Aria Yow SUID #3972965
Professor Bruce Lusignan
ANTHRO 133A – EDGE
Fall Quarter 1993-1994
Since the state of Kashmir was created, neighboring India and Pakistan have fought three wars over her control. The continuing violence at the “Line of Control” in Kashmir has implications for modern nuclear security. While territorialism appears to be the precipitating cause, the origins of this conflict are actually found in the socio-economic realm. Economic failures in India, especially, have contributed to the crisis. The conflict in Kashmir is the result not of territorial politics but of social and economic factors that can be traced back to the 1947 partition.
I. The Failure of the Indian Economy
At midnight on August 14, 1947, East and West Pakistan and India were “partitioned” and liberated from 190 years of British control. Pakistan became an Islamic republic in 1956, and India has continued to be majority Hindi (Hitchens 100).
In the democratic Dominion of India, the “Central Government” in Delhi and its 25 subordinate states are comparable to the US federal government. The Indian government is characterized by the federalism and Central supremacy. In a further analogy to US history, the Indian Constitution was drafted (in 1950) by a successful Dalit (“Untouchable”) who overcame poverty and caste politics. Like the US Constitution, it includes a code on the “Fundamental Rights” of its citizens (Heitzman 433). The Indian government is characterized by both democracy and centrism.
The modern Indian economy is characterized by heavy regulation by the “Center,” which sets goals for and strictly regulates private industry. Despite a recent trend toward reform and liberalization, both the private and the public industry bear the stamp of heavy Central involvement (CountryWatch 1-2; Heitzman 49, 309; Roy 73-4; Wolpert 199, 223-4).
The Indian economy favors commerce, mining, and heavy industry. The first Prime Minister after Partition set the tone for the government’s embrace of technology and development. On November 17, 1958, in a speech before the 29th Annual Meeting of the Central Board of Irrigation and Power, Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru proclaimed, “dams are the temples of modern India” (Roy 13, 82). Today, the multipurpose Sardar Sarovar Project in the Narmada Valley epitomizes this embrace of development (Heitzman 399; Roy 9).
Construction of the Narmada Dam threatens both the livelihood and the lives of millions of peasants in the lands surrounding the Narmada River, one of the three main Indian rivers. The Center’s “Planning Commission” claims that the Narmada Dam will provide both hydroelectricity and drinking water to the Indian population. However, in recent years the Center has been increasingly “flexible” with the 1) numbers of people to whom the diverted water would presumably provide drinking water, 2) numbers of people who will be displaced by the project, and 3) estimated cost of the dam. The government’s published data is both illusory and self-contradictory (Heitzman 399; Roy 27-32, 35).
In addition, in an ecology accustomed to flash monsoons, salination, resulting from the inability to drain a constant supply of water, will have catastrophic effects on the surrounding river valley. In an area characterized by subsistence (vs. surfeit) farming, the livelihood of the 25 million people who stay in the valley has yet to be addressed by the government. The last irony of the development is the ever-increasing external debt to the World Bank it is incurring (Heitzman 398-399; Roy 25-57, 50-53, 66, 68, 71; Wolpert 223).
According to a 2003 CountryWatch report, the Indian economy has a federal budget deficit of 12% of the Gross Domestic Product. It also has an external debt of $100,367 million (USD). Indian agriculture represents 25% of the Gross Domestic Product (GDP), but 64.7% of the national employment (CountryWatch; “India - 2003 Country Review” 64, 67).
The agrarian Indian economy is such that most Indians are too poor to buy the food they produce. The rural peasantry have been especially hard hit by the continuing devaluation of the rupee, inflation, and rising OPEC oil prices (affecting one of the region’s main products). By 1986, more than a quarter of India’s peasant population was landless, which has dire consequences in an agrarian economy (Heitzman 82, 85, 301, 307, 311; Roy 21-2; Wolpert 211, 225, 229).
