Graduating Senior !!
A Historical Drama Replayed:
The US War on Drugs in Latin America
Aqueelah McKinley
EDGE: Spring 2003
Introduction
The United States has a long history of intervention in the affairs of one it’s southern neighbor, Latin America. The war on drugs has been no exception. An investigation of US relations with Latin America in the period from 1820 to 1960, reveals the war on drugs to be a convenient extension of an almost 200 year-old policy. This investigation focuses on the commercial and political objectives of the US in fighting a war on drugs in Latin America. These objectives explain why the failing drug policy persisted despite its overwhelming failure to decrease drug production or trafficking. These objectives also explain why the US has recently exchanged a war on drugs for the war on terrorism.
Fighting a Losing Battle
Since it’s beginning, the war on drugs has been a series of lost battles. Failed expectations in Panama, Colombia and Bolivia provide glaring examples.
The US invaded Panama in 1989 and removed leader Manuel Noriega from power. Prior to Noriega’s arrest, the Bush administration had portrayed him as a “linchpin” in the narcotics drug trade. However, after his capture and imprisonment on drug charges,the drug trade went on unaffected. Drug trafficking actually increased through Panama (Fishlow 120).
In 1995, the US began to fund aerial eradication campaigns in Colombia. Military planes dumped pesticides over thousands of acres of coca fields. These campaigns turned out to be counterproductive, leading to an actual increase in the amount of coca acreage. The spraying of coca only led Colombian growers to diversify their techniques, growing coca amongst other crops or in locations that were hard to identify by radar techniques. In 2002, the CIA reported that more land was planted in coca than ever before in Colombia’s history ( Kirk 228).
Aerial eradication programs were especially destructive for Colombian farmers, because they were implemented without adequate consideration of the complex economic and political situation of Colombia. The alternative crop programs the US proposed to replace coca failed for various reasons. The unstable political situation made the area too dangerous to bring in “agronomists, engineers, and project specialists” to survey the land (Kirk 265). Even if farmers had been successful in growing alternative crops, the Colombian market for legal crops such as corn, yucca, coffee and chocolate was already “battered by global shifts in price.”(Kirk 264) Legal crops had to be transported on poor roads and farmers had to wait months to be paid for their goods. These were no competition for coca which was paid for immediately, often times with American cash, and transported without any charge to the farmers (Kirk 243).
The US again failed to address the reality that entire peasant villages were built around the coca industry, when devising the Dignity Plan in Bolivia. This plan took effect between1998 and 2002. The war on drugs in Bolivia meant the indiscriminate destruction of both legal and illegal crops by the country’s military. Legal crops destroyed included staple foods and exotic crops. The plan resulted in human rights violations and the dislocation of thousands of peasants- a direct contradiction of the US Senate’s Leahy amendment calls for funding to be withdrawn from militaries responsible for human rights abuses. Alternative development also failed in Bolivia as the legal products did not provide a viable alternative to coca. Ten pineapples are currently sold in Bolivia for one peso, less than 20 U.S. cents. (Is the War on Drugs Bringing Dignity to Bolivia?)
These experiences should have been enough to convince the US that a drug war that sought to reduce foreign supplies while almost ignoring domestic demand. The US failed to adjust US policy despite proof that Latin America would continue to find a way to supply illegal narcotics as long as the US demanded it. This problem was compounded by desperate economic situation of Latin American countries, many on the brink of economic ruin. Latin Americans were unwilling to “resign themselves to poverty” and devised complex networks to move drugs across US borders (Kirk 239)
Capturing major traffickers has only lead to the reorganization of illegal activity. When the leaders of the highly successful, Colombian based Cali Cartel were captured and imprisoned coca production merely shifted north from Peru to Southern Colombia (Kirk 232). The US Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) believes the leaders continue to manage their operations from their prison cells.
Even the capture of large amounts of drugs is inconsequential to traffickers. A U.S. government study concluded that the “enormous profits in cocaine trafficking make interdiction losses relatively inconsequential, especially in light of the fact that production and smuggling costs account for such a small part of street prices.” (Kirk 266) Drug traffickers can afford to lose significant amounts of product en-route because the price soars, between 6,000 and 8,600 percent. All indicators point to the demand in the US for drugs as the root of the drug problem.
