The Evolving Nexus between Islam and Iran
By,
Niloufar ‘Lily’ Sarafan
The nexus between Islam
and Iran is a complex one. Islam was brought to Iran via Arab-Islamic conquest
in 650 AD and has played a shifting, anomalous role in this nation-state ever
since. The ideas of nationalism, secularism, religion, and revolution are unique
in this Muslim country. Iranians, unlike many of their neighbors, hold on very
strongly to their pre-Islamic roots and achievements; sentiments of nationalism
are apparent throughout Iranian history and in the everyday conversations of
Iranians. In order to illustrate the role of Islam in Iran and the contemporary
Iranian situation, I will analyze the concept of an Islamic state, the
legitimacy of Islam in modern-day Iran with notes on the Islamic Revolution of
1979, the compatibility of Islam and Democracy, changes in access to information
in Iran today, and recent movements and trends in Iranian’s youth
population.
Islam and the Islamic State
The
Islamic revival trend of the late 20th century forged the intellection that the
‘resurrected’ Muslim nations were akin to Islamic states. The region considered
to make up the Muslim world indisputably comprises nations that maintain
majority Muslim populations. The extent to which these nations may be labeled
Islamic, however, is dubious. As the omnipresent uniformity ascribed to Muslim
nations has intensified with heightened media attention, the variance among
systems of governance in these countries has continued to be overlooked. The
Islamic presence in these countries, in fact, ranges vastly, from Islamic social
groups that strive to revive social morality and eradicate Western culture to
established political systems that endeavor to enforce Islamic law.
The definition and conception of an Islamic state has been
a source of debate in the realm of Islamic scholarship. Some scholars assert
that the period of the caliphate in Medina following the Prophet Mohammad’s
death represents the most recent example of a true Islamic state. These scholars
view all modern systems as “alien to Islamic principles, a creature of
imperialism...” and seek “a ‘truly Islamic’ state, applying the shari’a and
unifying the fragmented umma under a revived caliphate...” [Zubaida 104]. Others
would contend that some of today’s nations, albeit influenced by Western culture
and politicized through modern statecraft, are no less Islamic, understanding
that the “diversity of historical circumstances in which they try to apply that
ideal introduces a necessary element of relativity and imperfection...”
[al-Turabi 241]. An ‘Islamic State,’ it seems, is a conjectural model, which can
maintain varying practical paradigms.
As the sole Muslim
nation that installed Islamic principles into the political arena through a
popular revolution, the Islamic Republic of Iran, or jomhoury-e eslami-e iran,
henceforward referred to as Iran, serves as an appropriate case to consider. The
country’s official title represents the paradox of the question, as it embodies
both the notion of an Islamic state and a modern Republic. Determining whether
this heterogeneity has produced an un-Islamic system remains one enterprise of
this writing.
The Iranian Revolution and Islamic
Law
The Revolution of 1979, which brought Islam into Iran’s political
arena, was a paragon of complexity, characterized by relative nonviolence, an
exiled leader, and an unprecedented platform for governance. After all, “where
before had one seen a leader of an established religion emerge as the widely
popular, charismatic head of a revolution against a royal ruler who stressed his
own legitimacy, his ties to the national past, and his reformist plans?” [Keddie
1]. While several factors that lie at the nexus among politics, economics, and
sociology contributed to the Revolution, what is germane to the discussion is
how Islamic the system it introduced was. The popular movement of Iran’s 95%
Muslim population was not sparked exclusively by the motivation to implant an
Islamic government. Beyond a religious spearhead, Imam Khomeini stood as a
symbol of opposition to Mohammad Reza Shah and his ostensibly puppet-imperialist
regime. Due to the issue-oriented nature of Khomeini’s widespread taped
speeches, in which he asserted that Islam would “provide a solution for the
problem of poverty” [Khomeini 34] among other things, the call for revolution
inspired a wide range of Iranians, from liberal leftists to conservative
clergymen, to form a unified front against the longstanding monarchy of Iran.