As of the October 2002 census by the US Census Bureau International Database, India had a population of 1,045,845,226. India represents 2.4% of the world’s landmass, but 16% of her population, as of 1996. The Indian population continues to grow at a rate of about 2% a year (CountryWatch; Heitzman 81-2, 85, 91; Wolpert 4, 16, 156, 212, 223-227, 230-1). This is the numerical equivalent of adding the population of Australia or Sri Lanka, each year (Heitzman 63).
The failure of India’s Five-Year Plans best demonstrates the effect of strict government regulation on a complex economy. The First Five-Year Plan, instituted in Fiscal Years (FY) 1951-1955, sought to rehabilitate an economy wounded by World War II and Partition. The Second Five-Year Plan, enacted in FY 1956-1960, focused on heavy industry and electric power capacity (Heitzman 309, 392; Wolpert 224).
The Third Five-Year Plan (FY 1961-1965) sought to expand the industrial base. The Fourth Five-Year Plan (FY 1969-1973), projected a national income growth of 5.7% a year, but realized a rate of only 3.3% a year. In the early 1970s, US and UN-sponsored shipments of high-yield wheat and rice seeds failed to ameliorate India’s entrenched poverty and famine. Later studies showed that the gulf between the middle-class landowners and the landless poor, who couldn’t buy the seeds, actually widened during this time (Heitzman 310-1, 392-3; Wolpert 224-7).
In 1975, because of rampant poverty, unemployment and famine, riots forced Nehru’s daughter Indira Gandhi to institute a series of drastic austerity measures in an “Emergency Raj [Rule],” by which she aimed to reduce black-marketeering and tax evasion (Wolpert 228).
The Fifth Five-Year Plan (FY 1976-1977) was drafted as crude oil prices rose sharply, but was terminated early because of an unpredicted change in the government. The Sixth Five-Year Plan (FY 1980-1984) was one of the few to reach its targeted growth rate of 5.1% a year. However, later studies showed that the income of only 10% of the population rose above poverty level during this time. For the Seventh Five-Year Plan (FY 1985-1989), Ravij Gandhi, Jawaharlal Nehru’s grandson and Indira Gandhi’s son, instituted inheritance and income tax cuts, in a misguided effort to produce trickle-down aid. He also liberalized licensing regulations, in an effort to simulate private industry. However, lack of funding forced the Center to borrow more than expected, to finance the plan (Heitzman 306, 311, 393-4; Wolpert 230).
Prime Minister VP Singh’s Eighth Five-Year Plan (FY 1992-1996) included a special provision that at least half of all resources be expended in rural areas. However, in contrast to the projected GDP increase rate of 5-5.6% a year, the realized rate of GDP growth was only 4% a year (Heitzman 311, 393; Wolpert 221, 230).
The sum total of these Five Year Plans was a failure to redress heavy governmental regulation and a focus on heavy industry and commerce, at the expense of the agrarian economy. In a nation characterized by social, linguistic and cultural diversity, the Center failed to recognize the heterogeneity of the Indian economy itself, a mix of private and public industry (Heitzman 307, 312; Wolpert 230).
Despite its size, India plays a minimal role in the world economy. Western development and investment haven’t always benefited the Indian economy, nor have they always been welcomed. In August 1995, the BJP-led government in Maharashtra stopped a proposed Enron development there. Like in Gujarat, the rise of the BJP in the state of Maharashtra demonstrated the appeal of Hindu nationalism to the disenfranchised farmer (see III below). The fatal Union Carbide gas leak in Bhopal in 1984 is also emblematic, to many, of the US investment and development presence in India (Basu 4; Heitzman 286, 307, 311, 451; Nandy 10; Wolpert 225).
One positive result of the failure of the Indian economy is that grassroots environmental and social justice activism has recently prospered (Guha 2578-2581; HRW 5-7; 23, 24, 28-30, 32, 39, 44, 59, 61; Roy 10, 34, 37). The unfortunate other side effect is the rise of the “Sangh Parivar.”
