Colombia: Tomorrow’s Vietnam

By Jameel Johmson & Kristen Carothers

EDGE Spring, 2003

Securing economic opportunity, domestic and abroad, has always been an integral aspect of U.S. foreign policy. Dating back to the early 20^th century, when Teddy Roosevelt wielded his “Big Stick,” the United States first began to establish a presence in Latin America. It assumed the role of “Big Brother,” with the primary objective of creating an atmosphere viable to American economic growth in the region. Roosevelt’s policy was significant in that it developed the precedence for the United States to police not only its neighbors, but the entire globe as well. This political stance was aimed to safeguard American interests, ideological and material, but later set the stage for conflict as it was challenged and even further propelled by the spread of communism. The United States became directly embroiled in international conflicts, typified by American military presence in Vietnam during the 1960s and in Latin America in the 1980s. However, with the end of the Cold War, the fear of the growth of communism subsided and today, Latin American countries specifically struggle with the perils of the drug trade. It not only has etched a web of money laundering, violence, and corruption, but has also emerged as a global epidemic, particularly as it finances the activities of domestic guerilla groups and international terrorist forces. It presents a potential threat to American security and peace; however, it is not the sole reason for the current U.S. involvement in Latin America. The United States government is still haunted by the shadows of American bloodshed in Vietnam and predominantly, the backlash it has elicited from the general public. In order to avoid further scrutiny, the government is unwilling to admit their complete justification for the escalation of military forces in Latin America, particularly in the nation of Colombia. The existence of the drug trade is emerging as a pretext for increased U.S. interference in Colombia that is a detrimental force, fueling further violence and worsening human rights conditions. It is clear that Colombia is tomorrow’s Vietnam.

The devastating battle with drug trafficking has wrought far-reaching effects in Colombia. However, to understand the severity of turmoil and poverty that the drug trade perpetuates, it is necessary to also address the nation’s additional economic, political, and social ills. Historically, Colombia has been one of Latin America’s most stable countries, experiencing steady economic growth from the 1930s and onto the mid 1990s. Even through Latin America’s troubled times of the 1980s, Colombia maintained its financial fortitude with its economy growing at an average annual rate of 3.5 percent. The subsequent graph demonstrates this period of vigor.

World Bank Group: http://www.worldbank.org/nipr/lacsem/columpres/sld003.htm

The illustration shows the growth of the annual GDP (orange bar) along with the contributions from the number of factories (green bar) and rate of employment (blue bar) from the years of 1985 to 1995. The Colombian GDP averaged 4.6% increase, while its manufacturing establishments rose by almost 17% and employment grew by 33%. However, the prosperity that characterized the Colombian economy began to end in the mid 1990s, reaching a severe low in the 1999 recession. Harvesting of Colombia’s key export, coffee, was depressed and its prices plunged, in which this decline was one of the early and ominous signs of Colombia’s financial fate. Its demise continued as the annual GDP tumbled by 4%, while unemployment was stuck at a record high of 20% and 55% of the population (40,349,388) were well below the poverty line (Wall Street Journal, September 23, 1999). This dismal state of Colombia’s financial market helped blanket the nation in uncertainty, creating an atmosphere that embraced any prospect of riches, further cementing the supremacy of the drug trade.

Distant from the country’s sagging economy, narcotic growth and trafficking represents a $400 billion worldwide industry with its roots implanted throughout Colombia. Unlike earlier years, when the cultivation of coca (cocaine derived plant) remained low in the country, troubled economic times have spurred increased coca growth in the 1990s that has thrust Colombia forward as the world’s largest coca producer. For instance, in 1998, Colombia had 93,000 hectares (232,500 square acres) of land under coca and opium poppy cultivation, also generating 69,000 full-time jobs (The Colombian Economy after 25 Years of Drug Trafficking, Ricardo Rocha). Coca growth has attracted many laborers, primarily attributed to the agricultural decline that forced the displacement of numerous workers as depicted in the following graph.

http://www.mama.coca.org/feb2002/drugtrade.pdf

The graph shows the number of unemployed workers for the years between 1995 and 1999. It highlights a severe facet of Colombia’s economic struggles that has strengthened its foundation in narcotic growth and trade. Another startling aspect of the drug trade’s influence is that in comparison to the decline in coffee exports, the drug trafficking has generated greater revenue as reflected in the subsequent graph (1982-1996).

http://www.mamacoca.org/feb2002/drugtrade.pdf

As seen in the graph, by 1986, the illegal narcotics trade had emerged as an overwhelming source of income, nearly doubling the amount of finances brought in by legal coffee exports. The trend persists through the 1990s; a disturbing pattern demonstrating the considerable extent that Colombia was entrenched in the drug trade. Equally alarming, Colombia’s share of the cocaine market rose from 50% (1981) to 85% (1999), accounting today for about $7.5 billion of yearly income (CIA World Fact book). This money profited from the narcotics trafficking is cleverly interwoven into the Colombian economy, also providing the drug mafia with additional security. It was said that, “one could hardly go past a major development without being told that laundered money financed it. This included hotels, nightclubs and shopping centers, exclusive ranches and mansions” (Colombian Cartels, www.pbs.org). The following graph demonstrates the Colombian drug trafficking income as a percentage of the nation’s GDP ($250 billion).

