A Century of Economic Sanctions: A Field Revisited

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1. A Thirty Year Cycle?

Economic sanctions have many names: blockades, boycotts, embargoes, sometimes even described as quarantine or economic coercion. These concepts are almost synonymous. Under such headings the issue of sanctions has been of concern throughout the 20th century. In the early years “tariff wars” were on the agenda.¹ The continental blockade of the Napoleonic wars were in the mind of decision-makers. The First World War saw the application of sanctions against the allied countries of the continent. Following the War debates on sanctions have been intense at times. In retrospect, it appears to be a matter of thirty year intervals. Sanction policy was a major issue of discussion in the 1930s. In the 1960s a new intensive debate emerged and in the 1990s there is a repeated interest in sanctions issues. These three big debates on the topic of the uses and misuses of sanctions are interesting in themselves as a part of the ongoing evolution of peace thinking. They also show important shifts in the foci of concern, changes in related studies and the creation of new political practices. Let me quickly review the debates and then make some comparisons, which will help to put the present debate in perspective.

The first sanctions debate: Sanctions against Aggression. In the 1930s the discussion concerned the question of aggression. The issue was clear-cut: what was the international community of the day to do in face of major powers attacking other countries with the clear intent of occupying them? One of the conclusions from the First World War was a belief that the economic blockade of Germany had been effective. The German Imperial armies were not militarily defeated, it was argued, but it was the “home front” that succumbed, due to the economic strains put on the Wilhelminian regime. As a consequence, economic sanctions acquired an important role in the Convent of the League of Nations (Walters 1965, Mitrany 1925, Clark 1932, Taubenfeld 1958). The first challenge was Japan’s attack in 1931 on China and the following occupation of Manchuria. According to the legal framework of the League of Nations, this should have been a simple case of aggression and the clause on economic sanctions should have been released. It was not. When Italy some years later, in a similar fashion, initiated a war against Ethiopia, using a border incident as justification, there was somewhat more resolve. Sanctions were initiated, failed miserably and were, by the League of Nations, declared ineffective and removed, nine months after their imposition (Taubenfeld 1958, Walters 1965, Baer 1967). The debate around this failure was more intense than over the inability to initiate sanctions against Japan. The consequences of the nonperformance of the sanctions were far-reaching. It resulted in the demise of the League.

¹ Nicholson 1967.
The second sanctions debate: Sanctions for Decolonisation. The experience of sanctions against Italy did, however, not end sanctions debate, or sanctions policy. The UN Charter retained sanctions, “the economic weapon”, as an option (Taubenfeld & Taubenfeld 1964). In the 1960s a whole set of sanctions were initiated, but mostly by major powers and outside the framework of the UN. The examples are, for instance, sanctions on Cuba and the Dominican Republic (by the USA), on Albania and China (by the USSR), on Portugal, South Africa and Rhodesia (by Afro-Asian states) (Wallensteen 1968). In the 1960s also a vigorous debate ensued on the possibility of UN imposed sanctions on South Africa and Rhodesia (Segal 1964, Leiss 1965, Taubenfeld & Taubenfeld 1964). In none of these cases, however, was the old form of territorial aggression the key issue. Instead, the concern was with regimes and their treatment of their populations, the foreign policies they pursued (notably the alliances the governments were part of) or the threats they may have posed to neighboring countries. The unilateral declaration of independence (UDI) by the Smith regime in Southern Rhodesia in 1965 resulted in the first UN application of mandatory sanctions as a main tool of the world body. The sanctions, first initiated immediately after UDI by the colonial power, Great Britain, then recommended by the UN Security Council became mandatory in 1966 and remained in force until the end of 1979. After the Lancaster House agreement on the future of Rhodesia the sanctions were finally removed. The sanctions on Rhodesia were, by that time, the most comprehensive ones imposed by a world body. Sanctions on South Africa were instituted as well, first in the form of an arms embargo, in the 1980s also in the form of investment restrictions. The second sanctions debate, in other words, was concerned with issues of decolonisation, discrimination, democratic rule and was, as a consequence, very different from the first debate. In fact, the relationship between the two debates was rarely observed in the debate. The sanctions against Italy appeared to belong to an entirely different era and few wanted to point to this as a relevant experience. Obviously the sanctions issue under the League were different with respect to the intentions of the initiators, but this does not necessarily mean that the effects on the target were so as well.2

The third sanctions debate: Sanctions and the New Wars. The third debate can be dated to the decision by the UN Security Council to impose sanctions on Iraq. The purpose was to end Iraq’s occupation of Kuwait. The sanctions were set in immediately after the invasion in August, 1990. They remain in force by the time of writing. In a way, this application of sanctions was more parallel to the first debate and its focus on territorial aggression. The Security Council defined Iraq as the country that had broken the peace and, thus, measures under Chapter VII could be taken.3 In effect, Iraq was branded as an aggressor, although this language was avoided. A military build-up followed and a short, intensive war in January and February 1991 resulted in the forceful eviction of Iraqi troops from Kuwait. Sanctions remained in place, however, but now for the purpose of forcing Iraq to agree with the inspection provisions imposed after the Gulf War. As this short description makes clear, sanctions were not the only instrument. In

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2 As is the case in any summary, this is a too sharp conclusion. For instance the Taubenfelds consistently pointed to the Italian experience as did others with a background in international law. The proponents of sanctions, however, seldom made such linkages.

3 It is noteworthy that the concept of “aggression” was not used in the formal documents, although the concept was very much part of the debate (Christer Ahlström Uppsala has pointed this out).
both the first and the second debates, sanctions were seen as the option for achieving desired change, to be kept separate from military action. In the Gulf crisis it was one of the instruments. After the Gulf War pressure was also kept up on Iraq with repeated air raids on Iraqi installations. Following the Gulf War the UN Security Council (Table 1) has initiated ten new cases of economic sanctions, sometimes as the only action, sometimes in combination with other measures. Thus, the debate has had a rich array of cases for discussion (Hufbauer et al 1990, Martin 1992, Cortright & Lopez 1995, Stremlau 1996, Pape 1997, 1998a, 1998b, Baldwin 1998, Elliot 1998 belong to this debate)

This means that the 1990s show a record number of sanctions applications by the United Nations. This is a remarkable, not the least since the experiences of the earlier sanction periods have been mixed, to say the least. This record once again makes sanctions a pertinent topic for research and discussion. The situation is now improved by the fact that there are several more systematic studies on which to base conclusions (Galtung 1967, Wallensteen 1968, 1971, 1983, Doxey 1980, Hufbauer 1990, Martin 1992) and some more penetrating discussions (Baldwin 1985, Pape 1997). To what extent such studies have had an impact on policy making is a different question, however.