II. The Rise of Hindu Nationalism
The “Sangh Parivar” is a family of Hindu nationalist organizations that operate in the cultural, political, and social spheres. It consists of the following: the “Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh” (RSS, or “National Volunteer Corps”) was founded in 1925 with the mission of creating a Hindu State. The “Bharatiya Janata Party” (BJP, or “Indian People’s Party”) evolved in 1980 to become the political branch of the RSS, after the The “Vishwa Hindu Parishad” (VHP, or “World Hindu Council”) is the more controversial and publicized branch, and was formed in 1964 as the social branch of the “Sangh.” The “Bajrang Dal” is the militant youth wing of the VHP. Together, these bodies have a high degree of penetration into all aspects of Indian life. They are also known to operate “shakha’s,” militant nationalist training camps (Basu 3-4; Ganguly [2003] 2; HRW 13; Heitzman 175, 471; Mishra 1-4).
The rise in Hindu nationalism in the 20th century was largely the result of the failing Indian economy and increasing socio-economic disparities. It also benefited from a popular opposition to Western technology. As an expression of anti-establishment and anti-centrist sentiment, the Sangh appealed to the marginalized peasantry and the “Scheduled” (lower) castes, such as the Dalits (“Untouchables”) A sad irony of the anti-state agenda of the Sangh is that also opposes modern technology and development For this reason, it appeals to a great many impoverished, rural Indians. (Basu 1, 5, 6; HRW 4, 7, 10, 12-15, 58-61; Heitzman 175-6; 488; Mishra 1-4; Nandy 3, 5, 7, 11, 13; Roy 99; Trawick 2-3; Wolpert 200, 225, 249).
The “Sangh Parivar” benefits from anti-Muslim sentiment, and has been known to incite Hindu-Muslim violence in an effort to further its own social and political goals. A recent example of this occurred in the city of Ayodhya. Ayodhya lies several hundred miles east of Delhi and has actually been the site of Hindu-Muslim violence since the 13th century. As the proclaimed birthplace of the Hindi god Ram, it is the focus of much Hindu nationalist attention (Basu 3; Ganguly [2003] 2; Heitzman 149, 174, 176, 302, 471, 480, 495, 497; Trawick 2; Wolpert 24, 249).
On December 6, 1992, members of the BJP razed the Babri Masjid mosque, which had been built by Muslims in 1528. Because of this and the riots that ensued, the Indian Ministry of Home Affairs imposed a 2-year ban on VHP activity in 1992, which was later extended for another 2 years. On May 10, 1995, BJP members won 35% of the seats in Congress, a large representation in a coalition government (HRW 13; Heitzman 1, 149, 174-6, 302, 471, 477, 481, 497; Wolpert 249).
On February 27, 2002, two train cars carrying VHP members on their way to Ayodhya left the station at Godhra. This city is found in Gujarat, an Indian state of about 50 million on the West coast of India, near the Pakistani border. At the Godhra station, a Muslim mob surrounded and set on fire the two train cars. Fifty-eight Hindis were killed, including fifteen children and twenty-five women (HRW 10, 13, 31; Heitzman 471).
In the next three months, rioting in Gujarat claimed the lives of some 2,000 people, mostly Muslims. The central focus of the Human Rights Watch Report “Compounding Justice” is the complicity and even culpability of the “Sangh”-led politicians and police, as they both participated in and condoned the anti-Muslim violence. The discriminatory application of the “Prevention of Terrorism Act” toward only Muslim rioters evidenced an overt judicial bias (Digest – Nation & World A3; HRW 4, 10, 13, 30-35; Lal 86; Mishra 1; Terzieff A11; Trawick 4). Later statements by “Sangh” leaders about these events demonstrated a desire to replicate this anti-Muslim campaign, on a national level (HRW 33, 63; Mishra 2).