Due to the wide range of raison d'être for involvement in
the Revolution, many of which can be attributed neither to religious sentiment
nor the desire for an Islamic state, the Revolution has been labeled an Iranian
Revolution as often as an Islamic Revolution. Nonetheless, January of 1979 did
mark a religious revolution that permanently changed the perceptions of Shi’ism
and Islam. More important, the Revolution brought forth a new system of
government, an unprecedented design that struck an instant chord with Muslims
worldwide. Unlike the Islamic movements in other countries such as Egypt or
Pakistan or Afghanistan where all involved parties intended to invoke some hue
of Islamic principles into society or government, many of the Revolution’s
involved parties simply wanted “O death to this Shah![1]”
along with solutions to their daily struggles. This post-Revolution factionalism
may be one contributing factor to the un-Islamic sociocultural environment in
Iran, as will be discussed, and the complex puzzle that supports the author’s
surmise that Iran is not an Islamic state.
Sami Zubaida
tackled the query, “If the nation-state is an imported concept unsuitable for
Islamic cultural and social conditions, then can the Islamic state escape its
alien trappings in favor of a more authentic and harmonious form?” [Zubaida
104]. The author is of the conviction that this duality can co-exist where
Islamic laws and principles guide all realms of life. After all, ‘Islamic’ has
never had a single meaning; it has had related associations and a common pool of
traditions and values. Neither the political, legal, nor cultural realms can be
labeled as Islamic in Iran. While an Islamic presence in these areas is noted,
Iran does not constitute an Islamic state. Ironically, a rather popular slogan
of the Revolution was, “No to political compromise!” The irony lies in that the
‘Islamic’ government of Iran enforces both Islamic and manmade directives and
has been viewed as increasingly approaching secular nationalism[2]. “The reason Islam had mass appeal was the promise by
Khomeini that equality, the rule of law and freedom from foreign domination
would be protected under an Islamic republic” [Amirahmadi]. A look at Khomeini’s
governance model and the practices of post-Revolution Iran will shed light on
the distance between the Islamic Republic of Iran and an Islamic
state.
The substratum of Khomeini’s governance model, which
had no precedence in the Qu’ran, Sunnah, or Hadith, rested on a political theory
he originated entitled vilayat-i-faqih, or rule by jurisprudence, also known as
Islamic Republicanism in the West. He theorized that the activity of fiqh, or
jurisdiction of clerics over judicial matters, should be the model for his
government. He proposed the creation of an executive branch represented by an
elected president and envisaged an elected Parliament, or majlis, which would
write the laws of the Islamic state. Exercising power over both the majlis and
the President would be a Guardian Council. A spiritual leader, or rahbar, would
serve as the religio-political guide of the system who had the definitive voice
in all decisions as “a trustworthy and vigilant guardian of God’s creatures”
[Khomeini]. Khomeini took on this role until his death in 1989 whereby the
Constitution was altered to provide less power to the spiritual leader.
Khomeini’s political theory was undoubtedly borrowed from
many non-Islamic sources and fostered a great deal of controversy among some
Shi’i religious leaders who asserted that political leadership was not permitted
in the absence of the twelfth Imam. This novelty, however, does not necessarily
pronounce Iran to be un-Islamic. A survey of the characterizations of an Islamic
state along with an analysis of the specific components of the Iranian state
will illustrate that while the objective of Islamizing state and culture in Iran
was partially fulfilled, the goal of establishing a nation which operated under
“the ordinances of Islam” [Khomeini] was not executed, rendering questionable
and deficient Iran’s legitimacy as an Islamic state.
The
conception of Islam as a total social system, while a familiar tenet, was
brought to the forefront of modern discourse about Islam through foundational
figures like Ruhollah Khomeini, who contended that Islam is political at its
core. The fundamental attribute of Islam, which separates it from every other
system, is the conviction that sovereignty rests solely with God. “God alone is
the Ruler and His commandments constitute the law of Islam” [Mawdudi 9]. It
follows that legislation in an Islamic state should be carried out as prescribed
by the shari’a, or the set of laws specified by the Qu’ran and Sunnah, developed
independently of political rule, which constitute the will of God for all
Muslims. Muslims share the common sentiment that “toward God is the journeying”
[Qu’ran 3:28] and that worldly, secular concerns plague the Western world. With
such convictions, how did the shari’a fare in the modern political system of
Iran?