A mark of the sanctions of the 1990s, as compared to previous periods, is their link to internal war situations. This is clear-cut in the cases of Somalia, Liberia, Angola, Rwanda, Sierra Leone and FR Yugoslavia (Kosovo). The break-up of former Yugoslavia could be seen as a special case of internal war becoming international. Haiti was a case of pre-empting an internal war by international pressure. Two cases are related to the phenomenon of terrorism (Libya and Sudan). In the first and second sanction debates, such motivations would not have been acceptable. The sanctions on Rhodesia and South Africa, although concerning internal affairs, were internationally legitimate as they connected to the decolonisation process. This process was supported by the two alliances of the Cold War and belonged to the few agreements between these two sides. The sanctions directed against internal rule, such as those against Cuba and Albania, were not accepted in international organizations outside the domination of sanctions-imposing major powers.

The three major sanctions debates not only reflect different concerns but also different expectations. In the 1930s, sanctions were expected to be powerful enough to prevent major powers from unleashing war. The deterring effects turned out to be weak, however, and a similar use of sanctions was not seen after the Second World War. In the 1960s, UN sanctions were part of a decolonisation strategy, a goal that was widely shared. Countries, which “normally” would have rejected interference in internal affairs, had a different perspective on South Africa and Rhodesia. The use of sanctions against a major power, such as the sanctions against Italy, was ruled out by the veto in the Security Council. Consequently, UN sanctions could only be used against smaller countries, in case the permanent members of the Security Council could agree. This was rare and many sanctions were instead imposed outside the framework of the United Nations. The comprehensive US-led strategic embargo on the Soviet Union was initiated already in 1947 but was never legalized through the United Nations (instead a special organization,

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4 Sanctions were actually imposed on People’s Republic of China in the Korean war, but this was possible only through the absence of the Soviet Union at the meeting. In this conflict, furthermore, the armed intervention was the chief instrument.
COCOM, connected to NATO, was used, Adler-Karlsson 1968). The Arab League, and its special Sanctions Bureau in Damascus ran the Arab boycott of Israel. Still other sanctions were administered through superpower dependent organizations such as OAS, CMEA or other regional organizations.

Here there is a difference to the 1990s, when sanctions have been carried out more consistently within the framework of the United Nations. They have been able to build on a broader consensus among the major powers, not only including opposition to territorial aggression and decolonisation, but also to the break-up of states, ethnic division, the rule of legal authority and opposition to terrorism. Thus, more situations have become eligible for UN action. The agenda of the UN has been enlarged, and, in the general search for options, sanctions have again come to the forefront.5

Still, the possibility of acting outside the UN has not been abandoned. There are old and new sanctions outside the UN framework. Table 1 includes some examples. Most notable are the cases of US sanctions on China and Vietnam (ended during the 1990s), Cuba, North Korea and Iran (continued), India and Pakistan (on missile technology, and with international support on nuclear weapons development), sanctions imposed by Greece on Macedonia, African states actions on Burundi and Liberia, EU sanctions on Nigeria (diplomatic links) and some Arab states continued sanctions on Israel. The war between Armenia and Azerbaijan has also resulted in curtailment of economic relations, among the two nations.

It should be noted that most of new sanctions are fairly limited in scope. The sanctions on Rhodesia contained an almost complete ban of export and import. Oil was specifically targeted, as were arms, travel arrangements, air connections, financial operations and diplomatic relations. Table 2 gives a list of comprehensive sanctions where sanctions was the chief instrument of the sender against the target. Only two other UN sanctions have been this comprehensive: the sanctions on former Yugoslavia and Iraq, both in the 1990s. The non-UN sanctions are often even more limited, possibly with the exception of the African embargo on Burundi.

The three sanctions debates are, thus, instructive to compare. We may ask whether there is a cycle in the use of sanctions by global organizations? The sanctions debates have evolved. Perhaps, it is a coincidence or an exaggeration that they appear to come in thirty year cycles. However, it could also be an accurate observation. The experiences may be lost between generations. What was important lessons from the 1930s where not seen as relevant for the generations in power in the 1960s. Equally, the conditions of the 1990s may have appeared to be so different that whatever was learnt from the previous debates no longer appeared relevant. Thus, sanctions were thought to be more effective than before. The constraints of Inter-War or Cold War politics were not longer relevant for the 1990s. So it could legitimately be asked if sanctions could be used in a new way, and with more effect. This also shows that some issues remain the same. The first and foremost is the issue of success. Are sanctions today more successful than they were in the first and second periods? Have conditions for success changed? If so: why, if not: why not? The answers involve the issue of what is meant by success and its measurement, as well as the causal mechanisms.6

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5 The author is presently conducting a study on this theme.
6 The answer to the question why is not clearly responded to in the latest round of the debate, Pape 1998a,b, Elliot 1998.
This study deals with the success and failure of sanctions. After establishing the record in this regard, three clusters of explanations are related to the experiences of the 1990s.7

2. Success and Failure: The Rate of Success Remains Low

Economic sanctions, whether operated within the UN or outside, have never had a high record of success. Studying ten cases where comprehensive trade sanctions were instituted it was found that only two were successful, i.e. where the changes advocated by the sender, the initiator, were also carried out by the receiver, the target country (Wallensteen 1968, 1971, Ninic & Wallensteen 1983). Studying a much larger set of sanctions, with considerable variation in scope and content, success was recorded in one third of the cases (Hufbauer et al 1991). In a recent revaluation of this work it was found that only five percent were actually successful (Pape 1997). In his seminal work of the American strategic embargo on the Soviet block, Adler-Karlsson found that the embargo may have slowed Soviet development half a year, not more (Adler-Karlsson 1968). The historical record is one of caution as to the ability of making sanctions effective.

The definition of success is, of course, crucial and can be part of longer discussion. In military strategy it is often two outcomes that matter: victory or defeat. Thus, success and failure of sanctions could be a parallel: either the sender gets the receiver to change goals as desired by the sender (success) or not (failure). It is possible to make a closer grading of this, particularly if there are many cases to review. Baldwin 1985, 1997 has tried to capture this by introducing a greater variety of impacts and, creatively, wants to replace economic sanctions with the concept of economic statecraft. However, the credibility of the instrument of economic sanctions will depend on its ability to deliver at least some clear results (i.e. changes in behavior) at reasonable costs, within a reasonable time limit and where it is reasonable to conclude that the results are related to the effects of the sanctions. This speaks in favor of a rather sharp and dichotomous definition of sanctions.

This requires some further elaboration. First, economic sanctions have strong dislocating effects on any economy. It could mean that the longer they are in operation, the stronger will this effect be, thus, ultimately resulting in the inability of a state’s economy to operate properly. This is one argument for the continuation of sanctions, for instance, by the USA against Cuba (in operation since 1959, i.e. for 40 years, probably the longest sanction effort to run without any interruption, this century). However, the purpose of sanctions are often more precise and the time limits much shorter. British Prime Minister Harold Wilson in 1965 said that it was a matter of “weeks” before Rhodesia would capitulate. The Rhodesian leader, Ian Smith, did not step down until 14 years later, long after Wilson had left politics. Thus, the expectation that sanctions will be more effective the longer they continue simply is not true. As students of economy could testify, the economy will adapt to the new circumstances, and in fact gradually loses its

7 It should be made clear that this article builds on thorough research of the previous periods of sanctions and that reflections on the 1990s are more intuitive.
dependence on the sender. This is an argument in favor of asking for a definition of sanction success that expect changes in a short period of time.

