Constructive Regime Change:
Imagining a Nonviolent Alternative in Iraq
Andrew Friedman
EDGE – Professor Bruce Lusignan
Section: Monday 3:15
December 6, 2002
Introduction
The return of United Nations weapons inspectors to Iraq following unanimous ratification of UN Security Council Resolution 1441 represents a significant development for the well-publicized American policy of regime change in that country. This resolution presents Saddam Hussein with a “final opportunity to comply with [his] disarmament obligations” and requires that Iraq provide “immediate, unimpeded, unconditional, and unrestricted access” to all places, materials, and people that UN weapons personnel wish to inspect or interview.[1] Any failure by Iraq to comply with the obligations specified in this resolution would constitute a “material breach” and thus would carry the implied threat of a United States-led military response. Even as this resolution legitimates the option of military action in Iraq, however, we must also consider how it changes—and does not change—the prospects for alternative, nonviolent strategies that could be employed to remove Saddam Hussein from power and facilitate a genuine democratic transition in Iraq.
It is possible to imagine the policy that should follow military action in Iraq: “In short, the United States would have to become engaged in nation building on a scale that would dwarf any other such effort since the reconstruction of Germany and Japan after World War II. And it would have to stay engaged not just years, but decades, given the depth of change required to make Iraq into a democracy.”[2] Moreover, the estimated “cost of rebuilding Iraq’s economy…[ranges] from $50 billion to $150 billion, and that does not include repairing the damage from yet another major war. The United States should thus be prepared to contribute several billion dollars per year for as much as a decade to rebuild the country.”[3] If we can imagine the nation building process in a post-Saddam Iraq, then we must also ask the following question: would it be possible to initiate some of this rebuilding now, while Saddam Hussein is still in power, as a way of undermining his regime, tangibly improving the lives of ordinary Iraqis, and generating momentum for democratic change? Or is Saddam Hussein’s hold on power so entrenched, and his regime so absolutely repressive, that no constructive change is possible without the use of military force to remove him? This paper considers two interrelated possibilities for this sort of constructive regime change: urgent rehabilitation and empowerment of the Iraqi middle class by lifting economic sanctions and sponsoring an economic and human development package designed to increase the visible incentives for regime change; and cultivation of a popular constituency for regime change by engaging the Iraqi public through targeted public diplomacy outreach. It concludes that both strategies will be crucial in rebuilding Iraq and promoting democratization as part of a long-term nation building policy, but that they are not feasible as vehicles of meaningful change while Saddam Hussein remains in power. Ultimately, these strategies would have little hope of circumventing the deeply entrenched security apparatus and pervasive tentacles of Iraq’s current regime.
Iraq—Historical Background
In order to evaluate realistically the prospects for nonviolent regime change in Iraq, we must consider them in the larger context of Iraqi political history. Bordered by Kuwait, Iran, Turkey, Syria, Jordan, and Saudi Arabia, Iraq encompasses what was once ancient Mesopotamia, where some of the world’s great civilizations thrived.[4] Iraq’s current population stands at approximately 23 million, of which about 60 percent are Shiite Muslims, 18 percent are Sunni Kurds, and 15 percent are Sunni Arabs.[5] Iraq changed hands several times during the 20th century. From the end of World War I until 1932, when it was declared independent, Iraq was ruled as a British mandate. Constitutional monarchy then succeeded British mandatory rule as the Hashemites of Jordan ruled Iraq from 1932 until 1956, at which time Iraq allied with Turkey, Iran, Pakistan, and the United Kingdom to form the Baghdad Pact.[6] July 1958 inaugurated a decade of violent coups, which culminated in 1968 with the overthrow of the ruling military regime by socialist Ba’ath loyalists—one of whose top leaders was Saddam Hussein. In July 1979, Saddam Hussein became President of Iraq and Chairman of the Revolutionary Command Council after his predecessor and cousin, Ahmad Hasan al-Bakr, resigned.[7]
Since 1979, Saddam Hussein has ruled Iraq as an absolute dictatorship. Universally described by experts as ruthless and megalomaniacal, Saddam “demands unwavering loyalty from his subjects, and to get it he tortures and kills potential foes, purges his army, and terrorizes even his closest deputies.”[8] No opposition parties exist or operate in regime controlled territory, and national elections, like the recent referendum in which Saddam was elected to another seven-year term as president, routinely result in 100 percent victories for Saddam Hussein and his relatives. Saddam has also demonstrated on several occasions his willingness to crush dissent and preserve his rule even by the most brutal of means. These means have included the deportation and murder of thousands of Shiite leaders and their families in the late 1970s and early 1980s. In 1988, moreover, the regime suppressed a Kurdish popular rebellion by launching a chemical weapons attack against civilians in the northern city of Halabja.[9] Several thousand civilians, many of whom were women and children, died in the attack.
