On the Effects of International Economic Sanctions: With Examples from the Case of Rhodesia

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World Politics
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ON THE EFFECTS OF INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC SANCTIONS

With Examples from the Case of Rhodesia

By JOHAN GALTUNG*

I. INTRODUCTION

It may seem preposterous to write about the effects of the economic sanctions currently in effect against Rhodesia since the process is not yet completed: we do not know how it will all end, and primary source material of a crucial nature is not yet available.¹ But the purpose of this article is more in the direction of a general theory, using the case of Rhodesia as a source of examples and illustrations. The material on Rhodesia included here consists of some secondary sources, such as books and articles, and some primary sources, such as documents and other printed material; but the basic sources are mainly personal observation and a number of informal interviews with Rhodesian citizens (mostly businessmen) and with citizens of other African countries (mostly politicians), all dating from January 1966, about two months after UDI.² The purpose of such an exploratory study is obvious: to get some impressions about the psychological and social mechanisms of economic boycott when they are operating, instead of having to rely on retrospection. Besides, such an exploration can serve as a pilot study for a more thorough investigation both of the general theory of economic sanctions and other sanctions in the international system, based on historical cases mainly in this century, and of the Rhodesian

* This article is a revised version of a lecture given at the Department of Political Science, Makerere College, Kampala, Uganda, January 14, 1966; at Folkuniversitetet, Uppsala, Sweden, January 21, 1966; at a seminar organized by the Swedish International Development Authority and the Scandinavian Institute of African Studies, Gothenburg, Sweden, January 22, 1966; and at the Foreign Policy Association of the Swedish M.P.'s, Riksdagen, Stockholm, Sweden, March 10, 1966. The author wants to express his gratitude to the Scandinavian Institute of African Studies, Uppsala, Sweden, for a travel grant that made the research possible; to a large number of informants in Rhodesia and other African countries for their comments; and to colleagues at the International Peace Research Institute, Oslo, Norway. The responsibility for the conclusions drawn or indicated rests entirely with the author. The article may be identified as PRI0 Publication 20-3, International Peace Research Institute, Oslo.

¹ Using the term “Rhodesia” rather than “Southern Rhodesia” or “Zimbabwe” has no political implications; this usage is simply shorter and more frequently found.

² UDI is used as the common abbreviation for the Unilateral Declaration of Independence by the Smith government on November 11, 1965.
case in particular. It is as such that this article must be interpreted, not as anything more pretentious. Thus, although it is our impression that the interview excerpts presented are typical of attitudes of the majority of whites in Rhodesia and that the phenomena reported are significant, we have no formal way of proving this contention—for instance, by representative sampling.

Another warning may also be in order: the reader who looks for anything like a complete account of the antecedents and present circumstances of the entire complex of problems referred to today as “Rhodesia” will have to look elsewhere; in the present article only the bare minimum of background data and hypotheses is included, mainly in footnotes.

This being said, the virtues of studying Rhodesia in order to understand better the local impact of international economic sanctions should be stressed. Rhodesia is in no sense a simple case, but offers all the complexities of the modern world: racial strife, struggle for independence, complex relationships between national (UK), regional (OAU, Commonwealth), and universal (UN) sources of power, and the ingredients of North-South and East-West conflict. Thus, even though no one would generalize from the case of Rhodesia to other cases, an understanding of the Rhodesian case will serve as a basis for understanding other cases better.

II. The General Theory of Economic Sanctions

We shall define sanctions as actions initiated by one or more international actors (the “senders”) against one or more others (the “receivers”) with either or both of two purposes: to punish the receivers by depriving them of some value and/or to make the receivers comply with certain norms the senders deem important. This definition at

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8 A study of this kind is presently under way at the International Peace Research Institute, Oslo, under the direction of Fredrik Hoffmann.

4 There are, of course, many works available giving various accounts of the background of UDI. Scandinavian readers will find Holger Benettsson, Problemet Rhodesia (Stockholm 1966) elucidative. Very valuable information, as well as attempts at analysis, can be found in two papers by Peter Wallenstein, Den rhodesiska självständighetsfrågan efter december 1962, mimeographed (Uppsala 1965) and Aspekter på Rhodesiafrågen efter självständighetsförklaringen, mimeographed (Uppsala 1966). Non-Scandinavian readers will find Philip Mason, The Birth of a Dilemma (London 1958), Patrick Keatley, The Politics of Partnership (London 1963), and Nathan Shamuyarira, Crisis in Rhodesia (London 1965), valuable. However, apart from Wallenstein, Aspekter, these publications do not deal with the sanctions. A recent and relevant work on sanctions is Ronald Segal, ed., Sanctions Against South Africa (London 1964), presenting the papers and the recommendations of the International Conference on Economic Sanctions Against South Africa, London, April 14-17, 1964. For Scandinavian readers, Kaj Björk, Sydafrika och vi (Jönköping 1965), gives some of the arguments in connection with sanctions against South Africa.
once raises an interesting question. It is not obvious that the same action or sanction can serve both purposes; in fact, modern penology does not seem to warrant much belief in punishment as a general method for making people comply.\(^5\) Punishment may have other effects, as when criminals are kept off the streets and isolated in prisons where their deviant actions are hidden from the general view and thus are less consequential to the outside world, but this is not the same as making them comply.

Thus, when sanctions are discussed it makes good sense to ask which purpose is dominant. Imagine, in the Rhodesian case, that another policy had been enacted: that of rewarding the Smith government for any positive step toward majority rule, instead of punishing it for any step interpreted as negative relative to the goal of majority rule. Expressed concretely, this would have meant a policy of increased trade, or increasingly favorable trade conditions, and more contact and more diplomatic cooperation as less discriminatory practices were introduced in Rhodesia, with a well-thought-out and well-communicated pattern of action: so much reward for so much compliance. Even a positive escalation process might be envisaged. Imagine that arguments in favor of such a policy as a method of bringing about compliance were in fact quite convincing. Nevertheless there would probably be counter-arguments to the effect that “This is selling out to the enemy,” “This is rewarding sinfulness,” “This means that any rascal can come around and do something nasty and then extort a reward for undoing the harm he has done—which is tantamount to blackmail,” “There will be inflationary effects and we shall soon run out of rewards,” and “Who will pay for all this, anyhow?”

Without belittling the significance of any one of these arguments, it makes good sense to ask a politician engaged in sanction policies, “If you cannot have both, which outcome would you prefer, punishment without compliance or compliance without punishment?” If he insists that punishment is a sufficient condition for compliance, then he is simply naive; if he insists that punishment is a necessary condition for compliance, then he is probably in addition highly punishment-oriented in the sense that punishment has become an automatic and probably also cherished goal in itself. This punishment-oriented attitude is probably fairly widespread, particularly as applied to the international system, and serves to maintain negative sanctions.\(^6\) If com-


\(^6\) The best treatment of this theme is probably found in Bjørn Christiansen, Attitudes to Foreign Affairs as a Function of Personality (Oslo 1959).
pliance is not obtained, there is at least the gratification that derives from knowing (or believing) that the sinner gets his due, that the criminal has been punished. In this sense negative sanctions are safer than positive sanctions. And when hatred is strong, positive sanctions would probably be out of the question anyway.

In this article we shall disregard the punishment aspect and be interested in sanctions only as a way of making other international actors comply, and we shall concentrate on negative sanctions. As a reference for a more complete discussion, however, the following dimensions for classifying sanctions may be useful:

1. Are the sanctions negative (punishment for deviance) or positive (reward for compliance)?

2. Are the sanctions aimed at responsible individuals in a receiving nation, or are they collective (hitting the nation as a whole, including individuals and groups that are not particularly responsible)?

3. Are the sanctions internal (due to changes arising inside the receiving nation) or are they external (having to do with the interaction pattern with other nations)?

4. Are the sanctions unilateral (only one sending nation) or multilateral (several sending nations, with regional sanctions being a special case) or universal (with all or almost all other nations participating)?

5. Are the sanctions general or selective (involving all possible measures or only some special measures)?

6. Are the sanctions total or partial (involving all or only some measures of a special kind)?

7. Types of sanctions (types of values of which the receiving nation is deprived):*

* Many of these sanctions are mentioned in the relevant Article 41 of the Charter of the United Nations:

"The Security Council may decide what measures not involving the use of armed force are to be employed to give effect to its decisions and may call upon the Members of the United Nations to apply such measures. These may include complete or partial interruption of economic relations and of rail, sea, air, postal, telegraphic, radio and other means of communication, and the severance of diplomatic relations."

These provisions, of course, also apply to the United Nations itself. According to information given by Mr. David Owen to the meeting of the Technical Assistance Committee on November 24, 1965, the United Nations withdrew its experts from Rhodesia almost immediately after adoption of the Security Council resolution condemning developments there.

To give some impression of how the measures suggested in Article 41 of the Charter have in fact been used by the member nations, we have used the UN Press Services Reference Paper No. 4 (March 23, 1966) to study how the sanctions employed by four
major groupings among the sixty nations that had reported to the Security Council were distributed.

**Table I. Sanctions Against Rhodesia, by Type of Sanction and Country Grouping***

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>No recognition</th>
<th>Dipl. rel. restricted</th>
<th>Dipl. rel. not established</th>
<th>Telecomm.</th>
<th>Passport</th>
<th>Part. econ.</th>
<th>Compl. econ.</th>
<th>(N)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Socialist</td>
<td>84</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>33</td>
<td></td>
<td>(12)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Commonwealth</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>(13)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>African, not</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Commonwealth</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>(9)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All other</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>(26)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(N)</td>
<td>(25)</td>
<td>(9)</td>
<td>(8)</td>
<td>(4)</td>
<td>(11)</td>
<td>(19)</td>
<td>(26)</td>
<td>(60)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*The figures do not add up horizontally to 100% since one nation may employ several types of sanctions.

