationalization. However, with the beginning of the third phase in the middle eighties to nineties came the threat of recession and falling revenues. The government began to increase measures to diversify the oil industry within Nigeria in order to generate new business. Furthermore, older companies were given incentives to produce more in order to increase foreign investments. As a result, many more private owned oil companies formed. This subtle change in the government’s attitude toward oil companies caused community locals to charge the government with being biased toward big business. This feeling was exacerbated by claims of corruption and inefficiency within the government. Oil companies were accused of gaining influence over government officials by bribery and in 1981 the NNPC was described as being weak and full of bureaucratic delays. (41) These issues increased the difficulty of creating a uniform regulatory body and amplified community resentment towards oil companies and government.
The resentment from village communities arose from many of these aspects of history. The village communities with the most grievances are those representing minority ethnic groups in southern Nigerian along the Niger delta, the largest source of oil production. These groups include the Ogoni, the Ijaw, the Isoko, the Ibibio, the Ikwerre, the Urhobo, and other smaller groups (Obi 11). Much of the oil-producing areas remain in the south, yet northern Nigeria has historically yielded more of an influence. The major ethnic groups – the Hausu-Fulani, the Ibos, and the Yoruba – dominate the Northern, Eastern, and Western regions and make up approximately 66% of Nigeria’s population. Their influence has important implications because the Nigerian State controls all oil rents (receipts) which it shares with its partners, the producing companies, and allocates the remaining to “strategically placed-office holders”. Therefore, those who occupy these positions within the state governments have a direct influence over revenue distribution and minority groups have claimed that resource allocations have been biased against them, as the politically elite of the majority ethnic groups have come to dominate. This has been a large source of the corruption that surrounds oil-wealth and allows key people to have a type of monopoly over the regional oil economy (Obi 5). The effects of this monopoly are exampled by the interethnic conflict between the Ijaws and the Itsekerris. Their tension is based on historical ownership over the oil-rich land, but in the late nineties, this tension manifested itself as direct fighting when a local government office was moved from an Itsekerri to an Ijaw area; essentially shifting power from one group to another (www.jmk.su.se).
The deterioration of the majority-minority ethnic relations has contributed to the rising conflicts between the minority groups and the government. The claims of these groups are generally based on the idea that they occupy the wealthiest oil regions, yet receive a smaller amount of the revenues. In 1997, three of the largest oil producing states – Delta, Rivers, and Bayelsa – received a share of only 3.36%, 2.85%, and 2.28% respectively, and an even smaller amount was directly received by the ethnic minority groups (Frynas, Oil in Nigeria 44). This illustrates one of the structural flaws in Nigeria’s oil management - while states are receiving revenue, small as they may be, ethnic minorities remain marginalized, as they have no direct access to this revenue.
The disputes that have occurred between minorities and oil companies and the Nigerian government have generally been based on three different aspects: (1) a lack of investment in and development of oil-producing regions, (2) issues of rightful ownership over land, and (3) the consequences of environmental deterioration of communities due to the oil production. In the past two decades, there have been large disputes that have resulted in massive killings, instability, and a decrease in oil production and revenue. It must be noted; however, that in the past protests were generally peaceful and limited to individual communities, but by the 1990s, communities began organizing as their demands intensified. One of the first organizations to form to address these grievances was the Movement for the Survival of the Ogoni People (MOSOP). MOSOP demanded political autonomy for the Ogonis and environmental accountability on the part of oil companies. Their uprising sparked many similar protests across Nigeria. While MOSOP primarily targeted Shell, their efforts popularized notions of local control over natural resources and tunneling resources back to the regions from where they were derived (www.aaps.co.zw p. 5-6). Other organizations began to form such as the Ijaw National Congress and the Niger Delta Environmental Forum. The Ijaws were perceived by some as being very threatening because of their large numbers and they were responsible for some of the more militant protests. For example in 1997, Shell workers were taken hostage and oil installations were occupied by armed Ijaws (Obi 13).
Environmental conflicts have also fueled many protests. The destruction of the environment in the local communities has resulted in serious health-related issues, and also affects the livelihood of villagers. Water sources, farmland, wildlife, and cattle are among the few aspects of the communities that are being threatened by oil pollutants (Frynas, Politics and Economy 12). Additionally, more radical locals have called for a complete autonomy over land and argue that ownership of oil stems from historical occupation of the land. For example, a conference in 1998 attended by a variety of Ijaw from different communities resulted in the adoption of the Kaiama Declaration, which stated that, “all land and natural resources (including mineral resources) within the Ijaw territory belong[s] to Ijaw communities” (Frynas, Oil in Nigeria 47).