Second, it is interesting to see that a sender often makes the goals clear at the outset of the sanctions operation. Thus, there is a criterion by which the sanctions can be judged, a criterion that is independent of the economic effects of the sanctions. There are particular reasons why sanctions are imposed, and only when these have been fulfilled will the sanctions be lifted. These reasons are often straightforward. In the case of Cuba, it was the end of the Castro regime that was expected. In other cases the sender demanded, for instance, the access rights for international arms inspections (Iraq), return to democratic rule (Haiti), etc. These are all political demands and specific changes are to be undertaken by the target government. The economic effects, in other words, are means to achieve ends, not ends in themselves. This is often made clear by the sender government, who sometimes even apologizes for the hardships created for the public at large. It is regarded as necessary sacrifice for a higher cause, however. Success is different from the economic dislocation, the dislocations are means to reach the goals. As a second-level defense of economic sanctions governments and observers alike, will often resort to point out to the successful imposition of the sanctions, rather than their ability to accomplish the changes demanded. Thus, meeting the initial goals will be crucial for the judgement of success. If they have been met, to the satisfaction of the initiator then the sanctions are successful. This can be judged by observing statement of the sender government.

Third, relating to the second, if the sanctions have met the goal, it is logical that the sanctions also should be terminated, preferably with some declaration indicating the sender's satisfaction with the outcome. That will also make clear that the sender believes the changes have been induced by the sanctions. Operationally this means that we should look for successful sanctions among those cases where sanctions have ceased. Where they go on, clearly they have not met the conditions for success. If this is an acceptable procedure, we can note that only two of the eleven UN sanctions initiated during the 1990s had been lifted by the end of the decade (i.e. December 31, 1999), where the initiator has stated that the target country changed behavior and where it is possible to argue that a connection between sanctions and the change exists. These are: former Yugoslavia, following the Dayton Accords, and Haiti, following the resignation of the military junta and the reinstatement of the democratically elected government. It would give a success rate close to twenty percent. It is well in line with previous experiences. As mentioned, in the study of ten cases, there was a success-rate at this level, for sanctions that were wider in scope than those imposed during the 1990s. As mentioned, in the Hufbauer et al. study the success was given to be 34 per cent, a comparatively high number. It is safe to conclude, however, that the

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8 There are cases where changes took place, and sanctions were ended, but where the senders did not attribute the changes to the sanctions, notably the ending of African states' sanctions against Portugal after the May 1974 revolution. The revolution set in motion the liberation of the territories of Angola, Guinea(Bissau), Kap Verde islands and Mozambique. Only East Timor saw a different development.

9 One more case may be in the making, if Libya agrees to a trial of the men accused for the Lockerbie bombings.

10 Pape 1997, 1998 argues that is should rather be five percent.
1990s, in this regard, do not show a record of more successful economic sanctions than any previous experience.

Even so there is a need for closer scrutiny. The sanctions on former Yugoslavia (1992-1996) followed a war with Croatia in 1991 and again in 1995, a devastating air campaign and considerable military setbacks for the Belgrade-supported government in Bosnia. The sanctions had economically weakened the regime, and it was in need of access to the international markets, etc. The military efforts certainly also contributed to the country’s general economic crisis. All these elements, most likely, contributed to its agreeing to the Dayton Accords in November 1995. However, we should also note that the agreement did not, as such, pose a threat to the regime in Yugoslavia. The agreements regulated the situation in Bosnia, not elsewhere. In fact, almost the reverse is true: the agreements made the Milosevic regime a partner in peace and reduced the external threats to its survival. The intention of the sanctions were simply to separate Yugoslavia from Bosnia, not to change the regime in Belgrade or affect its behavior in general. There was no connection to a general democratization of Yugoslavia. Nor did the Belgrade regime change its way of operation. By 1998 it was again engaged in a war, in Kosovo, using very similar tactics to those that had been applied in the wars in Bosnia and Croatia. At least, we have to conclude that the effects of the economic sanctions were only one part of the equation explaining Yugoslavia’s acceptance of the Dayton Accords. It is, nevertheless, reasonable to conclude that the sanctions had an impact on the political calculations of the regime’s policy with respect to Bosnia.

Haiti is a more obvious case of success. It reminds of previous removals of juntas and ruling dynasties in the Caribbean. One successful case of sanctions reported earlier is the US-led embargo on the Dominican Republic in 1960-62, ending the Trujillo regime (Wallensteen 1968, 1971). The overwhelming power of the US has often prevailed. In this case, the threat of an imminent US invasion, as well as persuasion of a US delegation, led by former President Carter, contributed to the peaceful ending of the situation.

As mentioned above, very few of the new UN sanctions have been comprehensive. They have often included a limited range of goods. Most comparable to sanctions on Rhodesia are the cases of Yugoslavia and Iraq. In both the latter cases, the effects are influenced by the target’s involvement in war, or, in the case of Iraq, the experience of repeated air attacks. Either way, the same regimes remained in power, and their modus operandi did not change under the impact of the sanctions and other international pressure.

It could legitimately be argued that the success of sanctions should not only be understood in the submission of the target nation to the wishes of the sender. Sanctions might also be important for other reasons (Baldwin 1985). They show that the international community takes certain norms seriously, such as democratic government (i.e. sanctions against military coups, see Haiti), fight against terrorism (i.e. sanctions against countries suspected to harbor terrorists, see Libya, Sudan). Also, the resort to arms is such a norm, and the invasion of Kuwait fits that pattern. It is more debatable if there are such international norms prohibiting the internal uses of force by governments or rebels, as the cases of sanctions against Somalia, Liberia, Sierra Leone, Angola, Rwanda and FR Yugoslavia (Kosovo) would suggest. In all these cases, arms exports were prohibited to the country as a whole, or to certain actors. There are also situations of
indiscriminate use of weapons and force against civilians. As genocide is an international norm, sanctions could be related to this in the case of Rwanda. Thus, it appears fruitful to relate some sanctions to a wish to maintain or develop particular norms in the international community. As there are more such references in the sanctions debates and practice in the 1990s, there could today be a broader consensus on such international norms than previously. This would explain the more frequent use of sanctions by global organizations. It might not make sanctions more successful, however, if such norms are seen to be repeatedly violated even after the use of sanctions.