The table should be read with utmost caution since it is based on a press release, not on primary sources, and since one does not know to what extent the UN asked for information. However, the differences are nevertheless quite remarkable. The focus is on sanctions of the verbal, expressive type (such as nonrecognition) and on economic sanctions, with the socialist countries specializing in the former and Commonwealth and African countries in the latter. Telecommunication and travel sanctions have been remarkably underutilized, as have diplomatic sanctions. In December 1965, twenty nations had consulates general or high commissions in Salisbury. Only six of these—Denmark, the Federal Republic of Germany, Italy, Japan, Sweden, and the United States—were affected as of March 25, 1966. The table seems to indicate that those remote a nation is from Rhodesia, the more it uses nonrecognition; the closer the nation is, the more it uses economic sanctions. On the other hand, the less the trade with Rhodesia, the more complete the boycott; here the nations that are big traders have the most difficulties.

Also, there are very important exceptions to the relatively comprehensive sanctions called for by the UN in the resolution of November 20, 1966, in which the Security Council (with France abstaining) called upon "all states not to recognize this illegal authority and not to entertain any diplomatic or other relations with this illegal authority." Thus the information given by the Commonwealth Relations Office on January 31, 1966, is interesting in showing the loopholes in the sanctions system. Briefly stated, they are as follows, using the calculations made by Wallenstein (*Aspekter*, 29-32):

1. Zambia (export sanctions 30% effective)
2. South Africa (export sanctions 0% effective)
3. West Germany (export sanctions 70% effective)
4. Malawi (export sanctions 0% effective)
5. U.S. (export sanctions 45% effective)
6. Congo (L) (export sanctions 0% effective)
7. Portuguese territories (export sanctions 0% effective)
8. France (export sanctions 60% effective)

The loopholes have a clear structure. First of all, there are Rhodesia's ideological allies, South Africa and Portugal, who have a vested interest. They can hardly afford to have Rhodesia lose, since this might encourage similar processes directed against themselves. Second, there are Rhodesia's African neighbors, Zambia, Malawi, and the Congo, who are evidently more concerned with the impact of sanctions on their own vulnerable economies than with the use of sanctions as weapons against an ideological enemy. Third, there are the three biggest Western powers (the United Kingdom excepted): the United States, West Germany, and France, all with their vested interests. The diversity of motives for not making sanctions complete is impressive. Such diversity is a factor on which a skilful government in a receiving nation can base policies designed to demoralize the sending nation.
a) diplomatic sanctions
   (1) nonrecognition
   (2) rupture of diplomatic relations
   (3) no direct contact with political leaders
   (4) no cooperation by international organizations

b) communication sanctions
   (1) rupture of telecommunications
   (2) rupture of mail contact
   (3) rupture of transportation (ship, rail, road, air)
   (4) rupture of news communication (radio, newspapers, press agencies)
   (5) rupture of personal contacts (tourism, family visits)

c) economic sanctions
   (1) internal destruction (economic sabotage, strikes)
   (2) rupture of trade relations (economic boycott)
       (a) hitting imports to receiving nation (import boycott)
       (b) hitting exports from receiving nation (export boycott)

Economic boycott can comprise goods, capital, services. If passage of goods, capital, and/or services to or from the receiving country is reported, the boycott is supervised; if in addition passage is impeded, the boycott may be referred to as a blockade.

For simplicity we may disregard the cases of internal sanctions and sanctions directed at individuals; with the present structure of the international system, territorial integrity makes such actions—unilateral, multilateral, or universal—impossible unless they are combined with a military presence. In a future world, the supranational structure might include permanent enforcement machinery stationed in all nations—like local police stations in the nations of today—but this is for the future. Thus, our discussion here is limited to negative, collective, and external sanctions, and like most other analysts we shall concentrate on the theory of economic sanctions.

The theory is simple. The input-output matrix of the economy of the receiving nation is inspected. The impact of partial or total boycott of selected imports or exports is calculated. As a matter of rational politics, maximum effect with minimum boycott is looked for; in the

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case of a receiving nation for which there are accessible data on the economic system, this is a problem that might be left to computers. The ideal case would be that of a system in which total boycott of one product alone would be sufficient, and oil is often held to be this product.⁹

If the goal is to damage the economic system of the receiving nation without similarly damaging the sending nation, this can obviously be attained if a number of conditions that we can refer to as “the ideal case for an economic boycott” are fulfilled. The ideal conditions would be more or less as follows:

1. that imports have a very high loading on important sectors of the economy of the receiving nation;
2. that there is no internal substitute for the imports;
3. that a high loading of the important imports comes from the sending nation(s);
4. that there is no external substitute for these imports, so that the receiving nation cannot threaten to change trade-partners;
5. that the imports make up a very small part of the exports of the sending nation(s), and/or that the products can be exported to other nations;
6. that the exports from the receiving nation are sent mainly to the sending nation(s), and that there are no easy substitutes for them, so that the receiving nation cannot obtain income easily;
7. that these exports from the receiving nation can easily be obtained elsewhere by the sending nation(s) so that the sending nation(s) are not hurt economically and can threaten to change trade-partners, or that the exports cannot be obtained elsewhere by the sending nation(s) so that the sending nation(s) can demonstrate that they would rather suffer deprivation than touch products from the receiving nation; and
8. that trade relations are easily supervised and even controlled (as when the receiving nation is an island or is surrounded either by impenetrable terrain, such as swamps or deserts, or by nations that participate in the boycott).

⁹The basic facts about the structure of the Rhodesian economy seen from this point of view can be found in the survey reported in a Supplement to the Standard Bank Review (November 19, 1965), according to which a boycott of the major product for export, tobacco, should affect Rhodesia more than the United Kingdom if the latter were to stop importing it from Rhodesia.
It is easily seen that the case in which these conditions are met is that of a small economic satellite of a major economic power. In such a case, perhaps seventy-five percent, or perhaps even ninety percent, of both exports and imports of the small country may be with the big country, yet this trade volume may still be less than one percent of the big country's total trade. This trade structure occurs not infrequently in the present world, and it gives a major potential for control by the big nations of those small nations in their "sphere of interest," particularly since the power of any weapon lies more in its potential than in its actual use.

One could use this kind of situation as a point of departure for a complete theory of economic sanctions. The crucial concept here is vulnerability, which has an external and an internal component. The key to the understanding of vulnerability seems to be concentration: the more a country's economy depends on one product, and the more its exports consist of one product, and the more its exports and imports are concentrated on one trade-partner, the more vulnerable is the country. To launch economic sanctions without a careful examination of all these factors would be like launching a military campaign without military analysis.

Without going into a great many details, it is interesting to determine which countries rank highest in external vulnerability. As a first approximation, information about the percentage of the GNP comprising foreign trade (exports plus imports) is useful. Among the first ten ranks in the list given in the World Handbook of Political and Social Indicators\(^\text{10}\) are four islands (Barbados, Mauritius, Cyprus, and Malta), and among the first ten ranks in a similar list in the UN's Yearbook of National Accounts Statistics 1964 are three islands (Mauritius, Trinidad, Iceland) and Hong Kong, which for all practical purposes is an island. The two ranking lists are not identical, which reflects problems in connection with national accounts statistics more than changes between the periods of time the two lists cover. However, it is interesting to note that six of the first seven countries on the UN list are or have been under British rule. Also, the superpowers, the United States and the USSR, rank eightieth and eighty-first on the World Handbook list (with foreign-trade percentages of seven and five), which marks them as particularly invulnerable. The People's Republic of China ranks seventy-ninth, France ranks sixty-seventh, and the United Kingdom, fifty-first. Clearly, the big powers are very different from the smaller powers in external vulnerability. On the other

\(^{10}\) Bruce M. Russett and others (New Haven 1964). The data are from Table 46.
hand, the rank order correlation between the foreign-trade variable and GNP per capita is less than .10, so vulnerability should be seen more as a property of the small power than as a property of the poor nation. Thus, the general picture is that economic sanctions as a source of power tend to preserve existing power structures.

This becomes even more evident when we examine the extent to which exports are limited to a few commodities and their markets to a few countries. The rank order correlation of .606 between Michael Michaeley's indices of these two types of concentration suggests that these two aspects of external vulnerability tend to covary.\textsuperscript{11} Most vulnerable on both counts (if we also take into consideration the percentage of the GNP comprising foreign trade) are Hong Kong, Trinidad, and Mauritius; least vulnerable are big countries such as the U.S., Brazil, Mexico, India, Argentina, and Colombia. Bigger countries of course have in general more diversity in raw materials and bigger domestic markets; hence they have more potential for diversified domestic industries, which can be converted to export industries. On the other hand, the rank order correlation between the coefficient of commodity concentration and the percentage of the GNP made up of trade is only .108, and the corresponding correlation for the coefficient of geographic concentration is only .098. Hence, even if there is concentration of exports in terms of commodities and trade-partners it does not follow that exports are very important for the GNP.

Let us then imagine that the three factors of concentration we have discussed (concentration in the economy, concentration in commodities, concentration in trade-partners) are of equal weight in determining external vulnerability. Of course, if sanctions were universal (and not unilateral) geographic concentration would not count; if sanctions were general (and not highly selective) commodity concentration would not count; and if sanctions were both universal and general (and total) then only the trade percentage of the GNP would count. But \textit{a priori} it may be as difficult to make sanctions universal and general as it is to make them “bite.” Hence, we have added the ranks for each country reported in Michaely’s data on commodity concentration and geographic concentration\textsuperscript{12} to its rank for the trade percentage of the GNP. The distribution is interesting, but it should be noticed that the socialist countries are not included in Michaely’s lists, which comprise only forty countries. A high score on this index means low vulnerability and a low score means high vulnerability.