Iraq’s strategic significance to U.S. foreign policy interests flows—literally—from its oil. Iraq contains the second largest proven oil reserves in the world, and before the Iran-Iraq War broke out in 1980, oil production was 3.5 million barrels per day, with revenues of some $27 billion in 1980.[10] U.S. policy toward Iraq has been complex and, in retrospect, sometimes shortsighted. The U.S. engaged Iraq in the 1980s hoping to leverage Saddam Hussein as a counterbalance to the regime of Ayatollah Khomeini in Iran, which had overthrown the U.S.-installed shah during the revolution of 1979.[11] The U.S. therefore funded and armed Iraq during the eight-year long Iran-Iraq war, which took a devastating human and economic toll but ultimately yielded no real changes in the geopolitical status quo. The war left Iraq in debt to foreign creditors by some $40 billion dollars.[12] Thus, Iraq’s 1990 invasion of Kuwait was “immediately motivated by severe financial pressures generated by the Iran-Iraq war. In need of revenue, Iraq sought forgiveness of Kuwaiti loans made during the Iran-Iraq war, disputed Kuwait’s oil production levels and charged Kuwait with tapping into the Rumaila oilfield that lies almost entirely inside Iraq.”[13] In the ensuing Operation Desert Storm, an international coalition led by the U.S. forcibly removed Saddam’s regime from Kuwait. Coalition victory soon gave way to a policy of containment, which uses sanctions to prevent the regime from rebuilding its military. Sanctions, however, have been controversial: “Since their introduction in 1990, comprehensive economic sanctions on Iraq have raised substantial concerns about the impact of coercive measures against governments when the populations in question have no democratic rights.”[14] Economic sanctions warrant their own detailed discussion later in this paper.
Saddam Hussein—Survival Against the Odds
Any realistic assessment of the prospects for removing Saddam Hussein by nonviolent means must also take into account the unique qualities of his more than two decades-long rule. Ofra Bengio’s “How Does Saddam Hold On?” provides a useful analysis of Saddam’s talent for staying in power against the odds: “Saddam has kept his grip on power because of his ruthless personality, his foes’ blunders, and his lethally effective mastery of the pillars of authority in Iraq: the Baath Party, the security establishment, the military, and his own family cliques.”[15] Bengio also argues that Saddam has proven especially effective in times of crisis, using his propaganda machine to shift blame and consolidate his power. For example, Saddam appears to thrive most when his enemies exert pressure for his removal:
By essentially conditioning the end of the embargo on Saddam’s ouster, [George Bush and Bill Clinton] once again played into his hands. Saddam has used this demand to divert responsibility for the misery of sanctions away from himself and onto the United States, which he blames for all of Iraq’s mishaps. The prolongation of the embargo has thus strengthened Saddam rather than weakening him, not least because it has made Iraqis depend on him more than ever for their livelihood. What monies come into Iraq—through the U.N.’s ‘oil for food’ program, for example—are controlled by Saddam and his loyalists, who distribute them at will. Similarly, the seemingly permanent ‘emergency’ situation lets Saddam reinforce his repressive machine.[16]
Thus, Saddam displays a degree of control, and the ability to manipulate that control to serve his purposes in any variety of scenarios, that makes nonviolent regime change a daunting prospect at best.
