Nov. 2002
International Elements of Saddam Hussein’s Conflicted Iraq: Shifting Allies, Resolute Foes
By Lorin Pace
The Iraqi state has undergone significant change since Saddam Hussein’s rise to power in 1979. As with most nations, global international relations have played a formative role in Iraqi decision-making, just as Hussein’s oft-presumptuous initiatives have affected other nations’ relationships with Iraq. It is widely acknowledged that Hussein has systematically violated the human rights of many Iraqi citizens. In this sense, the current U.N. and U.S. military pressure on Iraq has a viable humanitarian platform in addition to economic motives. However, as war looms progressively nearer, it is advisable to evaluate the efficacy of comparable past efforts in order to make prudent decisions for the future. In the pursuit of a more acute comprehension of Iraqi international relations, this paper traces the political history of modern-day Iraq with an emphasis on foreign relations as influenced by Saddam Hussein’s leadership.
The modern Iraqi state had its beginnings as part of the massive Ottoman Empire. Iraq did not exist as a state under Ottoman rule; rather, where modern Iraq is now, there were three “vilayets,” the districts of Basra, Baghdad, and Mosul. Due to the sprawling nature of the Ottoman Empire, coupled with a somewhat tenuous conquest, the vilayets had a remarkable amount of administrative and economic autonomy. The three areas actually had less in common with each other than with other regions well through the middle of the nineteenth century. Basra had strong relations with the Gulf and India, Baghdad was a critical link for Syria and Iran, and Mosul was closely tied to Anatolia and Aleppo (Farouk-Sluglett & Sluglett, 2).
However, the second half of the nineteenth century saw Istanbul taking a more passionate interest in exerting greater control over even its most inaccessible territories. Through an amalgam of new Ottoman laws and administrative arrangements, known as the “Tanzimat,” common reforms and practices were established for all three Iraqi vilayets. The Tanzimat had the predictable effect of increasing cross-wilayet homogeneity. Simultaneously, European commercial interest in the region was rising rapidly. Most notably, Great Britain’s commercial activity in the area skyrocketed during this period. The economic trajectory of the region responded in a gradual shift from the pattern of a subsistence economy toward an export-oriented economy, a trend that was not to be short-lived. The Baghdad administration in specific made an effort to increase irrigation, state control over tribal peoples, and overall revenues (Farouk-Sluglett & Sluglett, 3-5).
Iraqi regional exports soared at the opening of the Suez Canal in 1869. Areas cultivated for grain and dates expanded rapidly, and exports to the rest of the Persian Gulf and India particularly increased. By the start of the First World War, Britain’s share in Iraqi trade accounted for three-fourths of Iraq’s total trade (Farouk-Sluglett & Sluglett, 7-8). Britain’s interest was not confined to Iraq, however. Recent analysis had convinced British leadership that oil was to be the naval fuel of the future, and Britain quickly established its oil stake in the Persian Gulf through the Anglo-Persian Oil Company. The importance of oil in the Persian Gulf was first visibly demonstrated through the otherwise unusual emphasis the Allies placed on the Middle East in WWI. Britain was tenacious in its efforts to wrest Turkish Arabia from the Ottoman Empire despite sustaining a brutal defeat on their way into Baghdad. Britain eventually succeeded and was pleased with the stipulations of the San Remo Agreement, which Britain devised in collusion with France. The execution of this accord exploited the unscrupulous tactic of reneging on previous British promises to local leaders in order to keep conflicting promises to France. The San Remo Agreement divided a great deal of Middle Eastern territory between Britain and France. Among Britain’s territorial allocations was the region comprising modern-day Iraq (Pelletiere, 26-32).
The Baghdad and Basra regions were relatively receptive to the formation of a union, but the Kurd-heavy northern Mosul region was vehemently opposed, preferring even Turkish dominance to union with the rest of Iraq. Britain’s oil interests would have been threatened by Kurdish separatism, however, and so eventually Mosul was strong-armed into the Iraqi state. By this time Britain had already decided that it would be most pragmatic to allow supervised monarchic self-governance rather than exerting direct control over the intractable territory. Britain eventually went so far as to recommend Iraq’s inclusion into the League of Nations, making certain to obscure the extant neglect of the Kurds in the Mosul region. Subsequently, the recommendation was approved, and Iraq’s political boundaries were formalized officially (Farouk-Sluglett & Sluglett, 11-15).