\textsuperscript{11} \textit{Concentration in International Trade} (Amsterdam 1962), esp. chap. 2.
\textsuperscript{12} \textit{Ibid.}, 22.
The least vulnerable countries are the United States (109 of 120 possible points), France (108), Italy and Japan (104), the Federal Republic of Germany (100), and the United Kingdom (99)—as one would expect. Most vulnerable is Mauritius with 9 points (3 is the minimum); then follow Trinidad and Panama (20) and Rhodesia, which ranks high on both kinds of concentration (ninth and tenth) and on the trade percentage of its GNP (27 points, giving a rank of four on this composite vulnerability list; it ranks eighth on the list in the World Handbook). All countries with point scores lower than 50 are or have recently been colonies, which means that they are vulnerable relative to their former mother countries.

For our purpose it is significant that Rhodesia (here including Zambia and Malawi) ranks fourth on the score of external vulnerability, since what we say would apply *a fortiori* to less vulnerable countries. (This rank is based on combined data for the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland for 1959, showing trade to be sixty-six percent of GNP, about half of that percentage comprising exports. Exports of Rhodesia alone, excluding Zambia and Malawi, constitute about forty-three percent of its GNP, according to the Supplement to the Standard Bank Review, indicating that Rhodesia’s position on that variable is not lower than that of the former Federation, so that Rhodesia alone would not rank lower on the index of external vulnerability.) Most of the countries scored fall between Rhodesia and the United Kingdom, indicating that if they are vulnerable according to one of the variables, then they compensate for it on either or both of the remaining variables.

The determination of a nation’s external vulnerability reflects only some of the ideal conditions for economic boycott described earlier. There are still the problems of how important the imports actually are, how easily internal or external substitutes can be found, and so on. Imagine then that all external conditions listed above (conditions 3-8) are obtained by extending the boycott from a unilateral through a regional to a universal action. Then the receiving nation is left with only three counterstrategies:

1. to train itself in sacrifice by doing without certain commodities, and preferably even liking it;
2. to restructure the national economy so as to absorb the shock of the boycott, by producing locally the imported commodities denied it or by making some substitutes for them, by finding alternative employment for people made jobless, and so forth; and
3. to organize changes of trade with third parties, or via third parties,\(^\text{13}\) or, if the boycott is truly universal, to engage in smuggling.

To what extent these counterstrategies are sufficient as defense will be discussed below; here it will be noted only that this repertory of defense measures is already quite limited. On the other hand, the world has yet to see a universal boycott.

The theory of the effects of economic warfare is now fairly similar to the theory of the effects of military warfare. Both kinds of warfare are means toward the same end: political disintegration of the enemy so that he gives up the pursuit of his goals. The method used is value-deprivation, which may or may not increase with time according to how the action proceeds and what countermeasures are enacted. Countermeasures may take the form of offensive measures (value-deprivation from the attacker) or defensive measures (reducing the value-deprivation inflicted upon oneself) of active or passive varieties.

We shall now distinguish between a naive and a revised theory of the effects of economic warfare. The naive theory of the relation between economic warfare (and also military warfare) and political disintegration sees some kind of roughly proportionate relation: the more value-deprivation, the more political disintegration.\(^\text{14}\) The idea is that there is a limit to how much value-deprivation the system can stand and that once this limit is reached (resulting in a split in leadership or between leadership and people), then political disintegration will proceed very rapidly and will lead to surrender or willingness to negotiate. The theory can be illustrated as in Diagram 1.

However, this theory disregards the simple principle of adaptation: that which seems unacceptable at the beginning of the conflict becomes acceptable as one gets used to life under hardship. Thus, the “upper limit” of what can be tolerated recedes as the value-deprivation progresses, and political disintegration becomes less easily obtainable. However, there remains an upper limit of value-deprivation, short of total destruction, which presents difficulties for the attacker. Even if we exclude moral problems, the attacker must recognize that he may have

\(^{13}\) An excellent account of how South Africa was able to get around the Indian boycott launched against it in July 1946 by means of trade via third parties is given in K. N. Raj, “Sanctions and the Indian Experience,” in Segal, Sanctions Against South Africa, 197-203.

\(^{14}\) This must, by and large, have been a major theory behind many efforts in recent history to bomb an adversary into submission. For an interpretative analysis of the effects of bombing in World War II on the United Kingdom, Germany, and Japan, see Galtung, “On the Effects of Bombing Civilians” (forthcoming). The line of argument is very much as for the effects of economic sanctions in the present article.
to restore the attacked nation and have to coexist with its new leadership, not to mention its future and possibly revanchist generations.

\[
\begin{array}{c}
\text{status quo ante} \\
\text{lower limit} \\
\text{upper limit} \\
\text{total destruction} \\
\text{VALUE-DEPRIVATION}
\end{array}
\]

POLITICAL DISINTEGRATION

Diagram 1. The Naive Theory of Economic Warfare

Thus, an important defense strategy is to indicate that one will hold out at least until the attacker’s upper limit is reached.

But we refer to this theory as “naive” also because it does not take into account the possibility that value-deprivation may initially lead to political integration and only later—perhaps much later, or even never—to political disintegration. The basic point here is that value-deprivation creates the social conditions under which much more sacrifice is possible so that the limit for political disintegration will be reached much later. The theory can be illustrated as in Diagram 2.

The problem is now under which conditions the revised theory is the more valid and under which conditions the naive theory is less naive. A short list of such conditions includes these:

1. The attack from the outside is seen as an attack on the group as a whole, not on only a fraction of it;
2. There is very weak identification with the attacker, preferably even negative identification; and
3. There is belief in the value of one’s own goals in the sense that no alternative is seen as better.

The interesting thing is that in economic warfare, often even more than in military warfare, the first condition is almost immediately and
automatically satisfied. The collective nature of economic sanctions makes them hit the innocent along with the guilty. They are in prac-

dagram 2. The Revised Theory of Economic Warfare
tice, if not in theory, an application of the principle of collective guilt. However, if the other two conditions are not satisfied, then this may turn to the benefit of the attacker. Internal dissension in the receiving nation may result when the people feel harassed. The people may then bring pressure upon the leaders to change their policy—in other words, political disintegration.

Thus, the recipes for economic sanctions of various types are fairly obvious. Like a military operation, the logistics of sanctions can be worked out in great detail, and this can even have its bureaucratic appeal since there is an element of administrative challenge, as well a neatness, about the operation when modern, well-organized societies with good national bookkeeping are involved. At the same time it is obvious where the weaknesses of the theory of economic warfare lie.
There are two weak points: (1) the idea that political disintegration is more or less proportionate to economic disintegration, and (2) the idea that economic disintegration cannot be counteracted. Of course, no politician of any standing would be so naive as to subscribe to the idea that economic sanctions—once they are effective, economically speaking—will automatically cause either partial or complete surrender. But the politician who is sophisticated at the verbal level may still be naive at the level of actions: he may simply be at a loss as to what to do when faced with the complexities of the effects of economic sanctions—or of other sanctions, for that matter. We shall try to describe systematically some hypotheses about such effects that are negative from the point of view of the sending nation(s), but before we do that, let us look more closely at the kind of theory the sending nation(s) (in this case, the United Kingdom) may have as to how the sanctions will eventually work.

Prime Minister Wilson’s methodology and theory of economic sanctions have been set forth in some detail in speeches given in Parliament on December 10, 1965, and January 25, 1966. First of all, there has been a policy of graduated escalation along two dimensions: starting with the United Kingdom, measures have proceeded from selective and partial sanctions toward practically general and total economic sanctions; they have proceeded from relatively unilateral action by the United Kingdom toward the universal action envisaged and hoped for. Some of this gradualism has been deliberate (to permit the threat of worse measures to be invoked at any time, as well as to prevent too much damage to Rhodesia, which will have to function in the future) and some of it has been a virtue of necessity. On the day of UDI, a number of financial measures excluding Rhodesia from the sterling area and from the preference status enjoyed by Commonwealth members were introduced, together with a ban on Rhodesian tobacco imports to the United Kingdom and on weapons exports from the United

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15 See the Official Report for these two days. For another and very similar example of a theory as to how sanctions might work, let us quote from the article “Can Smith be brought down?” Peace News (November 19, 1965), 1, 4. Six factors are mentioned: white supporters will desert Smith (1) “as the economic life of the country becomes more unmanageable”; (2) because of the staunch attitude of the governor and the symbolism of some people’s indication of their support for him; (3) because of the blank spaces in the newspapers, indicating censorship; (4) because of “unrest among members of the civil service, police and army”; (5) because of “unrest among the African population”; and (6) because of “South Africa’s refusal to deal in Rhodesian currency.” This list shows a clear overestimation of the organizational power of the African population and an equally clear overestimation of the force and legitimacy of British symbols far from home. Moreover, there is always the question of how many people really worry about censorship, particularly when it is directed against opinions and writers they dislike themselves.
Kingdom to Rhodesia. Then, in the three months that followed UDI, most moves toward complete boycott were made.

Incidentally, communications restrictions were remarkably under-utilized, particularly considering how tempting it must have been to use them since white Rhodesians are heavily dependent on such communications for maintaining their identity as an outpost of British (if not Labour) civilization. The United Kingdom has, however, tried to control access to Rhodesia, probably partly to symbolize its sovereignty over the "runaway colony," partly to control the information flow.\(^{16}\)

The Wilson theory as to exactly how political disintegration will take place within the very short time spans he announced in the first weeks and months after UDI contains such elements as increasing unrest among the whites due to unemployment and material deprivations resulting from reduced exports and imports. According to this theory, either development may be used by the existing opposition elements in Rhodesia or may lead to the formation of new centers of opposition; in either case the opposition may make an appeal to the governor, and a solution will be found through him. Thus, the governor may symbolize a return to "law and order," and the troops stationed in Zambia may be recalled at the governor's request. Exactly what may happen to Smith and his numerous followers in this context is not clear, but then Wilson is speaking as a politician, not as a social scientist.