Despite or because of these atrocities, the BJP carried the March 1998 Parliamentary elections. More recently, it largely won the December 2002 state elections in Gujarat, home to Ayodhya (Mishra 2). The current prime minister of India, Atal Behari Vajpayee, is a member of the BJP.
The same socio-economic factors that make the “Sangh Parivar” so appealing to the Indian peasantry are also present in Pakistan. In nation of only 147,663,429 (as of the 2002 International Census), a 1999-2000 economic survey showed that the number of Pakistanis living below the poverty level increased from 17.8 to 43.9 million, an increase of 146%. The same report showed that 63% of the population was living in rural areas without basic facilities. Rampant corruption, smuggling, money-changing and black-market schemes have weakened an already faltering economy. As in India, intensive mining and heavy industry have polluted the waterways, contributed to disease epidemics, and reduced the general quality of life (Behar 2-4; CountryWatch; Hilali 10-1; Terzieff A7, A11; Wolpert 225). Regardless of the level of Pakistani involvement in terrorism, Pakistan is widely believed to fund the fundamentalist Islamic militant groups “Jaish-e-Mohammed,” “al-Mansooriyan” and “Lashkar-e-Tayyaba,” (or “Lashgar-I Toiba”) (Baer 59; Behar 6; Brooke 5/16/03; Evans 3; Heitzman 295, 607; Kiefer 2; Rai 7/31/03). The first group was suspected of involvement in the murder of journalist Daniel Pearl (Behar 6).
The escalation of Hindu-Muslim conflict in the past ten years is both a factor in, and a reflection of, the increasing hostility between India and Pakistan. The roots of this conflict are more complex than is immediately apparent. While India is predominantly Hindi, it actually has a greater Muslim population than does Pakistan. As of October 2002, India had a population of 1,045,845,226, with a 12% Muslim representation. In addition, most of the Indian Muslims (who represented almost 25% of the population at turn of the 19th century) were either descendants of converts or Hindu mothers (CountryWatch; Heitzman 155; Wolpert 41, 99, 105).
III. The Crisis in Kashmir
The crisis in Kashmir dates back to 1947, when “Jammu and Kashmir,” one of three princely states, refused to ally itself with either India or Pakistan. With a predominantly Muslim population and a Hindi “maharaja” (prince), Kashmir could have chosen allegiance to either. As the largest state, it is politically important to both (Evans 2; Heitzman 46, 49, 51-3, 494, 516; Wolpert 66, 100, 205, 233).
In October 1947, shortly after Partition, Pakistan-loyal Muslims invaded Kashmir and led a brutal charge toward the capital, Srinagar. After Indian air forces helped repel the Muslims, Kashmir’s Maharaja Hari Singh signed a statement of accession to India. Indian Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru promised the Kashmiri citizens that rule would eventually be self-determined by the Kashmiris, through “impartial plebiscite.” This was the first of many promises of Kashmiri self-determination (Heitzman 71, 493; Wolpert 223-224).
However, Nehru kept Indian forces in Kashmir throughout his tenure as prime minister. The Indians and Pakistanis ground forces fought in Kashmir until January 1, 1949, when a UN cease-fire was enacted. A “line of control” was established along the cities of Batalik, Dras, and Kargil, in the Kashmir Valley. Pakistan claimed “Kashmir” on the western side and India claimed “Jammu and Kashmir” on the east. To further complicate matters, Pakistan would later cede part of its Northeastern territory to China (Bidway 1; Ganguly [2003] 1, 3; Heitzman 71, 494 521; Wolpert 223-4).
In 1952, Sheikh Mohammed Abdullah and the newly elected Muslim Constituent Assembly of Jammu and Kashmir voted for accession to India. Thereafter, India regarded this vote as a rejection, by the Kashmiris, of “impartial plebiscite” and self-determination. Nehru kept Sheikh Abdullah jailed for most of Nehru’s tenure. Kashmir was the site of continued territorial aggression for the next 50 years (Heitzman 520; Wolpert 234).