As previously noted, anti-oil protests were generally non-violent in the past. While it can be argued that community leaders and activists became more militant and violent by their own right, oil companies and the government contributed largely. The Nigerian government adopted repressive security measures to deal with anti-oil protestors. Anti-Shell protests by MOSOP were met with severe belligerence and a total of nine leaders were executed in 1995, adding to the extra-judicial killings, beating, rape, and arrests of many others. The government began to employ regulatory units, such as the Rivers State Internal Security Task Force in 1994 to police protestors (www.aaps.co.zw p. 13). Besides direct violence, state violence was also used in order to agitate conflicts between ethnic groups. It was written that,
The government readily proclaims the clashes to be purely ethnic. But the frequency of such clashes among erstwhile peaceful neighbours, the extent of devastation and the sophistication of weapons employed have convinced some independent observers that ‘broader forces might have been interested in perhaps putting the Ogonis under pressure, probably to derail their agenda (13).
Oil companies have also contributed to this violence by using their own security forces and also working in conjunction with state forces. While oil companies have the right to protect themselves, it is perhaps the over-reliance and hasty employment of security forces that results in violence. This is exampled by the Umuechem massacre in which local youths planned a peaceful demonstration against Shell and were met with teargas and gunfire from a unit of the Mobil Security Force requested by Shell officials because of its violent reputation. The cooperation between the state government and oil companies is evidenced in the XM Federal limited v. Shell case that revealed that the Nigerian government supplied security forces to guard oil installations and also that Shell was negotiating to import weapons into Nigeria in violation of an arms embargo. Additionally, there exist many formal and informal agreements between state controlled companies, such as the NNPC, and oil companies.
Nevertheless, the oil companies and the government have offered some concessions to the minority groups. For example, the Federal government launched many committees in order to inquire into the claims of the minority groups. In 1992, the Babangida government increased the amount of oil-revenue allocated to the groups from 1.5% to 3% and the Oil Mineral Producing Areas Development Commission (OMPADEC) was established to properly distribute the funds. This figure was later raised to 13% in 1999 (Frynas, Oil in Nigeria 49-56).
By examining the history of the oil companies in Nigeria and the cause of the conflicts between minority ethnic groups and oil companies and the government, some potential remedies can be offered to alleviate the tensions. Due to the feelings of governmental bias towards oil companies felt by minority groups, perhaps an objective judiciary body, which specializes in natural resource issues, could be included in order to resolve issues of rightful ownership over oil rich land. This body could be a body of the general international court systems, since the oil companies represent international interests, or could a member of the recently formed Organization of African Unity (OAU). Similar tensions are present across Africa and therefore such a body would benefit the entire continent. Additionally, new contracts should be devised and formalized in order to limit the influence of oil companies in state and federal government decisions in order to address the issues of corruption and informality that stems from such influences. These contracts should include clauses of liability of the oil companies over the environmental degradation that is the inevitable result of oil production.
The systems of distribution of oil-revenues and the percent that is allocated to local communities must be increased and the amount of bureaucratic red tape must be decrease. A committee of Nigerian economists, oil representatives, government representatives, and representatives from the majority and minority ethnic groups could be established as a part of government branch to ensure that all interests are represented especially when the oil revenue allocations are determined.
Furthermore, decreased militarization and less of a reliance on overly aggressive security forces must be championed. The present government led by President Obasanjo must wholly support efforts at increased democratization in order to allow peaceful demonstration and the claims of the minority ethnic groups to be heard.
In short, there is no general solution that can be offered without first addressing the many different sources of these conflicts. Once these sources have been addressed, it will be possible to build a more sustainable Nigeria, and Africa, that is less dependent on international companies and is able to support itself and the growing international community, based on its own resources and talents.
It goes without saying that inappropriate international policy response and ill-defined solutions have played their part in making Africa what it is today. A new conflict resolution framework with an emphasis on investment in conflict analysis will provide much needed insight into what is needed for the management, resolution and prevention of African conflict. Such an investment will provide the opportunity for African realism to feed into the international policy response on conflict. This must start with international policy prescriptions being formulated that include Africans at levels both at and below the narrow ruling and governing elites. In establishing a new partnership with Africa, Africans will have the opportunity to lead with the rest of the world committed to the same ideology and goals. The future of Africa and its natural resources and inhabitants stand in the reigns…the stakes are too high to ignore.
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