Clearly, if political disintegration should take place it would happen through the dual effect of sanctions, which weakens the people in power and strengthens those in opposition. For this to happen, as Wallenstein points out, it is not sufficient that the sanctions are perceived as an evil; alternative courses of action must also be perceived as lesser evils.\(^{17}\) Thus, it is Wilson's task not only to escalate into a sanction pattern as harsh as possible, but also to present alternatives as acceptable as possible. To achieve the latter aim, a vision of the near future that does not contain majority rule must be presented to the white Rhodesians—and the famous six points were designed to do this. What was held out to them was legal rule, not majority rule.\(^{18}\)

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\(^{16}\) This control of access to Rhodesia dates from November 1965 when "Great Britain established a general requirement for visas for travel to Rhodesia, and stated, on this occasion, that the sole legal authorities outside Great Britain having the right to issue such visas are the British embassies and consulates." Later on, sanctions were added to this rule: "The British authorities . . . reserve the right to refuse entry into Great Britain to persons who have sought visas for entry into Rhodesia from the representatives of Ian Smith's regime" (quoted from Royal Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Circular No. 27, March 11, 1966).

\(^{17}\) Aspektet, 25-26.

\(^{18}\) Wilson's thinking about how Rhodesia should be made to comply can be interestingly contrasted with the thinking of one Conservative M.P., Mr. G. Lloyd, who "sug-
Equally clear is Smith's counterstrategy: to reverse the order of utilities. For that purpose, sanctions must appear as manageable, even slightly ridiculous, and the alternatives must be defined not merely as a return to the pre-UDI situation but as alternatives that will of necessity have even more negative implications for the white Rhodesians. There are many ways of achieving this purpose. One of them is to maneuver Wilson into a position in which, because of the African Commonwealth members, he is unable to offer an alternative that does not contain majority rule. Another method is censorship, so that information about attractive alternatives (as well as information about serious effects of the sanctions) does not reach the Rhodesian reader. To the extent that that reader is in general agreement with Smith, this method will work, because there will be no demand for these two types of news; they will both cause severe cognitive dissonance. But the major counterstrategy will always be to channel the effects of the sanctions themselves in the best possible directions—and this is the topic to which we now turn.

III. THE DEFENSE AGAINST ECONOMIC SANCTIONS

Two principles for discussing counterstrategies against economic sanctions have here been presented. One of them follows from the logic of the attacker. There are three holes in this system, however, even when the sanctions are universal (adaptation to sacrifice, restructuring the economy to absorb the shock, and smuggling). The other principle follows from the logic behind what we have called the revised theory (that the collectivity is threatened, that there is no identification with the attacker, and that there is firm belief in one's own values).

The details about how the first three counterstrategies work out in the Rhodesian case are in a sense obvious aspects of the total situation. More important is the question the social scientist observing the situation will immediately ask: Are these strategies self-reinforcing, so that some immediate benefit or reward can be derived from engaging in them, and so that one does not have to rely on belief in ultimate victory.
or loyalty to the regime alone? The following accounts seem to indicate that this is the case for all three.

Q. How do you manage with so little petrol?
A. Oh, that is easy enough. You know, if a family has two cars and receives some petrol for both, to put one car in the garage is not very much of a sacrifice. Besides, some of us who live in the countryside and have offices in Salisbury join our rations and form a car pool and go in together. It is strange to see how much better friends one becomes with one’s neighbors in such situations—we really did not know them before. And if even this should not work, this may be the great impetus that forces the city to develop adequate collective transportation, and if even that does not work, doctors are almost unanimous that walking is good for you.\textsuperscript{19}

Thus, an important mechanism increasing group solidarity is revealed: the car pool seems to have some of the same functions as the bomb shelter during an air raid.\textsuperscript{20} \textit{Adaptive measures} have become goals in themselves.

Q. But what about all kinds of luxury goods, or household appliances?
A. You must remember that very many families here are quite well off. They have a refrigerator, maybe even two. They work. If refrigerators cannot be bought, well, some will be without and others will not have the latest models. But most will have refrigerators, and they will last—our technicians are not so bad that they cannot improvise some spare parts. And as to luxury goods—we have been without them during two world wars when we helped Britain, the same Britain that attacks us today, and we can do without them again. Besides, one family has some and another family will borrow from it. That was also the pattern during the war.

Again, there is the possibility of improvisation and of mutual aid, with the well-known social implications of both. Hence, there is immediate reward in the process, and this reward may be particularly attractive as more people are deprived of this kind of experience in their daily

\textsuperscript{19} Thus, there were stories in the press about the Masais, who are able to keep fit and healthy because they walk to work (hunting) over long distances every day.
\textsuperscript{20} A good account of the effects of air raids on Britain is found in R. M. Titmuss, “Argument of Strain,” in Eric and Mary Josephson, eds., \textit{Man Alone} (New York 1962), 505-15.
life. (Thus, in a more traditional and poorer society there would be only marginal reward to derive from this sort of experience, since it is not scarce.)

However, sacrifice also has its immediate, built-in reward. Conspicuous sacrifice, when indulged in by the leaders of a society, may have its obvious propaganda effect: the sanctions themselves may give the leaders pretexts to demonstrate their ability to share the plight of the people. Under normal conditions such occasions are denied them and such demonstrations would in fact make them appear ridiculous; under moderate hardship they can act out a carefully balanced amount of heroism and sacrifice. And this signal is communicated not only to their own believers and disbelievers, but also to the sending nation(s), conveying to them the message “We would rather suffer at your hands than give in.” Thus, the situation opens possibilities for the use of symbols out of which strong ideological sentiments can be made, and this is another self-reinforcing ingredient. It should be noted in passing that this advantage does not apply equally to the case of military action, since there heroism may be too risky: the leaders may be captured or simply perish if they carry it too far.

Let us then turn to the possible consequences of restructuring the economy. People in key economic positions are also usually people with political influence. An economic boycott may reshuffle the relative importance of economic sectors so that new economic elites emerge. The question is, Will the new elites be more or less willing to comply with the norms of the sending nations? Since economic boycott in general implies a rapid decrease of import-export business and a change toward home-based production, the question is whether the cosmopolitan layer of the tertiary sector (engaged in trade), which stands to lose some of its significance, is more or less amenable to compliance than are the emerging leaders of home-based industry or agriculture (or other primary activities).

In the Rhodesian case, the farmers are seen as the group most solidly behind Smith. In addition to the simple structural reasons that are

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21 After UDI, shops in Salisbury displayed posters with drawings of Rhodesians in uniform, with rather determined faces, tightening their belts. The general idea was that of serving the country again, of “the men being called up,” something of the prewar atmosphere described by Doris Lessing in her novel *A Proper Marriage*.

22 Thus, the idea of the prime minister bicycling to his office might appeal to many. (Incidentally, the photograph of Smith on a bicycle that figured in many newspapers implied no permanent change in his means of transportation.) But just as important might be the idea of symbolizing “everything normal”; the receiving nation can make political gains on this as well as on conspicuous sacrifice.

23 According to observers, the opposition in the white Rhodesian population amounts to around 20,000 and consists mainly of the press, the bankers, the industrial-
conducive to making farmers nationalists in most nations, and in favor of cheap labor, there is also the element of isolation from world trends and consequently a solid measure of conservatism, a kind of asynchrony relative to the second half of the twentieth century. For the cosmopolitan businessmen nothing of this applies, or it applies much less. Businessmen are more likely to have connections abroad—or money. They depend for their personal needs less on development in Rhodesia, whereas the farmers have no or few alternatives. But for this same reason the farmers might also feel that the policies of the Smith government are rather hazardous, and one day the farmers could turn against him. In our view, however, this is unlikely precisely because of the way in which economy and sociology here seem to go hand in hand: changes in the economy put power more and more into the hands of the farmers; they increasingly become the symbol of national survival. Moreover, when an import-export firm has to close down there is little alternative use to which it can be put, whereas it makes a great deal of sense for the government to subsidize the conversion of tobacco land to grain fields or pasture.

Thus, there is a built-in and ever more powerful mechanism of reinforcement here, and the same effect seems to apply to efforts to make substitute products. If such efforts fail, then Britain is to blame; if they succeed, then it is a proof of local ingenuity and justifies the claim to independence. To make automobile fuel out of sugarcane—or even out of coal, which is also a surplus product—would be the ideal. To assume that the nation receiving sanctions will never be able to do such things because it never did them before is a little bit like trusting that children will never grow up when left alone. At any rate, the self-reinforcing power of such inventiveness will probably lead to a chain

ists, the lawyers, the teachers, and people in their primary circles. We know of no solid data to support this contention.

24 One very simple reason is that the ownership of farms is usually hereditary, which ties farmers to the territory for generations ahead. A professional’s job is not hereditary; he can afford to be nonnationalist or even antinationalist since his position will not similarly affect his offspring.

25 Of course, the list of people belonging to the opposition according to observers (footnote 23) is impressive, and these people could be most dangerous to the regime. However, they have lost much of their prestige simply from being less functional than the farmers, who will always have the important task of keeping the population alive during a period of crisis. Thus, our argument is in terms of transfer of legitimacy due to a dislocation of the center of gravity in being functional to the community at large. The result may be more legitimacy to sectors favoring more apartheid.

26 Thus, in South Africa, the technology of extracting oil from coal is already quite advanced. According to the Times Review of Industry (December 1963), about ten percent of the country's needs are taken care of that way (the state-owned plant SASOL produces about forty million gallons of gasoline annually).
reaction both in inventiveness and in feelings of autonomy. Thus, it is almost certain that regardless of the political outcome, Rhodesian industry will come out of the crisis with a greater share of the home markets—and this possibility probably serves as an extra incentive.