During the Second World War, Iraq’s solid support of the Allied forces lent greater credibility to growing Iraqi hope for a federation of Arab States. At the close of the war, Iraq joined with other sovereign Arab states in the region to form the Arab League. The Arab League charter stated that its objectives were “the strengthening of the relations between the member-states, the coordination of their policies in order to achieve co-operation between them and to safeguard their independence and sovereignty; and a general concern with the affairs and interests of the Arab countries.” While the League has grown in membership and endured for many decades, it has been largely ineffective in both harmonizing Arab interests and mobilizing member nations toward achieving them, as evidenced by the hapless Palestinian quest for a state, a measure supported by the League (Smith, 10-11).
Another product of WWII was a firm alliance between Iraq and Transjordan (now Jordan). United in their opposition of an Israeli state, they invaded Israel immediately upon its declaration of independence in 1948, but were ultimately turned back (Hiro, 16). The alliance between Iraq and Jordan was nonetheless fortified by the effort, and it continued to flourish throughout the period of further conflict with Israel and the Suez Canal Crisis. In 1958 the alliance reached a zenith in the formation of the Arab Union of Jordan and Iraq. This federation was not only a reflection of the close Iraqi-Jordanian relationship, but it also served as a counterpoise against the recent federation of Egypt and Syria, the United Arab Republic (UAR) (Farouk-Sluglett & Sluglett, 50-55).
The UAR was vehemently opposed to the pro-Western stance of the Arab Union and became determined to undermine its power. It went so far as to make periodic radio calls to the Iraqi people, urging them to overthrow their government. The calls did not go unheralded, and in 1958 the Iraqi general Abdul Karim Kassem led a successful coup d’etat. Kassem then proclaimed the country a republic and supplanted Arab Union ties with a closer relationship to the UAR. He also pulled away from Britain economically, but placated the West somewhat by maintaining oil exports, which were crucial to the Iraqi economy (Farouk-Sluglett & Sluglett, 48-62).
Kassem’s next initiative was to ‘reclaim’ the emirate of Kuwait, averring that it was an estranged region of Iraq. Britain quickly moved in to protect the Kuwaiti government, and Kassem aborted the measure. After ruling for several years, Kassem was assassinated in 1963 by members of the Arab Baath Socialist party (Hiro, 19-21).
The Arab Baath Socialist party was founded in April 1947 after a pan-Arab congress in Damascus. The party was formed to promote Arab unity and freedom, seeking to end colonialism and promote humanitarianism. The platform of the Baath party called for Arab governments that were “national, populist, socialist and revolutionary.” The first cell of the Baath party in Iraq was established clandestinely in 1952, and its power grew despite efforts by Kassem to suppress the movement. By the time Kassem was assassinated, the Iraqi Baath party had its own militia and approximately 15,000 Iraqi sympathizers (Hiro, 21-22).
Kassem’s assassination was followed by several short-lived regimes. Iraqi hostility to the West was renewed after the Six Day War in which Israel won significant territory. In addition to declaring war on Israel, Iraq finally cut off its oil pipeline to Western nations and nationalized all foreign oil companies, which were perceived as being pro-Israel. After Jordan quelled Palestinian guerrilla efforts within their boundaries, Iraq angrily closed its border to Jordanians and demanded that they be expelled from the Arab League, a stark contrast to the two countries’ previously robust relationship. Syria, on the other hand, received substantial Iraqi help in their military effort against Israel. Iraq’s friendship with the USSR was also growing as remaining Western alliances dwindled (Hiro, 19-28).
In the meantime, Kurdish rebels continued to be a perennial problem. In 1970 the Iraqi government finally consented to an autonomous Kurdish region around Mosul. This arrangement temporarily appeased the neglected Kurds, but they soon realized that their actual autonomy under the agreement was negligible. Kurdish nationalists began to fight back against Iraqi government forces, sustained primarily through Iranian supplies and weaponry. Iraq responded to the pressure by reconciling some of its border disputes with Iran, and as a result, Kurdish supplies were halted in 1975 and the rebellion was temporarily quelled (Farouk-Sluglett & Sluglett, 142-144, 158-160).