The shari’a is in contrast to most current legal
systems in the world, where the law is defined as a systematic set of written
codes, authorized by a legislative assembly, as in the case of pre-Revolution
Iran. The theological reason for not fixing the shari’a in a codified form is to
emphasize its nature as God-given or divine. It is important to note that “the
Constitution of the Islamic Republic is not the Islamic shari’a” [Zubaida 106].
In Milestones, Sayed Qutb asserts that an Islamic state can come to be “...after
all affairs have been submitted to the laws of God and the society as a whole is
willing to accept the just division of wealth prescribed by Him, and every
individual of the society...firmly believes that this system has been legislated
by God Almighty.” In Iran, a Constitution was put in place which uses the
shari’a as a source of legislation, but which grants sovereignty to man as well
as to God.
The Council of Guardians, which Khomeini
specified in his political theory, has broad-based political and legislative
prowess, despite its official role of ensuring that the laws of the country
conform with the shari’a. Even the constitutional statutes which contradict
Islamic law, some of which Khomeini justified as the necessary abrogation of the
shari’a in the “interests of the Islamic community,” are elevated to being the
“divinely-ordained duty of all the people” [Arjomand 202]. While the modern
context and system which Khomeini works with in order to instate his objectives
does not undermine the possibility for a true Islamic state, the abrogation of
Islamic law and the expanded sovereignty to encompass both God and man does
introduce un-Islamic elements into Iranian governance. The question then is not
whether modern circumstances and foreign-borrowed ideas have produced an
un-Islamic state; it is whether the tools of modern statecraft and politics were
used to construct a system which follows the ordinances of Islam. “For a state
to be Islamic it must be organized, and its affairs be conducted, in accordance
with Islamic divine law...the interpretation of the Shari’a is within the
exclusive domain of the ulema...” [Rahnema 10].
Examples of the conflict, in which “a clerical leadership
has claimed to protect tradition but has amended and broken age-old religious
protocols for the sake of state expediency,” [Boroujerdi 14] help to elucidate
the claim that Iran should not be labeled ‘Islamic.’ The Iranian Constitution
enshrines Iranian nationality as a provision for citizenship, and specifies that
each Iranian must have “a convinced belief in the...official school of thought
in the country [Shi’ism]” [Zubaida 105]. Iranian nationalism was not shunned in
favor of a unified international Muslim community. While nationalism and Shi’ism
were not the central tenets of the Revolution, their existence illuminates the
continuance of pre-revolution elements in the new Constitution. Also, when the
stance of the Council on economic policy in 1988 was not considered favorable by
Khomeini, he issued a refutation which declared that the shari’a was not binding
on the Islamic government[3]. The effective removal of the
requisite of Islam in legal affairs essentially granted individuals in the
government with unlimited powers. This phenomenon has resulted in what countless
texts have identified as extensive political corruption, where “those with full
control of the judiciary are engaged in all kinds of mischief” [Banuazizi]. A
concluding example concerns family law in Iran. Whereas the shari’a provides a
very systematic set of laws for this area, the civil courts under the Islamic
Republic never quite abandoned the liberal policies of the Shah’s regime. This
move, after the constant denigration of the Shah’s policies in this realm,
epitomized the inconsistencies to come in Iran after 1979. The fact is that
tensions between Islamic law and practiced law are ubiquitous in Iran where
“even the Revolutionary Guards who run the morality-enforcing Komitehs can be
bought” [Zahedi 7]. With a system that grants such sovereignty to man, there
remains little room for launching a true Islamic order. Iran maintains an
Islamic presence and an Islamic appearance, but in the political and legal
realm, the reality is that “the Iranian constitution reads very much like most
modern constitutions, containing only a few provision that can be considered to
be strictly Islamic” [Banuazizi 3]. The author does not wish to contend
that anything Islamic must follow uniform guidelines, as will be discussed. The
essentials of an Islamic state, however, have been spelled out through varying
frameworks, with some invocation of traditions and a Qu’ranic basis. While the
specific political framework of an Islamic state is unspecified, the main values
and traditions of Islam can be examined, or in the case of Iran, not examined.