In the pattern of employment, however, it is difficult to discover anything self-reinforcing. The governmental policy of letting imported labor from neighboring countries to be the first to absorb the shock so as to deflect the effects of sanctions and even turn them toward friends of the enemy (except for the case of Africans from Mozambique and South Africa) is probably clearer, but it is not internally stimulating. The next in line to absorb the shock would be, or could be, native Africans. A cleverer policy would be to distribute the impact more evenly and to display some cases of conspicuous sacrifice by the white community.

But very strong reinforcement, as far as we can judge, comes from the third strategy, that of smuggling:

Q. But haven’t you all become so well adjusted to rather regular business patterns that it is difficult to do more irregular types of business?

A. As to the moral aspect, No—if we have to do something irregular, Britain is to blame, not we. And as to habits, I’ll tell you how it is. Look at Salisbury; see how beautiful and perfect everything is. Look at the surroundings; see what a good life we have. My wife and I used to go to garden parties and give garden parties perhaps three times a week; there were shows and exhibitions; the weekend trip to Beira for a good swim, an occasional hunt—we had and still have everything except, I have to admit, life had a tendency to be somewhat boring. And then these blessed sanctions came into our existence and we had to get out of our smug practices and use all our talents again. I have never had so much fun since I came here—years ago! You have to figure out how products can be brought in by middlemen, how you can threaten that firms we used to import from will lose their markets here forever if they do not help us, how goods can eventually be smuggled into the country if that is necessary, how to get petrol more cheaply than from the Portuguese merchants who set up filling stations across the border from Umtali and charge exorbitant prices for the gallon. You really get a chance to show what you are worth.

At this point it must be added that the challenge of smuggling is not
enough; one also has to be at least moderately successful in order to be rewarded in the process. Thus, if the sending nations are able to ensure that regardless of how much talent is invested in smuggling very few goods will in fact materialize, the rewards from this defense mechanism will dwindle away. But in Rhodesia, with its extensive borders adjoining friendly territories, even moderate talent should be able to bring about major success.27

Thus, in general the thesis that economic sanctions, at least to start with, will have a tendency to create social and political integration rather than disintegration seems to be a relatively strong one.28 But this thesis is not unconditional. Thus, it will probably not hold in traditional societies based more on primary relationships, but then such societies are less likely to depend on trade for their continued existence.

27 According to the report on the fuel situation in Rhodesia circulated to member states by the UN Secretary-General, the oil expert Walter J. Levy states that “oil shortages are already the cause, and will increasingly be so, of the major and most overt upset in the Rhodesian economy and society.” The statement is interesting since it is not phrased in absolute terms; all it says is that the oil embargo causes more economic difficulties than the other embargoes. And Levy also adds, “... If the question were one of survival the availability of oil, in itself, would certainly not be the decisive consideration during the next few months.” This sounds reasonable, since only twenty-seven percent of the energy needs are covered by means of oil, whereas sixty-three percent are met by coal from the Wankie coal belt and ten percent of the needs are covered by hydroelectric power from the Kariba Dam. Since the Wankie coal belt is in Rhodesia and “to blow up the Kariba Dam would mean to flood Beira” (according to a Rhodesian informant), this means that about three-quarters of the energy needs are under control. And where oil is concerned, the railroads have been switching from diesel engines back to steam engines and the forty-three percent of the oil that went into ordinary gasoline for cars covers a substantial fraction of luxury consumption. It is worse with the ten percent that was used for airplanes, but this is hardly too difficult to replace (figures from “The Bite on Business,” The Sunday Times, November 14, 1965). But when Mr. Levy, the oil expert, goes on to say that by the middle of 1966 the Rhodesian economy would be significantly affected and “that, on such a basis, there would be pressure on the regime, and the oil embargo could be of even greater political and psychological import than the immediate economic impact,” then one wonders on what kind of data such conclusions are based (quotations from UN Weekly News Summary, Press Release WS/231, March 4, 1966, 3-4). According to the Rand Daily Mail (Johannesburg), February 16, 1966, about 150,000 liters of gasoline go into Rhodesia by car from South Africa and Mozambique every day, which is close to the normal consumption of about 300,000 liters. According to the New York Times (international edition, April 16-17, 1966, 1), the amount had risen to 50,000 gallons from South Africa alone by mid-April, but then the minimum daily consumption was estimated at 150,000 gallons a day.

28 Such theories, understandably, have also been very popular in Rhodesia. Thus, in a letter to the editor of the Rhodesia Herald, November 25, 1965, one writer asserts (rightly or not) that the food situation was better in Germany in 1918 than in 1917, that the Versailles Treaty led to the German experiments with rockets with their well-known consequences, that the reparations Germany had to pay to Serbia (such as trams for Belgrade) gave Germany a bridgehead on the economic market in that country because of the necessity for repairs, and so on—in short, stories of how sanctions may backfire and lead to unanticipated consequences. Stories of the same kind also cropped up in our interviews.
The theory also presupposes that there is strong support among the sectors that become dominant in a crisis economy, and it presupposes that smuggling is not entirely impossible. Under these conditions the short-term impact of economic sanctions will be negligible.

However, it can be argued that even if the economic effect of sanctions is negligible, or at least manageable, there will always remain a moral element. Other nations have by their action declared themselves against the receiving nation and have tied their action to moral depreciation, even condemnation. What are the effects of such moral disapproval?

These effects may lead to surrender—for instance, under the conditions mentioned above of strong latent identification with sending nation(s) and severe doubts as to the propriety of one's own actions. However, both of these conditions can be manipulated by means of modern propaganda, for the government in the receiving nation will legitimize its control of the machinery of news communication with reference to the crisis and will probably gain acceptance for its claim. The obvious techniques are to keep public expressions of approval of the motives of the sending nations below a certain threshold, perhaps even down to zero percent, and approval of one's own motives above a certain threshold, perhaps even up to a hundred percent. Only a very unrefined government will aim for the extreme thresholds here—the more sophisticated will stay away from the extremes to satisfy the more sophisticated members of the population. What matters is not so much what people think as whether they think there are many who share their treacherous thoughts—in other words, what matters to the government is the creation and maintenance of "pluralistic ignorance." And complete censorship will only lead to suspicion.

Much more complicated is the case, as in Rhodesia, where there is at the same time very strong identification with the sending nation and strong disapproval of its sanctions. In other words, there is cognitive dissonance, as illustrated in Diagram 3. The simplest way of solving these dissonances would be either to accept the sanctions and become, in fact, an adherent of Wilson's policies or to reject Britain and become an anti-British Rhodesian. No doubt both these factions exist, but they

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29 "Pluralistic ignorance" is what obtains when there is confusion about where the majority stands. In Rhodesia, even under the mildly authoritarian conditions reigning there now, it would be difficult for an opposition that happened to be in the majority to know that this was the case, since there is no adequate way of expressing such attitudes, and hence no incentive for action due to the feeling of being supported and strongly so.

30 For the first presentation of this theory, see L. Festinger, A Theory of Cognitive Dissonance (Evanston 1957), particularly chap. 1.
are not majority factions. In fact, there are strong formal and informal pressures against either position; against the former for obvious reasons and against the latter because so much of the local ideology is based on the idea of loyalty to British symbols. Hence, the technique for resolving the dissonance is to split the cognitive elements, and since attitudes toward sanctions are homogeneously negative, "Britain" will have to be split. Some interview excerpts give insights into the mechanisms:

Q. But Queen Elizabeth, whom you say you greatly admire, and pay allegiance to, declared herself in favor of the sanctions.

A. Do you really believe that? Oh no, that was because she was forced to do so, and by whom do you think, by that same Wilson. He told her to do so. But you know what, some of us who watched television very closely saw a twinkle in her eye; that was a secret signal to us that she is really in favor of us, she is with us.

The structure of this cognitive configuration, shown in Diagram 4, is obtained by introducing "Wilson" and splitting "Queen Elizabeth" into the apparent and the real one. There is not only one cycle but sixteen (one with five, five with four, and ten with three elements), all of them balanced. The structure has several advantages. It preserves the basic attitudes, and at the same time it has a measure of sophistication that can serve as a good basis for speeches, editorials, and such. The ability to distinguish between the apparent and the real is usually
highly thought of, and much involved conversation is possible on the basis of Diagram 4, with Wilson pictured as a crook and Queen Elizabeth as schizophrenic.

Another example, based on the Rhodesians’ intense dislike of Harold Wilson, is presented in Diagram 5.

![Diagram 5. A Simple, Unbalanced Configuration]

Q. You love Britain and want to remain within the Commonwealth, and you dislike Wilson. But you cannot deny that Wilson is a part of Britain, and even a rather important one, the country’s Prime Minister.

A. Oh yes, he is. By a rather slim majority, though. But that does not prove that Wilson is a true Briton. It only proves how clever he is, and how effective international communism is.

Q. How so?

A. Well, it is well known here that Wilson is really a Communist; you see it quite clearly in his earliest writings. In later years he has disguised it, or tried to do so. But we believe there is some kind of link between him and Peking. For how could you otherwise explain all these things that happen? That we, the best-run colony in Africa and the most truly anti-Communist of them all should be the last ones to gain independence, that everything should be turned against us when we want what was due to us rightfully after our partners in the Federation, Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland, or Zambia and Malawi as they like to call themselves now, gained independence?