Historical Reasons behind a “Frozen” Drug Policy
Drug-war scholar Peter Reuter has described US drug policy as being “frozen in place” since the 1980s (Kirk 241). The question as to why the US continued to implement ineffective drug policy in Latin America may be answered by considering the history of US foreign relations with Latin America. A common theme of US intervention in Latin American political affairs whenever its own economic and political interests are in the balance is easily recognized.
The Monroe Doctrine, signed in 1823, declared the US as protectors of the Western Hemisphere. It recognized Latin America to be in one of its sphere’s of influence. There were dual reasons behind early US interests in Latin America- a shared historical background and an economic incentive. Both North and South America had gained early independence from European power. The US was emerging as a superpower, but had much less interaction with neighboring countries than did its rival, Europe. The Monroe Doctrine was drafted to limit European influence in Latin America. This doctrine would reign over foreign relations in Latin America for over a century (Fishlow 16). Under President Roosevelt, a corollary was added to the doctrine that declared the US to be an “international police power” over the Western Hemisphere (Fishlow 17)
Traditional US interests in Latin America have been in maintaining military security, political solidarity and economic advantage. Between 1898 and 1920, these interests were maintained by military intervention. In 1903, when the Colombian government refused to sign a treaty allowing the US to purchase land and build the Panama Canal, Panama was assisted by the US in gaining independence from Colombia. The US sent warships to prevent the Colombian military from quelling the revolt. Within three days, the US signed a treaty with the newly formed country of Panama for the purchase of the Canal Zone and construction of the Panama Canal. The Canal Zone was used for the next 97 years to conduct security operations and trading. Most recently the Canal Zone has been used as the hub of anti-drug operations. (Colombia Electronic Encylopedia)
During the 1920’s, the US practiced dollar diplomacy in Latin America. President William Taft touted dollar diplomacy, the use of “dollars instead of bullets” to advance US foreign interests, as a “humanatarian” way to forge economic ties with Latin American countries (Mabry, Historical Text Archive). Dollar diplomacy led the US to take over the finances, customs houses and debts of Latin American countries. When Nicaragua was threatened by a civil uprising, President Taft invoked the Roosevelt corollary that declared the US “an international police power” in the Western Hemisphere. Not only were troops sent to quell the revolt, but US banks took over Nicaragua’s customs collections and applied the proceeds directly to Nicaragua’s debt. President Taft encouraged American businesses to extend their loans to Nicaragua, as well as Honduras and Haiti, offering the businessmen full military and diplomatic support from the government. American Marines remained in Nicaragua to prevent future revolts for the next 21 years, excluding a short period in 1925. (US Intervention in Latin America)
President Franklin Roosevelt’s Good Neighbor policy marked an era of non-intervention in Latin American affairs. However, this ‘non invasive’ policy emerged during a time when friendly relations with Latin America were strategically favorable for the US. Numerous developments of this era are described by President Roosevelt:
We have negotiated a Pan American convention embodying the principle of nonintervention. We have abandoned the Platt Amendment, which gave us the right to intervene in the internal affairs of the Republic of Cuba. We have withdrawn American Marines from Haiti. We have signed a new treaty which places our relations with Panama on a mutually satisfactory basis. We have undertaken a series of trade agreements with other American countries to our mutual commercial profit. Peace and War: United States Foreign Policy 1931-1941, 1943, pp. 323-329.
With a second world war looming ahead, the US sought to establish peaceful relations with their nearest neighbors. The Good Neighbor policy proved to be effective in allowing the US to compete with Germany for Latin American influence. Peaceful relations with Latin America during the war helped the US to prevent Axis powers from establishing bases that could endanger the Panama Canal or the United States itself. (Good Neighbor Policy). The US even sought friendly relationships with Latin American leaders who admired the successes of the fascist Axis powers. (Latin America-US Relations).
