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1
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- The Evolutions of Nuclear Strategy
- US – Soviet Security Cooperation
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2
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- Problems:
- Schelling, “theory degenerates at one extreme if there is not scope for
mutual accomodation; it degenerates at the other extreme if there is no
conflict at all and no problem in identifying and reaching common goals.
- Each claiming to be powerful enough to destroy the other and neither
believing the other’s protestations of his peaceful intentions
- task: to recognize when mutual
interests conincide
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3
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- Stable conflict
- Retaliation is not to win, but to prove to the attacker that his losses
would be large
- Hurt social and economic structure
- Coercive bargaining – coercion, intimidation and deterrence
- Best weapons are protected from a first strike
- Did the development of intercontinental missiles strengthen the concept
of deterrence?
- What do you think about the
analogy of the modern deterrence to the ancient institution of the
exchange of hostages?
- Do you agree with the proposal that a nation should abstain from the
most advanced weapons, while encouraging the enemy to improve his
defenses?
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4
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- Problem with arms control: alien to military thinking, surprise attacks:
one needs more weapons so adversary cant wipe all out in first attack
- Arms control over disarmament
- From mid 1950’s US negotiation position in UN changes – how to live with
the bomb
- Can nuclear weapons be confined to the role of arms control?
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5
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- Nuclear pacifists
- “tradition of civilized warfare”
- Nuclear weapons violated any attempts to proportionate violence
- Accidents, ensured east-west conflict
- Arms race intermediate stop to disarmament
- Terror can be used to deter and keep international peace
- Act of threatening use of nuclear weapons immoral? Threats imply usage
- Does threatening to use nuclear weapons carry the same moral stigmas as
actually using them?
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6
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- Close calls in Berlin, Korea, the Middle East, Cuba, South Asia
- Managing crisis over avoiding them
- Set standards and approach to dealing with management, but not avoidance
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- Crisis Management
- Operational requirements
- 1. top level political body maintain knowledge and informed control
- 2. coordinate movements of military with diplomatic strategy
- 3. slow down tempo of military movements
- Avoid military threats
- Military alerts and force movements undertaken to reduce vulnerability
and readiness
- Select diplomatic proposals and define interest
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- Prudence:
- Neither superpower shall initiate military action against the other
- Shall not exploit its advantage in a crisis
- Operate with great restraint in policies and actions
- Shall not permit a regional ally to drag into shooting war
- Accept intervention by the other power in a regional conflict if such
intervention becomes necessary to prevent overwhelming defeat of ally,
each shall accept responsibility for pressuring ally to stop sure of
defeating opponent
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9
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- Threats to Crisis Management
- Tension
- Temptation to exploit advantage
- Regional conflicts
- Crisis military movements
- Controlling own military
- Crisis induced stress
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10
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- Crisis Avoidance
- How does the US – Soviet conflict defer from other classical forms of
power conflict and how much do you think this affected the course of
events?
- Deterrence, alliance commitments, military, and economic aid
- Example: Berlin airlift
- New opportunities emerged for reducing conflict, particularly in Europe
where the vital interest of both sides were engaged
- Vital interests facilitate cooperation and crisis prevention
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- Was détente “oversold” in the Basic Principles Agreement, which included
general principles that committed the US and Soviet union to avoid
nuclear war and outbreaks?
- For Soviets: peaceful coexistence means political equality with US
- The proposal put forward in 1983 by the American committee on the east
west accord urges the US and the Soviet Union to negotiate “a precise
set of ground rules having to do with specific geography and specific
ban on direct or indirect use of combat forces” was such an agreement
possible?
- Norms of competition lack institutionalized arrangements.
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12
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- Powers should undertake case by case diplomatic conversations on various
regions
- Trends of third world toward greater conflict will confront both
superpowers with declining influence in those areas
- Pressures to reduce both superpower’s involvements aboard might lead to
mutual restraint and tacit cooperation
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13
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- Bibliography:
- - Lawrence Freedman, The Evolution of Nuclear Strategy (Macmillan 1981)
pp. 190-207.
- - Alexander George, "U.S.-Soviet Efforts to Cooperate in Crisis
Management and Crisis avoidance," in Alexander George, Philip J.
Farley and Alexander Dallin, eds., U.S.-Soviet Security Cooperation,
(Oxford U.P., 1988) pp. 581-599.
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14
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