Shijun Liu

                                                                                                            December 5, 2002

                                                                                                            Bruce Lusignan

The Ethics of War In Religion And What Needs To Be Understood For Peacekeeping In The Middle East

War and religion have historically had an interesting relationship in the Middle East.  This unique geographic region has served as the center of the three main religions of the world, Christianity, Judaism, and Islam, while also remained a war-ridden place from the days of antiquity.  In light of the present crisis involving war and terrorism, the international community has poured in much effort to maintain peace in the Middle East.  However, the success of those peacekeeping efforts has been minimal, and the type of excessive bloodshed that has come to be associated with the region continues.  Understanding the ethics of war in each of the three religions would contribute to our understanding of the events of war in the Middle East, and would further shed light on the improvements that need to be made in the peacekeeping process. 

First, the basic view on war held by the Christians is that war is rarely justified.  Christianity condemns the taking of human life and places on the state the duty of protecting the innocent.  The state has the prerogative to do what is necessary to prevent human lives from being wasted.  Nevertheless, though war is to be avoided under ordinary circumstances, the Christian faith does allow for Just Wars to be conducted when the appropriate conditions are met.  In order to defend human lives and uphold morality, there exist times when force must be used. 

The Just War principles originated from the ancient times with classical Greek and Roman philosophers Plato and Cicero.  Later, Christian theologians like Augustine and Thomas Aquinas provided their own addendum.  In its essence, the Just War Theory amends and even reconciles the assumption that taking another human life is wrong.  Of course, the duty belongs to a righteous Christian to distinguish proper from non-proper circumstances.  As a necessary detractor, it must be emphasized that the Just War Theory provides only a framework for groups and individuals to assess the justification for waging wars of absolute necessity.  In its appropriate form, the Just War Theory differentiates between the actions of groups and individuals.  For groups e.g. nations, states, etc., the decision is to either wage or not wage war on another group.  For individuals, he/she must use the Just War Theory to help him/her decide whether it is morally right to take part in war.  The foundation of the Just War Theory, however, lies not in justifying but rather preventing wars.  Its primary objective is to serve as motivation for states to look for alternative ways of resolving conflicts.  One should note that historically humans have erred in this area.  People would be misled into thinking that the mere claim of a war fitting the criteria of the Just War Theory erases all the wrongs associated with that war.  Just because a war is justified, it’s not actually a good thing. (BBC, Religion & Ethics of War)  Although a Just War is permissible because it’s a lesser evil, it nevertheless is an evil (BBC, Religion & Ethics of War).  War, however justifiable, always brings harm to the people who are affected. 

Different from Christianity, Judaism does not regard the kind of violence that brings about justice as wrong.  It accepts that certain kinds of war would be ethically justified.  Sometimes it could even be morally acceptable to kill.  In the Old Testament God gives his clear approval to war as he is identified as a warrior, leading the Jews in conflict, bringing them victory, and protecting them from enemy forces.  But at the same time the Old Testament portrays the Jewish race as a group of people longing for peace, “they shall beat their swords into ploughshares and their spears into pruning hooks: nation shall not lift up sword against nation, neither shall they learn war any more.” (Isaiah 2, Ibid.)  It must be noted, however, that peace is perceived as holy, coming directly from God, and will only be realized when moral justice and harmony have been established between not only peoples, but also among individuals within their communities.  What this implies is that justice cannot be claimed unless every member of the group is free from prejudice and inequality.  And members of that group have the duty to make sure that fellow members receive the fair treatment that they deserve and should take the effort to actively pursue justice for their peers.

