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- Written By:
- Sidney D. Drell; Philip J. Farley; David Holloway
- International Security, Vol. 9, No. 2. (Autumn, 1984), pp. 51-91
- A Presentation By: Judy Wang, pp. 51-78
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- Futile: Offensive missiles would prevail in a competition
- Costly: Maintain deterrent threat
- Destabilizing: Speed up arms race
- -compete to build defensive system
- -come to build offensive missiles to overcome opponent’s defensive
system
- -pressure to strike first (fear other side’s defensive capabilities)
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- Other Measures besides ABM Treaty:
- 1971 agreement on “hotline” –reduce risk of accidental war by allowing
leaders to communicate during crises
- 1973 agreement to prevent nuclear war and to act to avoid a nuclear war
during crises
- Agreed to ABM Treaty in 1972: to avoid nuclear war and its “devastating
consequences for all mankind”
- -accepts deterrence as a necessary condition instead of as a threat
- Self-deterrence: suicidal for any country to start a nuclear war
- Does self-deterrence still apply today? Does it apply to rogue states?
If self deterrence works, why fear a nuclear threat at all?
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- Article V.1: “each party undertakes not to develop, test, or deploy ABM
systems or components which are sea-based, air-based, space-based, or
mobile land-based.
- Vague: on purpose so as not to rule out other devices that can be
developed in the future. As long as treaty is amended, these devices are
not exempt.
- Reagan, March 23, 1984: Wants to build a Strategic Defense Initiative
(SDI)
- Escape from reliance on mutual deterrence, but interim goal is to
enhance deterrence
- 1985-1989: a cost of 26 billion dollars
- Says it is consistent with ABM….for now
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- Late 1960’s, Soviets began to doubt effectiveness of ABM systems.
- Increased confidence in deterrence, realized that both sides vulnerable
to a devastating retaliatory strike if it attacked first.
- Desired ABM Treaty b/c without it…
- Upset the nuclear balance
- Lead to an unconstrained race in ABM systems and the further deployment
of offensive forces
- Not effective vs. offensive missiles
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- View U.S. weapons program as a way to gain strategic superiority.
- Criticized Reagan’s speech as a way for the U.S. to undermine its
commitment of making progress in limiting and reducing offensive weapons
- Serious Threat and Rejection of ABM Treaty
- Soviets would respond by building their own
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- Soviets still focus on how to wage a war and defeat the enemy
- Soviet Activities in ABM technologies:
- Upgrading the Moscow ABM system, fully operational since 1970 or 1971
- Replace Galosh interceptor missiles with SH-04 and SH-08 nuclear-armed
missiles (allows them to use atmospheric sorting to differentiate
between real vehicles and ecoys)
- New phased-array radars to complement missile detection
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- SH-04 and SH-08 could be used to create a nationwide defense
- Building a radar that fills a gap in the Soviet early warning system,
claim the radar is designed for space tracking and thus, consistent with
the Treaty
- Surface-to air missiles (SAMs) improved capability to deal with smaller
radar cross sections and shorten reaction times
- SA-12àreported to have
been tested vs. ballistic missile reentry vehicles, a violation of
Article VI.a of the ABM Treaty.
- No concrete evidence that Soviets will pull out of ABM Treaty
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- Space-Based Chemical Lasers:
- Can travel the speed of light in space above the atmosphere
- Complex, expensive, vulnerable to attack, effective countermeasures,
must function above atmosphere.
- Complexity of defense system: page 68.
- Three Layer Defense system, if 90% effective, would allow only 8 out of
8,000 to arrive on target
- Other weaknesses:
- Vulnerable to direct enemy attack with space mines
- Countermeasures such as disruption of operations, like sensors and
communication links, would render it inoperable.
- Decoys
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- X-ray lasers, driven by nuclear explosives and mounted onto a missile
that can be launched rapidly.
- Idea is to mount this system on a rocket to be boosted into space upon
detection of a missile attack
- Most important conflict is if the system can be deployed rapidly enough
to attempt a boost-phase intercept
- Must be based near Soviet territory due to the shape of the Earth
- Countermeasures:
- High-thrust “hot” missiles that burn below the top of the atmosphere
- Alter trajectory of launch
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- Ground-based lasers whose beams are aimed up to a small number of large
relay mirrors that then direct the beams to mission mirrors, which then
redirect the beams onto their targets.
- Fewer parts in orbit that space-based system, avoids time constraint of
pop-up
- Unavoidable technical and operational problems
- Vulnerable to attack
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- Target the post-boost vehicles, then target the individual warheads.
- Generally harder to target: smaller
- Warheads are smaller and harder still and more numerous—can also
dispense light decoys, which follow the same path
- Can confuse sensors with anti-simulation (making warheads look like
decoys)
- No real viable defense
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- No prospect for defending the nation against a massive attack
- Easier to do b/c of recent technological advances, and b/c the goal is
to destroy enough warheads to cause the attacker to expend more of his
force than he destroys
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