Several years afterwards in 1979, the Iraqi President was succeeded by General Saddam Hussein, a member of the dominant Baath Party and a Sunni Muslim. At about the same time, fundamentalist Islamic revolutionaries in Iran accomplished the bouleversement of their secular government and established a theocratic Shiite republic in its stead, under the leadership of the Ayatollah Khomeni. The Iranian Kurds were greatly agitated by the ardent Shiite domination in Iran, and their unrest was contagious across the Iraqi border, fomenting renewed rebellion in Mosul (Hiro, 33-34). Even more significant was the uproar provoked in the numerous Iraqi Shiite communities (particularly in Basra) in response to Iranian religious fervor and an explicit call for Saddam Hussein’s assassination by the Ayatollah Khomeni (Mottale, 119). Hussein responded by nullifying the recent Iran-Iraq border resolutions and declared authority over the entire Shatt al Arab River (critical to both nations for its ports). This audacity inflamed the anger of the Ayatollah Khomeni, and in 1980 military conflict was ignited. Full-scale war ensued for nearly a decade, eventuating in a stalemate cease-fire somewhat unsatisfying to both parties (Hiro, 43-44).
Despite the seemingly inconclusive outcome of the Iran-Iraq War, the nature of the protracted conflict had lasting repercussions for both nations, setting the stage for future military and economic developments. The U.S.S.R. had long been the dominant player in Iraqi foreign trade, but its hegemony began to slip with further Western involvement. The Soviets were still the dominant supplier of Iraqi military equipment, accounting for nearly fifty percent of Iraq’s major weapons systems. It is hardly surprising that Iraq received military aid from other countries as well, but what is shocking is that the other countries abetting the Iraqi military effort were generally Western (Graham-Brown, 2).
France, for example, was the second-leading supplier of Iraq’s weaponry, accounting for roughly a fourth of the total. The French-Iraqi relationship was unique in that France was one of the select countries allowed to maintain its holdings in the Iraq Petroleum Company (IPC) after it was nationalized. France held a quarter share in the IPC, and perpetually strove to protect its huge economic investment in Iraq. Many of the other Western countries that supported Iraq in the Iran-Iraq War were less overt in their motives, particularly since most of them had passed legislation controlling the transfer of any lethal weapons to Iraq (Graham-Brown, 2-3).
Nevertheless, many countries were quite tendentious in favoring Iraq. Brazil, Italy, and Spain supplied armored cars, warships, ammunition, and parts, as did Egypt (Mottale, 121). The U.K., despite maintaining a “strict” ban on supplying lethal equipment, allocated a disproportionate amount of “dual-use” military equipment to Iraq, claiming such equipment was exempt from the ban. Dual-use equipment included such items as helicopters, aircraft, machine tools, and electronic equipment (Graham-Brown, 3). The U.S. was more gradual in adopting the stance of supporting Iraq over Iran. In 1982 Iraq was dropped from the U.S. list of “states supporting terrorism.” Iraq was soon reconciled into diplomacy with the U.S., justified in top officials’ perceptions as a nation warring “not as a confirmation of the expansionist and aggressive nature of the Baathist regime, but as a move that could check the power of revolutionary Iran.” The U.S. also adopted the “dual-use” exception and was of great support to Iraq, particularly in the high-technology sector (Graham-Brown, 2). Overall, the attitude of the West towards Iraq during the Iran-Iraq War was that Iraq was the lesser of two evils when contrasted with Iran’s fiery fundamentalism.
The U.S. relationship with Iraq was improving steadily when it was discovered that the U.S. had been illegally supplying the Iranian army with anti-aircraft missiles and tank rockets through Israel in order to improve relations with Iran as well. This tactical mishap was widely publicized as the Iran-Contra scandal or Irangate. In apprehension of Iraqi distrust, the U.S. redoubled its efforts to assist Iraq. Iranian aid was abandoned, and, furthermore, the U.S. was hypocritically tenacious in preventing Iran from acquiring other arms through international markets. This forced Iran to rely solely on the “gray market,” a cash-and-carry system that made it extremely difficult for the army to procure weapon parts, particularly for the American weapons they had recently acquired. The U.S. even conducted strategic satellite reconnaissance for Baghdad field commanders, allowing them to better anticipate and thwart Iranian strikes (Mottale, 123).