Before declaring battle, however, the wagers of the war must genuinely attempt to make peace.  Both parties should try to resolve all conflicts in a violence-free manner.  Any military action without attempts to make peace is unlawful. (Deuteronomy 20:10)  Before the start of the battle, it is also the duty of the military commander to make sure that innocent civilian lives be spared.  Nevertheless, to make the above rule pragmatic, necessary amendments were added.  For example, if a non-combatant knowingly stays in a place where the battle is about to take place and disregards the given warnings, then he/she waives his/her safety and protection.  Even if this were the case, however, soldiers must make the effort to distinguish between active fighters and non-participants.  During the war, soldiers are allowed to intentionally kill only combatants.  They should not approach the living quarters of civilians if they have no reason to be suspicious of a hiding enemy.  

            A special case in Judaism, in which violence is permitted, is self-defense.  The Talmud specifically states that a person, either a Jew or a non-Jew, is permitted to kill “a pursuer” to save his life.  As simple as it sounds, this rule carries remarkable consequences.  It extends far beyond the reaches of the individuals to entire groups of people and even to states.  Thus if a nation feels that another nation is infringing upon its territory and harming its people, then it possesses the right to defeat the attackers and secure peace within its domain.  This rule, however, does not clearly define when an act constitutes an infringement of its land and leaves this complex judgment to the leaders in charge.

Contrary to the other two religions, Islam sets down clear and firm guidelines for when a war is ethical and how a war should be conducted.  War is permitted in defending oneself, (Qur’an 22:39) in defending Islam, in protecting Muslims from oppressing states, and in protecting the innocent from being oppressed. (Qur’an 4:75)  War should be conducted in a disciplined way, avoiding injury to non-combatants, (Qur’an 2:190) with minimum force, with no anger, and with humane treatment toward prisoners of war.  In all cases, murdering the innocent leads to punishment in Hell, “If anyone killed a person – unless it was for murder or for spreading mischief in the land – it would be as if he killed the whole people.” (Qur’an 5:32)

In addition, Muslims must take to heart the fact that defending Islam should never be confused with spreading Islam.  An example of defending Islam is fighting off the enemy when an Islamic state is being explicitly attacked.  Defending Islam does not mean forcefully manipulate people of other faiths in attempt to spread religion.  A nation does not possess the right to conquer another nation, regardless of who was the initiator of aggression.  Islam condemns such behavior of seeking revenge on the aggressor.

During battle, soldiers must also follow a strict code of conduct.  For example, Islam forbids the attacking of wounded soldiers unless the wounded is still fighting.  Similar to Judaism, only combatants should be targeted during battle.  The Prophet’s view for protecting non-combatants is shown by a hadith in which Muhammad sees a woman being killed in the battlefield and condemns the action.  The Qur’an also lays down rules for the treatment of prisoners of war, “when you meet in battle those who disbelieve, then smite the necks until when you have overcome them, then make them prisoners, and afterwards either set them free as a favor or let them ransom themselves until the war terminates.” (Qur’an 47:4)  In addition to the Qur’an, military commanders are also responsible for providing guidance to their soldiers.  Abu Bakr, the First Caliph, gave a list of rules that must be obeyed to his army when he released them into battle.  Among them include, “do not commit treachery or deviate from the right path; neither kill a child, nor a woman, nor an aged man; bring no harm to the trees, nor burn them with fire, especially those which are fruitful; you are likely to pass by people who have devoted their lives to monastic services; leave them alone.” (Qur’an 47:4)  To advocate the strict adherence to the rules, examples of noble conduct are glorified.  Saladin demonstrated ideal Muslim conduct during the capture of Jerusalem in 1187.  Although Christians had ravaged a number places holy to Islam, Saladin steadfastly prohibited acts of vengeance.  His army behaved in such a disciplined way that there were no deaths or violence after the city surrendered. (Qur’an 47:4)