An alternative interpretation is that sanctions are expected to reduce fighting and lead to the support of particular peace-making efforts. In the case of Angola, there was a peace agreement to uphold. In the cases of Liberia and Sierra Leone, such efforts were emerging. Most notable is that there are five such situations in the continent of Africa. With the use of sanctions, the international community could show its concern for the situation and its commitment not to make the situations worse. It also says that it could not find other ways of dealing with the internal wars. This illustrates that the norm-promoting aspect of sanctions is not easily interpreted. Which norms are actually intended to be promoted and what is the effect to be expected? Success would have to be judged in the ability of sanctions to deter repetitions of norm-breaking. On this score, there is little evidence of success. What happened in one part of Africa or even in a neighboring country did not deter leaders in other parts, such as in Liberia or Sierra Leone from pursuing their goals. Arms embargoes had little deterring effect. In the end, the credibility of any sanction will depend on the success in the more narrow sense. The conclusion is that only if the instrumental application, to arrive at the requested change in the target’s behavior, has a good track-record will sanctions work as a deterrent for other actors and become a credible demonstration of international commitment.

The arms embargo and the pressure on Yugoslavia in the Kosovo crisis relates to another and more recent norm change: the ambition to act early in conflict. The scenarios triggering Western action in this conflict are obvious. They all involved the danger of a conflict spreading from Kosovo into Albania (which remained tense since the 1997 crisis), Macedonia (which had a preventive deployment already), and from there on to Greece (with which Macedonia had a serious conflict recently) and connecting to the protracted Turkish-Greek confrontation. The Kosovo conflict had not reached the magnitude of other conflicts, but the requirements of preventive diplomacy seems to spur the actions of Western countries in the war that began in 1998. Sanctions were a part of the measures, but not a strong element.

Thus, it is clear that in the 1990s the world as arrived at a situation where the UN sanctions have not become more effective, although they have been put to a wider use for a wider set of purposes. Looking at the cases outside the UN framework, we have to draw the same conclusion. The US sanctions during the 1990s against North Korea, Iran, China, India and Pakistan do not seem to have changed the behavior of these states or their leaders in the direction demanded. The EU diplomatic action against Nigeria did not result in changes. In this case, however, a new leader took over in 1998 displaying a different attitude to democratization. Here it can legitimately be asked if this can be attributed to the sanctions policy or, at least, if there is an important combination effect?
Against this background we see that sanctions rarely bring about the dramatic shifts in policy demanded by the sender.\textsuperscript{11} As already made clear, this does not exclude the fact that economic sanctions have economic effects and, thus, become serious concerns for leaders. The leaders have to handle difficult problems, and sometimes have gained considerable experience in dealing with difficult situations. All the cases of UN sanctions during the 1990s have been directed against authoritarian or totalitarian regimes, which can command the country’s resources almost without opposition in dealing with the effects. In addition they are able to hide the sender’s purposes in imposing the sanctions. Certainly, the leaders desire a situation where the sanctions are lifted, but that is not the same as stating that the sanctions have the political effects intended. Often the demands from outside mean that a regime will have to step down or that it has to abandon a central element of its internal or international policy. Such shifts are more difficult to contemplate, and the economic costs to the country may appear, to the leaders, as smaller than the changes in a central policy concern would be. The trade-off too often speaks in favor of defiance.

The continued low rate of success needs a pause for reflection. The sanctions debate has, in the 1990s been able to learn a little more from systematic research than previous debates. However, the record of the actual application of this knowledge at the moment of decision-making appears equally poor. This is notable, as the record of failure in sanctions could most effectively be rectified if the policy-maker’s selection of cases for sanction use was done so as to ensure success. This would mean that sanctions would not be used as often. Also it would be discovered that they might be more successful at targets against which they are not at all used today. If such a perspective gained ground, the use of sanctions would not be different from the application of any other instrument: the chances of success and failure should be assessed before the strategy is being used. It would improve the reputation of the sanctions and it would give the world an effective non-violent instrument.

3. Sender Perspectives

Throughout their modern use, sanctions have been tied to international organizations. They have remained part of the statues of leading organs. During the Cold War, however, it appears that more sanctions were applied outside such frameworks, while in the 1990s they are clearly more frequent inside international organizations. By their very nature, sanctions will require international support, as their technique is to reduce availability of external goods to a particular country and its regime. Thus, bilateral sanctions will seldom be effective in achieving such the necessary isolation.

The significance of major powers in making sanctions is evident also in the 1990s: the USA, UK and France have been important in bringing about sanctions on Yugoslavia (two instances), Iraq and Haiti. There are still examples of smaller countries inflicting sanctions on other small countries, notably the African states on Burundi. The

\textsuperscript{11} There is a slight shift in the argumentation pointing to the role of sanctions in a package of measures. The contribution of sanctions specifically is then even more difficult to entangle, but the trend is interesting, see Elliot 1998.
fact that major powers lead sanctions do not in itself explain whether sanctions will succeed or not, however. Perhaps it is fairer to say that sanctions imposed by major powers will receive more attention than those carried out by other actors. Media coverage is not related to success, however.

The role of media in the 1990s appear more complex than in previous periods. In particular the ability of media to release support for humanitarian concerns has become a new factor. There was such concern behind the sanctions on South Africa and Rhodesia, but this cannot be compared to the remarkable coverage of Somalia or the international interest in the humanitarian effects of sanctions in Iraq.

The media interest suggests a continuous shift in sanctions motives. In the 1930s the debate was focused on the action of states, in particular major states, and their aggressive actions. In the 1960s debate, and actions, had a broader concern, but dealt with conflicts such as white-black, colonialism-liberation, racism-democracy, i.e. an aggregate level. In the 1990s, however, the individual suffering of women and children have become apparent. The tendency is one of increasingly reducing the sphere of state sovereignty and replacing it with a concern for the human beings. The repressive nature of Italy’s Fascist regime was part of the consideration, but the major power relations did pay less regard to this. The repression of South Africa and Rhodesia’s minority regimes was important. In the internal wars of the 1990s the motives of the different parties appeared secondary to the sufferings inflicted.

In the earlier debates, there was an important left-right distinction. Sanctions on Italy, South Africa and Rhodesia were more likely to be supported by the left than by the right in the Western political spectrum. In the 1990s the patterns have been more complex. Sanctions on Iraq was seen as adequate a reaction by the left, but not by the right. In the crisis over Yugoslavia the left-right continuum was blurred, as was the case in Somalia and other African cases. In internal political affairs, left-right considerations have not ceased to be important, but as a guide to international actions they have become less useful. The issues of states, nationality and territory was more difficult to fit with the established pattern. There might today be a tendency of the right to be more in favor of sanctions than for the left: sanctions on Yugoslavia had strong support from conservative regimes in Western Europe, as did sanctions on Libya and Sudan (views of the terrorism issue may follow a left-right continuum). In several of these cases, the “left” may not have been able to suggest a more coherent alternative strategy.

