



Digital Watermarking

Ton Kalker

Hewlett-Packard Labs



Overview


- Part I
 - classification of watermarking
 - basic examples
 - applications
- Part II
 - Spread-Spectrum watermarking
- Part III
 - Quantization Index Modulation
- Part IV
 - Costa's Theorem

Part I

Introduction & Classification

What is Digital Watermarking

- Original signal
 - host (cover)
 - audio, image, video, 3D model, ...
- Auxiliary data
 - potentially related to host
- Multiplexed into one signal
 - Watermarked signal
- Two receivers
 - Humanoid receiver
 - signal detector
 - host signal
 - Mechanical receiver
 - watermark detector
 - auxiliary data



Players

- Simon (sender)
 - Access to host signal
 - Transmitting message embedded in host
- Robert (human receiver)
 - Access to watermarked signal
 - Access to machine for message reading
- Evan (human or not)
 - Man in the middle
 - Intentional and/or non-intentional interference
 - Intentional: attacker
 - Non-intentional: channel
 - Has no access to (shared) secrets by Simon and Robert



Signal Roles

- M : transmitted message
 - Simon embeds in
- C_o : host signal
 - Simon modifies to
- C_w : watermarked signal
 - Evan modifies to
- C_{nw} : degraded & watermarked signal
 - Robert restores to
- C_n : restored signal
- M_n : estimated message

Classification: steganography

- Steganography
 - Secret writing
- Context
 - Simon free to choose any host
- Goal
 - Communicate reliably a secret message to Robert
 - Hiding the presence of the message to Evan
- Note
 - Host distortion may potentially be large!

SimpleStego (Memon et al.)

- Initialization

- Simon and Robert agree upon a common cryptographic n-bit hash function $h = H(C)$

- Loop


- Simon chooses an n-bit message M.
- Simon shoots $O(2^n)$ pictures with his HP camera
- After $O(2^n)$ pictures, Simon will have a picture C such that $H(P) = M$
- Simon sends C
- Robert retrieves M

SimpleStego (Memon et al.)

- Theorem
 - For SimpleStego, Evan cannot distinguish between an picture encoding a message or not
 - SimpleStego is secure
- Issues
 - SimpleStego is impractical
 - Complexity
- Steganography objective
 - Design practical secure stego methods
 - Design stego detection methods

Classification: Authentication watermarking

- Context
 - Simon is given a specified host signal
- Goal
 - Transmit authenticity flag
 - One message only
 - Any interference by Evan flips the flag
 - Robert can verify authenticity
- Note
 - Embedded digital signature



Machine

SimpleAuth


- Initialization
 - Simon and Robert agree upon a common and public cryptographic n-bit hash function $h = H(C)$
 - Simon and Robert agree upon a common secret n-bit message M .
 - Simon is given signal C
- Loop
 1. Simon randomly modifies C yielding $Q \sim C$
 2. If not $H(Q) = M$, go to (1).
 3. If $H(Q) = M$, transmit Q

SimpleAuth

- Theorem
 - If n large enough, any modification of the transmitted signal Q by Evan will result in a flip of the authentication flag.
- Issues
 - SimpleAuth is impractical
 - Complexity of Simon and Robert is equal
- Authentication objectives
 - Design practical secure watermark authentication methods
 - Allow for localization of interference
 - Allow for benign modifications

Classification: Robust Watermarking

- Context
 - Simon is given a specified host signal
- Goal
 - Transmit a message M
 - Any restricted interference by Evan retains M
 - Typically a distortion constraint
 - Evan cannot read, modify or erase the message M
 - Robert can reliably read M
- Note
 - Distortion constraints are typically not well-modeled
 - In practical situations, Evan might resort to
 - Exploiting the weakness of perceptual models
 - Ignoring his imposed interference constraints



LSB Watermarking

- Initialization
 - Host signal P is an $n \times n$ image with 8-bit pixel values
 - Simon and Robert agree upon a secret pseudo-random common $n \times n$ bit array X .
- Transmission
 - Simon transmits the bit 'b' by replacing the LSB-plane of the image by ' $Y = b \text{ XOR } X$ '
 - Embedding distortion: 0.5 bit/pixel
- Channel
 - Evan restricted to only replace 25% of the LSB values: $Y \rightarrow Z$
 - Channel distortion: 0.25 bit/pixel
- Detection
 - Robert correlates LSB plane of Z with X
 - If n large, Robert will retrieve message bit b with high probability