In the context of modern day terrorism, militant Muslims have put forth the argument that they have rightfully devoted themselves to the pursuit of justice using whatever means necessary.  Thus to understand the sources of extreme activities such as terrorism, we must trace to the root of the problem by looking at the circumstances surrounding religious fanaticism.  After all, those people have proven so desperate as to relinquish all logical means as conflict resolutions.  The primary cause that would help to explain the zeal exhibited by the religious fanatics comes from their belief that severe wrong has been done to Muslims.  They often see a powerful enemy e.g. a militarily strong nation such as Israel as the source to prolonged suffering.  Moreover, they see themselves as either ignored by the international community or that the help provided by the other nations is inadequate.  They feel obligated as conscious Muslims to bring justice to a group of severely battered people.  There will never be peace as long as the tyrannical suppressor is in existence.  Fighting the suppressor face-to-face, however, would mean certain death since the general population lacks the necessary military means to combat the invaders.  But justice must be pursued, and Islam calls for the unity of the Muslims to bring justice to other Muslims.  Under the circumstances of desperation, whatever one can do to weaken the suppressor could be seen as a service to the general cause.  So to a suicide bomber, he/she is showing the purest devotion to justice by doing all that he/she could personally do to defeat the enemy so that those being harmed could be set free. 

In an example from Holy War, Holy Peace, Gopin shows an encounter with a distinguished young man from Gaza who addresses the concerns of Muslims in the area.  Gopin served as the moderator of the discussion during the meeting involving the Gazan, two well-educated Israelis, several Arabs, and several American Christians. (Gopin 18)  The chief concern of the young man from Gaza was that the Gaza strip is a source to grave injustice.  Many Palestinian people have been destroyed or harmed there over an extended period of time by the Israeli Jews.  He asks, “why is everyone apologizing to the Jews, when the Jews should be apologizing to us?”  The profundity of the question lies in his audacious questioning of the present situation with regard to the inaction of the international community.  What he is effectively saying is, “What about us?  What about our pain that is happening now, not fifty years ago?”  The Muslims, when angry, are not likely to admit that they are hurt and need help to another group.  This would be outright humiliating by religious standards.  Furthermore, the Israelis hold a distinct militarily advantage in the conflict with the Palestinians, and this phenomenon alone generates a sense of shame and inferiority in the Palestinians.  Gopin observs, “it seemed to this young Gazan that he was really trying to share the depth of his misery to the group by using the concentration of his metaphor.  He stole their unique place of pain, and thus the sacred memory of murdered family members.” (Gopin 19) 

Another issue that has sprung up is the method used for settling disputes.  When the Western nations intervene with the affairs of the Middle East, they have a tendency to assume that the Middle East nations would be satisfied at the ways for making peace in the West.  The use of words as the principal means of peacemaking is ubiquitous in Western culture.  Those who consider themselves peacemakers and diplomats are skilled at resolving conflict through negotiating.  Consequently, the willingness to use words is indispensable in peacemaking negotiations conducted by Western nations.  However, a common fallacy lies in assuming that people of other cultures are ready to “come to the table” and speak up.  This vital first step for the nations in dispute to come forth and outline their differences and agree on future arrangements has proven difficult.  For many Middle Eastern countries, the lack of trust, and suspicion of deception, frustrates any attempt to arrive at a peace settlement. (New 165)  Most of time they choose not to articulate their true feelings for reasons either it is beyond their present capacity, or they feel it is really shameful, like deep envy, or shame at the collective humiliation of one’s group. (Gopin 144)  Conducting battle, however, is far more virile and honorable than articulating in words feelings of one’s grief or inferiority. 

Thus not surprisingly, the mismatch of peacemaking expectations has contributed to repeated failures for arriving at an agreeable resolution during negotiations.  Intuitively, if one party expects words and the other expects deeds, or one expects rational negotiation and the other expects apology, then we have the makings of conflict perpetuation, and even escalation, with the intervention of verbally obsessed peacemakers who do not understand this problem. (Gopin 145)  What is worse is that if a resolution is somehow forced, then one party would come to expect the terms to be followed while the other would utterly disregard what is expected of them.  When conflicts break out after the negotiation process (which they inevitably will as the real issue has not been settled), the hostility would aggregate upon previous experiences.