Again, there is the same technique. “Wilson” is split into two, the position as prime minister and the person Wilson—and just as the apparent Queen Elizabeth should be dissociated from the real one, so should the person Wilson be dissociated from the prime minister’s office, which he holds unrightfully, not because of any electoral fraud, but because he has not revealed his true intentions. Moreover, “international communism” is brought into the picture, as in Diagram 6. Again there is an extension from one unbalanced cycle to sixteen

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81 This was in January 1966.
balanced ones, and again, an increase not only in balance, but also in sophistication of the structure of argumentation. The evils are now brought back to "international communism," which offers an extensive basis of explanation since there is a great deal of tradition, even literature, that the theories can be hooked on to.

Q. But how does international communism operate here?
A. Well, you know the hold they have on Tanzania, with that Peking Communist Nyerere. You also know that Peking wants copper. So what would be better than to create the conditions under which better land transport would have to be built from Tanzania right into the copper belt, under the pretext of helping Zambia with oil and petrol, and then the Chinese can sit on it? Also, conditions are created whereby the moderate Kaunda regime may have to yield to extreme leftists, and Zambia is also theirs. Kenya can fall any moment—so isn't it rather strange that Britain should attack the only real friends they have down here in the fight against international communism? And how do you account for that, except by admitting that communism has crept into Britain itself—or rather, at its very head, in that Mr. Wilson? And that he was able to persuade the others, playing on their fear of losing the votes of the Afro-Asian nations in the United Nations?

Expressions like these are so frequent that they seem to be a rather accepted ideology. There is no sign of the Rhodesians' underestimating the enemy: to them he is both strong and extremely intelligent in his machinations. However, he does make a mistake: he underestimates the dormant power of Britain, and fails to foresee that one day the British people will awake and see the spell that has been cast over them. And in the meantime it is up to Rhodesia to keep vigil, to be on guard
and tell the truth to the world. This duty also gives an international role to the Rhodesians, a deeper meaning to their existence and to their fight. The parallel with Cuba in the Western hemisphere is immediate.

Thus, the world is dichotomized into one good and one bad part, as it usually is in times of crisis. But, one may ask, what has happened to the basic issues, majority rule and UDI? And this is precisely the point: the basic issues have in a sense disappeared; a reinterpretation has taken place, giving the sanctions a new meaning. Not that Rhodesians are not able at any moment to argue about these issues, but the third issue of communism is always there as an even more dominant theme. Whether it is called a smoke screen or not, its role in the cognitive system is considerable.

The insertion of “majority rule” and “British rule” in the cognitive system presented above is simple: both kinds of rule are possible agents of communism. “British rule” is seen as such only as long as it means Wilson or Labour rule (for which reason the Rhodesians paid enormous attention to all British by-elections that might have upset Wilson’s precarious majority in early 1966 and to all signs of a split in the Conservative party, which they analyzed as they did Queen Elizabeth) and alignment with Afro-Asian nations in the UN. And “majority rule” is seen as the agent of communism only as long as it means government dominated by “all these Communist-trained Africans, coming out of Dar es Salaam, aligning themselves with Nkrumah, Touré, and others” and “so-called Pan-Africanism.” Thus, the final goal is arrived at: the portrayal of independent Rhodesia as one of the few remaining bastions of the free world, misunderstood and betrayed by people who would do well to put their own house in order before they criticize white Rhodesians.32

Here are we in little Rhodesia trying to form a bastion of democracy against the shaky black states to the north of us only to find the formidable might of the good old U.S.A. pitted against us. Why?

Have we ever asked you for anything in the way of foreign-aid handouts or squandered your gifts on graft, personal gain, or flashy cars, like so many of the black despots in Africa and Asia? One day you are going to need a trustworthy and staunch ally in this part of Africa and, apart from the Republic of South Africa, which is likely to be your next target for destruction, on which

other country in the whole of this continent can you honestly rely with confidence?

Where is your much-vaulted sense of fair play? Where were your sanctions and embargoes when Hungary was crushed or when India seized Goa? Perhaps the nations involved were a little too powerful for your might, and it is only the smaller, comparatively defenseless countries like ours that you are prepared to tackle.

Well, good luck to you—you go right on trying to placate and pander to the petty little tyrants on this continent and see what you get by way of thanks for it in the end.

As for criticism and your holier-than-thou attitude in the United Nations and elsewhere regarding our relationship with the Africans, may I suggest that you put your own house in order and start treating your own Negroes and Red Indians (especially the latter—they have more right to the country than the European “settlers”) fairly before throwing stones in our direction.

You had better snap out of your fawning terror of the Afro-Asian bloc and give us a chance before you lose yet another of the few friends left to you in this sorry world.

However, consistent ideologies are not enough. They may appeal to the intellectual and be useful in discussions, but in an atmosphere where political discussion is discouraged and contact with foreigners is seriously reduced, they are of limited value except as a ritual, not unlike religious liturgies. People cannot repeat these arguments in their daily conversations; in such contexts other symbols and forms of expression appealing more directly to the emotions are needed. And they have not been wanting in Salisbury after UDI.

First of all, there are the jokes ridiculing the sanctions. An advertisement in the *Rhodesia Herald* announced the New Year’s Eve party at a certain restaurant with an admonition to “order tables now,” some alluring comments on the culinary pleasures to be expected, and the assurance that “there will be no sanctions against drinks.” The point about this jocular remark is not that it is particularly good—much better jokes were heard in everyday conversation—but that it appeared in an advertisement for everyone to see. Thus, the people become familiarized with the sanctions, and the sanctions become more manageable, just as “doodlebugs” were more manageable than V-weapons. At the same time, jokes heard by the present observer were never directed against Britain as such, but rather against Wilson; never against Com-
monwealth symbols, but rather against policies and some member nations of the Commonwealth.

Second, there is the element of superstition, even mysticism, dear to anyone exposed to a crisis. Thus, the word “Rhodesian” was held to carry a secret message, revealed when a line is drawn between the s and the i—Rhodes/Ian—or Cecil Rhodes and Ian Smith:

So, you see, it is already in the word! Rhodes founded the colony; Ian is giving us independence!

It was also reported that the Friends of Rhodesia Association went out of their way to get their offices in Durban set up in Salisbury House, Smith Street, but were unable to get them on the eleventh floor to symbolize the date of UDI (11/11/65). This kind of magic is probably linked to right-wing extremism in somewhat the same way as dogmatism and quasi-scientism are tied in with left-wing extremism.

Third, there is an element of style in the Smith regime that may appear spurious to its style-conscious antagonists in the mother country, but not necessarily to the Rhodesians themselves. A great proportion of the customary rigamarole of British democracy is carried over, and the solemn phraseology remains intact. However, Smith himself is as an orator considerably closer to the style of the Rhodesian farmer than is, for instance, Wilson. Symbols associated with Smith, such as the RAF, “wounded in the war,” “a farmer himself,” a certain lean handsomeness, and the idea that he is not so much a professional politician as

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83 This Association was originally formed with the three goals of promoting tourism to Rhodesia, of encouraging the purchase of Rhodesian goods, and of acting as a pressure group by writing letters to the press, and so on.

84 The Proclamation of Independence, signed on “this eleventh day of November in the Year of Our Lord one thousand nine hundred and sixty-five” may sound quaint: “Now Therefore, We the Government of Rhodesia, in humble submission to Almighty God who controls the destinies of nations, conscious that the people of Rhodesia have always shown unswerving loyalty and devotion to Her Majesty the Queen and earnestly praying that we and the people of Rhodesia will not be hindered in our determination to continue exercising our undoubted right to demonstrate the same loyalty and devotion, and seeking to promote the common good so that the dignity and freedom of all men may be assured, DO, BY THIS PROCLAMATION, adopt, enact and give to the people of Rhodesia the Constitution annexed hereto. GOD SAVE THE QUEEN.”

There is style to that proclamation, and its expressive adequacy was fully appreciated by our informants. The same applies to the little document entitled Rhodesia’s Finest Hour, showing the Smith government impeccably lined up for the signature ceremony, with the Queen’s image watching them. We quote from Smith’s speech: “Let there be no doubt that we in this country stand second to none in our loyalty to the Queen and whatever else other countries may have done or may yet do, it is our intention that the Union Jack will continue to fly in Rhodesia and the National Anthem continue to be sung. . . . We Rhodesians have rejected the doctrine of appeasement and surrender. The decision which we have taken today is a refusal by Rhodesians to sell their birth-right, and even if we were to surrender, does anyone believe that Rhodesia would be the last target of the Communists and the Afro-Asian bloc?”
a solid Rhodesian who has taken on himself the responsibility for a job to be done, must contribute to identification. Above all this distinctly Rhodesian style underlines the justification of UDI and the idea that Rhodesians are different from and yet of the same blood as the British.

In a sanction process a receiving nation is greatly aided by a general tendency to underestimate it. It is customary in human affairs to underestimate one's opponent, under a relatively wide variety of conditions. There is a particularly simple reason why this is a fortiori true for the case of economic sanctions. A nation about to be punished is a nation that has done something wrong; it is morally inferior in one way or another. To attribute to it intelligence, tactical ability, moral strength, tenaciousness, or other properties valued highly by the punishing nation(s) can easily lead to serious cognitive dissonance. The more such virtues sending nation(s) admit the receiving nation has, the less justified do the former's own actions appear and the less probable their chances of victory, for the properties mentioned are precisely among the ones needed to counteract the effect of sanctions.

Thus, one can predict easy acceptance of ideas to the effect that the population of the receiving nation is inferior where intelligence and morality are concerned. Varieties of this theme—for instance, that this inferiority applies “only to the leaders and not to the people” or “only to the people and not to the leaders” (who control the people in an authoritarian or totalitarian manner)—will also in all probability appear, just as theories about gray eminences. Obviously, such theories may often have a nucleus of truth or may even be quite adequate descriptions of objective reality—but this is not the reason why they are held to be true. When pressed for data, people in the sending nation(s) will usually quickly reveal a nonempirical attitude, a lack of data, and a lack of ability to revise their judgment when new data that point toward revisions of the prejudices appear.