In September 1965, Kashmir witnessed a second Indo-Pakistani war. A US embargo on ammunition and replacements for both armies led to a suppression of hostilities within three weeks. Subsequently, the UN Security Council called a cease-fire, to which both sides adhered. On January 10, 1966, at the request of the Russian Premier, Indian Prime Minister Lal Shastri and Pakistani leader Ayub Khan signed the Tashkent Accord. According to the terms of this agreement, the two nations agreed to both diplomatic negotiation and restored trade relations (Evans 2; Heitzman 520-521; Wolpert 235). This was the last successful intervention by a third party.
The third Indo-Pakistani War, in December 1971, was fought over the secession of the “autonomous” East Pakistan. Despite a majority Muslim population, East Pakistan was also the subject of Pakistani aggressions. As ten million Hindu refugees flooded into India, fleeing atrocities in East Pakistan, Prime Minister Indira Gandhi asked for US support but was rebuffed. She later requested, and received, Russian military aid. Bangladesh was created out of East Pakistan, the US aligned itself with China. India retaliated by signing a friendship treaty with Russia (Evans 2; Heitzman 521, 547; Hitchens 105; Roy 111; Wolpert 235-6, 239-242).
India won a decisive military victory in this third declared Indo-Pakistani war. On July 2, 1972, both sides signed the Simla Agreement. According to the terms of this agreement, both sides agreed to “settle their differences by peaceful means through bilateral negotiations,” excluding the UN and all other parties. Both sides also agreed to the existing coordinates of the Line of Control (Heitzman 521, 547; Wolpert 235-7).
After a period of relative calm in the late 1970s and 1980s, tensions again increased. By 1989, India had gained military and political ascendancy in South Asia. However, fighting continued in Jammu and Kashmir, and India blamed Pakistani-sponsored “cross-border terrorism” for the violence. Using Kashmiri “independence” as an agenda, Pakistan supplied military and diplomatic aid to the Kashmiri insurgents, and actively infiltrated the Jammu and Kashmir borders. The three Muslim-separatist groups named in II above were instrumental in the violence in Jammu and Kashmir, which continues today (Bidwai 1-2; Brooke 5/16/03; Evans 3; Ganguly [2001] 908, [2003] 1; Heitzman 511, 521-2, 551, 600; Kiefer 2; Waldman 2/13/03, 5/5/03: 2; Wolpert 238).
In April and May 1999, Pakistani incursions across the Line of Control at Kargil, led to the undeclared fourth Indo-Pak war. The Indo-Pakistani violence has only increased in the past 5 years (Ahmad; Altman; Anthony; Brooke; Digest – World & Nation; Eckholm; Evans 3; Gall; Ganguly [2001] 907-8; Hilali; Kifner, Lal; Landay; Marquand; Mishra; Rai; Terzieff; Waldman; Zahra; Zubrzycki). Today, the Line of Control is the site of near daily violence (Zubrzycki 5/29/1998).
Despite expressing interest, in May 2003, in negotiations, the Indian External Affairs Ministry rejected a Pakistani ceasefire proposal on August 12, 2003. This proposal was widely supported by both Jammu and Kashmiri leaders and Pakistani Muslim organizations (Xinhua News Agency).
Throughout all of these conflicts, the Kashmiris have borne the brunt of the violence. The Indo-Pakistani conflict has claimed more than 35,000 lives, since 1988 alone (Evans 8). One estimate puts the total dead, since 1947, at 50,000 (Landay 6/1/1998). Many of these are the Kashmiris themselves.
IV. The Indo-Pakistani Conflict and Global Security
The Indo-Pakistani conflict in Kashmir presents a real and immediate threat to global security. India possesses the world’s seventh largest nuclear arsenal (Lal 86). This arsenal is said to be in the hands of civilians (Marquand).