In recent weeks Saddam has also manipulated the political posturing of the Bush Administration to his advantage in Iraq through calculated use of patronage and relentless propaganda. According to a Boston Globe report, in October the regime doubled food rations to every citizen, increased government employee salaries, and bribed Shiite Muslim clans with money and luxury goods in order to ensure their support in any potential conflict.[17] Also in October, the regime freed thousands of political prisoners and portrayed the move as a gesture of thanks for Saddam’s recent 100 percent victory (with 100 percent turnout) in a national referendum on his continued leadership. The Washington Post quoted Saddam’s statement to Iraqi television: “In light of these results…we show mercy rather than punishment.”[18] These reports indicate that Saddam is using American calls for regime change to shore up popular support for his regime while at the same time strengthening his ability to repress any opposition. In a recent interview with an Egyptian newspaper, Saddam Hussein’s comments illustrate the type of propaganda campaign he is waging in Iraq and throughout the Arab world: “The U.S. wants to impose its hegemony on the Arab world, and as a prelude it wants to control Iraq and then strike the capitals that oppose it and revolt against its hegemony. From Baghdad, which will be under military control, it will strike Damascus and Tehran…. The problem is no longer Iraq’s problem only, it is the problem of the whole Arab nation from Tangier to Baghdad. The fate is one, and it is written in martyrs’ blood.”[19] These claims resonate in the Arab world, where America’s campaign against terrorism is often seen rather as an extension of American imperialism.
Shibley Telhami warns that regime change by military action in Iraq will be viewed by Muslims in the Arab world as an example of this American imperialism: “Powerful ideas are willingly accepted because they inspire, not threaten. Even those who are reluctant to embrace democracy, like the leaders in Beijing, have understood the need to emulate much of America’s economic approach lest they be left further behind. And in embracing a new economic approach, they have also unleashed a political process they will not be able fully to control.”[20] Telhami’s observation thus begs the question: can such a process be unleashed in Iraq right now by creating favorable economic conditions for ordinary Iraqis? Could such a process induce a momentum for democratic change that even Saddam Hussein would not be able fully to control?
Imagining a Nonviolent Alternative
In order to answer the question of whether a plausible nonviolent economic alternative to military action indeed exists, we must look more closely at the current sanctions regime in light of UNSC Resolution 1441. In 1995, following five years of comprehensive sanctions on Iraq, the UN Security Council established the Oil-for-Food program in response to the growing humanitarian crisis the sanctions were producing in Iraq. Under this program Iraq is now permitted to sell unlimited amounts of oil to “finance the purchase of humanitarian goods,” all of which are subject to strict UN approval in order to prevent importation of so-called “dual-use” goods that could have military as well as civilian applications. [21] The Oil-for-Food program was conceived as a way to alleviate the suffering of the Iraqi people while restricting the government’s ability to rebuild its military.
The UN emphasizes the positive effects of this program on the Iraqi population but acknowledges that it was never intended to become a long-term solution: “The oil-for-food programme was never intended to be a substitute for normal economic activity. As long as the comprehensive sanctions remain in force, however, there is no alternative to the programme for addressing the humanitarian situation in Iraq. Despite its shortcomings, the programme has and continues to make a major difference in the lives of ordinary Iraqis.”[22] The UN points out that the program has been expanded and now encompasses infrastructure rehabilitation as well as 34 different sectors. These sectors, which were expanded in June 2002, now include: “food, food-handling, health, nutrition, electricity, agriculture and irrigation, education, transport and telecommunications, water and sanitation, housing, settlement rehabilitation (internally displaced persons—IDPs), demining, special allocation for especially vulnerable groups, and oil industry spare parts and equipment” as well as “construction, industry, labour and social affairs, Board of Youth and Sports, information, culture, religious affairs, justice, finance, and Central Bank of Iraq.”