Were there new internal political constellations that made sanctions an attractive alternative to leaders in the Western countries? In an innovative analysis, Hoffman suggested that sanctions were pursued in order to handle domestic cleavages. If this is applied in particular to leading countries, it makes sense, as Hoffman shows with the cases of Italy and Rhodesia (Hoffman 1968, Wallensteen 1971). The use of military actions against Yugoslavia or the Serb Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina was not convincing to leaders and public in Western Europe. The suffering of the populations in Bosnia was apparent, however. The use of peace-keeping troops were seen as a way to protect international humanitarian relief efforts. Sanctions also gained support as a way of reducing fighting. It was possible for leaders in Western countries to show concern, maintain parliamentary and popular support and not take risks. Unfortunately, it all had little impact on course of the conflict. Thus, domestic politics may have played an important role in the choice of the strategy. In the sanctions debate, the realization that
sanctions are made with a close eye to the national political science has seldom gained a prominent role, however. It is not difficult to realize that leaders are more concerned about ruling their own country than one far away, where there are no votes to be gained. There were some changes during the 1990s in motives but as before, the explanations for success and failure are to be located elsewhere. Major powers or international organizations are not more successful today than they were before.

4. Target Perspectives

Smart sanctions
Much of the focus in the three debates is on the sender, the initiator, of sanctions. The motives are of course important: which goals are to be accomplished and why are sanctions used for this. However, the question of success and failure is more determined by the effects in the recipient country, the target, which receives the economic onslaught that economic sanctions constitute. The ability of targeted economies to adapt to the new circumstances still tends to be underestimated in the debate. The question of failures of sanctions, thus, reverts to the sender: which groups are, actually, the targets of the sanctions? Here some interesting changes can be observed in the debate as well as in practice. Not only is it true that the targets have shifted from aggressive actors in international affairs to internally repressive actors. Now there are also targets inside countries.

The following are some examples. The Security Council actions on Angola have included the targeting of one particular actor, UNITA, as the party not following the internationally recognized agreements (decisions were taken in 1993, 1997 and 1998). The sanctions were targeted on oil and arms deliveries to Unita, then came to include the travel and funds for Unita officials and their families. In 1998 it also included freezing of funds and trade with diamonds. In the sanctions on former Yugoslavia instituted after the onset of the war in Bosnia in 1992, specific sanctions were imposed on Bosnian Serb areas in 1994. The case of Haiti not only included oil and arms, but the sanctions also aimed at junta members directly, and included the freezing of their bank accounts. In this case, the sanctions were also turned on and off: They were imposed first in June 1993 and were suspended in August the same year, as events were seen to be favorable. However, by October 1993 they were reinstituted and by May 1994 included further categories. In this way, the Haiti case is one of fine-tuning sanctions as well as applying them instrumentally as punishments and rewards for “bad and good behavior” of the junta. A new way of doing the same is to impose sanctions, and then exclude the Government the Security Council wants to support. This has been done against Rwanda (arms embargo imposed 1994, government of Rwanda excluded in 1995), and Sierra Leone (oil and arms embargo 1997, ECOWAS excluded and since 1998 also the Government. In this case, the entry of members of RUF is specifically mentioned). These sanctions operate on a level of interference in internal affairs which was unheard of in the previous debates and in the traditional experiences of the UN system. Thoughts of “smarter sanctions” are parallel to
the development of smart weapons: more precision, less collateral damage, and thus more efficacy.\footnote{The concept of “smart sanctions” was used in the conference in London, December 1998. The word captures well the new intentions in the modern sanctions debate.}

There is even a paradox. Whereas such smarter sanctions earlier would have been seen as too soft, they have now been seen as the most hard-hitting. Humanitarian concerns have clearly had an effect in the debate. Most closely this has to do with the reported effects of sanctions on Iraq (see more below).\footnote{Pape, who argues very strongly against sanctions, claims that the sanctions on Iraq has inflicted “incredible human costs (including the deaths of more than 500 000 children)”, Pape 1998, p 197. Paradoxically, if the numbers were to be true the sanctions must be economically very efficient.} These concerns are new developments and have considerable attraction. The use of smart sanctions would be ideal. These would include travel restrictions for particular persons and their families, visa requirements, preventing sale of tickets, loss of diplomatic immunity for certain officials, prevention of monetary transactions for particular individuals, withdrawal of scholarships for family members, prevention of normal medical treatment for identified persons, etc. The list of possible sanctions can be made longer.

Politically, smart sanctions assume that the leaders can be separated from their populations in a simple way. It may have been possible in the case of Haiti, where the members of the military junta were identifiable. The same may have been true for the sanctions against the Dominican Republic thirty year earlier, where the Trujillo family was well-known. In these cases the rulers built on a legitimacy which separated them from the rest of the population. In other cases, however, regime leaders may be seen as representatives of entire groups (Smith of the Whites in Rhodesia, Milosevic for the Serb nationalist parties), etc. Sanctions are not only there to remove a particular leader, which smart sanctions seem to imply, but to change the thinking of an entire social group. Otherwise a consequence may be that identified leaders that are undermined by new sanctions are replaceable by others, even “harder”, representatives of the group in question. The utility of smart sanctions requires a closer analysis of the target country and the strength of the representatives of the incumbent regime.

It should also be observed that the “smart” approach only functions if the leaders are dependent on international relations. Historically, it can be seen that financial operators are those that are most immediately hit by international sanctions. Thus, if traders, investors, and other commercial interests control the powers of a society, they are likely to be vulnerable to sanctions. They have strong interest in accommodation with the wishes of the sender. The prohibition of travel documents, flight connections as well as financial movements are “smart” sanctions in this case. However, what is to be done in case the regime shows little interest in such operations and is not sensitive to disruption in international relations?

In the case of Rhodesia, the group most directly affected by the sanctions where those that were most dependent on and loyal to Britain. The unilateral declaration of independence (UDI) was made by other whites that sustained themselves on agriculture and thus were less dependent on international commerce. The sanctions had the effect that in a short time, the liberal whites were forced to leave the country or find means of living which meant that they contributed to the defense against the sanctions. It is likely that the same has happened with sanctions on Iraq, Sudan and Libya. Furthermore, these
countries have enough of resources and regional connections to maintain their economies without facing mass starvation. The example of Haiti tells us that in cases of close dependence, sanctions are likely to have more devastating effects, than in other contexts. It appears that neither Saddam Hussein, Colonel Khadaffi nor General Bashir are interested in visiting Western countries or depend for their political survival on the links with these countries. The opposite is actually true: they are sustaining themselves in power partly on the fact that they are anti-Western. The sanctions, paradoxically, serve their political purpose! Their opposition to the West is made more visible to the public.