In 1968, India refused to sign the US-backed Treaty on the Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons. In 1995, 175 other nations approved an indefinite extension of the treaty. India still refused to sign, considering it “discriminatory” against “peaceful nuclear” applications (Heitzman 373, 517, 545, 549, 551, 555, 601).
In August 1996, India refused to sign the UN-sponsored Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty. On May 11, 1998, India tested its nuclear weapons for a second time (the first time was in 1989). Pakistan followed suit, and tensions between India and Pakistan further deteriorated (Roy 93; Heitzman 1ii, 601-2; Landay 5/29/98; Zahra 1; Zubrzycki 6/2/98). One of the campaign pledges of the BJP during the 1998 campaign had been to declare India a nuclear weapon state (Zahra 1).
Despite the US use of Pakistani bases during the recent “War on Terror,” the US has always been more closely allied with India. The blind eye with which the US views the Hindu-sponsored terrorism can be attributed to our psychological identification with India as the world’s largest democracy. (Heitzman 548; Kiefer 2; Lal 86; Rai; Waldman 2/13/03; Wolpert 247).
Our own economic interests have also influenced our relationship with India. As a nation of more 1 billion potential consumers and workers, India represents an important economic market to the US. Despite evidence of the atrocities in Gujarat and Kashmir, US military and economic support has consistently benefited India. In the years since President Nixon’s rejection of Indira Gandhi’s appeal for aid, the US and India have developed an increasingly close relationship. In contrast, Pakistan is widely believed to be the new home to al-Qaeda’s operations (Altman; Behar 6; Cato Institute 34; Heitzman 548, 551; Keifer 2; Mishra 3; Wolpert 248).
Carl Von Clausewitz described war as a series of actions and reactions which mutually reinforce each other (Von Clausewitz 105) and which arise from either “instinctive hostility” or “hostile intent” (Von Clausewitz 102). In addition, he says that war is never an isolated event (Von Clausewitz 106). By this definition, the situation in Kashmir is a protracted war, with hostile intent by both India and Pakistan as the cause.
One definition of abuse is the lack of control, as opposed to the excess thereof. The situation in Kashmir exemplifies this absence of control, with its tragic repercussions for the Kashmiri people.
V. Solutions
India continues to interpret the bilateralism of the 1972 Simla Agreement with Pakistan, as a prohibition on third party (multilateral) negotiation (Landay 6/1/1998). Throughout the years, trade sanctions by the US and other countries have also proven to be ineffective in punishing aggressors (Evans 5; Ganguly [2001] 908; Heitzman 547; Keifer 1; Landay [5/29/1998] 1; Zubrzycki 5/19/1998).
In light of the socio-economic causes of the Indo-Pakistan conflict, a possible solution to the crisis involves US economic aid. Because US aid has increasingly been directed toward military applications, any solution to the crisis must involve an international body endorsing and distributing the aid, appropriately. (Altman [7/2/03] 1; Landay [5/29/1998] 2; Zahra 1)
Non-governmental organizations (NGO’s) in both countries have played a crucial role in furthering social justice (Ganguly [2001] 909, Guha 2578-2581; HRW 5-7; 23, 24, 28-30, 32, 39, 44, 59, 61; Roy 10, 34, 37). These third parties could also be impartial messengers of crucial nuclear security information. The transparency of nuclear information has become increasingly important to global security (Ganguly [2001] 912-916; Landay [5/29/1998] 2; Marquand 2).
The crisis in Kashmir is the result of varied socio-economic factors and their complex interaction with political dynamics. It has important repercussions for geopolitical and nuclear security. While it might seem that the Kashmiri crisis is caused by political conflict, it is in fact a reflection of social and economic failures in both India and Pakistan. Despite appearances, the conflict in Kashmir has origins in the social and economic domains, and the solutions to this crisis can be found therein.
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