[23] The UN contends that efforts in these sectors have resulted in tangible improvements in the “overall socio-economic conditions of the Iraqi people country wide. In addition, it has prevented the further degradation of public services and infrastructure.”[24] Some of the specific improvements cited include an increase in the nutritional value of monthly food distributions, significant decreases in children’s malnutrition rates, a more reliable electricity supply to consumers, and substantial increases in residential construction projects (14,432,896 square meters by the end of 2002).[25] Moreover, the UN highlights that the program is now meeting 60 percent of the need for supplies at primary and secondary schools in the center and south of Iraq, while improvements in the agricultural sector have made poultry and eggs affordable to large segments of the population for the first time since sanctions were imposed.[26]
Critics of the program, however, say that its shortcomings are profound and that sanctions have hampered reconstruction of the Iraqi middle class by making ordinary Iraqis even more dependent on Saddam’s regime for daily subsistence: “[If] there is to be any internal pressure on the Iraqi government to improve its human rights record—or, indeed, even if it is to be successfully challenged—it will not happen while the average Iraqi’s means of survival depends on the regime’s control of resources.”[27] Another observer puts it this way: “The sanctions have wiped out Iraq’s middle class, once substantial and the envy of the Arab world. Engineers on the verge of retirement now make $20 a month, and teachers only a fourth of that. At the same time, the sanctions have made most of Iraq’s 22 million people dependent on monthly rations paid for by UN-supervised oil sales—creating what some observers have called Iraq’s ‘dictatorship of need.’”[28] In the view of many experts, economic sanctions have actually increased Saddam’s power over his population, because he controls all imported goods and has also profited handsomely from a thriving black market in illegal oil sales to Syria, Turkey, and Jordan, two of which are key U.S. allies in the region. Estimates put the profits from this illicit oil smuggling at $2 billion dollars per year—illegal income that flows directly to Saddam’s regime.[29]
Moreover, American and British concerns about “dual-use” items have further restricted the flow of goods to ordinary Iraqi consumers: “In all, the $54 billion worth of oil sold under [Oil-for-Food] has translated into fewer than $20 billion-worth of goods arriving in Iraq. This amounts to a meager 41 cents a day per person, hardly enough to repair the country’s infrastructure or rebuild its shattered middle class.”[30] On an annual basis, that figure amounts to about $156 for each Iraqi citizen.[31] At the same time, critics have said that the Oil-for-Food program serves merely as a band-aid by bringing commodities into the country “rather than restoring Iraqis’ purchasing power or the country’s infrastructure to anything approaching pre-war levels.”[32] As a result of this rampant poverty and a crumbling civilian infrastructure, “to impoverished Iraqis, the goods in Baghdad’s shops may be as unattainable as if they were on display in Amman.”[33] A growing number of Middle East experts have therefore begun to call for the complete elimination of non-military economic sanctions on Iraq as a way of empowering the middle class and removing the political and humanitarian leverage Saddam Hussein now enjoys under the current Oil-for-Food regime. Bengio made a similar argument in 2001:
[Containment] should be modified slightly, so as to maintain the vigilance of Iraq’s nuclear, chemical and biological weapons programs—preferably through an ongoing U.N. inspections regime with teeth, backed up by the constant and credible threat of force—while easing economic sanctions, especially along humanitarian lines. Taken together these moves may ease the state of emergency in Iraq, which itself has become Saddam’s primary card.[34]
Thus, the return of weapons inspectors to Iraq satisfies an essential precondition for the lifting of sanctions and makes it possible to imagine going even further. Some experts have suggested that by moving toward a more drastic economic recovery program designed to accelerate the rehabilitation of Iraq’s middle class and economic infrastructure, the international community would go a long way toward undermining Saddam’s regime.