The bank account sanctions also require a high integration into the international economy. Such sanctions have been instituted on Libya, Unita in Angola, and Haiti. They are likely to be effective on very corrupt regimes, which constitute a part of the international economy, have resources that are attractive to the outside world and thus, are sensitive to disruptions in financial flows. Such sanctions may be more effective against a Zaire under Mobutu, or an Indonesia under Suharto. They might in fact be so effective that a discrete threat may be sufficient for them to submit to external demands.

Smart sanctions have to face a special challenge. It becomes a way of singling out individuals. They will have vested interests of their own in the outcomes. Thus, settlements of sanctions situations might include a factor of personal fear that has not been the case before- The leaders will ask themselves ‘will the sanctions against me actually cease or will I face renewed troubles?’ Whether such fears help to bring out a readiness to agree or rather results in increased defiance needs to be sorted out. As has been observed for the case of the war crimes tribunals, it might provide an extra incentive for leaders not to submit to the opponent. Such sanctions do open up new possibilities and would be interesting to explore further.

Comprehensive Sanctions
Among the new, comprehensive sanctions former Yugoslavia is an interesting case. The economy of the different Yugoslav republics were interlinked and the violent break-up also meant that the economies of the new units were grinding to a halt. The war efforts added to this. The sanctions contributed to reduce the economic dynamics. In stead a culture of smuggling emerged, and maffiotic networks were created throughout the neighboring countries.\(^{14}\) The sanctions resulted in a perverse economy, which served to cement the existing regime. FR Yugoslavia has become a center for organized crime operating clandestinely all over Europe. The regime has not been shaken, however. In stead, sanctions have become a part of Serb mythology as propagated by the official media.

The targets of the UN economic sanctions display one consistent pattern: They are all directed against authoritarian regimes or groupings, which rely strongly on the use of police and military for maintaining control. This is an important observation affecting the outcome of sanctions, particularly in the case of comprehensive sanctions. The regimes have often had power instruments under their control already before the sanctions were imposed. This means that they have been able to project their view of the issues of

\(^{14}\) In Albania this resulted in an artificial “economic growth” and the ending of the sanctions by 1996 resulted in a complete economic collapse in 1997, leading to a Western peace operation to help stabilize the country. By 1998 Albania had become a supporter of the Kosovar Albanian uprising against FR Yugoslavia.
contention and the reasons from sanctions. The complaints by the initiators of sanctions has been a consistent one: the targets do not understand why the sanctions are imposed. The ability of the target to see themselves as victims is not surprising and should be expected. Authoritarian regimes are likely to be able to fight sanctions with whatever means at their disposal, including their control over media. Thus, we find in all cases of sanctions smuggling, shady deals, strange transaction, shipments that have gone “astray”, falsification of documents, etc

Still, economic sanctions do have economic effects. Governments often will admit that and may, in many occasions, blame more on sanctions than is warranted. The sanctions may provide a convenient scapegoat for mismanagement or incompetence on the part of the target government. Sanctions can also stimulate economic investment in areas, which earlier have been imported. In such cases the sanctions actually functions as tariffs, with the advantage of being imposed from the outside.

Clearly, a new element in the sanctions debate is the question of humanitarian effects of sanctions. This has been given particular significance in the case of sanctions against Iraq. It is surprising that the same has not aspect has received prominence in the sanctions against former Yugoslavia. The basis for the claim of the particular humanitarian effects of the sanctions against Iraq is the article in the medical report published in Lancet 1995. The calculations made by FAO on the basis of this study suggested that up to 560 000 Iraqi children may have died as result of UN economic sanctions. However, few observers seem to have taken note of the subsequent letter to the editor by one of the authors, reporting that the results from the 1995 survey could not be verified in follow-ups for 1996 and 1997. Clearly, the death-rates of children were much lower and consequently the effects of sanctions less dramatic, to the extent there is a direct link between the sanctions and the suffering.

The humanitarian concern is new. There were reports suggesting that sanctions on South Africa would in fact hurt the black African population more, but these were often dismissed as part of South African propaganda. In the case of Iraq, which is not likely to meet human standards of honesty, the impact discussion has been different. It is interesting to ask why.

There are two plausible explanations, which both do not exclude each other. The first is that in general, humanitarian concern has become greater. The reactions to many of the crises facing the world in the post-Cold War period has had a humanitarian root. The conflicts have been seen primarily as humanitarian disasters, and thus prompted humanitarian support. It is a sign of the times that the UN created a Department of Humanitarian Affairs only in 1992, following a General Assembly resolution in 1991. The interventions in the wars in Bosnia and Somali were undertaken as ways of protecting humanitarian deliveries. In the Cold War period, humanitarian concerns were, in the dominant discourse, made dependent on whether it benefited one or the other side

\[15\] Galtung 1967 is the first analysis of the dynamic effects of sanctions on the target country and it remains valid not only as a study of Rhodesia but of sanctions in general.

\[16\] This was an important finding in Wallensteen 1968, 1971, 1983 and was seen in a number of the cases of comprehensive sanctions (listed in Table 2).


\[18\] Zaidi 1997, I am grateful to Johan von Schreeb for this reference. For arguments pointing to the inadequacy of the Iraqi government in making sure humanitarian assistance reaches the needy, see Stremlau, p 44-45.
in the Cold War. Wars since the early 1990s may be seen more realistically as the human suffering they actually always have been.

The second explanation is that the sanctions on South Africa and Rhodesia had strong support from the opposition movements. Solidarity groups carried the sanctions efforts in the opinion, particularly in the West. The opposition in these countries expected to benefit from the weakening of the regime that the sanctions were expected to inflict. It was part of a strategy to bring down the government. In the case of Iraq, the opposition groups have had little role in forming Western public opinion. They may not even have had influence on Western decision-makers’ policy. Their popular support in Iraq is debatable. Clearly, they are not the source of alternative information or alternative interpretations. They are not the ones to explain whether the suffering of the Iraqis is going to result in a political change or not. This is to suggest that sanctions requires an opposition for success. This can be seen as a causal mechanism for sanctions success: the double grip.

The “Double Grip”
A key finding for success of sanctions is what could be termed the double grip theory. The economic sanctions will create political problems for the incumbent government in the target country. It will use the instruments available to maintain itself in power. If there is a strong opposition, which is in agreement with the externally imposed sanctions, it can use this situation in order to bring pressure from inside on the government. The government will, thus, face a two-way struggle: to reduce the sanctions from abroad and to handle the opposition at home. If the sanctions are maintained and the opposition is acting internally, the government will find itself squeezed from two sides, a double grip. This may explain why sanctions succeed in some instances to bring down a government. This was the pressure that operated on the Dominican Republic in the early 1960s. It was also the situation in which the apartheid regime found itself in the late 1980s (its lack of military success added to this). It can be debated if the same arguments also apply in other instances of (limited) sanction successes. The Milosevic regime may have been under more domestic pressure in 1995 than is readily admitted. The large mobilization against the government a year later (against the fraudulent elections, 1996-97) suggests this. In the case of Haiti, there was considerable public discontent with the military junta and it must have realized that it had little staying power in face of continued sanctions or a military invasion. Let us return to this theme shortly.