In the Rhodesian case the most common themes are expressed in these excerpts:

The white population in Rhodesia is, in fact, so uneducated that they say about ninety-seven percent of them are illiterate. The reason why they are there is that they cannot compete with West Indian labor (Nigerian politician).

The white population is about the size of the population of Chelsea.

Expression of such theories was very frequently found in Salisbury as well as London. Possibly the theories are quite valid—but then they are also valid in all other countries. Ghost-writers and -thinkers are found everywhere.
Now, imagine you asked the city council in that city to take care of the affairs of a nation. They would simply not be able to do so; more talent and training are required (British politician).

Most of the settlers are there to seek comfort alone; that is all they care for; they have no higher ideals than their own well-being. Deprive them of some of their material comfort, deny them some of their imported stuff, and they will ask for fair weather very quickly (countless informants, rank-and-file and politicians).

One reason why the Wilson team could not negotiate with Smith’s people was that they were so silly that they did not even understand the proposals put forward to them (British informants).

Smith is not able even to write his own speeches, not to mention formulate governmental policies—but there are men behind him who are the real rulers and who do all the brain work. Smith is only a front figure (Opposition member, Rhodesia).

They have poorer brains down there, and they are shut out from the general trends. They used to say that “Kenya was for officers, Rhodesia was for other ranks.” And these poor whites have of course much more to lose (white newspaperman, Kenya).

What all such statements do not take into account is above all the same factor: that human beings and social systems change when exposed to crisis. The city council of X-town, when given the responsibility of heading a nation, may develop abilities not expected by either itself or others; and a society, when worked upon by the forces of cohesion, may draw on reservoirs of strength and ability not only to resist stress but also to act creatively—qualities that lie latent in quieter periods. This is in a sense a truism—anyone who lived through the occupation of, say, a European nation during World War II will know by his own experience that there is a great deal of truth to this.

More important is the advantage of being underestimated. First of all, it makes the sending nation(s) overestimate the probable effect of the sanctions they initiate, and that gives the receiving nation a better chance to counteract the effects. Moreover, if the receiving nation is clever enough, it will conceal some of its unrecognized strength and conform to its image as inferior and may be able to extend the fight on this basis. Besides, to appear stupid in a conference may be a very clever tactic since it impedes communication and makes it easier afterward to claim that there were misunderstandings. In more formal terms: one
can retain the pretense of willingness to negotiate and yet make negotiation impossible. At any rate, to have hidden resources is always an asset.\textsuperscript{36}

We know of no better way to summarize all this discussion of the defense against sanctions than by quoting the following lines from Ian Smith's "Three Months of Independence" broadcast to his nation:

The thought of operations carried out by British troops based in a Commonwealth country—which is now a republic and no longer acknowledges the Queen or flies the Union Jack—against a fellow-member of the Commonwealth which has no wish to become a republic, unless the Commonwealth abandons the ideals upon which it was built, still shows loyalty to the Queen and is proud to fly the Union Jack, is to me incomprehensible. . . . Is it not appropriate to ask Mr. Wilson a direct question: Is he a fellow traveler?

If not, why does he allow British ships to pour British provisions into the Viet Cong, thus assisting them to wage their deadly war against Americans, Australians and New Zealanders?

If not, why is he aiding and abetting the Communist forces in their march down the American continent?

If not, why does he continue to supply and assist the Communist revolutionaries in Cuba?

If not, why does he continue to aid and finance, with British taxpayers' money, the openly Communistic countries of Ghana and Tanzania, in spite of their withdrawal from the Commonwealth, accompanied as it was by the hurling of vile insults at Britain?

If not, why—when Rhodesia is holding the front line against the Communist forces in Africa—is Mr. Wilson boasting and bragging about his efforts which are calculated to bring us to our knees?

If he is not a Communist, perhaps he could tell us precisely what he is doing to combat the spread of communism in the world today, on the one hand, and on the other hand, what he is doing to promote democracy and democratic institutions in the world, and particularly in Africa?\textsuperscript{37}

\textsuperscript{36} This is particularly true if one can even afford to use these resources to help others when one is in distress oneself. A typical example of the Smith government's strategy in this respect was demonstrated in connection with the cyclone in Mozambique at the beginning of January 1966: Smith sent a widely publicized cable to the Governor-General of Mozambique offering all kinds of assistance—at a period when Rhodesia itself was in a difficult situation (Rhodesia Ministry of Information, Press Statement 29/66, January 10, 1966).

\textsuperscript{37} Quoted in the \textit{Rhodesia Herald}, February 11, 1966.
IV. Conclusions

In this article the conclusion about the probable effectiveness of economic sanctions is, generally, negative. To arrive at this conclusion the target society has been analyzed as an organism with a certain self-maintaining potential. When hit and hurt it reacts—like most organisms—in such a way as to try to undo the damage and to restore the status quo ante. In so doing, the target society may even be partly strengthened because of the hidden forces that are activated. The goals of the system may not only be maintained but even be reinforced; the sending nation(s) not only may fail to achieve their goals, but may even contribute to exactly the opposite of what they hoped for.

Sanctions against collectivities will always affect the just together with the unjust, since collective sanctions correspond to a philosophy of collective guilt. From the outside, where nations as such (Germany, Rhodesia) appear as the wrong-doers, sanctions are just another way of acting out the billiard-ball image of nations—that is, nations as undifferentiated wholes. From the inside, collective sanctions seem unreasonable to both the just and the unjust, with the consequences we have tried to describe.

To many, these effects will serve as an example of the lack of isomorphism between interpersonal and international relations: what works at the individual level does not necessarily work at the level of interaction between nations. However true this may often be, it is not a good example. Prisoners will often feel precisely that “only a part of me did wrong, and only a short time—and here all of me is imprisoned, and for a long time.” Even if great care is taken, verbally, to draw a line between the peccatum and the peccator and not generalize from the sinful act to definitions of the whole person as a sinner, imprisonment is nevertheless a way of putting all parts of the person, sinful or not, in prison. Thus, there is in practice also a billiard-ball conception of man as an undifferentiated whole. Biology protects this billiard ball from differentiated imprisonment, much as norms of national integrity protect the nation billiard ball. In both cases imagination must be exercised to find more differentiated forms of punishment.\footnote{Let us pursue this parallel a little further. A basic point in sanction theory is immediacy; whether the sanctions take the form of reward or of punishment, they should ideally follow the actions to be rewarded or punished so closely that a clear connection is established. If there is a considerable delay, the learning effect may be considerably reduced. However, a characteristic of the international system is its long reaction-time, because of the generally weak level of integration and because of delays caused at the intranational level. The case of Norwegian trade with Rhodesia may be suggestive in this respect. In this}
But nothing of what has been said should be taken to imply that there are no conditions under which economic sanctions will work. For reasons due to the structure of the internal economy of the target nation as well as to its trade structure, the damage wrought or anticipated may appear so much more frightening than the renunciation of its goals that capitulation or compromise may be the result. Also, although there may be short-term adaptation, the long-term effect may nevertheless be capitulation or compromise out of boredom, fatigue, and desire to return to more normal conditions and ways of life.

Then there is another, and much more important, class of conditions under which sanctions may work and often do work. In fact, sanctions are used continuously, in everyday social interaction, at the individual and at the national levels of interaction. But characteristic of this use of sanctions is a communality of interest in which rupture of generally smooth relations is perceived as a worse threat than some short-run lack of gratification. Hence, sanctions not only "bite," they also "work" in the sense that compliance is obtained. This is the case within primary relations, as within a family or a peer group, and is also the case within secondary relations based on contractual or normative situations. But when this sense of communality of interest is lost, i.e., when there is

case, "all imports to and exports from Southern Rhodesia, except consignments contracted before November 27, 1965, have been banned." What then happened to Norwegian trade with Rhodesia can be seen from Table II.

Table II. Monthly Value of Norwegian-Rhodesian Trade, 1966 Compared with 1965, in Thousands of Norwegian Kroner

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Monthly Change in Trade, 1966 Minus 1965 Values</th>
<th>Cumulative Change in Trade, 1966 Minus 1965</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>January</td>
<td>1975</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>February</td>
<td>216</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>March</td>
<td>-2347</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>April</td>
<td>644</td>
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<tr>
<td>May</td>
<td>224</td>
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<tr>
<td>June</td>
<td>1471</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>July</td>
<td>-3093</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>August</td>
<td>-1911</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>-2821</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The figures are for exports and imports combined. Thus, there was a quick increase in trade after UDI (mainly in imports from Rhodesia). Then there are some fluctuations in the cumulative pattern until the decrease became stabilized during the summer of 1966. In total trade statistics for 1966, a considerable decrease relative to 1965 will appear. But the pattern is similar to rewarding a child for its mischievous behavior at breakfast, punishing it in the afternoon and the evening, and then announcing that the total day was worse for the child than the preceding day. (Trade statistics are from Månedistatistik over utenrikshandelen, Statistisk Sentralbyrå, Oslo.)
conflict and patterns of influence become predominantly coercive, then sanctions seem to function in a completely different manner. This does not mean that they cannot both bite and work in this case, too, but there are indeed many conditions that must be fulfilled, as has been indicated in this article.

The condition for sanctions to be effective that is most often referred to in more or less scholarly analyses is the problem of *universality*. The argument is that economic sanctions have failed because they were not universal; some countries did not participate, or some other way of circumventing the sanctions was found (smuggling, use of third parties, and so on). Only detailed analysis of individual cases can do justice to this argument. But even though the argument no doubt has some validity, there are also important reasons to believe that this validity is limited.