Michael Isherwood, a lieutenant colonel in the U.S. Air Force, discusses the potential benefits of such a policy: “By lifting economic sanctions, the Bush administration would demonstrate its concern for the welfare of the Iraqi people and deny Saddam the ability to blame the United States for their suffering. Without sanctions, Saddam will have to improve the quality of life for all Iraqis.”[35] And if Saddam fails to deliver, the logic goes, his people—released from dependence on his regime for daily survival—will begin to generate crucial momentum for a change in leadership and Saddam’s position will be weakened. At the same time, lifting sanctions would deny Saddam the illicit income that he currently achieves through black-market oil smuggling.[36] One journalist points out that it was nonviolent means, and not military action, that finally brought down Slobodan Milosevic in Yugoslavia:
The actual heavy lifting to overthrow Milosevic was done by key elements in the society—the students, the trade unions, the middle classes. The combination of student demonstrations and a miners’ strike ignited a popular revolt. The United States also assembled an international coalition which, at the crucial moment, exerted political and diplomatic pressures…Perhaps something along these lines could be done in Iraq. The oil workers could play the role the miners played in Yugoslavia. Women, too, might become a key agent of change; there are stirrings throughout the Muslim world that reflect women’s desire for greater freedom.[37]
This suggestion, of course, is a simplification. However, it does point to an alternative that has not received sufficient attention in American policymaking circles. In fact, the existing Oil-for-Food infrastructure would serve as an appropriate jumping-off point for an expanded market. The international community, working through the UN, would need to devote substantial funds towards bringing to Iraq’s population “technology, credit, access to world markets, and management know-how.”[38]
A cadre of educated merchants already exists in Iraq, which used to reign as one of the most modern and successful capitalist economies of the Arab world until Saddam Hussein led his people into two devastating wars. Ironically, it was Saddam himself who was responsible for this economic development: “While other Arab states traded their petrol dollars for palaces, Iraq built roads, schools and factories, and sent engineers and doctors to study in the United States and Europe. Saddam ordered sweeping land reform, a health-care system and minimum-wage laws. He opened male-dominated professions to women…. Iraq became the Arab world’s first modern economy.”[39] Since the 1980s, however, Iraq’s middle class has languished into poverty, and “by 1993 the Iraqi economy under sanctions stood at one-fifth its size in 1979, and then took a further nose dive in 1994.”[40] The State Department estimated Iraq’s Gross Domestic Product (GDP) at $57 billion in 2001 and its annual GDP per capita in 2000 at $2,500, with 100 percent inflation.[41] Any economic development would thus capitalize on Iraq’s already-existing infrastructure and would seek to engage directly with the educated workforce-in-waiting.
U.S. allies in the region would need to become key players in this strategy and would have strong economic incentives to do so. For example, Jordan, which already depends vitally on Iraqi oil and on the Iraqi market for Jordanian consumer goods, would play a central role.[42] Jordan’s Foreign Minister, Dr. Marwan Muasher, recently explained the economic reasons behind its preference for a non-military approach to regime change in Iraq: “[When] Jordan speaks about Iraq, it is not in the business of defending Saddam. When we speak about Iraq, we speak out of our own national interest… We have all our oil supply coming from Iraq at a discounted rate. If we are to get our oil from other than Iraqi oil, we have to come up with 550 million additional money [to pay] the difference…. To give you an idea, this is 8 percent of our GDP.”[43]
Dr. Muasher elaborates further that a military crisis in Iraq would destabilize Jordan politically as well as economically: “It would create public discontent at home, especially if there are civilians being it in Iraq. It will create a refugee problem on our borders…. We are not talking about defending Saddam Hussein. I doubt anybody would defend his regime…. But we believe that diplomacy should be given a chance, so that this can be achieved through diplomacy and not through a war.”[44] Jordan thus has a clear economic and political interest in contributing to an economic development package that might avert war and increase the size of the Iraqi market for Jordanian products. Jordan’s counterparts in the Arab League also officially oppose military action against Iraq, as expressed in a recent communiqué urging “continued cooperation between the UN and Iraq as a prelude to the lifting of sanctions and embargo imposed on Iraq and to end the suffering of its people.”[45] Like Jordan, these Arab League states have strong trade interests in Iraq that could provide compelling incentives to participate in an economic and human development program for the Iraqi people. The presence of about 100 Saudi businesses at the Baghdad International Trade Fair in November 2002 illustrates the attractiveness of Iraqi markets to key Arab League states.[46] Politically, moreover, Arab League participation would also help to neutralize any efforts by Saddam Hussein to portray an economic development package as an American conspiracy against the Arabs.
