ABSTRACT
The morality and utility of nuclear weapons have long been debated since their creation. Despite the sturdy public consensus in favor of nuclear weapons throughout the Cold War, some advocates continually called for abolition of these weapons. Now that the Cold War is finally over and the dangers of an all-out nuclear strike are diffused, what will we do with our current nuclear arsenal?This paper examines the pos-Cold War era with respect to nuclear weapons and what should be done in the future with U.S. nuclear weapons policy. The U.S. is currently participating in several treaties (i.e. ABM, CTBT) designed to decrease the global presence of nuclear arsenals, yet there is still much progress to be made in reducing these nuclear forces.
The main source used for t his research was the recent (June of 1998) National Academy of Sciences release, “The Future of U.S. Nuclear Weapons Policy”, a report written by the Committee on International Security and Arms Control. This document is the most up-to-date, comprehensive attempt to outline in writing the most appropriate goals of the United States with respect to nuclear weapons proliferation.
As the committee concluded many times, and as most sources concluded, the present U.S. policies on nuclear weapons are not sufficiently aggressive, or rather they are not being implemented seriously and quickly enough. With the goal being massive reduction to complete disarmament, the U.S. has a long way to go in improving the overall safety of all. Because the U.S. is a world leader, they must make the first drastic steps in reducing the nuclear presence in the global community.
INTRODUCTION
During the Cold War, nuclear weapons were at the center of U.S. and Soviet national security strategies, while both countries were developing large, diverse, and accurate nuclear forces that were maintained at very high alert levels. The officially stated reasons for these forces, in general, were in the U.S.’s perspective to deter the Soviet Union from attacking or threatening to attack the U.S. or its allies with conventional forces or nuclear weapons. On the Soviet side, the reason was to deny the U.S. and its allies any military or political advantage from their possession of these nuclear weapons, and to be able to deliver a crushing retaliation to any use of nuclear weapons against the Soviet Union.
The actual events of the Cold War period are consistent with the view that the nuclear forces and policies of the two sides were successful in their stated purposes: from 1946 onward, neither side succeeded in consistently imposing its will on the other, neither waged major war against the other, and neither launched a nuclear attack against anyone.[1] Of course, both countries were still standing in the wake of the memory of vast WWII destruction, knowing that all the destruction was achieved using conventional forces.
When the Cold War ended, the biggest uncertainty on the U.S. and Russian governments’ table was what to do with their appropriate nuclear arsenals. What would the new purposes for and policies of nuclear weapons be in the future? The debate surrounding the appropriate purposes and policies for U.S. nuclear weapons has been in existence since the dawn of the nuclear age. Upon the ending of the Cold War, this debate eftered a new phase. Now that thm threat(of an all-out nuclear strike was non-existent, would there be good reason for the U.S. to possess such an immense nuclear arsenal? What methods should be employed, if any, in order to reduce the amount or control the usage of these devastating weapons?
Many arguments are being examined very closely by the present governments. Some argue for complete abolition of nuclear weapons, while others argue that complete abolition is difficult if not impossible because of the nuclear weapons already possessed by unlicensed nations such as India and Pakistan. Because abolition by law does not necessarily mean abolition in actuality, eliminating our nuclear arsenal would, in effect, make us vulnerable to those states who possess nuclear weapons illegally.
Another argument for keeping our nuclear arsenal is that of using it for deterrence purposes. Simply having nuclear weapons provides protection and power enough for the United States. Essentially, if people know we have the ability to use these weapons, they will refrain from launching an attack on us, because we could obliterate them with nuclear weapons.