LSB Watermarking


- If Evan obeys constraints
 - LSB watermarking robust

- However
 - Interference constraint not perceptually motivated
 - Evan is allowed less distortion than Simon

- Objectives
 - Robust watermarking with
 - Relevant distortion constraints
 - Provable security


Compliant World

- All content is encrypted on all digital interfaces
- Link-by-link encryption; devices internally process clear content
- Controlled by CSS, 5C, 4C, ...
- Includes DVD players, DVD RAM, SDMI audio, DVD audio, PC's



Non-Compliant World

- All analog devices, some digital
- Marginalized by standardization efforts




- Macrovision spoilers
- Watermarks

- By licensing contract no unprotected output



- New laws in US and EU


Broadcast Monitoring




Name That Tune



Helper Data for Processing



Formal Model



- WNR = Watermark to Noise Ratio
 - Channel / Embedding
 - WNR large: high throughput
- WDR = Watermark to Document Ratio
 - Embedding / Host
 - WDR large: high throughput


Basic questions

- What is the maximal rate of reliable communication?
- What is the coding scheme to achieve maximal rate?

Classification: Reversible Watermarking

- Context
 - A given host signal C_o and a message M
- Goal
 - Transmitting M embedded in C_o
 - Retrieving M from received signal C_{nw}
 - Restoring C_o from received signal C_{nw}
- Note
 - In most reversible scenarios Evan is absent
 - Theory in the case of presence of Evan is not completely understood

Formal Reversible Model




SimpleRev

- Initialization
 - C is iid $B(r)$ source sequence of length n
 - $C = \{c_1, c_2, \dots, c_n\}$, all c_i independent
 - $\text{Prob}(c_i = 1) = r, 0 < r < 1$
 - Hamming distance
 - Even absent
- Procedure
 - Compress C, say using Huffman encoding: $\langle C \rangle$
 - $|\langle C \rangle| \sim n H(r)$
 - $H(r) = -r \log(r) - (1-r) \log(1-r)$: binary entropy
 - Add $n(1 - H(r))$ random message bits
- Reversing
 - Strip message bits
 - Decompress


SimpleRev

- Resulting parameters
 - Distortion: $D = 0.5$ bit per sample
 - Rate: $R = 1 - H(r)$ bit per sample
- Generalization
 - Apply previous procedure only for a fraction α of the bits in P .
- Resulting parameters
 - Distortion: $D = 0.5 \alpha$ bit per sample
 - Rate: $R = (1 - H(r)) \alpha$ bit per sample
- $R(D)$ relation (time-sharing)

$$R = 2 (1 - H(r)) D$$



Formal Reversible Model




Basic questions

- What is the maximal rate of reliable communication?
- What is the coding scheme to achieve maximal rate?
- Is the previous scheme optimal?

Optimal Reversible Watermarking

$$R(D) = H(r + (1 - 2r) D) - H(r)$$



$$R = 2(1 - H(r)) D$$

Classification: Fingerprinting

- Context
 - A group of N users
 - A unknown group S of k colluders (multiple Evans)
 - A single host signal C_o
- Goal
 - Embedding a message m_i in C_o for each user I
 - Retrieving at least on identity I in S from a colluded version $[[C_s]]$
 - where $[[.]]$ is some averaging operator
- Note
 - some applications require the retrieval of all of S



1: 10101010101010101



2: 1010101010101111



3: 10101110101010101




N: 10001110101010101



Fingerprinting Application

- Alternative to Digital Rights Management (DRM)
 - DRM = pro-active protection of content
 - active enforcement of allowed usage rules
 - FairPlay (iTunes), MS-DRM (Napster), OMA-DRM (Cingular), Helix (Real), ...
 - non-interoperable walled gardens
- Fingerprinting
 - retro-active enforcement of usage rules
 - content labeled with user identity
 - unauthorized distribution is traceable
 - even after collusion!