Indeed, an essential component of such a plan would be a targeted public diplomacy effort aimed at engaging the Iraqi public directly. This effort would need to counteract Saddam’s propaganda machine with the message that economic benefits can only be sustained as part of a broader democratic transition—something unattainable as long as Saddam Hussein remains in power. Right now, “apart from the material harm done by sanctions, the perception that they are harmful is itself harmful, reducing Iraqis’ expectations and therefore the government’s incentives to meet them.”[47] As a result, lifting sanctions would create an immediate sense of expectation among the Iraqi public for improvements in their quality of life, which the international could help to deliver through trade. By offering Iraqis tangible economic benefits now and drawing a clear connection between Iraqi suffering and the policies of Saddam Hussein’s regime, such a plan would serve both to empower the middle class at large as consumers and to increase their incentives to push internally for regime change
Leveraging Public Diplomacy for Regime Change
The United States would need to devote significant public diplomacy resources toward bringing this message to Iraqis. Public diplomacy “involves U.S. Government activities intended to understand, inform, and influence foreign publics through international exchanges, international programs, media research and polling, and support for nongovernmental organizations.”[48] These activities encompass a range of processes and strategies, some traditional and some non-traditional, all of which are intended to serve America’s national and foreign policy interests: “Public diplomacy solidifies relations with America’s allies, seeks to inculcate others with American values, and promotes mutual understanding between the United States and other societies. Done properly, it reduces the potential for conflict—military, political, and economic—and dispels negative notions about the United States.”[49]
Public diplomacy represents an “inexpensive, yet highly effective, way to promote American policy and interests overseas.”[50] This outreach entails more than public speeches, press releases, or media appearances; it requires “sustained interaction with the indigenous government, media, elite, and public at large to build sympathetic constituencies…. It means disseminating information about U.S. policies and values…[and] exposing foreigners to U.S. culture and ideas.”[51] The United States would therefore need to begin a vigorous public diplomacy initiative to coincide with the economic rehabilitation program. Allies like Jordan and Turkey, both of which stand to benefit materially from the lifting of sanctions, would need to become a part of that positive message.
It will no doubt be a challenge to penetrate Iraqi society with a public diplomacy message, but a promising medium has emerged in recent months that could perhaps be exploited to reach out to the younger segments of Iraqi society on a large scale. Young Iraqis would play a critical role in generating the political momentum for nonviolent regime change. This project is the Middle East Radio Network (MERN), more often dubbed Radio Sawa. The Washington-based, Arabic-language radio station, launched by the U.S. government in March 2002, represents a distinctly new approach to international broadcasting: “85 percent pop music, 15 percent government-generated news, slickly packaged with market research in hand.”[52] Radio Sawa plays both American and Arabic popular music, punctuated by short news broadcasts, 24 hours a day, through a combination of FM, AM, medium-wave, and digital satellite channels.[53] The station broadcasts out of Jordan, Kuwait, the United Arab Emirates, Greece, Djibouti, and Cyprus, to ensure that it reaches the widest possible audience in the Middle East.[54] Radio Sawa “hopes, as its primary mission, to advance long-term U.S. interests through the broadcast of accurate information, and at least dispel some of the fictions spewed by Arab government-run media.”[55] The station employs sophisticated marketing techniques to reach its target audience of young people under 25, a potential market of 300 million people. These techniques are reflected in its programming: “[The] idea was to build an audience with commercial type programming, then sell it a product—in this case, American news and American values.”[56] Although it is still too soon to determine the exact size and demographics of that audience, early assessments suggest significant potential. A survey in October 2002 revealed that Radio Sawa is now the most-listened-to radio station among young people in Amman, Jordan—Iraq’s immediate neighbor to the west.[57]
Radio Sawa programming could be tailored to the specific characteristics of Iraqi society. It could be used to counteract Saddam Hussein’s propaganda, which continues to deflect blame for the suffering of ordinary Iraqis under his repressive regime. The initiative also anticipates the challenge of reaching Iraqi airwaves by using several bandwidths and wave channels. This design feature will protect its ability to reach Iraqis should an Arab government be pressured to shut down one or even some of its broadcasting locations. This would prevent Saddam Hussein from completely blocking Sawa’s message from reaching the Iraqi people.