First of all, even under a totally effective blockade a country may continue to run on its internal resources, and these resources (economic, social, moral, political) may be strengthened rather than weakened by the sanctions. The question is whether these resources are sufficient to maintain a society and a political community—and this question cannot be answered in general and *a priori*.

Second, although the economic effect of sanctions by definition increases with the increasing participation of the senders, it is not obvious that the moral effect increases. On the contrary, to feel that the rest of the world is “ganging up” on one may serve as a very effective and hardening stimulus, supporting paranoid and psychopathic tendencies as well as more salutary forces. 39 However, we know very little about this.

But even if the direct and intended consequences of sanctions are unlikely to obtain, there may be other effects. When analyzing political actions in terms of their consequences, and particularly in terms of whether the actions serve the purposes intended for them, less rational purposes are often forgotten. If economic sanctions do not make a receiving nation comply, they may nevertheless serve functions that are useful in the eyes of the sending nation(s). There is, for example, the punishment aspect referred to earlier. There is the value of at least doing something, of having the illusion of being instrumental, of being busy in time of crisis. When military action is impossible for one reason or another, and when doing nothing is seen as tantamount to complicity, then *something has to be done to express morality*, something

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39 This is a major perspective in the well-known content analyses of German actions and reactions before the outbreak of World War I made by R. C. North and his colleagues.
that at least serves as a clear signal to everyone that what the receiving nation has done is disapproved of. If the sanctions do not serve instrumental purposes they can at least have expressive functions. Thus, as a highly dramatic (and costly) way of reinforcing international morality, economic sanctions may be useful, although it would be interesting to compare their effects with those of much cheaper means, such as declarations, resolutions, or demonstrations.

This judgment leads to the suspicion that economic sanctions may serve the purpose of expressing moral disapproval best when they are of a symbolic nature and value-deprivation is kept low. Moreover, we believe that this purpose is served still better if the senders deprive themselves of as much or even more value as the receivers are deprived of. Thus, a boycott of South African oranges may by itself be a meaningful demonstration of an attitude, an act of communication so to speak. But which case is more effective: when there is no other way for the boycotters to obtain oranges, whereas South Africa easily finds other markets, or when South Africa finds no substitute market, whereas the boycotters indulge in oranges from Israel, Cyprus, or Spain?—in other words, when only the senders are hurt, or when only the receivers are hurt? The dilemma may serve well as an illustration of the difference between nonviolent and violent reasoning, but where the resolution of the dilemma is concerned we simply do not know the answer.\footnote{See footnote 5.}

Let us now turn the argument around and imagine that experiences with economic sanctions in this century had been more positive. Let us imagine that economic sanctions as a coercive measure have become a permanent and frequent aspect of international interaction. What changes does this imply in the structure of the system? And, to what extent are these changes cherished results and to what extent less-applauded consequences?

First of all, if economic sanctions have come to stay, it would be unwise of realistic and clever governments not to think about countermeasures. Some governments will even today define themselves as belonging to minority groups in the international system against whom such sanctions might be wielded; others are foresighted enough to appreciate that the world structure may change and that they may one day become the victims of such policies, however improbable that might seem today.\footnote{Thus, Norwegians would be most surprised and indignant if they heard that the Lapps had been influential enough to marshal nations into a boycott of Norway because of discriminatory practices. They would be less surprised, perhaps, but equally}
The first and most obvious countermeasure would be to do what many nations do today as a part of their program of total defense: broaden their basis of production for exports so that their economy cannot be destroyed by actions pertaining to one or a few products only. One-crop countries are vulnerable because of the greater ease with which an economic boycott can be supervised.\footnote{Shipping is of course also a "crop," putting a nation like Norway in the same position as many developing, raw-material-exporting countries where vulnerability is concerned.} This, then, leads to \textit{diversification of the national economy}.\footnote{indignant if certain attitudes expressed at the UNCTAD conferences about Norwegian shipping policies crystallized into boycott actions.}

Second, nations will try to increase the number of recipients of their exports and suppliers of their imports in order to be less dependent on a single nation that might engage in unilateral boycott actions against them. This will also make boycott actions less easy to carry out since there will be fewer relationships like the one between Britain and Rhodesia. One may refer to this as the \textit{defeudalization of international trade}.\footnote{indignant if certain attitudes expressed at the UNCTAD conferences about Norwegian shipping policies crystallized into boycott actions.}

Both of these strategies will be applauded by many today since they are compatible with general moves toward political and economic independence. This approval also applies partly, but only partly, to the third countermeasure: the tendency toward \textit{economic self-sufficiency}, which has been a classical component of defense against military warfare and is an equally obvious component of defense against economic warfare. This tendency is also consistent with the almost universal need for economic structures that can save a nation from expenses in foreign currencies. But the consequence of self-sufficiency is decreased world interdependence; and to the extent that a high level of interdependence, economic and otherwise, between the nations of the world is seen as a way of strengthening the capacity of the international system to resist war, this is a rather negative consequence.

Thus, the countermeasures consequent to a declared policy in favor of the application of economic sanctions are consistent with economic policies pursued by many nations today, but are based on other reasons. This consistency will facilitate their implementation, and, since there will then be less to fear, their implementation will probably also further the acceptance of economic sanctions. But these consequences do not appear to be consistent with a view of the interdependent international structure as more resistant against violent conflict than a structure very low in interdependence. Thus, one may run the risk of buying a (dubi-
ous) nonmilitary coercive measure at the expense of an even more
dangerous international structure than that we already have.

In conclusion, although this is outside the general scope of this article,
let us indicate some classes of answers to the obvious and highly legiti-
mate question, *What, then, can be done?* If we exclude military actions
on moral grounds and economic sanctions on pragmatic grounds, what
is left? This question can be discussed by reference to the survey given
in Section II, with special attention to the dimensions of positive versus
negative, individual versus collective, and external versus internal
sanctions. This article has dealt with sanctions that are negative, collec-
tive, and external—and of a further special type, economic. Answers to
the question may, however, possibly be found among the other combi-
nations.

But first of all, there are all the other *negative, collective, and external
sanctions*. We have indicated above some reasons why communications
sanctions may be effective, but in general we feel that very much of
what we have said in this article about economic sanctions would apply
*aper rem* to these other types of sanctions. More particularly, it does not
seem that the "nonrecognition games" often indulged in by govern-
ments are very instrumental, although they may serve a number of
expressive functions. The same probably applies to diplomatic ruptures.
But many detailed studies are needed to know more about this.

Second, there is the possibility of *positive, collective, and external
sanctions*—in other words, of indicating the conditions under which
sending nations will offer *rewards* rather than conditions under which
they will try to administer punishment. In the Rhodesia case this would
mean outlining a policy of (even escalating) rewards for every step
toward majority rule and social integration. It may be argued that this
was tried and failed; we shall not enter that debate. The important fact
from our point of view is only that we know very little about how such
positive sanctions would actually operate. Thus, would none, some,
most, or all of the mechanisms we have described for negative sanctions
be operative, only in reverse? Would sending nations be willing to
renounce the punishment element of negative sanctions? Would there
be more or less opportunity to express morality when right rather than
wrong actions were singled out for attention through the system of
sanctions? Could positive sanctions and negative sanctions be com-
bined?

Third, there is the possibility of *negative, external, but *individual
sanctions*. These are impossible under present conditions of interna-
tional law, which reserves the right of jurisdiction over individuals to nationals and/or individuals on national territory. Nevertheless, let us imagine for a moment that international society was structured in such a way that sanctions could be aimed at responsible individuals, like federal police actions in some cases in the United States. In that case, almost none of the processes we have indicated would be operative. It is the collective nature of economic sanctions that sets in motion processes that counteract the impact and have the additional quality of being almost automatic. Thus, the skilled politician in the receiving nation who knows or senses these processes has at his disposal a force that he can amplify if he has the necessary talent. He can ride a wave, so to speak, and his major temptation will probably be to overdo the amplification, to emphasize too much the spirit of sacrifice, to use too vivid colors in the way he presents the picture of the situation to his followers, and so on. But, if key individuals in the nation had already been arrested through quick action (perhaps parachutists?), there would be fewer to rally around—and if, in addition, there was a certain level of identification with the world police, this might solve the whole problem.

Fourth, there is the possibility of external and individual, but positive, sanctions. This would mean that the sending nations would single out for attention particularly valuable individuals in the receiving nation and would reward them. This is already being done to a considerable extent, through prizes, awards, invitations to lecture, and so forth, but it could be done more systematically and on a grander scale. It would encourage individuals, reduce pluralistic ignorance, serve as a reinforcement of morality, and emphasize the brotherhood of mankind—but it could also open the way to all kinds of retaliation against the rewarded individuals by the authorities to be influenced. It would effectively change loyalty patterns of some people more in the direction of the sending nation(s), but what the short-term and long-term effects of that would be is difficult to tell.

Finally, there is the possibility of internal sanctions. In the case of Rhodesia, this would mean the whole repertory of Gandhian techniques, from general strikes to parallel rule—if we exclude direct violence against people or against objects (sabotage). The virtues of internal action are many: it would provide training in political action and organization (but would also presuppose it); it would increase self-reliance instead of strengthening the pattern of reliance on outsiders; it could be much more effective than external sanctions since most of a nation's economy is internal—but it would also set in motion
many of the same counteracting processes. White Rhodesia would still feel persecuted and would be able to play on the David and Goliath theme—and there will always be many on the side of a David.

In short, it is difficult to tell, but the a priori value of these alternative techniques is at least as positive as that of economic sanctions, the world’s experiences in this century considered. Thus, the field is open for both research and new policy measures—and it seems safe to predict that the rest of this century will witness much experimentation in this field. It is only to be hoped that such experimentation will be not completely unguided by good theory and good data—as well as by a constructive and positive orientation in international affairs.