1	Intelligence Estimates on Iraq’s Nuclear Weapons Program
2	CIA National Intelligence Estimate (Prewar) High Confidence that Iraq was “expanding its chemical, biological, and nuclear programs” Claimed Iraq could produce a nuclear weapon within a year of gaining fissile material Claimed that Iraq would “probably have a nuclear weapon during this decade” Pointed to aluminum tubes, magnets, and high speed balancing machines as evidence that Iraq was seeking HEU (highly enriched uranium Claimed that Iraq was purchasing fissile material from African states; British and American governments pointed to Nigeria as a supplier US Department of State and Energy disputed estimates
3	IAEA estimates (Prewar) According to IAEA, “no indication of resumed nuclear activities…nor any indication of nuclear-related prohibited activities at any inspected sites.” No evidence of imported uranium Iraq’s nuclear capabilities “deteriorated substantially” since 1991, according to the IAEA Refuted CIA estimate that aluminum tubes were applied toward uranium enrichment
4	Post-War findings David Kay: “We have not uncovered evidence that Iraq undertook significant post 1998 steps to actually build nuclear weapons or produce fissile material.” Imported uranium allegations untrue: according to former ambassador Joseph Wilson, “it was highly doubtful that any transaction had ever taken place.” The Bush administration admitted that the accusation should not have been included in the 2003 State of the Union address Kay did note that Iraq did preserve some pre-1991 technology According to Kay, there was interest in early 2002 to resume and enrichment program, but this did not lead to illegal activities