Iran’s label as Islamic deserves attention – its validity as an Islamic state,
is problematic. “As far as public law for the administration of an Islamic
state is concerned, one can draw upon early Islamic history and tradition
regarding service for forms of achieving political ideas of Islam” [al-Turabi
249]. Islamic history and tradition have not been central to the political
process in the Islamic Republic, where social change geared toward a Muslim
population was always the underlying principle.
“An Islamic
state...is the domination of Islamic precepts through the coercive power of the
state over the social, cultural and political life of all segments of society”
[Rahnema 9]. Iran, with a 75% post-Revolution-born population that is weary of
the “appropriateness of Islam as a political ideology” [Amirahmadi], is not
completely characterized by an Islamic socio-cultural environment. Despite the
amendment of the initial constitutional right of free expression to require the
media “to enjoin the good and forbid the evil” [Zahedi 6], there exists in Iran
the pervasive flow of outside information through satellite dishes, liberal
publications, and Internet cafes. “Despite the complete control exercised by the
state over the mass media and educational system, and over the shape of social
policy and the traditional forms of coercion…the Islamic Republic is admitting
its failure in the cultural sphere” [Zahedi 15]. A true Islamic state would not
comprise a majority percentage of women that wear colorful sheer scarves and
fitting coats as substitutes for the veil. Moreover, it probably would not
condone secular music, poetry, and film, all of which currently inundate Iranian
culture. “The austere spirituality of Shiite Islam meshes with the sensuous
richness of Persia, even as the two clash” Sciolino 36]. As al-Turabi mentioned,
an Islamic state requires an Islamic society. The Islamic nature of Iran’s
religiously apathetic citizens is as questionable as the legitimacy of its
Islamic governance. The most recent manifestations of this convenient abrogation
of shari’a and blend of Western principles and ideals has been the amendment
process of the Guardian Council, in which shari’a rulings on non-Muslim lives or
on women’s rights in marriage have been altered or amended due to heavy focus on
human rights in the Western sense. This shows the opportunity for the type of
Islamic reformation that Aghajari, to be discussed later, has presented the
possibility for in Iran.
Islam and
Democracy
The compatibility of Islam and Democracy has been a
long-lived topic of interest for Muslims, Non-Muslims, and scholars alike. The
apparent victory over Communism in the late 1980s sparked the sentiment that
Western liberalism was destined to dominate the new world order. This line of
thinking disturbed those who had a stake in lack of democratization in Middle
Eastern societies. A realm of scholarship has been devoted to the topic of Islam
and Democracy; “The New Orientalism and Democracy” illustrates that the
consistent trend in Orientalist thought has rendered the Muslim World as being
unsuited for democratization.
In the 1980s, this standard
tenet of Orientalist thought was expanded to an international scope. The same
old assumptions that served to depict the interplay of the Muslim World and
Democracy were used by scholars to “generally concur that democracy thrives in
those countries that possess a ‘civil society…,’” defined as “the collection of
autonomous social organizations that resist arbitrary exercises of state power.”
Until quite recently, Western experts argued that social associations in the
Middle East were much too feeble to challenge the political prowess of the
state. And the ‘logical’ deduction was that Islam’s despotic tendencies
accounted for this weakness, since “the totalistic character of the faith seemed
to imply that only a totalitarian state could put its dogmas in practice.” The
view of the dominion of the state and the promotion of political quietism in
Islam persisted until recently, when some scholars began to question the ‘state
above society’ claim. Of course, Western experts revised their views completely
after the Iranian Revolution; the state was in fact strong and Shi’ism was now a
revolutionary ideology.
Three particular trends came out
of the revisionist thinking of the late 1980s. Studies of “radical Islam”
increased as Islamist movements increased in visibility. States in the region
were seen as less powerful, especially in the face of declining oil prices. And
studies of mafias and interest groups as potential equivalents of “civil
society” took form. A new generation of Orientalists emerged in this era, and
while they were uncomfortable with previous claims that Islam encouraged
political submission, they shared the conviction that it was incompatible with
Democracy. Some younger Orientalists maintain the thesis that Islamic
civilization “refuses to legitimize political authority.” Daniel Pipes submits
that the political ideals detailed in the Shari’a are “impossible to fulfill,”
thus ensuring that Muslims will view any form of government as illegitimate.