Constructive Regime Change: A Real Possibility?
While public diplomacy initiatives can and have been launched already in an attempt to engage the Iraqi public, these efforts alone will never be enough to engender any meaningful change in Iraq. The question thus remains: does lifting economic sanctions as part of an urgent economic rehabilitation package represent a viable nonviolent means to regime change? Unfortunately, it does not appear likely that lifting sanctions would succeed in empowering the middle class sufficiently to facilitate regime change. Prospects for rehabilitating the Iraqi middle class while Saddam remains in power, without enriching Saddam himself, are dismal. Saddam has demonstrated time and again throughout his rule that his control is pervasive and absolute. Although there is ample evidence to conclude that sanctions have had the unintended consequence of strengthening Saddam Hussein’s leverage internally, there is little doubt that they have severely hampered his ability to threaten regional and international security by rebuilding his military and weapons of mass destruction program. Just because sanctions have not weakened Saddam Hussein internally does not mean that removing them would weaken him either. That is a dangerous leap of faith. Indeed, there is a formidable body of evidence to suggest that these sanctions have impeded his efforts to rearm.
If nothing else, lifting sanctions would likely cause the Iraqi people to expect more from their regime in terms of social welfare, perhaps shifting more of the responsibility for their suffering back onto the regime and away from the United States. But Saddam has demonstrated repeatedly that he can skillfully manipulate the expectations of his people to his own advantage. He is a master of self-preservation, whether that means releasing political prisoners when it is expedient or targeting civilians with nerve gas in order to suppress a popular rebellion. Saddam has proven that he does not hesitate to sacrifice the well being of his people for the sake of his own rule. There is not enough compelling evidence to suggest that he would act differently if a newly rehabilitated middle class began clamoring for more freedom. Even after the Gulf War, when he was thought to be at his weakest, Saddam managed to crush a Shiite rebellion and consolidate his power once again. It would be dangerous to assume that Saddam would not also manipulate the lifting of sanctions to his own advantage. Indeed, to underestimate his resilience—and his will to persevere—would be to ignore the history of his more than 20 years in power. Nation building, it seems, will have to wait until Saddam leaves the picture. But as soon as he does, the United States and the international community will need to have a massive economic rehabilitation package ready for immediate implementation. And they must also be prepared to sustain it for many years to come.
[1] United Nations Security Council Resolution 1441, November 8, 2002 (http://www.un.int/usa/sres-iraq.htm).
[2] Mariana Ottaway et al, “Democratic Mirage in the Middle East,” Carnegie Endowment for International Peace Policy Brief (October 2002): 2.
[3] Kenneth M. Pollack, “Next Stop Baghdad?” Foreign Affairs (March/April 2002): 45.
[4] United States Department of State, “Background Notes: Iraq” (http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/6804.htm).
[5] Council on Foreign Relations, “Iraq: The Country” (http://www.cfr.org/background/background_iraq_thecountry.php).
[6] http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/6804.htm.
[7] http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/6804.htm.
[8] Council on Foreign Relations, http://www.cfr.org/background/background_iraq_thecountry.php.
[9] Council on Foreign Relations, http://www.cfr.org/background/background_iraq_thecountry.php.
[10] http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/6804.htm.
[11] Council on Foreign Relations, http://www.cfr.org/background/background_iraq_thecountry.php.
[12] http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/6804.htm.
[13] Sarah Graham-Brown and Chris Toensing, “Why Another War: A Backgrounder on the Iraq Crisis,” Middle East Research and Information Project (October 2002): 2-3.
[14] Graham-Brown 6.
[15] Ofra Bengio, “How Does Saddam Hold On?” Foreign Affairs (July/August 2000).
[16] Bengio, “How Does Saddam Hold On?”
[17] Anthony Shadid, “Hussein Woos Iraqis with Food and Jobs,” The Boston Globe (October 15, 2002): A1.
