Notes
Slide Show
Outline
1
Preserving the ABM Treaty
  • Written By:
  • Sidney D. Drell; Philip J. Farley; David Holloway
  • International Security, Vol. 9, No. 2. (Autumn, 1984), pp. 51-91



  • A Presentation By: Judy Wang, pp. 51-78
2
The Case against Missile Defense:
  • Futile: Offensive missiles would prevail in a competition
  • Costly: Maintain deterrent threat
  • Destabilizing: Speed up arms race
    • -compete to build defensive system
    • -come to build offensive missiles to overcome opponent’s defensive system
    • -pressure to strike first (fear other side’s defensive capabilities)



3
Preventing War and Reaching a Common Goal:
  • Other Measures besides ABM Treaty:
    • 1971 agreement on “hotline” –reduce risk of accidental war by allowing leaders to communicate during crises
    • 1973 agreement to prevent nuclear war and to act to avoid a nuclear war during crises
  • Agreed to ABM Treaty in 1972: to avoid nuclear war and its “devastating consequences for all mankind”
    • -accepts deterrence as a necessary condition instead of as a threat
    • Self-deterrence: suicidal for any country to start a nuclear war
      • Does self-deterrence still apply today? Does it apply to rogue states? If self deterrence works, why fear a nuclear threat at all?
4
About the ABM Treaty and Reagan:
  • Article V.1: “each party undertakes not to develop, test, or deploy ABM systems or components which are sea-based, air-based, space-based, or mobile land-based.
  • Vague: on purpose so as not to rule out other devices that can be developed in the future. As long as treaty is amended, these devices are not exempt.
  • Reagan, March 23, 1984: Wants to build a Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI)
    • Escape from reliance on mutual deterrence, but interim goal is to enhance deterrence
    • 1985-1989: a cost of 26 billion dollars
    • Says it is consistent with ABM….for now
5
The Soviet Perspective
  • Late 1960’s, Soviets began to doubt effectiveness of ABM systems.
  • Increased confidence in deterrence, realized that both sides vulnerable to a devastating retaliatory strike if it attacked first.
  • Desired ABM Treaty b/c without it…
    • Upset the nuclear balance
    • Lead to an unconstrained race in ABM systems and the further deployment of offensive forces
    • Not effective vs. offensive missiles
6
"View U.S."
  • View U.S. weapons program as a way to gain strategic superiority.
  • Criticized Reagan’s speech as a way for the U.S. to undermine its commitment of making progress in limiting and reducing offensive weapons
  • Serious Threat and Rejection of ABM Treaty
  • Soviets would respond by building their own
7
Soviet Activities
  • Soviets still focus on how to wage a war and defeat the enemy
  • Soviet Activities in ABM technologies:
    • Upgrading the Moscow ABM system, fully operational since 1970 or 1971
    • Replace Galosh interceptor missiles with SH-04 and SH-08 nuclear-armed missiles (allows them to use atmospheric sorting to differentiate between real vehicles and ecoys)
    • New phased-array radars to complement missile detection
8
Soviet Activities (cont)
  • SH-04 and SH-08 could be used to create a nationwide defense
  • Building a radar that fills a gap in the Soviet early warning system, claim the radar is designed for space tracking and thus, consistent with the Treaty
  • Surface-to air missiles (SAMs) improved capability to deal with smaller radar cross sections and shorten reaction times
  • SA-12àreported to have been tested vs. ballistic missile reentry vehicles, a violation of Article VI.a of the ABM Treaty.
  • No concrete evidence that Soviets will pull out of ABM Treaty
9
Missile Defenses
  • Space-Based Chemical Lasers:
    • Can travel the speed of light in space above the atmosphere
    • Complex, expensive, vulnerable to attack, effective countermeasures, must function above atmosphere.
    • Complexity of defense system: page 68.
    • Three Layer Defense system, if 90% effective, would allow only 8 out of 8,000 to arrive on target


    • Other weaknesses:
      • Vulnerable to direct enemy attack with space mines
      • Countermeasures such as disruption of operations, like sensors and communication links, would render it inoperable.
      • Decoys
10
Pop-up systems
  • X-ray lasers, driven by nuclear explosives and mounted onto a missile that can be launched rapidly.
  • Idea is to mount this system on a rocket to be boosted into space upon detection of a missile attack
  • Most important conflict is if the system can be deployed rapidly enough to attempt a boost-phase intercept
  • Must be based near Soviet territory due to the shape of the Earth
  • Countermeasures:
    • High-thrust “hot” missiles that burn below the top of the atmosphere
    • Alter trajectory of launch
11
Hybrid System
  • Ground-based lasers whose beams are aimed up to a small number of large relay mirrors that then direct the beams to mission mirrors, which then redirect the beams onto their targets.
  • Fewer parts in orbit that space-based system, avoids time constraint of pop-up
  • Unavoidable technical and operational problems
  • Vulnerable to attack
12
Mid-Course Intercept and Battle Management
  • Target the post-boost vehicles, then target the individual warheads.
  • Generally harder to target: smaller
  • Warheads are smaller and harder still and more numerous—can also dispense light decoys, which follow the same path
  • Can confuse sensors with anti-simulation (making warheads look like decoys)
  • No real viable defense
13
Terminal Defense
  • No prospect for defending the nation against a massive attack
  • Easier to do b/c of recent technological advances, and b/c the goal is to destroy enough warheads to cause the attacker to expend more of his force than he destroys