This Muslim mentality, coupled with the “medieval failure” of developing a
stable political system, comprises Pipes’ analysis, which has found an
ever-widening audience in the United States. The article’s authors accentuate
and critique what has become a noticeable pattern in Orientalist
thought:
When the consensus of social scientists held that democracy and
development depended upon the actions of strong, assertive social groups,
Orientalists held that such associations were absent in Islam. When the
consensus evolved and social scientists thought a quiescent, undemanding society
was essential to progress, the neo-Orientalists portrayed Islam as beaming with
pushy, anarchic solidarities. Middle Eastern Muslims, it seems, were doomed to
be eternally out of step with intellectual fashion.”
Despite
neo-Orientalist theory that social movements in the region will assuredly result
in decreased tolerance if not anarchy, today’s Western and Middle Eastern
scholars concur that the economic crises in Middle Eastern states have increased
their weakness, which reflects in the greater visibility of social groups
comprised of Islamists.
The article’s authors critique Orientalist
thought in its downplay of the significance of imperialism on the political
state of the Middle East and in its claim that the key to democracy lies in “the
proper balance of power between state and society.” They submit that finding an
“optimal division of labor” between state and society needs to be tended to by
experts, since “the fact that democracy has not flourished in the Middle East
does not mean its development is impossible.”
An increasing
number of Muslims have made the call for some form of democracy, posing the
question, “is there an Islamic path to a pluralist democratic society?” While
most Muslims are content with spewing out that Islam served as the informant of
democratic essentials, modern discourse on Islam and democracy should focus
unfettered debate on specific historical circumstances. Since the spheres of
religion proper and more political affairs have been distinct in Islamic
history, one could assert that the adoption of certain democratic elements might
be acceptable so long as they do not fall in the category of un-Islamic values.
However, even with the democratic ideals that tend to be squeezed out of ideas
like shura, the challenge of pluralism is that consultation and participation
are encouraged so long as the sovereignty of God and moral fiber of the
community is emphasized or dialogue among thought-diverse Muslims is beneficial
so long as everyone remains “within the confines of the faith and common
decency.” This translates into no toleration for “enemies of Islam,” be they
skeptics, atheists, or hypocrites. The respective statuses of non-Muslims and
women in the Muslim World remain as antagonistic to the values of equality and
democracy. While discourse on political participation and protection of human
rights has become more mainstream, the current scope of Islamic thought has left
little room for liberalism and religious
indifference.
Current State of Affairs: Economic and
Social
Foreign investment in Iran, which practically began with the
establishment of Bank Shahi jointly by Iran and Britain in 1888, reached its
climax in 1979 when 1,641 companies with private foreign shareholders were
registered. After the victory of the Iranian Revolution in 1979, foreign
investments were quickly dropped and nullified. Major impediments to foreign
investment activity in the early post-Revolution years included the confiscation
of property belonging to foreign companies and the creation of new legal
barriers. After a period of recess, the trend of foreign investments in the
Islamic Republic of Iran resumed in 1993. From March 1994 to October 1998, the
government approved 64 foreign investment plans that totaled $2 billion.
European countries accounted for $1.6 billion while Asian countries accounted
for the rest. The continuance of foreign investment in Iran is an important goal
for the stabilization of relations and Iran’s role in the word market. At
present, joint venture projects worth billions of dollars in the fields of
chemical industry, automobiles, and hotel construction are under way in Iran
with foreign investor partnerships. Ambiguity surrounding the foreign investment
law has been the most important factor behind the government’s failure to
attract foreign capital. The law states that only foreign individuals and
private institutes, not foreign governments, can invest in Iran, in order to
preserve the national sovereignty of the country. Specifically, foreign capital
is allowed to be spent on development projects or productive activities related
to agriculture, industries, mines, and transportation. Foreign investment is a
significant new area in Iran, and it will provide the impetus for improving the
quality of industrial products, acquiring modern technology, and competing in
the international market. Many Guardian Council and Majlis members in Iran
maintain ultra-conservative views against foreign investment; one such
individual concluded, “We should not necessarily think that all foreign
investment brings technical development and creates capital and employment, or
leads to economic growth.” It has been stated in Iranian journals that
technocrats instead of economists devised Iran’s foreign investment plans,
resulting in surface investment with lack of sufficient depth of capital. The
victory of the Revolution and the ensuing eight-year war with Iraq hindered
development in Iran and made a centralized economy almost necessary. A 1991
decree translated into the introduction of privatization. Efficiency seems to be
the main problem encountered in Iran’s privatization efforts. Usually, the same
management and economic goals are maintained with only a change in
administration. Because Iran’s new government promotes partially isolationist
policies, many of these industries have little incentive to compete with global
leading firms. This was clearly not the case with Iran Khodro and has recently
been changing in Iran’s telecommunications sector. The telecommunications sector
is not being privatized, but there has been talk of allowing European companies
to invest in the state-owned sector since the advent of the Internet has caused
the demise of the longstanding monopoly.
