Walk Softly but Carry a Big Stick: US Intervention in Guatamala

By Jared Delgin

“My Country let us walk together, you and I:

I will descend into the abysses where you send me,

I will drink your bitter cup,

I will be blind so you may have eyes,

I will be voiceless so you may sing,

I have to die so you may live.”

-Guatemalan Otto René Castillo

Killed, 1967

What events can inspire a person to such sentiments? These are the words of a man who would do anything for his country. He is willing to venture into the abyss for his country. He is willing to lose his sight, his voice. He has to lose life so that his country may live. Guatemala must have been in a horrid state for him to be convinced of the necessity for his own martyrdom. But what put his country there? What force caused this thing that he loved so much so much pain? In the pages that follow, I will recount the points of a story of deceit and tyranny. I am going to indict my own homeland, the United States of America, with the crimes that caused Otto René’s homeland so much suffering.

However, in order to understand the United State’s approach to Guatemala in this century and for that matter any Latin American country, the policies adopted by the US must be looked at in the context of the Cold War with the Soviet Union. The Cold War and halting the spread of communism was paramount in any decision made after the Second World War. The policy instated to deal with Latin America echoed this, for it was here, in the Western Hemisphere, that America would make it “clear with finality” that they viewed all forms of communist activity as alien and hostile to the country’s ideals, as something that could easily jeopardize the peace of the United States.[i]

But why was Latin America so important, one might ask. Well, the security of Latin America was of utmost importance to the United States for many reasons. Most obvious is the proximity of Latin America. It is contiguous to the US from Florida to the Pacific, not to mention a 1,800 mile open border with Mexico. Also, it contains the Panama Canal, cited by former Ambassador to Guatemala, John Peurifoy, as “our greatest strategic installation anywhere in the world,” as well as the sights for two other potential canals, and permanent and emergency American military bases. It provides a proven air route to the East and is the source of great strategic materials. Yet another essential aspect of Latin America is its role as a market for United States’ commercial exports. By the end of 1950, the amount invested in Latin America had reached about $6 billion, as compared with direct private investments outside the Western Hemisphere totaling about $4.6 billion. Latin America purchased about $2.7 billion worth of United States goods, which comprised about 50% of all imports into the area. The various nations of the region devoured 44% of total exports of American automobiles, 40% of the textiles, 30% of the chemicals, 40% of the iron and steel manufactures, and 30% of all machinery. However, not only was Latin America a key market for the US economy, it also was a crucial supplier of raw materials. In 1950, a considerable amount of the supply of strategic materials originated from Latin America., including 100% of the imported vanadium, over 95% of the castor oil and quartz crystals, over 80% of the crude petroleum and fuel oil, over 60% of antimony, cadmium, and copper, over 50% of the imported beryl, bismuth, and lead, and substantial amounts of the chromite, manila fibers, manganese, iron ore, zinc, and tin. As well as the import of more than $1 billion worth of non-strategic materials, such as coffee, sugar, bananas, and wool. The purchasing of these materials, strategic and non-strategic, were considered vital for more than just their inherent values. They provided the Latin American countries with the money to finance their purchases of transportation and industrial equipment, consumer goods, and military hardware.[ii] So, needless to say, the protection of Latin America was essential in 1950 as well as today.

Now, I already stated that the United States felt the need to protect the Western Hemisphere, especially Latin America, from the “communist threat”, but I feel the need to expand upon this. The perception of the United States can best be described as paranoia defined by an over-exaggeration of the situation. American officials believed that “the imperialist drive of the of the international communist conspiracy, emanating from and directed by the Kremlin,… constituted the major threat to the peace of the world.”[iii] American officials believed that there existed a core of Soviet agents in practically every country of the world, promoting, as put by John Foster Dulles, “not a theory, not a doctrine, but an aggressive, tough, political force, backed by great resources and serving the most ruthless empire of modern times.” On top of this, the US believed that Latin America was a prime target and fertile breeding ground where the communists could “broadcast their seeds of provocation and hatred.”[iv]

Thus, when Guatemala “fell” to communism, they thought their fears were coming to life and they took steps to liberate it. “The battle lines for the Western Hemisphere were emphatically drawn in Guatemala in 1954.”[v]