“The Colombian Economy after 25 Years of Drug Trafficking”, Ricardo Rocha

The illustration points to the financial control that the drug trade has gained; yet in 1998, their income of $7.5 billion was only 3% of Colombia’s total GDP ($250 billion). It reflects the relatively diminutive effects that drug trafficking has directly on the fraught Colombian economy. However, the overwhelming and worldwide influence of the drug trade can never be overlooked as “the estimated turnover of $400 billion has the power to corrupt almost anyone” (World News, R.E. Kendall, Secretary-General of Interpol). Drug money’s vast influence in political iniquity has become another symptom of the ills that afflict Columbia.

Corruption and the criminal drug economy have been constant factors intertwined in the political instability of Colombia. Drug networks have infiltrated social institutions and most recently, it was revealed that the successful presidential campaign of Liberal Party candidate, Ernesto Samper (1994), was primarily funded through drug revenue, in which his election campaign received $6 million (Colombia’s Samper and the Drug Link, www.pbs.org). The considerable extent of the power and influence of the drug lords has furthered the decay of government authority, contributing to the establishment of Colombia’s present-day “narco-democracy” (Colombia: To Save a Democracy, Cassandra Flenker). The term refers to the nation’s faction of drug traffickers, who have seized control of Colombia’s political, judicial, and private sectors.

Notably, positioned at the forefront of this “narco-democracy,” have been the crime cartels: Medellin and Cali. The Medellin cartel, led by Pablo Escobar, was the first of Colombia’s powerful drug organizations that fed cocaine to the United States and abroad throughout much of the 1980s. During that time, the Medellin was also thought to be responsible for the murder of countless political officials, police, prosecutors, judges, and journalists. Unfortunately, the Medellin demise in the early 1990s only facilitated the rise to power of their rivals, the Cali cartel, led by the Rodriguez Orejuelas brothers. After replacing the Medellin cartel, the Rodriguez brothers flooded the markets and today, they now supply 80 percent of the cocaine flowing into the United States and Europe (The Cali Connection, www.ccsf.edu). It is a stark reflection of the power they possess.

In addition, Colombia suffers from a lack of national cohesion and the political fragmentation contributes to the inefficacy of their government to deal with the drug trade. Each different state fights to affirm its own regional independence, failing to form a united body that effectively opposes the trade and growth of narcotics. At the same time, allegations continue to mount, asserting that the Colombian government has been too lenient on the drug cartels. For example, the Rodriguez brothers (Cali Cartel) received the near-maximum penalty of 23 years when convicted, but are likely to be released after six (The Cali Connection, www.ccsf.edu). Many experts consider this a result of an arrangement between the Colombian government and the brothers to avoid their extradition to the United States, where they would face harsher penalties. More disturbing, DEA agents still believe that the Rodriguez brothers continue to manage the Cali cartel right from their prison cells (Colombian Cartels, www.pbs.org). The shortcomings of the Colombian government’s ability and desire to more effectively confront drug trafficking has created further uncertainty within the nation, particularly with its condemnation by the United States in 1996. It intensified Colombia’s loss of political legitimacy in domestic and international forums. This has furthered the staggering loss of public confidence that has now been compounded with fear as the social atmosphere of Colombia has been enveloped by the actions of guerrilla and paramilitary groups.

In earlier years, these independently armed forces first appeared in response to their bitter dissatisfaction with the government and burning desire for change. However, economic hardships had pressed them to embrace the lure of riches and life of violence associated with the drug trade. The most notable of the guerrilla groups have been the Revolutionary Forces of Colombia (FARC) and the National Liberation Army (ELN). In opposition to the Colombian oligarchy of the 1960s, FARC was established in 1964, as the military wing of the Colombian Communist Party. It was comprised mainly of disenchanted farmers and destitute laborers, aligned with the Soviet movement and Moscow-line communists. On the other hand, although ELN was also formed in 1964, it was greater influenced by the Cuban revolution and was composed mostly of students and Colombian university graduates (Colombian Labyrinth, Rabasa and Chalk). The divergence between the groups was attributed to the tensions between Cuba and Moscow over strategy in Latin America; though, the goals of both insurgents were to enact social change, diminishing the unjust disparity in wealth among Colombian citizens. These aims were consistent for both groups and involvement in drug trafficking was mostly carried out by paramilitaries, who were privately armed “self-defense” groups. However, during the early 1980s, the cultivation of coca became a dominant economic activity and in opposition to the paramilitaries and government, the guerilla groups of FARC and ELN also began to promote and protect the coca crops. In this period, the vicious relationship among guerilla groups, paramilitaries, and the Colombian government was developed that later would create much turmoil in the country.