Internet and
Access
Even though the age of the Internet and ‘coffee net’ or
Internet cafe in Iran is still in its infant years, the establishment of these
Coffee Nets, which provide long distance phone services to other countries at
much lower rates than the government telecommunications company, has created a
real crisis for this organization, which had up to now practiced a monopoly.
Some officials in the telecommunications company have been overheard as saying
that the monopoly they enjoyed for so long is doomed for failure. All one needs
is a computer and Internet connection through an Internet Service Provider (ISP)
or an independently installed dish to enjoy Internet access. Two million users
have already figured this much out. Currently there exist hundred of private and
public entities that serve as ISP's. And with fiber-optic technology becoming
more common and accessible, most of these facilities operate as `Coffee Nets'
around the country. The rates for overseas calls are dramatically lower than
those of the Telecommunications Company of Iran, or TCI. Because of this
phenomenon, many Internet Cafes were shut down last May due officially to
licensing problems, and known unofficially as undesired competition for TCI.
Internet usage and long distance phone calls are at an all-time high in Iran.
And a short while after all the Coffee Nets were reinstated and hundreds more
were established around the country, Iranian Minister of Post, Telegraph and
Telephone (PTT) Ahmad Motamedi announced that some services of the
Telecommunication Company of Iran would be transferred to the private sector.
BBC News announced in November, “Iran is planning to open its telecommunications
sector to foreign operators in order to meet soaring public demand for telephone
lines and internet access.” Iran has been lobbying for entry in the World Trade
Organization; a top team of Siemens management recently said that
telecommunication was the key to Iran’s entry since opening telecommunications
to the world is analogous to opening society to the world. Foreign investment
and privatization are important concepts in the modern Iranian state, where a
reform-minded populace and a revolutionary regime are sometimes at odds. The
economic development of the country and Iran’s positive stance in the world
market depend on outside partnerships and internal improvements. It is clear
that entry in the WTO, coupled with the removal of the ILSA sanctions will have
gargantuan repercussions for Iran – current efforts can help foster an
environment where such events may be possible.
Aghajari
and the Student Revolution
Clearly, Iran’s economic situation has
opportunity for growth; but the social situation presents a more dynamic case to
observe. It has clearly been determined that the idea of ‘Islam’ is not a stable
one and adapts to its different environments, just as it has adapted very
uniquely and strategically in Iran over the past 23 years. Because the society
is generally secular, according to all accounts and best represented in Thomas
Friedman’s string of opinion editorials on Iran in July 2002 of the New York
Times, the new Post-Revolution generation is not fighting for a new version of
Islam; instead they struggle for basic rights including freedom of expression,
which new access to information brought forth through the Internet and the
constantly evolving print media is providing. There have been spurts of student
uprisings over the past 5 years, but none as dramatic and influential as that of
the past few months with the case of Hashem Aghajari, whose attack on
"traditional Islam" has earned him a death sentence by a court. Student
demonstrations condemning the sentence have been the most widespread since the
uprising at Tehran University in the summer of 1998. Aghajari, a University of
Hamadan history lecturer, journalist, and active member of the reformist Islamic
Revolution's Mujahideen Organization (IRMO).