After World War II, the poverty and severe economic disparities existing in Latin American countries caused the US to fear communist revolutions would erupt. Several countries were given foreign assistance in training police, under the ideology that “if a country became economically self-sufficient through technical assistance from anti-Communist advisors, it would be better able to protect itself against Communist subversion.” Assistance was awarded to countries based on their ranking on a “subversive pressure” scale, from zero to one hundred. A high ranking meant that assistance was urgently needed. (Huggins 76) A developing relationship between Cuba and the Soviet Union increased US concern that other Latin American countries would follow Cuba’s example. The US responded by increasing technical and economic assistance to the region (Latin America-US Relations)
Links between Historical Foreign Policy and the War on Drugs
U.S. intervention in Latin America to further political and economic interests was justified in the late 20th century and into the 21st century in the name of a war on drugs. Many critics of US drug policy claim it was a response to the end of the cold war. They argue that once communism was no longer a national concern, the US had to fabricate another reason to intervene in Latin American affairs. One critic notes the shared ideology between the wars on communism and drugs:
Briefly but frenetically between 1986 and 1990, the US substituted the war on drugs for anti-communism as an ideological and tactical framework for US policy in Latin America. American authorities sunk enormous energy into stopping the South American cocaine flow. The war on drugs combined many of the elements that had long shaped US policy in the Americas . . . With anti-communism in the late 1980s on the wane, the national security apparatus of the state (including the CIA, the Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA), military intelligence, and the National Security Council (NSC)) mobilized for a war on drugs in the hemisphere. (David Sheinin, The New Dollar Diplomacy in Latin America)
Indeed, many of the foreign relations tactics employed by the US between 1820 and 1970 have reappeared in recent years.
The annual recertification process provides an example of how the war on drugs establishes the US as a superpower and allows political manipulation of Latin American countries. Each year, foreign countries receiving aid from the US are subject to an annual recertification procedure in which their efforts to curtail the drug trade are evaluated before US aid is renewed. Mexico’s newest president, Vicente Fox, has been outspoken in his opposition of the recertification process. He speaks for many Latin Americans in calling the process insulting to Latin American countries. The US evaluates the progress of Latin American countries in reducing drug production and trafficking, but no one evaluates the progress of the US towards demand reduction. (Fishlow 121, 122)
Moreover, the recertification process is corrupted by US political interests. Colombia and Mexico have consistently been recertified despite known corruption, human rights atrocities, and growth in drug trafficking in both countries. Aid was renewed based on “intent” to decrease the flow of drugs out of these countries. In a tone similar to the Good Neighbor Policy, US administrations feared the effect that decertification would have on US relations with Mexico and Colombia. ( Drug War Report Card)
In recent years, the US has found a way to
increase military presence in Latin America in the form of a war on terrorism. The war on terrorism provides opportunities
for the U.S. to give more direct aid to Latin American governments than could
be accomplished under the auspices of the war on drugs. The level of involvement the war on
terrorism provides is similar to the war on communism The war on drugs has suffered budget cuts due to the war on
terrorism.
Colombia: A Case Study of the War on Terrorism
Colombia provides a case study of how the war on terrorism allows the US increased protection of its strategic interests. The war on drugs in Colombia already involved the US in Colombia’s real war. As Human Right Watch informant, Robin Kirk, notes:
Like it or not, the US eradication campaign was enmeshed in it (the Colombian civil war) and exacerbated it. To protect the spray planes, the United States had enlisted the help of Colombia’s army. U.S. law required that Americans vet the Colombian troops they chose to train and equip and remove officers or units with human rights problems. Yet even a squeaky-clean counternarcotics battalion could not work in a vacuum. (Kirk 266-267)
Recent US involvement in the Colombian civil war in is, therefore, not entirely new. The involvement is more open and straightforward.