Crowned as the guardians of the narcotics trade, the guerilla and paramilitary insurgents pierce and rip at the delicate social fabric of Colombia, perpetuating violence and feelings of trepidation as they struggle for control of the drug market. These groups offer protection by overseeing each stage of drug trafficking from its cultivation on the farm to its manufacture in the labs, and to its movement in the hands of smugglers. It is a service that rewards the insurgents with profitable gains in revenue. For instance, in 1998, guerillas and paramilitaries received 620 billion pesos ($551 million) solely from the drug trade. FARC specifically has a breakdown of fees (gramajes) such as $5263 for protection per laboratory, $2631 for security of landing strips, and $4210 for protection of coca fields per square acre (Colombian Labyrinth, Rabasa and Chalk). In turn, these groups used the derived money to finance armed conflicts and primarily support the growth of their military forces.

Today, the guerillas and paramilitaries are comprised of approximately 9,000 to 12,000 armed combatants, involved in numerous illegal activities. These include bombings, murders, kidnappings, extortions, hijackings, as well as conventional military action against Colombian political and economic targets. FARC and ELN are responsible for 20 to 30 percent of all of the kidnappings that take place in the world. For example, in March of 1999, the FARC executed three U.S. Indian rights activists on Venezuelan territory after it kidnapped them from Colombia (Colombian Labyrinth, Rabasa and Chalk). Foreign citizens are often the targets of FARC kidnappings, but no local citizen is immune from the violence that the insurgents promote. For instance, the homicide rate in Colombia has more than doubled over the past 20 years with the growing presence of guerrillas and paramilitaries. These groups, trying to gain control, commit “social cleansing” murders or limpiezas, slaying those deemed misfits or suspected of cooperating with the opponent (Colombian Labyrinth, Rabasa and Chalk).

http://www.mamacoca.org/feb2002/drugtrade.pdf

As the graph depicts, the homicide rate was 30 people per 100,000 inhabitants in 1980. However, with the rise in social and armed conflict, attributed to the increase in drug trade activity, the rate has doubled that in 1998. Equally alarming, in many areas, men and children have been forced to join the guerrilla or paramilitary groups, wrenching families and societal units apart. In contrast, the number of those who have chosen to flee such violence has been another shocking aspect, in which approximately 1,200,000 people have been displaced in 1998 (Colombian Labyrinth, Rabasa and Chalk).

In addition, even those who should have some effect in combating the violence, such as law enforcement officers and members of the judicial branch, have been rendered ineffective. Through threats on the lives of these officials and their families, the guerrilla and paramilitary insurgents weaken the power of the law and government organizations, also reducing the influence of educational, media, and security institutions. As the escalation of chaos and criminal activity combine with the deterioration of state and social bodies, the Colombian nation finds itself in a climate of insecurity.

Furthermore, with the connection between the drug trade and the guerilla and paramilitary insurgents, United States’ concern about the situation in Colombia continues to heighten. The U.S. recognizes that drug matters are not issues confined to the Colombian nation, but are more universal, having far-reaching effects that also significantly impact events within American borders. The influx of drugs have certainly influenced large metropolitan areas in the United States, as they have also become centers of drug-related violence, with rival gangs competing for sales territory and addicts stealing to keep themselves high. Washington fears the direct effects that drugs have on Americans as well as the possible repercussions of allowing guerrilla and paramilitary warfare in Colombia to continue. It is a concern of the U.S. government that Colombia’s rebel conflicts will extend into neighboring countries, creating social and economic instability in important U.S. allies, broadening the base for possible terrorist activity. This is a fear compounded by the September 11^th tragedy and in its aftermath, the American government wants to ensure that terrorists can no longer depend on drug capital as finance for their campaigns.