Understanding
Aghajari’s words are of utmost significance in this crucial time when Islam, not
as the peaceful text that it is, but as a hijacked practice influence by
colonialism, economic deprivation, and misinterpretation, is evolving into
something new. What Aghajari proposes is not anathema to the core of Islam, and
his rhetoric has been a vital component of Islamic dialogue, especially in the
Shi’a tradition, for some time. It is, however, a blow in the face of Islamic
leadership, which does not invoke the egalitarian principles and tradition of
dialogue which Islam has to offer.
In his address
commemorating the 25th anniversary of the death of Dr. 'Ali Shari'ati, one of
the ideologues of the Islamic movement before the 1979 Revolution,
Aghajari began by noting that just as “the Protestant movement wanted to
rescue Christianity from the clergy and the church hierarchy," so Muslims must
do something similar today. The Muslim clergymen who have come to dominate their
faith, he said, were never meant to have a monopoly on religious thinking or be
allowed to ban any new interpretations in light of modernity. “Just as people at
the dawn of Islam conversed with the Prophet, we have the right to do this
today,” he said. "Just as they interpreted what was conveyed [to them] at
historical junctures, we must do the same. We cannot say: `Because this is the
past we must accept it without question.' . . . This is not logical. For years,
young people were afraid to open a Koran. They said, `We must go ask the mullahs
what the Koran says.' Then came Shariati, and he told the young people that
those ideas were bankrupt. [He said] you could understand the Koran using your
own methods. . . . The religious leaders taught that if you understand the Koran
on your own, you have committed a crime. They feared that their racket would
cease to exist if young people learned [the Koran] on their own. We need a
religion that respects the rights of all -- a progressive religion, rather than
a traditional religion that tramples the people. . . . One must be a good
person, a pure person. We must not say that if you are not with us we can do
whatever we want to you. By behaving as we do, we are trampling our own
religious principles.”
Mr. Aghajari concluded: “Today, more than ever, we
need the `Islamic humanism' and `Islamic Protestantism' that Shariati advocated.
While [Iran's clerical leaders] apparently do not recognize human rights, this
principle has been recognized by our Constitution. . . . The [Iranian regime]
divides people into insiders and outsiders. They can do whatever they want to
the outsiders. They can go to their homes, steal their property, slander them,
terrorize them and kill them because they were outsiders. Is this Islamic logic?
When there is no respect for human beings?” Thousands of students marched in
Iran in protest of Aghajari’s sentence and in solidarity with the causes they
have been trying to promote since the time of the Revolution.
Many scenarios are possible, of course, especially with
the formidable threat of a preemptive attack on Iraq or any number of foreign
policy decisions that will affect the region. One possibility is a non-violent
internal political revolution that focuses on Iran’s current situation, which
with all its negative points is still in the best position for a democratic
methodology, excluding the Mossadeq era, that the country has ever faced. The
amendments that have been passed which abrogate shari’a and appeal more to basic
universal human rights with respect to religious tolerance and gender equality
will likely continue as the political situation in Iran is receiving not only
the attention of Iranian citizenry within Iran’s borders and within the
expatriate community, but also of the world at large. This way, the Constitution
and the parliamentary process put in place will be utilized to a point that they
are more accountable to the people; once the system is more accountable and the
populace utilizes the political process more effectively, as they have in recent
years with 80% voting records, the Supreme Leader’s position will be made less
effective. There will not be a mass revolution as there was 23 years ago; there
is too much political apathy due to the results of that movement to merit any
similar response. But the world can expect that the vibrant, educated youth of
Iran will pave the way for an Iran which meets their needs and goals and dreams,
whatever form that may take.
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All
other sources not cited were derived from author’s Honors Research in Iran in
Summer 2001, which included extensive interviews and surveys. Information about
the interviewees will not be revealed, at their request, for their own
protection. Data and information included in sections of the report on
government and citizenry attitudes, as well as current policies and events in
Iran are extremely hard to come by in English print, which made necessary the
use of these foreign sources.
[1] a trademark slogan of Iran’s
Revolution
[2] Dr. Amirahmadi of Rutgers
University and Elaine Sciolino of the New York Times, among others, assert this
claim in various articles and speeches.
[3] Zubaida,
“Is Iran an Islamic State?”