            Using specific example from an actual peacemaking negotiation on the international level, in repeated interviews between Arabs and Jews, striking differences to how each addresses and interacts with the other is observed.  Arabs see honor and dignity as the vital necessities during meetings.  They honor the Jews through obvious and implied conciliatory language and gestures and expect the same in return.  The Jews, on the other hand, see honoring the Arabs as far less important, or even something that would be useful only as the culmination of a relationship.  Jewish members often miss the cues altogether.  What the Jews perceive as necessary is that the Arabs must recognize the issues of security and life preservation of the Jews.  The Arabs must also acknowledge the right of Israel to exist.  The Israelis consider this basic to any meeting, and take grave offense when realizing that their assumption is not shared.  For the Arabs, of course, acknowledging the right of Israel to exist (at times at the expense of sacrificing their own land) should be considered as part of the endgame, after Israel has shown signs of goodwill and a genuine effort to making peace.  Thus the Jews miss the precious verbal and nonverbal gestures involving honor and dignity while the Arabs miss the critically important existential needs expressed by Jews.  Needless to say, this initial mismatch of expectations would play an important part in hampering the processes of conflict resolutions that soon follow. 

During meetings, further clashes arise from incompatibilities.  Israelis are often eager to speak, interact, and argue with the Arabs and Palestinians, while the latter in principle would refuse, even at international gatherings involving third-party moderators, to look the Israelis in the eye and speak to them directly (Gopin 141).  To rejectionist Jews and sometimes peacemakers, this would be mistaken for proof that Muslims would never accept the Jewish existence in the Middle East under any terms.  For the Jews, there would be nothing useful to discuss without a basic commitment to the value of their lives, their faith, and their existence.

            The conclusions that we can draw, however, from these failures to make peace would prove beneficial toward future efforts of peacemaking.  It is evidently clear that we must not use words and dialogue as the only path of reconciliation.  As moderators, Western nations must train their delegates to watch for all cues offered by Muslims.  They must also try to understand the depths and power of human symbolism in the Muslim World, and not miss the important opportunities for transforming relationships between nations in the Middle East.  We must open our minds and the minds of our allies to a variety of possible paths of reconciliation.  Grievances are bound to strike either side when gestures of reconciliation are ignored or not appropriately reciprocated.  In other words, in addition to training our diplomats and peacemakers in dialogue and negotiation, we must train them to detect other gestures of reconciliation innate to the Muslim World.  Dialogue is only one subset of ways for human reconciliation, favoring those who are verbal and aggressive in group encounters.  It favors the better educated, and frustrates those who engage in reconciliation through gestures, symbols, emotions, and shared work. (Gopin 142)  The use of words has its limits.  In the Muslim World, actions and deeds mean much more, and are trusted much more than the words and symbols adopted by the West.

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Gopin, Marc.  Holy War, Holy Peace.  Oxford University Press.  New York.  2002.

New, David, S.  Holy War.  McFarland & Company, Inc.  Jefferson, N.C.  2002.

Thompson, Kenneth, W.  Ethics And International Relations.  Volume Two.  Council on Religion & International Affairs.  New York.  1985.

Partner, Peter.  God of Battles, Holy Wars of Christianity and Islam.  Princeton University Press.  New Jersey.  1997.

BBC – Religion & Ethics of War.  Http://www.bbc.co.uk/religion/ethics/war/christian.shtml.  2002.

BBC – Religion & Ethics of War.  Http://www.bbc.co.uk/religion/ethics/war/justwarintro.shtml.  2002.

BBC – Religion & Ethics of War.  Http://www.bbc.co.uk/religion/ethics/war/judaism.shtml.  2002.

BBC – Religion & Ethics of War.  Http://www.bbc.co.uk/religion/ethics/war/islam.shtml.  2002.

Geering, Lloyd.  Who Resolves the Conflict.  The Fourth – An Advocate for Religious Literacy.  Volume 15.  Number 4.  July – August 2002.