Hussein was also able to outmaneuver Iran in terms of Arabian support. Iraq was bolstered financially by Saudi Arabia and Kuwait, under the theory that Iraq would protect them from Iranian invasion (Hiro, 428). Iran, despite possessing nearly three times the manpower of Iraq, eventually found itself alone. Only Syria and Libya endured as Iranian allies (Mottale, 123). As a last-ditch effort, Iran stepped up its use of chemical gasses, particularly cyanide and other blood agents. Hussein matched their strategy with the use of mustard gas. The massive Kurdish casualties in 1988 in Halabja, Iraq were an externality of this inhumane exchange (Pelletiere, 206). It soon became clear to both nations that neither would be able to achieve clear-cut victory, and a cease-fire was reached.
While superficially it appeared that Iraq had acquired little but debt from the war, it had ballooned into a bona fide military power, in no small part due to the assistance of the West. Analysts Karsh and Rautsi aver that were it not for Western support, Iraq would “undoubtedly have lost the war” and would never have invaded Kuwait (Graham-Brown, 3). Despite his massive, residual wartime debts, Hussein remained confident of his nation’s power, securing an additional $3 billion in credit from an American-run Italian bank, which he channeled directly into his nuclear and chemical arms programs (Mottale, 125). Iraq at this stage had quadrupled its military to one million and tripled its tanks to over 6,000. Armament increases were even more considerable in contrast with their previous levels, and Hussein’s weaponry was far more technologically sophisticated than it had been before the war (Farouk-Sluglett & Sluglett, 272).
When Kuwait informed Hussein that he was expected to repay war assistance in full, he was indignant, and demanded that the emirate pay him $10 billion for defending them from Iran. He also accused them of cheating on the limitations that the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) had set to sustain high oil prices, thereby claiming that Kuwait had stolen additional Iraqi money. Kuwait denied the allegations and held firm in their demands. Hussein responded by invading Kuwait without warning (Mottale, 126).
International support for Iraq vanished as swiftly and as suddenly as Hussein had come to occupy Kuwait. In a remarkable and unprecedented display of unity, the U.N. Security Council unanimously enacted a comprehensive trade embargo endorsed by virtually all of Iraq’s trading partners. The embargo also entailed the shutting down of Iraq’s major oil pipelines through Saudi Arabia and Turkey (Nakhjavani, 39-40).
While Hussein was irate over the embargo, he was more jolted by the widespread support it found in his traditional trading connections. He had apparently deluded himself into believing his doctrine that Iraq was the defender of the Arab World. Only Jordan disagreed with the embargo, but dissented for its own political and economic reasons rather than to show support for Iraq (Graham-Brown, 8).
Despite the overwhelming economic damage the sanctions imposed, Hussein refused to compromise. France and Russia were two of the major powers that wanted to give Hussein more time for mediation and rely on the long-term economic effects of the trade embargo on Iraq. Their position was surprisingly unpopular, however. In contrast, the U.S. and Britain, no doubt strongly swayed by spiking oil costs, were fixed on militarily expelling Iraqi forces from Kuwait. They argued in harmony with many other Western nations that Iraq was liable to invade Saudi Arabia also and thereby cause further international economic damage. When the U.N. Security Council finally tallied the votes for Resolution 678, which authorized “all necessary means” to remove Iraq from Kuwait, it met with little opposition. China abstained from voting, as did Zimbabwe and Ecuador, which were also insecure about military action, but only Cuba and Yemen voted directly against the resolution. Part of this unusual outcome can be attributed to the immediate lack of counter poise to the U.S. in the Soviet Union; it was surely far easier to pressure weaker states into compliance during this period when they could not count on the bulwark of the U.S.S.R. The U.S. only compromised on a single point in the resolution; they would wait until early 1991 to strike in order to allow a final attempt at negotiations. When Hussein continued to snub all settlement concessions, the U.S. – led Desert Storm Coalition forces were deployed (Graham-Brown, 9). Among the Western nations directly participating were Great Britain, France, Germany, and Italy (Gnesotto & Roper, 171-179).