4. International System Perspectives

Major Powers and Sanctions
The reactions of the international community is obviously important for the success of sanctions. The political and economic isolation of the target country is a prerequisite for the chances of success. This is a reason why international organizations are used for

19 Sellström 1999 shows this for the case of Sweden.
20 Wallensteen 1968, 1971, 1983, but this term has not been used before.
sanctions, as this will generate more international support for the sender and more isolation for the target. Most important are the reactions among major powers and the target's neighbors.

The most obvious change between the three sanctions debates is the difference in the major power configurations. This is captured by the commonly used labels: “Inter-War”, “Cold War” and “post-Cold War” periods. The world has move from a system of 5-6 major powers via bipolarization to the present situation with one superpower. The sanctions against Italy were abandoned as several major powers were not supportive (in particular USA, Germany). In the period of the second debate, sanctions were mostly made outside the UN framework and became often part of the Cold War dynamics. The two UN imposed sanctions in this period had significant support of major powers. Even that proved not sufficient to achieve the isolation desired by the sanctions initiators.

It is noteworthy that in the third debate, the isolation issue has not been as prominent. In stead impatience with the sanctions record has resulted in a strategic discussion about military action. In the cases of Iraq and Sudan such measures were actually taken. The bombings were repeated against Iraq, a peak being the heavy bombardments in December 1998. The actions were done outside the framework of the United Nations. This is, first of all, a clear indication that the sanctions have not achieved the desired goals, second, that the UN is increasingly seen as an obstacle for US policy. The sanctions against Sudan were in 1998 supplemented with the bombings in Khartoum, following the attacks on the US embassies in Dar-es-Salaam and Nairobi. Already before this the US was supporting a military strategy against the Sudan. The various movements resisting the National Islamic Front regime in Khartoum were brought together in a broad alliance. A new military front was opened in 1997. The military actions have so far not brought about the desired changes.

Military action was in 1998 repeatedly threatened against Yugoslavia, in connection with the Kosovo conflict. In this case, the US acted in concert with leading allies of NATO. The option of renewed sanctions, apart from the arms embargo imposed in 1998, against Yugoslavia seemed to be less important, perhaps indicating a dissatisfaction with their impact in the previous period.

In the case of Haiti, a military invasion was very close when the military junta agreed to step down. In some of the remaining cases, the threat of military action has been less important or non-existent (Angola, Liberia, Somalia, Rwanda, Sierra Leone, perhaps Libya).

The threat of escalating sanctions into military action by major powers is a new feature in the debate. It can be linked to the changed international scene. In the Cold War years, there was always a danger of military measures bringing a conflict into the Cold War followed by nuclear escalation. In some instances, military actions were taken (e.g. Czechoslovakia, Afghanistan, Granada, Panama) without considerations of sanctions. In these cases the danger of escalation was low as the interventions occurred in areas part of the “sphere of interest” of either side. In the post-Cold War period there are less constraints of this sort. The military interventionary option gains ground. For the future this might be a more ominous development. If a relatively peaceful option, such as sanctions, are seen as unsuccessful, the temptation for military action may increase as the “only alternative” available.
Neighbors and Sanctions
Isolation with the help of other major powers is not the only international system aspect of sanctions. A consistent concern in the sanctions debate has been the significance of neighboring countries. In the case of Italy, neighbors such as Switzerland were neutral, which meant that trade could continue as before. Other neighbors suffered considerably when trying to follow the sanctions. In the case of Rhodesia the trade could continue through South Africa and Portuguese controlled territories. A neighbor faithful to the sanctions was Zambia, thus being exposed to severe economic strains and receiving little understanding internationally. In the cases of the 1990s the lack of cooperation of neighbors such as Iran in the case of Iraq, or many of the weak neighbors around Yugoslavia, has been important for breaking the sanctions. The issue is a consistent one and no ways of carrying the sanctions to a complete implementation have been devised.21

All cases, whether successful or not, point to the difficulties in isolating a particular country or, even more so, a part of a country. The target regime will have strong incentives in evading the sanctions and will use available resources to make a flow of crucial goods coming through, be it oil, spare parts for military equipment, machinery or other important items. It can build on the fact that no government is strong enough, and, government control over the economic is globally receding. It can also take advantage of an increasingly globalized world where the market is more supreme than ever and purchasing power matters more than political affiliations. Isolation strategies are likely to become even more difficult for the future.

Isolation, Opposition and the Double Grip
How, then, can sanctions at all be successful? The theory of double grip points to the need for political isolation. There has to be a certain economic effect, but not having political allies in the international system may be more important for a regime. Such allies can be instrumental in providing particular implements. But they may be most important in bolstering the will to fight back. The Iraqi regime has not been that isolated. On the contrary, the highly publicized actions against Iraq has consistently generated support for Iraq throughout the Arab world, although not among other Arab regimes. This may have helped the regime’s morale. The same is not true for the Serb nationalist regime in Belgrade. It has found little appeal globally outside Serb nationalist circles. Russia has acquired a political significance for Belgrade beyond its economic or military role in the world. Thus, Milosevic has been more willing to adapt Yugoslavia's policies if this has been a request from Russia. It would probably be able to withstand sanctions longer, but not without that crucial support. It appears safe to conclude that Russia’s policies may have been more important in making Yugoslavia obey to the Dayton Accords or in coming to the negotiations in Rambouillet on Kosovo. The internal weaknesses combined with the strength of international political isolation is what provides the success of the sanctions, i.e. the regime in the target country is exposed to a double grip.

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21 An interesting surveillance scheme was instituted for the sanctions that were aimed at the Bosnian Serb Republic on the border to Yugoslavia, see Pellnäs.
Organizations and Sanctions
Sanctions policies have been important for organizational identity. Had the sanctions against Italy resulted in the withdrawal of Italian troops from Abessinia in the 1930s it would have been a boost to the organization. In a way: the architects behind the League’s sanctions policy gambled and lost not only the sanctions but the entire international organization. In the second debate, sanctions issues have been important to particular organizations (e.g. CoCom, OAS, OAU, CMEA, The League of Arab States). They served to give them a role. The same is true for the UN sanctions. But it means that the future of such organizations may hinge on the success of sanctions. The sanctions undertaken during the 1990s, if not successful, could affect the legitimacy of the UN. However, the organization has also been involved in other actions, notably a large number of peace keeping operations and peace treaties which probably have a more lasting impact on the credibility of the organization. It is not likely, that the reputation of the UN today only remains with the sanctions issue. It has more diversified functions than did the League of Nations.