[18] Rajiv Chandrasekaran, “Hussein Frees Thousands in Iraqi Prisons,” The Washington Post (October 21, 2002): A1.
[19] Middle East Media Research Institute (MEMRI), Special Dispatch Series – No. 437, November 5, 2002.
[20] Shibley Telhami, “A Hidden Cost of War on Iraq,” New York Times (October 7, 2002).
[21] United Nations, Office of the Iraq Programme, “Oil-for-food programme: A Fact Sheet,” November 2002 (http://www.un.org/Depts/oip/background/fact-sheet.html).
[22] http://www.un.org/Depts/oip/background/fact-sheet.html.
[23] http://www.un.org/Depts/oip/background/fact-sheet.html.
[24] http://www.un.org/Depts/oip/background/fact-sheet.html.
[25] http://www.un.org/Depts/oip/background/fact-sheet.html.
[26] http://www.un.org/Depts/oip/background/fact-sheet.html.
[27] Peter Kiernan, “Oil-for-Food Revenue Equivalent to Yearly Income of $156 for Each Iraqi,” Washington Report on Middle East Affairs 21, no. 3 (April 2002): 22.
[28] Shadid, “Hussein Woos Iraqis.”
[29] Graham Brown 9.
[30] “Sharpening sanctions; Iraqi sanctions,” The Economist (May 15, 2002).
[31] Kiernan 21.
[32] Graham-Brown 8.
[33] Colin Rowat, “How the Sanctions Hurt Iraq,” Middle East Research and Information Project Press Information Notes, August 2, 2001 (http://www.merip.org/pins/pin65.html).
[34] Bengio, “How Does Saddam Hold On?”
[35] Michael W. Isherwood, “U.S. Strategic Options for Iraq: Easier Said than Done,” The Washington Quarterly 25, no. 2 (Spring 2002): 145.
[36] Isherwood 145.
[37] Dusko Doder, “How Not to Overthrow Saddam; the Bush plan and the alternatives,” The American Prospect (July 15, 2002): 24.
[38] George C. Lodge, “The Corporate Key: Using Big Business to Fight Global Poverty,” Foreign Affairs 81, no. 4 (July/August 2002): 14.
[39] Stephen Glain, “Saddam the Builder,” Newsweek (March 11, 2002): 30.
[40] Graham-Brown 7.
[41] http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/6804.htm.
[42] Graham-Brown 9.
[43] Briefing by Dr. Marwan Muasher, Minister of Foreign Affairs of Jordan, July 19, 2002, Brookings Institution (http://www.jordanembassyus.org/new/me/iraq.shtml).
[44] http://www.jordanembassyus.org/new/me/iraq.shtml.
[45] Arab League Resolution, November 11, 2002 (http://www.arableagueonline.org/arableague/english).
[46] Sahid Ali Khan, “100 Firms to Participate in Baghdad Fair,” Saudi Gazette (September 29, 2002).
[47] Rowat, “How the Sanctions Hurt Iraq” (http://www.merip.org/pins/pin65.html).
[48] United States Advisory Commission on Public Diplomacy, “Consolidation of USIA into the State Department: An Assessment After One Year,” October 2000 (http://www.state.gov/www/policy/pdadcom/acpdreport.pdf) 5.
[49] United States Advisory Commission on Public Diplomacy, “Consolidation” 5.
[50] United States Advisory Commission on Public Diplomacy, “Consolidation” 5.
[51] United States Advisory Commission on Public Diplomacy, “Consolidation” 8.
[52] Felicity Barringer, “U.S. Messages to Arab Youth, Wrapped in Song,” New York Times (June 17, 2002): A8.
[53] Janine Zacharia, “Tuning into the voice of freedom,” The Jerusalem Post (April 19, 2002): 7B.
[54] Barringer, “U.S. Messages.”
[55] Zacharia, “Tuning.”
[56] Barringer, “U.S. Messages.”
[57] “Research Shows Radio Sawa Surges in Middle East,” PR Newswire, October 9, 2002.