Perhaps the most popular stance on U.S. nuclear weapons policy today seems to be one of progressive constraints. While preserving the core function of the nuclear arsenal, to deter nuclear aggression, nuclear forces would be reduced, their roles would be more narrowly defined, and greater emphasis would be placed on achieving higher standards of operational safety.[2]
Much of the international political landscape focuses on the United States and Russia. U.S. and Russian nuclear forces have evolved to some state since the cold war ended, but many argue that further evolution is highly desirable. The present non-adversarial relationship between the U.S. and Russia is providing the environment for these changes to take place. Many would argue that the ultimate goal in the long run is to feasibly prohibit the possession of nuclear weapons all together. The possession of nuclear weapons by rogue states such as India and Pakistan, however, further complicates this issue.
THE CURRENT
SITUATION: WHY CHANGE NUCLEAR WEAPONS POLICY?
Over the course of
the Cold War, both Russia and the United States negotiated a series of arms
control agreements to limit the direct dangers of their specific nuclear
confrontation. In addition to
attempting to limit dangers within their countries, they lead in the
construction of other agreements involving other countries, with wider
participation, intending to curb the proliferation of nuclear weapons in other
countries.[3] It
can be argued that these attempts at antiproliferation and arms control succeeded,
because there were no accidental, erroneous, or unauthorized launches of
nuclear weapons and no escalation to nuclear war. The nuclear arsenals were eventually capped, albeit at very high
levels of 30,000 to 40,000 nuclear weapons each for the U.S. and the Soviet
Union.[4] The spread of nuclear weapons into the
possession of additional countries proceeded much more slowly than most people
foresaw in the ‘50's and 60's. Now,
with the end of the Cold War, the nuclear arsenal of the United States and Russia
are shrinking significantly, with dismantlement of warheads proceeding at a
pace of 1500-2000 per year on each side.[5]
But is this enough? What has happened
since the fall of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War, and why do we
need to further alter the existing nuclear weapons policy?
The first Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START I), signed in 1991 as the Cold War was ending and now being implemented by both the United States and Russia, will reduce the number of strategic nuclear warheads by the two countries from 13,000 and 11,000, respectively, to about 8,000 each. START II, signed in 1993 and ratified by the U.S. in early 1996 but not yet ratified by Russia, would further limit the number of deployed strategic warheads to 3,000 and 3,500 on each side. At the Helsinki summit in March 1997 Presidents Clinton and Yeltsin agreed to seek a START III treaty with a level of 2,000 to 2,500 deployed strategic nuclear warheads. In addition, nuclear testing has ended, and the U.S. and Russia have agreed not to target their missiles against each other on a day-to-day basis.[6]
These actions have obviously halted if not reversed the nuclear competition that was experienced on both sides so characteristically during the Cold War. However, the actions have not eliminated the physical threat that the existence of these weapons poses. The nuclear forces of both countries, although greatly diminished since the Cold War, could still inflict catastrophic damage on any area that they could target. Also, those weapons not technically addressed by the START programs could be retained without further agreements and pose considerable risks of breakout, theft, or unauthorized use.
Appearing largely unchanged since the Cold War is the present structure of the plans for using nuclear weapons, with both the U.S. and Russia seemingly continuing to emphasize early and large counter force strikes and both remaining capable, despite the reductions, of quickly bringing their nuclear forces to full readiness for use.[7] Because of this fact, the dangers of initiation of nuclear war by error or by accident are still very high.
Current U.S. nonproliferation policy can be loosely divided into three overlapping areas: (1) maintaining and strengthening the formal nonproliferation regime, (2) reassuring nations that foregoing nuclear weapons will not jeopardize their security, and (3) preparing to respond if additional proliferation occurred.[8] The Clinton Administration has shown good leadership in supporting and achieving the CTBT (Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty), but the absence of great changes in U.S. nuclear posture and practice to reflect the post-Cold War conditions weakens the credibility of this leadership. Basically, the U.S. is not practicing what they preach, so to speak. Also, nonnuclear nations are uncertain as to what reassurances the U.S. will provide if they happen to be threatened by a nuclear attack.