Digital Cinema



Watermark Parameters

- Perceptibility
 - perceptibility of the watermark in the intended application



Original image



Image + hidden information

Watermark Parameters

- Robustness

- resistance to (non-malevolent) quality respecting processing




JPEG compression



Additive noise & clipping

Watermark Parameters

- Error Rates
 - example: copyright detection



Watermark Parameters

- Complexity
 - hardware & software resources, real-time aspects
 - baseband vs. compressed domain
- Granularity
 - minimal spatio-temporal interval for reliable embedding and detection
- Capacity
 - related to payload
 - #bits / sample

Watermark Parameters

- Layering & remarking
 - watermark modification
- Security
 - vulnerability to intentional attacks
 - Kerckhoffs' principle

Part II

Spread-Spectrum Watermarking

Patchwork


- 2 disjoint sets, A and B , of $N/2$ pixels each
 - pixels in each set (“patch”) chosen randomly
 - assumption:

$$S = \left(\sum_i A_i - \sum_i B_i \right) / N \approx 0$$

- embedding bit $b = \{-1, +1\}$: $A'_i \leftarrow A_i + b * 1$, $B'_i \leftarrow B_i - b * 1$

$$\begin{aligned} S' &= \left(\sum_i A'_i - \sum_i B'_i \right) / N = \\ & \quad \left(\sum_i A_i - \sum_i B_i \right) / N + \\ & \quad + (N/2 - (-N/2)) / N \approx b \end{aligned}$$

- if $|S'| \approx 1$, watermark present with value $\text{sign}(S')$
- Prototypical spread-spectrum watermarking
 - communicate information via many small changes



Spread-Spectrum Watermarking

- Original Signal $x[i]$ (Gaussian, iid, σ_X, \dots)
- Watermark $w[i]$ (Gaussian, iid, σ_W, \dots)
- Watermarked Signal
 - (1/2)-bit version (*copy protection*)
 - H0: $Y[i] = X[i]$
 - H1: $Y[i] = X[i] + W[i]$
 - 1-bit version (*helper data*)
 - H0: $Y[i] = X[i] - W[i]$
 - H1: $Y[i] = X[i] + W[i]$

Spread-Spectrum Watermarking

- Received Signal $Z[i]$
 - Distinguish between two hypotheses H_0 and H_1 .
- Maximum likelihood testing
 - (Gaussian, iid) optimal tests statistic given by correlation
 - $D = (\sum_i Z[i] W[i]) / N$
- Not Marked : $Z = X$
 - $E[D] = (\sum_i E[X[i]] E[W[i]]) / N = 0$
 - $E[D^2] = E[(\sum_i X[i] W[i])^2] / N^2 =$
 $= (\sum_i E[X[i]^2] E[W[i]^2]) / N^2 =$
 $= \sigma_X^2 \sigma_W^2 / N$

Spread-Spectrum Watermarking

- Marked : $Z = X + b W$
 - $E[D] = b \sigma_W^2$
 - $\sigma_D^2 = \sigma_X^2 \sigma_W^2 / N$
- For N large D is approximately Gaussian distributed
- Error rate determined by $Q(D / \sigma_D)$
- Marked : $|E[D]| / \sigma_D = \text{Sqrt}(N) (\sigma_W / \sigma_X)$
- Robustness increases with
 - More samples
 - More watermark energy
 - Less host interference


Detection (effectiveness)

- Correlation sum D
 - assumed Gaussian
 - $\sigma_W = 1$
 - variance $\sigma_X^2/(N)$
- Decision rule becomes

$$\hat{b} = \begin{cases} +1, & \text{if } D > 0; \\ -1 & \text{if } D < 0. \end{cases}$$

- Probability of error
 - Q function

$$Q\left(\frac{\sqrt{N}}{\sigma}\right)$$




Detection (robustness)

- Correlation sum D
 - assumed Gaussian
 - mean $-a, +a$
 - variance $\sigma_X^2/(N)$
- Decision rule becomes

$$\hat{b} = \begin{cases} +1, & \text{if } D > 0; \\ -1 & \text{if } D < 0. \end{cases}$$

- Probability of error
 - Q function


$$Q\left(a \frac{\sqrt{N}}{\sigma}\right)$$




Detection (false positives)