It is interesting to see that the sanctions policy, in some cases, served to unite countries which otherwise may have been at loggerheads. There is a tendency for regional organizations to have particular enemies as focal points for internal cohesion. This is clearly in the use of the Arab League and its boycott against Israel. Also a similar significance could be seen in the sanctions against Portuguese colonialism, Southern Rhodesia and South Africa. As decolonisation now is over as a major process, the OAU today is finding a new role as an instrument for conflict resolution in African states. The repeated crises over Bosnia and Kosovo, which both posits NATO countries against the government in Belgrade, may have similar functions in consolidating a new role for NATO in the post-Cold War period. This is particular true if the outcome is a semi-permanent stationing of NATO forces in the Southeast Europe.

5. General Conclusions
UN sanctions are today more often resorted to than before. In the three sanctions debates, those of the 1930s, the 1960s and the present one there are some consistent patterns. There continues to be a preoccupation with the motives of the initiator, but they have less to do with the outcome than the countermeasures of the receiver, the target of the sanctions. A new concern is the one of humanitarian considerations. They did not play much role in previous debates, partly because they were dismissed as important, partly because the sanctions were having less such impacts. It also seems that the humanitarian effects in the sanctions today against Iraq have been exaggerated. Little suggests that sanctions today are more effective than they were before. The conditions for successful sanctions, the double grip, are often lacking and sanctions are brought about less as an effective, non-violent tool for the solution of a problem. More often the choice of sanction is conditioned by a need to appear “taking action”, particularly in the domestic audience. The continued globalization makes it less likely that sanctions will become more successful in the future. Reduced control of governments means it will be more difficult to enforce sanctions and the increasingly unfettered markets will provide more
opportunities for sanction breakers. The interest in smart sanctions is one way out of the present sanctions dilemma. However, smart sanctions may in fact tilt the use of sanctions even more to become an instrument only of rich actors against poor ones. Already, there is a tendency for sanctions to be one instrument – among many – for major powers. In a world of only one superpower, it becomes an instrument to be used with others, in a huge arsenal. Thus, it remains important to insist that sanctions are carried out through the framework of the United Nations to keep them as a less frequently used, better targeted and more legitimate measure for the world community. A more optimistic, but long term approach, is to support the development of a global civil society consisting of NGOs, action groups and transnational linkages, thus building up internal peaceful opposition in potential problem-countries. This would enable earlier reaction to threatening developments, create channels for communication in crisis, and be resources in post-crisis developments. In this way the sanction debate of this century might find inputs for a fresher start.
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### Table 1

**Economic Sanctions in the 1990s (up to end of 1999)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Imposed by</th>
<th>Target Country</th>
<th>Economic Measures</th>
<th>Began</th>
<th>Ended</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>UN</td>
<td>South Africa</td>
<td>Arms</td>
<td>1977</td>
<td>1994</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UN</td>
<td>Iraq</td>
<td>Oil, arms, air, travel</td>
<td>1990</td>
<td>Ongoing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UN</td>
<td>Former Yugoslavia</td>
<td>Trade, air, (including Bosnian Serb Republic, spec, 1994)</td>
<td>1991</td>
<td>1996</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UN</td>
<td>Libya</td>
<td>Arms, travel</td>
<td>1992</td>
<td>Ongoing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UN</td>
<td>Somalia</td>
<td>Arms</td>
<td>1992</td>
<td>Ongoing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UN</td>
<td>Liberia</td>
<td>Arms</td>
<td>1992</td>
<td>Ongoing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UN</td>
<td>Angola</td>
<td>Oil, arms, travel</td>
<td>1993</td>
<td>Ongoing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UN</td>
<td>Haiti</td>
<td>Trade, arms, finance</td>
<td>1993</td>
<td>1994</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UN</td>
<td>Rwanda</td>
<td>Arms</td>
<td>1994</td>
<td>Ongoing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UN</td>
<td>Sudan</td>
<td>Diplomacy, air</td>
<td>1996</td>
<td>Ongoing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UN</td>
<td>Sierra Leone</td>
<td>Oil, arms (Excl Govt since 1998, RUF spec)</td>
<td>1997</td>
<td>Ongoing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UN</td>
<td>FR Yugoslavia</td>
<td>Arms</td>
<td>1998</td>
<td>Ongoing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EU</td>
<td>Nigeria</td>
<td>Diplomacy</td>
<td>1995</td>
<td>1998</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USA</td>
<td>Cuba</td>
<td>Trade</td>
<td>1959</td>
<td>Ongoing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USA</td>
<td>Vietnam</td>
<td>Trade</td>
<td>1975</td>
<td>1994</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USA</td>
<td>Sudan</td>
<td>Trade</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USA</td>
<td>Iran</td>
<td>Trade, diplomacy</td>
<td>1979</td>
<td>Ongoing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USA</td>
<td>China</td>
<td>Trade areas</td>
<td>1989</td>
<td>1998</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USA/others</td>
<td>India</td>
<td>Missiles Technology</td>
<td>1998</td>
<td>Ongoing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USA/others</td>
<td>Pakistan</td>
<td>Missiles Technology</td>
<td>1998</td>
<td>Ongoing</td>
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<tr>
<td>USA/others</td>
<td>Korea, North</td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Greece</td>
<td>FYRoMacedonia</td>
<td>Transport</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arab States</td>
<td>Israel</td>
<td>Trade</td>
<td>1945</td>
<td>Ongoing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>African States</td>
<td>Burundi</td>
<td>Trade</td>
<td>1996</td>
<td>Ongoing</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Sanctions in italics are those that might correspond to the definition of comprehensive sanctions, as applied in Table 2. There are also a number of sanctions type of actions pursued by parties in violent conflict, for instance, in the conflicts over Cyprus, Nagorno Karabach and Somaliland.
**Table 2**  
*Ten comprehensive economic sanctions, 1932-1966*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Sanction</th>
<th>Start</th>
<th>End</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>UK</td>
<td>USSR</td>
<td>Trade</td>
<td>1933 1933</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>League of Nations</td>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>Trade</td>
<td>1935 1936</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arab States</td>
<td>Israel</td>
<td>Trade</td>
<td>1945 Ongoing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USSR</td>
<td>Yugoslavia</td>
<td>Trade</td>
<td>1948 1955</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>African States</td>
<td>South Africa</td>
<td>Trade</td>
<td>1960 1994</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(UN)</td>
<td>Albania</td>
<td>Arms</td>
<td>1960 Ongoing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USA</td>
<td>Dominican Republic</td>
<td>Trade</td>
<td>1960 1962</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USA</td>
<td>Cuba</td>
<td>Trade</td>
<td>1960 Ongoing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USSR</td>
<td>Albania</td>
<td>Trade</td>
<td>1960</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>African States</td>
<td>Portugal</td>
<td>Trade</td>
<td>1963 1975</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UN</td>
<td>Rhodesia</td>
<td>Trade</td>
<td>1965 1979</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Note: This builds on Wallensteen 1968, 1971, 1983.*