In any case, the continued efforts made by the U.S. and Russia to reduce their nuclear arsenals are necessary in order for other nations possessing nuclear arms to participate in the arms reduction process and strengthen the global nonproliferation regime. The degree of commitment of the nonnuclear weapons states to these crucial collective efforts will surely depend at least in part on impressions about whether the nuclear weapons states are working seriously on the arms reduction part of the global nonproliferation bargain.[9]
DETERRENCE
According to the Committee on International Security and Arms Control, understanding the history of nuclear weapons policy and addressing the challenges of formulating new policies for the future both require an appreciation of diverse definition, applications, and dilemmas of “deterrence.” In the release by the CISAC, “The Future of U.S. Nuclear Weapons Policy,” the committee outlines what it meant by the term in any particular context:
The words “deter” and “deterrence” both derive from the Latin deterrere, to frighten from. The narrowest dictionary definition of “deter” in English, correspondingly, is “to discourage from some action by making the consequences seem frightening.” Both in everyday language and in the language of specialists in international politics and military strategy, however, “deter” has long since had a somewhat wider meaning: it is used not only to describe discouraging an action by the prospect of consequences that are frightening, but also for situations in which the restraint arises simply from the prospect of failure to achieve the intended aims, or the prospect of costs exceeding an action’s expected benefits.
In principle, nuclear deterrence could be used to deter not only nuclear attacks but also attacks with conventional forces, attacks with BCW (biological and chemical weapons), and even assaults on vital national interests by nonmilitary means. The principal roles generally attributed to U.S. possession of nuclear weapons are (1) deterrence of premeditated nuclear attack; (2) deterrence of major conventional war; and (3) compensation for possible inadequacies in nonnuclear forces, including deterrence or response to attacks with chemical or biological weapons.[10] Because we are in a post-Cold War era, these roles are less demanding for a few reasons. The likelihood of an all-out war between the U.S. and Russia has greatly diminished, and because of that, the role of nuclear weapons in general is lessened. In addition, although the importance of regional conflicts has increased, the use of nuclear deterrence by the U.S., Russia, or any other declared nuclear weapons state in these conflicts is unnecessary, unlikely, and even harmful in come cases.
A principle rationale for maintaining a credible and effective nuclear weapons stance is based on the need to provide a hedge--an insurance policy--against a reversal in relations with Russia or China. Over time, both of these nuclear states have demonstrated a tendency for radical shifts in their political orientation, as well as an enduring commitment to possess nuclear weapons both for the status they afford and as an essential part of their security strategy.[11]
Neither Russia nor China would today seriously consider eliminating their nuclear arsenals, however, they would probably love to see the United States eliminate its arsenal. While the U.S. is debating the pros and cons of a dramatically reduced nuclear arsenal, and even considering complete disarmament, the Russians and Chinese are currently modernizing their own nuclear defense forces. Given the inability to predict or control where these states will be in terms of nuclear power in the next five years, it is prudent for the United States to hedge its bets in case of a reversal of friendly relations between these two countries, this hedge being to maintain a strong nuclear deterrent.
The strong necessity for maintaining a nuclear deterrent can be seen with the real-world example of the Gulf War. Iraqi leaders most likely attributed their decision not to use chemical weapons and biological agents because they knew they could possibly face a nuclear counter-attack by the United States. Now, whether or not the U.S. would have actually gone through with a nuclear assault on the Middle East is questionable, but that is irrelevant in the case of deterrence. Saddam could simply not count on the U.S. or Israel from refraining to use nuclear weapons in response to an attack. Other factors as well could have contributed to Iraq’s decision not to use BCW, but the crucialness of the implied threat of a nuclear response cannot be ignored.