- Correlation sum D
 - assumed Gaussian
 - mean $-1, 0, +1$
 - variance $\sigma_x^2/(N)$
- Decision rule becomes
$$\hat{b} = \begin{cases} +1, & \text{if } D > +T; \\ -1, & \text{if } D < -T; \\ 0, & \text{if } |D| \leq T. \end{cases}$$
- Probability of false positive

$$2Q\left(T \frac{\sqrt{N}}{\sigma}\right)$$



Error Rates




Transmitting n-bit messages

- Initialization

- for each message $m \in \{0, \dots, 2^n\}$ select a watermark sequence W_m
- Simon and Robert share the code book $\{W_m\}$

- Loop


- Simon chooses message m
- Simon adds W_m to host C_o
- Robert correlates C_{nw} with every element in code book
- Robert declares the message m' such that $W_{m'}$ has the largest correlation with C_{nw}




Practical Spread-Spectrum

- Message M is represented as n -bit structure
- Each bit is associated with anti-podal pair of watermark sequences
 - $Y = X + W$
 - $Y = X - W$
- M is transmitted and received bit by bit

Watermark Embedding



Watermark Retrieval




Perceptual Watermarking


- Original x .
- Apply transform T : $y = T(x)$
 - $T = I, \text{DCT}, \text{FFT}, \text{log}, \dots$ (or any combination thereof)
- Add pseudo-random sequence w : $z = y + w$
 - Allow adaptation of w to host signal
 - $Z = Y + \alpha W$
 - In position
 - only in textured image regions, not in silence
 - In value
 - less energy in flat regions than in textured regions
- Apply inverse transform: $x' = T^{-1}(z)$

Perceptual Watermarking

- $T = I$
 - Spatial watermarking
- $W = X_A - X_B$
 - Binary $\{-1,+1\}$ -valued pseudo-random sequence
- Adaptation, e.g.
 - Less power in flat regions
 - More power in textured regions



Cox Image Watermarking Scheme




Evan's options

- Simple waveform processing
 - “brute-force” approach
 - impairs watermark and original data
 - compression, linear filtering, additive noise, quantization
- Detection-disabling methods
 - disrupt synchronization
 - **geometric transformations** (RST), cropping, shear, re-sampling, shuffling
 - watermark harder to locate
 - distortion metric not well defined
- Advanced jamming/removal
 - intentional processing to impair/defeat watermark
 - **watermark estimation**, collusion (multiple copies)
- Ambiguity/deadlock issues
 - reduce confidence in watermark integrity
 - creation of fake watermark or original, estimation and copying of watermark signal


De-synchronization

- Attack
 - harder to find watermark
 - does not remove watermark
- How to measure distortion?
- Spread spectrum
 - fails without sync
 - re-synchronizing difficult
 - noiselike carrier
 - no peaks in frequency



StirMark

- Popular, free WWW software
 - simulate printing and scanning
 - nonlinear geometric distortion + JPEG
- Easy to use and test




Optimal Rate Question

- Given a some statistical constraints on
 - the host C_o
 - model and energy
 - the embedding distortion P_e
 - type and power
 - the channel distortion P_a
 - type and power
- and allowing for arbitrary long signals,
- what is the maximal rate (number of messages per sample) that can be achieved?

Maximal Transmission Rate

- Assumptions

- C_o is a white Gaussian signal of power P_o
- The embedding power is restricted to P_e
- Evan implements an Additive White Gaussian Noise (AWGN) channel of Power P_a



Spread-Spectrum Bound

- Observation
 - host signal and channel are AWGN to the watermark signal W_m

- Shannon's Theorem applies

$$R = \frac{1}{2} \log\left(1 + \frac{P_e}{P_o + P_a}\right)$$

- For small WDR and modest WNR

$$R = \frac{1}{2} \log\left(1 + \frac{P_e}{P_o}\right)$$

- Host interference dominates

Performance regions

- WDR small

$$R = \frac{1}{2} \log\left(1 + \frac{P_e}{P_o}\right) \approx \frac{1}{2P_o} P_e$$

– rate grows linear with embedding power


- WDR large

$$R = \frac{1}{2} \log\left(1 + \frac{P_e}{P_o}\right) \approx \frac{1}{2} \log\left(\frac{P_e}{P_o}\right) = c + \frac{1}{2} \log(P_e)$$

– grows logarithmic with embedding power

Performance graph

Eggers, Girod ©



For low WNR Spread-Spectrum approaches rate of optimal scheme ICS

For large WNR Spread-Spectrum underperforms with respect to the ICS scheme.