Colombia’s status as the base of the drug trade is a genuine problem that poses a threat to American security; however, terrorism is not the sole reason for the United States’ involvement in Colombia. One of the primary motives for American intervention has been the protection of Colombian oil deposits. The U.S. currently receives 50% of Colombian exports, in which a significant part consists of oil. In fact, Colombia is the seventh largest oil supplier to the United States and is also believed to harbor at least 2.6 billion barrels in untapped reserves. In addition, over the last 10 years, consumption of oil in the U.S. has risen 15%, corresponding to the 78% growth of Colombia’s oil production, in which it has sent most of the surplus amount to the United States (“The Real Reason for U.S. Aid to Colombia,” M. Klare, News Wire).

http://www.mamacoca.org/feb2002/drugtrade.pdf

The graph illustrates that from 1980 to 1985 Colombia was only producing as much oil as it consumed, but after 1985, Colombia was generating more than twice the amount of oil it utilized, exporting much of the excess to the United States. In addition to the oil that America receives from Colombia, Venezuela is another major contributor of petroleum to the U.S. It is also one of Colombia’s neighbors threatened by the spread of guerrilla and paramilitary warfare and preserving Venezuela’s stability is one of the more relevant reasons that the U.S. is so deeply concerned about Colombia. Venezuela possesses even more oil reserves than Colombia, approximately 73 billion barrels. It is the only OPEC member in the Western Hemisphere and is the third largest oil supplier to the United States, accounting for 13% of American petroleum imports. This fact presses the United States to maintain Venezuela as a stable trading partner, particularly a result of American reluctance to depend on the Middle East after the Gulf War. The existence of oil in Latin America is a reflection of the true basis of U.S. involvement in Colombia, which again demonstrates that the United States’ foreign policy is dictated by the prospect of financial gain.

Furthermore, in order to solely defend its economic interests, the United States continues to supply Colombia with military and financial aid, using the pretense of the drug trade. The U.S. has approved a $1.3 billion aid package to Colombia, making this Latin American country the third largest recipient of U.S. assistance. It should be noted two-thirds of the money have been allocated to the Colombian military, funding its national army and police, while only the diminutive portion of 33% has been assigned toward drug control (Militarizing the War on Drugs, Shannon McManimon). The United States has sent helicopters and hired American military personnel to transform the Colombian military into a more professional and effective force capable of combating the insurgencies. It is evident that although U.S. money has been distributed to Colombia, the funds and American presence primarily serve to train the Colombian military in order to quell social conflict and to not eradicate drugs specifically.

In addition, as the United States’ involvement in Colombia continues to increase, the immediate effects of American intervention is not completely clear. However, U.S. presence has already sparked violence from different Colombian locals, military and non-military, contending that American interference has been another instance of “Yankee” imperialism. Also, the money that the United States has allocated goes toward supporting the Colombian army in their battle against the insurgents; however, it is the national army that commits 86% of the human rights violations in the country (Globalization and Instability: The Case of Colombia, E. Herman). Equally disturbing, is that the best drug eradication effort the U.S. has directly promoted has been the aerial spray of coca crops. However, aerial spraying has only killed 15% of these coca plants and unfortunately, it has been a greater contributor to the destruction of food crops, contamination of water, and poisoning of humans and livestock (The Folly of the U.S. Drug War, http://warpeace.org). The course of U.S. action is gradually shaping a bleak future for Colombia as America continues to ignore history and past failures, blinded by its pursuit of money.

With all the events triggered by the United States’ outside interference, Colombia resembles tomorrow’s Vietnam. There are striking parallels that exist in the U.S. approach to Vietnam and now Colombia, which strangely point to disaster. In the 1960s, American oil companies and war industry contractors encouraged U.S. action in Vietnam in order to seek oil reserves. Not surprisingly, today, people again believe that there are untapped reserves in Colombia with the oil industry applying the greatest pressure to further U.S. involvement. In addition, there are no other countries supporting the United States’ interference in Colombia, and this is the first time that the British have refused an American request since Vietnam. However, one of the most ominous signs of the increasing U.S. presence in Colombia has been the complete American disregard for the native inhabitants. Similar to Vietnam, it can produce the anti-American sentiment that diminishes the support of local leadership necessary to enact lasting social change. However, the United States is purely acting out of economic self-interests, in which it is the lure of financial gain and not the cost of human lives that spurs American policy. Essentially, whether the U.S. claims that it is a war on communism or a war on drugs, they solely seek to protect their monetary resources, at home and abroad. American military escalation in Colombia is just another instance of U.S. pursuit of further capital and if the United States is willing to admit it or not, it is on the brink of another Vietnam tragedy.

Bibliography

1. Klare, M. “The Real Reason for U.S. Aid to Colombia.” News Wire.

2. Wall Street Journal, September 23, 1999.

3. Rocha, Ricardo. The Colombian Economy after 25 Years of Drug Trafficking.

4. World News

5. Flenker, Cassandra. Colombia: To Save a Democracy.

6. www.pbs.org. Colombia’s Samper and the Drug Link.

7. www.ccsf.edu. The Cali Connection.

8. Rabasa and Chalk. Colombian Labyrinth.

9. McManimon, Shannon. Militarizing the Drug War.

10. Herman, E. Globalization and Instability: The Case of Colombia.

11. http://warpeace.org. The Folly of the U.S. Drug War.