But even before the communists got their hands on Guatemala, the United States was already interfering in the country’s affairs. The country of Guatemala is largely agricultural. In the 1950’s 2.2% of the people owned 70% of the land and another 22% owned 20% of the land. This left 10% for the remaining three-quarters of the population, most of who were Native Americans. This clearly did not bode well for the development of the nation. It resulted in a rapid exhaustion of the land by excessive cultivation and the financial impossibility of the poor proprietors to use artificial fertilizers. Renters normally had to pay the owners from 50% to 60% of their crops and were constantly in danger of having their land repossessed if they could not make rent. It was because of this and other situations that many small farmers, in order to sustain their families had to acquire other part-time work. But the vast majority of the time, even this was not enough. Guatemala suffered from the highest infant mortality rate in the Americas; 40% of those born died before completing their infancy and if one only looks at rural zones, then the number climbs to 60%. One of the major reasons for this horrific state of affairs was the lack of health care. For instance, about 14.3% of expectant mothers within Native American groups received any medical assistance and only 9.7% of their children were born in hospitals or other equipped facilities. But even if they survive they face horrible living conditions while growing up and as adults. Only 40% of the population of the population lived in houses. Furthermore, only 33.8% of the dwellings had piped water and only 29.4% had flush toilets. If this were not enough to ensure poor health, only about half of the population could afford shoes.[vi]

Now, where the average Guatemalan was not doing so well, there were of course the few large landholders who were doing very well. The system that existed provided these landholders with an ample work force, for as stated earlier, even those with land had to look for extra work to supplement their incomes. This supplement came from working for the large landowners during harvest time. In this way the landowners are provided with a cheap work force when they need it and don’t have to worry about it or supply for it in the off-season.[vii] The largest reason for this system’s counter productive nature is that these large landowners are almost exclusively foreigners and on top of that American, such as the United Fruit Company, who had large landholdings in Guatemala. Understandably, these foreigners were more concerned with the international market and not so concerned with the internal Guatemalan market. This influenced not only prices, but what crops they produced, until 90% of Guatemalan agricultural production was focused on coffee and bananas, export crops which almost without exception made their way to the American market. Consequently, Guatemalans were not only forced to import food, but also, the vast majority of the profits from the country’s largest industry did not go back into the country, but instead was channeled back to the United States.[viii] Also, the fact that Guatemala’s two largest exports were coffee and bananas only exacerbated the situation. The coffee market, being restricted almost exclusively to the United States and Europe, had a very limited, inelastic demand and therefore prices were subject to great fluctuations, depending on the size of the crop, blights, and the overall cost of production for a given year. Furthermore, when prices were high, the market had a tendency to look for substitutes like tea. Thus, the coffee market tended to be highly unstable. A very similar analysis could be exacted on the banana market, though bananas have even more readily available substitutes making its market even more insecure than that of coffee. The price of bananas depended almost solely on the whims of its major market, the United States.[ix] Accordingly, a poor year for either crop meant that tons of Guatemalan farmers would not get that extra job to supplement their income. So, in an attempt to fight against this almost feudal system, the revolutionary government of Jacabo Arbenz instated a Land Reform policy that was going to take the idle lands of the large landholders, of which there was much, and redistribute those lands to the peasant farmers. This policy, which would of course affect the American landholders the most, since they were the largest landholders, was not met well by either American business or government.

Now, with this as a backdrop and the Cold War as the setting, we are ready to embark into the United States involvement in Guatemala beyond commercial dealings. For it was the combination of the two that inspired the US Government to take a more active role in Guatemala. The Land Reform of the Arbenz Government threatened to take away hundreds of thousands of acres of land from American proprietors, especially United Fruit. With the land expropriations the communist fears, as previously stated, seemed to be confirmed for American officials. They believed that no government would take such a radical measure against a United States business if it were not dominated by communists. This makes sense when one looks at the prevailing definition of communism from that time. Communism was seen as being anything “alien to American ideals” and which “adversely affects” a nation “as a place for capital investment.”[x]

As a result, the United States, in its own view, had no choice but to intervene directly in Guatemala. However, it is interesting to note that though America did take direct action, the role of the Government was never admitted. It was a completely clandestine operation. The operation belonged to the CIA and was dubbed PBSUCCESS. For the purpose of this operation, many resources were allocated. It received its own communications facility, financial officers, support people, cover agents, and special powers to requisition confidential funds. So, with this, they needed to find a leader among the Guatemalans themselves. Their final choice, Castillo Armas. He was an ex-military man with a reputation for being fairly honest, a folk hero image, and an Indian appearance. Once chosen, the American government began to furnish Castillo with all the requirements for a successful invasion. He was even supplied with an army. “Recruits were gathered from among the Guatemalan exiles and the neighboring republics. Many of them were clearly mercenaries.”[xi] Training centers were set up in both Nicaragua and Honduras which received shipments of rifles and other small arms, machine guns, and ammunition. Later, as the date of the invasion drew closer, military aid agreements were signed with both Nicaragua and Honduras, so that by May, 1954, supplies were being sent directly to these countries by both air and sea. These new materials included Bren guns, mortars, flame-throwers, and even several old American bombers.

