North Korea and the Bomb

The first nuclear bomb was dropped in World War II. During this time there were only a few countries that had access to the technological resources to produce such a destructive weapon. Since then, information on nuclear power and the mechanical aspect of nuclear weapons is easily accessible through books or through the Internet. This basically means that not only the powerful nations have nuclear capabilities but also the small and poor countries are now capable of being extremely dangerous. Now to think any irrational person or nation can pretty much destroy any other nation during any point of time. This has created uneasiness across the world and a difficult task of global nuclear non-proliferation must be enforced to ensure a safety of the people worldwide.

There are now approximately 18 countries that have nuclear capabilities.' There was an increase of 7 from last year. Of course, some countries prove to be more dangerous than others, due to how their government is structured. For instance, Iraq is a prominent concern because it is a dictatorship, which means that one person can make all the decisions for that country. Now in order for other surrounding countries to defend themselves they must have comparable weapons, and that is when nuclear proliferation occurs. This causes an increase in tension and also an increase in the possibility of a nuclear war.

Now it is the duty of international councils, such as the International Atomic Energy Agency, the IAEA, and powerful countries, such as the United States of America, to regulate the testing and production of nuclear weapons in threatening countries. However, sometimes in extreme cases such as the one in North Korea, the IAEA is not effective, therefore the responsibility goes to the powerful countries. The passage of treaties is usually the first step taken toward nonproliferation. Nuclear violations often occur in spite of the treaties, due to the fact that the consequences are not that considerate of preclusion.

Since the 1950's the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (North Korea) has been proceeding with a nuclear development program to strengthen its international status and to communize the entire Korean peninsula. North Korea was first exposed to the nuclear power when Washington threatened to use this in order to stop the on going Korea War. The United States of America nuclear bluster over Korea actually began rather early in the war. President Harry Truman promised in November of 1950 that the United States of America would take whatever steps are necessary to stop the Chinese intervention, claiming that the use of nuclear weapons was always a heavy consideration. North Korea and China were waiting out the bluff delivered by the United States of America. Then Eisenhower took power, and he gave discreet hints on using the nuclear weapons during the National Security Council meeting. Just two months later, in July 1953, the United States of America, China, and North Korea concluded an armistice ending the Korean War. Eisenhower claimed that the threat of the nuclear weapons played a major role in the bringing about the truce agreement that ended the war.

By 1980, then, North Korea perceived itself to be on its own, trapped between the Sino-Soviet conflict to the north, the Sino-American alignment to the west and Japan to the east, and many hostile soldiers to the south. To conclude that North Korea's nuclear program was solely a response to the United States of America nuclear threats may be too simple a statement. What North Korea is trying to accomplish through nuclear arms is: to obtain diplomatic leverage, to reduce dependence on China and Russia, to gain an advantage over South Korea's conventional superiority made nearly inevitable by the South's rapidly growing economy, and to set the stage for the first hereditary transfer of power in history by a Communist regime. These factors, however, can be classified broadly as a reaction to a looming danger. United States nuclear threats, in light of the instability of North Korea's alliance with China and the Soviet Union, and the superiority of the combined South Korean and the United States of America conventional forces, may well have convinced the North that a nuclear program was a strategic necessity. For North Korea to support or just to go along with nonproliferation, it needed some trade and somewhat of a political acceptance by the international community. The North needed the outside world as badly as the world needed the North to abandon its nuclear program, and this mutual dependence created the possibility of a successful nonproliferation strategy.

Although North Korea's nuclear program was long viewed with serious concern by United States policy makers, the issue acquired greater urgency following the announcement by Pyongyang, on March of 1993, of its intent to withdraw from the nonproliferation treaty. The action constituted a rejection of a demand by the Vienna-based IAEA that it allows an inspection of two suspected nuclear waste sites at its Yongbyon nuclear facility before March 31, 1993. The sites are thought to contain evidence that in 1989 North Korea removed some of the fuel rods in a small, experimental, five mega watt (MW) reactor and reprocessed them to extract plutonium. The suspected diversion was inferred from laboratory analysis of materials collected during regular inspections of North Korea's declared nuclear facilities, that began in June 1992. Unsupervised or insufficiently monitored handling of the spent fuel rods would make it impossible for inspectors to reconstruct the operating history of the reactor and thus compromise the IAEA's ability to assess the extent of any past plutonium production. if the rods now being removed are not placed in a safeguarded storage environment or otherwise subjected to continuous inspection, North Korea could reprocess them to obtain plutonium for use in nuclear weapons.

North Korea not only rejected the demand for special inspections but it barred the IAEA from further routine inspections as well. It also continued to rebuff South Korean demands to implement a December 1991 bilateral de-nuclearization agreement, which among other things provided for negotiation of a mutual inspection regime.

For some time the stated long term strategy of the Clinton Administration has been to seek to negotiate a comprehensive settlement of Korean peninsula issues, in which North Korea's acceptance of inspections would be matched by new political, economic and security overtures on the part of the United States. Since the Administration began talks with North Korea in June 1993, officials have stressed that their first priority is to contain North Korea's stock of reprocessed plutonium and to get any such material placed under safeguards. To this point, diplomatic efforts led by the United States and the IAEA have failed to gain North Korea's agreement to reestablishing a regular inspection regime or to allowing special inspections to determine whether its scientists have diverted material to weapons use. During a series of negotiations with senior State Department officials last June and July, North Korea agreed to suspend its withdrawal from the nonproliferation treaty in exchange for United States assurances against the use of force. This includes nuclear weapons, and an American commitment not to interfere in North Korea's internal affairs.