Since the terrorist attacks on the United States in 2001, the US has focused more attention on several international organizations labeled as terrorist groups. Two Colombian leftist insurgencies are included among these groups. These are the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) and the National Liberation Army (ELN). In addition to rebelling against the Colombian government, these groups are also responsible for 170 bombings of a major pipeline owned by the multi-national Occidental Petroleum Company. The bombings caused the pipeline to be out of service for 250 days in 2001, giving the US an economic incentive for aiding the Colombian government in fighting the illegal armed groups.(US Targets Colombian Rebels as War against Terrorism Escalates)
The shift of US attention from the war on drugs to the war on terrorism in Colombia is quantified by major reallocations of US aid. $470 million of yearly funds once allocated to anti-drug operations in Colombia have been shifted to counterinsurgency. $88 million goes toward “infrastructure security programs”, $71 million for helicopters and $17 million for military training (US Focus Expands from Drugs to Oil). The Colombian government has also been given permission to use equipment once only approved for anti-drug operations against terrorists. 900 Colombian soldiers are expected to be trained by the end of 2003.
This aid is proposed to help the Colombian government direct more attention and funds to fighting the guerilla groups. However, Colombians and other critics do not hesitate to point out that Colombia is also the 10th largest supplier of oil to the US. It was glaringly clear that the shifts in funding from anti-drug to anti-terrorism efforts began at a time when a war with Iraq was pending and the disruption of oil supplies were on the horizon.
Rebel groups in Colombia, such as the FARC, see the recent US intervention in Colombia’s civil war as only the newest and most visible development in a long standing effort by the United States to “take Colombian wealth”.( US Focus Expands from Drugs to Oil) According to the FARC, the US has been involved in Colombian affairs since its independence from Spain. In fact, the group traces its beginnings to an attempt by the Colombian military to exile peasants from their lands with help from the US.
The FARC is very outspoken in calling the war on drugs a pretext for the United States to interfere with Colombian “internal affairs.” They believe that the US is eyeing Colombian oil as part of a plot to become independent of Middle Eastern supplies. According to FARC sources, oil recovery in Colombia increased from 100,000 bbls/day in 1980 to 850,000 bbls/day in 1999. The FARC also points to the track record of the U.S. in Nicaragua and Panama as evidence of hypocritical policy. They claim that the US gave the Nicaraguan government weapons in exchange for cocaine and supported Panamanian leader Noriega, though he was known to participate in drug trafficking. (FARC website)
Conclusions
Motivations for US presence in Latin America are the same today as they were in the previous century. Just as military presence in Latin America secured the US as “protectors” of the Western Hemisphere, today the US continues to establish good relations with Latin American militaries. The US government appreciates that these relations allow US political interests to be promoted in Latin America. An economic motivation also exists as close military ties with Latin American countries lead to battle equipment being purchased from the US and subsequent Latin American dependence on the US for training in using this equipment.
The war on communism, the war on drugs, and most recently, the war on terrorism have all allowed the US to maintain a military presence in Latin America while maintaining the status of a ‘good neighbor.’ The recent turnover of the Panama Canal and US military bases in Panama to the Panamanian government, showed how highly the US values its occupation of Latin America. The US was not ready to give up military presence in the Canal Zone after 97 years of occupation and requested to keep 3,000 troops in Panama to continue drug operations. They began negotiations to turn Howard Air Base into a multilateral counter-drug center. Panama ceased negotiations. (Importance of the Proposed Multilateral Counter-Drug Center (CMA) to U.S. Strategic Interests in the Region)
A real war on drugs can only be successful waged as a
multi-national cooperative effort. The US
declared war on drugs has suffered due to failure of the US to realize and
adjust ineffective tactics. The
priorities of the US have been to retain political, economic, and military
influence over stopping the flow of drugs, as shown by the swift shift to
anti-terrorism activities when these would allow more direct intervention. The results of the past 40 years of losing
the drug war, show that an effective drug war cannot be led by one country that
will inevitably serve its best interests.
The US has repeatedly ignored the “connections between extreme poverty,
social unrest, and authoritarian rule” and continued to use military
intervention as a policy to maintain stability. (The New Dollar Diplomacy
in Latin America) The drug problem
crosses many national boundaries and must be addressed by all countries
involved--suppliers, transporters and demanders of narcotics (Figure 1). An effective drug war must be an intimate
international cooperation – where policies are mutually agreed upon.
American Studies International, October 1999, Vol.
XXXVII, No. 3
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