However, the largest part of the arsenal handed to Armas was psychological. The CIA had a plan for the psychological preparation of the target government and its population which was then to be followed by a sudden show of apparently massive force. For this to work, though, the army had to be neutralized and to this end the CIA spent the majority of its psychological war efforts. One of the major projects was to transmit anti-Arbenz, pro-Armas radio broadcasts into Guatemala. Broadcasting began on May 1^st, 1954, Guatemala’s Labor Day, to guarantee the largest audience possible. The station dubbed itself the “Voice of Liberation” and adopted the slogan “Work, Bread, and Country.” Every piece of their broadcasts were planned and fabricated. The broadcasters claimed that they were operating from within Guatemala itself, even though they never set foot on its soil. They would also simulate government “raids”, only to broadcast the next day from a supposedly new location. In this manner, they not only urged the public to support the rebel invasion, which they always said was imminent, but gave potential dissidents encouragement by providing them with “proof” of Arbenz’s incompetence. The Voice of Liberation sounded so real that soon it was accepted as the authentic source of information by many foreign correspondents, including the New York Times.[xii]

The CIA had other plans as well. Propaganda leaflets were dropped from aircraft throughout Guatemala. The Agency even enlisted an American Cardinal of the Roman Catholic Church to arrange secret meetings with members of the Guatemalan section of the Catholic Church. This resulted in a proliferation of anti-Arbenz pastoral messages which of course received significant press coverage. The Agency, still had to secure the army, however, and to this end they sent in operatives to speak with high officers in the armed forces. Those who couldn’t be persuaded to undermine their government at first were offered bribes and not surprisingly, it was found that Arbenz “would not be backed by his army in the event of an anti-communist revolution.”[xiii]

Now, it was the State Department’s turn to make the invasion at least acceptable internationally. So, at the Tenth Inter-American Conference, which met in Caracas, they aimed for International approval or at least acquiescence of the ongoing effort to halt the International Communist Conspiracy. To this end Dulles gave what Senator Hickenlooper described as “one of the most clear, powerful, and concise speeches, laying down exactly what the situation was, that I have ever heard in my life.”[xiv] At the end of the conference, the only Country to vote against the American resolution to fight Communism as an International Conspiracy was Guatemala.

In his desperation, Arbenz even attempted to buy arms from the Soviets, but the arms were caught and gave the US the perfect alibi for invasion. On June 17, 1954, the forces of Castillo Armas crossed over the Honduran border and invaded Guatemala under the banner “God, Fatherland, and Liberty.”[xv] This “army” consisted of about 150 troops. The original “army”, described as a “rag taggle” by American officials, was constituted of about 400 émigrés and other recruits, who were reduced by about 100 after training and selection. About a half of the remaining troops were chosen to return to Guatemala and lead internal revolts, receive arms and supplies, and conduct various acts of sabotage. Of these, only around 50 were not killed or arrested. So, the remaining 150 after invading Guatemala, settled down in United Fruit territory, where they of course encountered no opposition, and waited for the Arbenz regime to collapse.

This happened as soon as the old American bombers dropped bombs in the middle of the Guatemala City parade ground and the Government’s oil reserves, further crippling the country’s already hopeless air force. In a state of near panic, Arbenz began distributing weapons to the peasants, but this was too much for the regular Army Officers to take. So, on June 27^th they demanded that Arbenz resign and he did, just ten days after the rebellion began. Soon after, the regime of Castillo Armas was recognized by the American Government.[xvi]

In conclusion, the United States of America had their hands in the affairs of Guatemala for far too long. First, indirectly through American business, but later the government of this country decided to take a much more active role. It is my contention that the United States, in all of it’s forms, was the cause direct and indirect of the poor state of the country of Guatemala and the anguish of Otto René, the Guatemalan poet from above. In his eulogy for his dead comrade, Che Guevara, Fidel Castro said:

“He was filled with a profound spirit of hatred

and loathing for imperialism, not only because

his political awareness was already considerably

developed, but also because shortly before he had

the opportunity of witnessing the criminal imperialist

intervention in Guatemala through the mercenaries

who aborted the Revolution in that country.”