For reasons that remain a matter of differing United States and North Korean interpretations, the agreement broke down. The North Koreans felt as though the inspections went beyond what had been agreed upon with United States negotiators. However, with the threat of the IAEA Board of Governors would report to the UN Security Council, the North Koreans agreed to one-time inspection, and after further antagonism, Pyongyang eventually issued visas to the IAEA's inspectors.

On March of 1993 the United States further its efforts to diffuse the confrontation of North Korea. The United States scheduled a series of high level talks with North Korea on a range of Korean peninsula issues, which intended to lead to an exchange of envoys. However, similar problems arose. The North Korean's proved to be unreasonable once again. The inspections did not go as planned as the North Korean's refused to let the inspectors take the necessary glove box samples and gamma ray scans at the reprocessing facility. Also the IAEA inspectors found evidence of tampering with seals on the hot cell in the reprocessing facility. North Korea's refusal to allow free access to the IAEA inspectors and evidence of forced entry into the hot cell area lent new urgency to the issue and underscored Pyongyang's unreliahility as a negotiating partner. The North Korea crisis escalated when North Korea announced that it had begun changing the fuel rods in the reactor without the presence of IAEA inspectors. To alleviate this problem the Clinton Administration offered to hold the high level of talks to consider the whole range of Korean peninsula issues, including economic, diplomatic and security benefits the North Korea might obtain if it agreed to place its nuclear program under international inspection and safeguards. The negotiations failed the and the general director of the IAEA reported to the UN Secretary General that the North Koreans had removed almost half of the fuel rods without necessary safeguard measures, and the IAEA were no longer able to verify the amount of plutonium North Korea was producing.

Through the tenacious efforts of the United States an agreement was reached on October 1994 that addressed the

threat posed by North Korea's nuclear program and to defuse tensions on the Korean peninsula. Under the United

States/North Korean Agreed Framework the North Koreans agreed to the following actions:

- Freeze activity at its existing nuclear reactor and at a facility for extracting plutonium from reactor fuel rods.

- Eventually dismantle the existing reactor as well as two reactors now under construction.

- Cooperate in transferring out of North Korea an existing group of used nuclear fuel rods which the United States says contain enough plutonium to make about four nuclear bombs.

- Permit regular inspections of its nuclear program by the International Atomic Energy Agency as called for under terms of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty.

- Allow, at some undetermined date in the future, inspection of two sites suspected of containing undeclared quantities of waste from past nuclear production.

The actions pledged by the United States are:

- Arrange for the international financing and supply of two modern nuclear reactors to North Korea for electricity production, at an estimated cost of $4 billion.

- Supply quantities of heavy oil to North Korea to tide it over during the nuclear energy transition.

- Ease economic and trade restrictions on North Korea.

Both countries agree to take steps toward establishing diplomatic liaison offices in each other's capital.'

Even though this agreement proves to a great step for non-proliferation treaty, this does not guarantee that we are safe or free from a North Korean bomb. They violated the treaty in the past, which they could do the same to this agreement.

It turns out that the North Koreans are suspected of being a nuclear threat again, and the United States is tempted to drop the 1994 nuclear agreement. North Korea will not let a United States inspection occur. The North Koreans feel as though the United States are interventionist. In fact on November of 1998 North Korea asked the United States to pay $300 million for the right to inspect an underground site suspected of being used to construct nuclear weapons. The United States rejected the proposal. Their argument is that they should not have to pay compensation to confirm that the North Koreans are living up to their obligations under this important nuclear agreement. Clinton's wanted to determine whether the unacceptable proposal developed due to the fact of their weakened economic conditions or it is simply just a move toward hostility. The IAEA proposed that North Korea allow the nuclear "watchdog' access to its suspect underground facility if it wishes to prove that it is not nuclear related. The IAEA has been working to verify that North Korea is keeping its promise to freeze its nuclear program under the agreed framework. However, they are still not making very much progress in verifying the history of the past North Korean nuclear programs.

The United States has taken on a huge responsibility due to its status upon the world. However, notice the United States did not just simply overpower the North Koreans with military action. There was not a full-scale attack instead; violence was used as the last resource. With small countries, such as North Korea, that is capable of containing nuclear weapons. The foreign diplomats must realize that military enforcement is often times not the right answer.

The argument now is whether or not it really is fair for the United States as the right to stand against nuclear proliferation, while having nuclear capabilities as well. Small countries might feel even more inferior than it already does, and might think that the only defense is to have nuclear weapons of their own. Therefore, there is a debate over whether or not all countries should have nuclear weapons. Though it would be better to not have any countries have nuclear weapons, we would be ignorant to think that is possible when there is a great deal of knowledge upon the subject. The ideal of all countries achieving nuclear weapons would be that every country will prove to be very dangerous, and that maybe there will be more negotiations and less chance of war in fear of total destruction.

Bibliography

Abstracts of GAO Reports and Testimony, FY97. Nuclear Nonproliferation: Implementation of the U.S./North Korean Agreed Framework on Nuclear Issues. www.gao.gov./AindexFY97

Burns, Robert. "Another Inspection Crisis?" www.archive.abcnews.com

Choe, Hyoung-Chan. "North Korea's Dangerous Nuclear Deal, Process, and Prospect." Korea. New York: University Press of America, 1996.

CRS Report: North Korea's Nuclear Weapons Program. www.middlebury.edu

Korea Herald. "IAEA offers to inspect suspect underground facility in North." December 3, 1998.

MacDonald, Callum. "The Democratic People's Republic of Korea: a Historical Survey.' North Korea in the New World Order. Ed. Hazel Smith. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1996.

Seattle Times. "N. Korean nuclear site is focus of U.S.visit." November 11, 1998.

Smith, Hazel. North Korean Forein Policy in the 1990's: The Realist Approach. North Korea in the New World Order. Ed. Hazel Smile. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1996.