The war was won decisively in only six weeks. By the end of the second week Iraq had already been forced from Kuwait, but the Coalition continued to destroy both military and non-military structures in Iraq that could arguably affect Hussein’s military power (Alnasrawi, 209-210). In light of the razing of Iraq, international opinion began to turn against the Desert Storm effort, and U.S. forces that had intended to advance even further were persuaded to retract rapidly (Graham-Brown, 11).
Despite the prompt end to the war, the formerly united U.N. was widely divided on the issue of sanctioning Iraq, particularly since Hussein was still intransigent. Predictably, countries like France, Russia, and China were less vehemently opposed to Hussein’s regime than the U.S. and Britain due to the closer economic ties they had previously held with Iraq. Despite chronic disputation, the U.N. Security Council was able to pass multiple resolutions in the months following the close of the Desert Storm strike. Most significant was Resolution 687, which retained the provisions of the international economic embargo on Iraq, excepting only “foodstuffs” and “materials and supplies for essential civilian needs” upon the condition of notifying the Sanctions Committee. Other standout provisions included the identification and destruction of Iraq’s weapons and weapons facilities of mass destruction, as well as war damage reparations and recognition of sovereignty for Kuwait (Graham-Brown, 58).
While there has been a concerted attempt to enforce Iraqi sanctions, Hussein has undermined them whenever possible. Human quality of life has deteriorated severely in Iraq due to the economic impositions and resulting dearth of basic supplies. The situation has scarcely improved in the decade that has passed since the imposition of the sanctions. Over 1.6 million Iraqis have died during this period from food and medical shortages (Imam, 1). Easily treatable diseases like diarrhea claim tens of thousands of lives each year. The Basra and Mosul regions have suffered the most. Even after Iraq was conditionally allowed in 1996 to sell oil for food again (in the amount of $2 billion annually) to ease the human suffering, Hussein has disproportionately allocated the resources to his Sunni supporters and starved the Kurds and Shiites (Graham-Brown, 74-83).
In recent years the international call for mercy toward the helpless of Iraq has been so vociferous that the U.N. Security Council has allowed Iraq to export much more oil than the original limit of $2 billion. Hussein’s resistance to proper allocation still persists, however, as the Oil for Food program necessarily channels resources through the government for distribution (Alnasrawi, 213).
Sympathy for Iraq remains diverse and varied in level of commitment. France, Russia, and China are still anxious for the economic embargoes to be lifted, and they have pressured the U.S. to soften its stance on Iraq, undoubtedly due to a great extent to their vested economic interest in Iraqi oil. Turkey is also indirectly supportive of the current regime simply because it fears Kurdish insurgency within its own borders should the Iraqi government be toppled. Syrians and Iranians share similar concerns, and are just as unwilling to part with territory should Kurds ever converge in desire for their own nation-state. Syria in recent years has indicated some rapprochement with Iraq, recommissioning the oil pipeline between the countries, while Turkey has ‘legalized’ the perennial smuggling trade with Iraq. Iran, for stark historical reasons, is still somewhat bitter towards Hussein but has also begun some reconciliation. In the meantime the Kurds remain factional and somewhat vulnerable despite widespread international sympathy (Graham-Brown, 144-147).
Other countries in the Arab World also exhibit increasing ambivalence in regards to U.N. sanctions. None of the original Coalition allies except Kuwait still share the resolute position of the U.S. and Britain. Many of the smaller Gulf states are particularly concerned with the negative humanitarian externalities of the sanctions, even though they have been compounded by Hussein’s abuses. Qatar and the United Arab Emirates have completely restored relations with Saddam Hussein. Egypt has also shied away from a hard-line position on the sanctions, but is still attempting to court Hussein’s obedience to the resolutions (Graham-Brown, 146-147).
A gradually increasing regional and worldwide minority in reconciliation with Iraq has recently been catalyzed by U.S. military pressure on Iraq due to alleged violations of the sanctions proscribing weapons of mass destruction. Opponents complain that the U.S. and its ally, Great Britain, will strike Hussein regardless of what U.N. inspectors discover, but U.S. President George W. Bush insists that an invasion is only necessary should Hussein be openly found in violation of the aforementioned sanctions (Karon, 1). International sympathy for Hussein’s regime will undoubtedly be indispensable to its survival should another assault occur, but any meaningful support could very well hinge on the outcome of U.N. inspections. Only when the results have finally been disinterred will the world find out if war will again be waged in the troubled Persian Gulf.
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