PROHIBITION: THE CASE OF THE “NEW ELIMINATIONISTS,” AND THE BENEFITS AND RISKS OF NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT
Today, those advocating the abolishment of nuclear weapons have revived the debate, calling into question once again the role and necessity of these weapons in the contemporary national security environment. In the forefront of this new nuclear debate are the “new eliminationists”--those advocating either complete abolition of nuclear weapons or further immense reductions as a first step on the road to a nuclear-free world. Among many of its supporters are distinguished individuals, self-appointed committees, high-profile commissions, and several retired four-star officers who held the highest nuclear commands during and after the Cold War.[12]
The recommendations of the new eliminationists rest on four principles, or rather propositions:
(1) The use of nuclear weapons against non-nuclear states is morally and politically indefensible, and the threat of nuclear use to deter these states in incredible. States such as Iran, Iran, North Korea and other so-called rogues can be deterred, and if necessary defeated by the West’s technological superiority in conventional weaponry. There is not benefit in holding nuclear weapons and targeting them at these states, because the U.S. would never actually launch them anyway.
(2) The destructiveness of nuclear weapons is so great that they have no military utility against another nuclear state except for deterrence purposes. In light of this fact, the necessity for vast stockpiles of deterrent nuclear weapons was eliminated with the end of the Cold War and the fall of the Soviet Union. In any case, Russia cannot presently afford to maintain such stockpiles as a modern nuclear arsenal.
(3) Because of the decreasing Russian control over its nuclear forces, more frightening is the probability that deployment of nuclear weapons could occur inadvertently or accidentally.
(4) The possession of nuclear weapons by some states merely encourages other states to acquire them, and therefore reduces the overall security to everyone. The reason that states like India will not sign on to the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) is because of the inherent double standard that it presents. While the U.S. still possesses such a large nuclear arsenal, they cannot expect other nations to reduce or otherwise halt the production of theirs.
The propositions of the “new eliminationists” are not wholly extreme or unpractical. The point is well taken that the United States presents such a double standard in its desires for non-proliferation. Also, it makes sense that nuclear weapons will never actually be used in a conflict between two states that possess them, and therefore it merely poses a threat to everyone because of the risks that they could be deployed accidentally or inadvertently.
However, the argument of the “new eliminationists” is a bit idealistic and a bit off-base. In exploring the desirability of prohibiting nuclear weapons, the balance of benefits and risks that this course of action would entail must be evaluated. A durable prohibition of nuclear weapons would have three main advantages. First, it would seemingly eliminate the risk that nuclear weapons might be used by the states that now possess them. Second, a prohibition would also reduce the likelihood that additional states will acquire nuclear weapons. A third advantage to complete nuclear disarmament is related to the inherent ambiguous moral and legal status of nuclear weapons.[13] Technically, nuclear weapons must only be used for self-defense, must not be directed at civilians, must not cause unnecessary suffering to combatants, and must not cause greater harm than is necessary for the legitimate military purposes of using them[14]. It is hard to imagine any use of nuclear weapons meeting all of these criteria, and therefore nuclear disarmament would eliminate this ambiguity.
Nuclear disarmament also has great risks. There is always the risk that the prohibition would break down and that a state may decide to cheat by possessing a very small nuclear arsenal, simply for coercive purposes. States may also withdrawal from a disarmament agreement if they felt their interests would no longer be protected without nuclear weapons. It would be difficult o build an international security system large and powerful enough to prevent these types of things from happening.
Another concern with regards to nuclear prohibition is that it would remove the moderating effect that nuclear weapons have had on the behavior of states, resulting in an increased likelihood of major war. The nuclear age represents the longest period of time in which a war between major powers has not taken place. Many regional conflicts have taken place since, including civil wars, however none of these generated direct combat between nuclear weapons states. Therefore, there is a notion that, if introduced, complete nuclear prohibition may lead to frequent large-scale conventional conflicts. There is obviously no demonstrable relationship between the actual possession of nuclear weapons and the avoidance of war, but the intuitive reasoning of the possible relationship is, in the least, quite convincing.
Achieving the conditions necessary for a durable global prohibition and disarmament of nuclear weapons would not be easy. The unprecedented degree of international cooperation that would be necessary for such a feat is highly unlikely, but many would agree that it is still something we should strive for in the future.
