| Tactical Nuclear Weapons: The Debates within NATO |
| Brian Burton |
| What are Tactical Nuclear
Weapons? Lance missile |
| Slide 3 |
| MADM warhead (1-15
kt) W54 SADM (.02-1kt, 163 lbs.) Atomic Demolition Munitions |
| Short-Range Aircraft A-7 Corsair II |
| Slide 6 |
| Background: the 1950s |
| Korean War 1950-3: US considers use of nuclear weapons against North Korea and China | |
| Policy of the Eisenhower administration was to respond to any direct Soviet aggression with Òmassive retaliationÓ | |
| NATO Carte Blanche exercise, 23-28 June 1955: war-game simulates future European conflict with Warsaw Pact involving tactical nuclear weapons; the outcome was 355 nuclear detonations in West Germany, the Low Countries, and northern France and 5.2 million immediate civilian casualties | |
| First US Army divisions in Europe are equipped with nuclear capability |
| Should NATO rely on tactical nuclear weapons to offset the Warsaw PactÕs conventional superiority? |
| With development complete, there is less overhead to maintain large nuclear forces than large conventional forces | |
| Warsaw Pact/Soviet Union will be deterred, knowing that in the event of war their conventional forces will be destroyed by NATOÕs nuclear weapons |
| Should NATO rely on tactical nuclear weapons to offset the Warsaw PactÕs conventional superiority? |
| Political constraints among the allies | |
| Issues of authorization and control | |
| Due to massively increased casualties on a nuclear battlefield, more rather than fewer conventional forces would be required to carry out military objectives | |
| Cost of maintaining nuclear infrastructure absorbs resources that could otherwise be used to achieve conventional parity with the Warsaw Pact | |
| ÒSlippery slope:Ó use of tactical nuclear weapons in war could lead to a full-scale strategic nuclear exchange |
| Background: the 1960s-1970s |
| Under Kennedy, the US policy shifts from Òmassive retaliationÓ to Òflexible response:Ó the ability to respond in kind to any Soviet aggression; conventional arms race with the Soviet Union heats up | |
| US involvement in Vietnam | |
| Period of dŽtente with the Soviet Union; SALT talks under Nixon | |
| DŽtente comes to an end in the late Ô70s during the Carter administration |
| Issues in the late 1970s-1980s |
| Enhanced Radiation Weapons | |
| Deployment of new Intermediate Nuclear Forces to Europe | |
| Possible Employment and ReaganÕs ÒWinnable WarÓ |
| ERW: the ÒNeutron BombÓ |
| Relies on prompt radiation effects with minimal blast damage | |
| Fraction of the explosive yield of other battlefield nuclear weapons | |
| Designed for tactical use: radiation kills troops inside armored vehicles, while the lesser explosive power supposedly lessens collateral damage effects |
| ERW: the ÒNeutron BombÓ |
| NATO leaders are prepared to allow President Carter to deploy ERW in Europe despite political repercussions | |
| April 1978: Carter decides not to proceed with production | |
| 1981: Reagan orders production of ERW to proceed, but keeps the weapons stockpiled in the United States |
| Modernization of NATO INF |
| Soviet deployment of SS-20 IRBMs and Tu-26 Backfire bombers worries Western European leaders, who request more US nuclear support | |
| US prepares to deploy Pershing II SRBMs and Tomahawk cruise missiles to Europe | |
| Deployment sparks massive protests in Europe; political support wavers |
| The ÒWinnable WarÓ |
| ERW development and new deployments of INF and battlefield systems=preparations for an imminent war? | |
| SecState Haig: in a conventional war, NATO might fire a Ònuclear warning shotÓ | |
| Reagan: ÒI could see where you could have the exchange of tactical weapons against troops in the field without it bringing either one of the major powers to pushing the button.Ó |
| The Post-Cold War Era |
| August 1991: Dissolution of the USSR | ||
| September 1991: President George Bush orders withdrawal and retirement of all US battlefield nuclear systems | ||
| Where might tactical weapons be needed in the future? | ||
| Rogue states | ||
| Heavy shelter penetration | ||
| Future conventional conflict? | ||
| Slide 17 |
| Sources |
| Boutwell, Jeffrey D., Paul Doty, and Gregory F. Treverton, eds. The Nuclear Confrontation in Europe. Dover, MA: Auburn House Publishing Company, 1985. | |
| Daalder, Ivo H. The Nature and Practice of Flexible Response. New York: Columbia University Press, 1991. | |
| Kromer, Robert. New Weapons and NATO: Solutions or Irritants? Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, Inc., 1987. | |
| Nurick, Robert, ed. Nuclear Weapons an European Security. Hampshire, England: Gower Publishing Company Limited, 1984. | |
| Olive, Marsha McGraw, and Jeffrey D. Porro. Nuclear Weapons in Europe. Lexington, MA: Lexington Books, 1983. | |
| Pierre, Andrew J., ed. Nuclear Weapons in Europe. New York: New York University Press, 1984. |