STEPS TOWARD A SOUND NUCLEAR WEAPONS POLICY
According the National Academy of Sciences report, the United States should rethink its Cold War-era nuclear weapons policies and seriously consider the goal of nuclear disarmament, or at least consider working in that direction. Specifically, the U.S. should:
*Begin work on START III immediately rather than waiting for the Russian government to ratify START II.
*Take nuclear weapons off hair-trigger alert.
*Retire the SIOP— the Single Integrated Operational Plan.
*Preserve the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty.
*Declare a policy of no-first-use-weapons.
*Make deep cuts in the numbers of nuclear weapons, not just deployed strategic weapons.
*Lead the way in building an international security system in which all nuclear weapons are prohibited. (Points taken from Moore, M. 1997)
The Cold War is history. The United States needs to move at a much quicker pace in downgrading the role of nuclear weapons. Continued reliance on nuclear deterrence among the nuclear weapons states undermines the credibility of these states in their opposition to proliferation. In short, the U.S. needs to practice what they preach, otherwise they will find themselves in an increasingly awkward position if they continue to maintain that their security requires such a strong nuclear deterrent force while denying the validity of this argument for other nations.
The U.S. could greatly reduce the role of its nuclear weapons without risking an increased probability of war, and in addition, the downgrading of such weapons would likely improve the U.S. relations with Russia. Reducing the role of nuclear weapons, however, should not be taken as meaning the elimination of nuclear weapons. Although desirable, nuclear disarmament is far, far in the future. In the meantime, the U.S. should not publicly proclaim its use of nuclear deterrence as the core function of its defense against attacks. Tight verification procedures are necessary for every level of the reduction process, and the levels of cooperation necessary for this to happen would be unprecedented.[15]
Is all of this possible? Yes, it can be. However, as pointed out in the NAS release and in many reviewed documents concerning U.S. nuclear weapons policy, the U.S. cannot begin to make great steps in this direction if they do not set the example for other nations.
CONCLUSION
Says President Clinton in a May 1998 radio address,
“Over the past few years, we’ve made remarkable progress in reducing nuclear arsenals around the world and combating the spread of nuclear weapons. Building on the Reagan and Bush administrations, we entered that START I treaty into force, lowering both Russian and American nuclear arsenals. . .we have the opportunity to leave behind the darkest moments of the 20th century and embrace the most brilliant possibilities of the 21st. To do it we must walk away from nuclear weapons, not toward them. Let us renew our determination to end the era of nuclear testing once and for all.”
The process of reducing national nuclear arsenals to a few hundred warheads would lay much necessary groundwork for nuclear disarmament. In any case, a regime of progressive constraints on nuclear weapons is a good prescription for reducing nuclear dangers without adversely affecting the security interests of the United States.
Although it appears the U.S. is wanting to eliminate nuclear weapons from the face of the earth, we cannot deny that, at the moment, they are still necessary to possess. The agenda that the President and NAS document put forward is ambitious to say the least, and cannot be accomplished quickly. It will not be easy to achieve the conditions necessary to make a durable global prohibition on the possession of nuclear weapons desirable or even possible. However, many believe that the time has come to intensify the effort to achieve the goals outlined.
WORKS CITED
Joseph, Robert G., and John F. Reichert. The case for nuclear deterrence today. ORBIS v42, nl (Winter, 1998): 13 pages.
Moore, Mike. Nuclear Disarmament: the NAS blueprint. Bulletin o the Atomic Scientists v53, n5 (September-October, 1997): 14 pages.
The President’s Radio Address. (Pres. Bill Clinton, Transcript) Weekly Compilation of Presidential documents v34, n21. may 25, 1998.
“The Future of U.S. Nuclear Weapons Policy” National Academy of Sciences report: written by the Committee for International Security and Arms Control. National Academy Press, Washington, D.C., 1997.
