International Relations Theory II

PS 243B, Winter 2002

Meets Tuesdays 3:15-5:45 in Building 50, Room 51B

http://www.stanford.edu/class/polisci243b

Professor Michael Tomz

Department of Political Science

Office: Encina West Room 310

Mailbox: Encina West Room 417

Phone: 725-4031, email: tomz@stanford.edu

Office Hours: Mon, 2:30-4:00

PS 243B is the second of a three-quarter graduate-level sequence in international relations theory. The primary audience is political science graduate students intending to take the qualifying exam and/or write a field paper in IR. Advanced undergraduates and Master’s students with adequate preparation may take the course with permission from the instructor.

The course sequence PS 243A-C has three main objectives:

• To give students a brief introduction to the very large literature on international relations, with a view to helping them prepare for the synthesis and analysis they will be required to carry out in the IR field exam.
• To introduce students to a variety of frontier research problems that animate current work in the field, so they can see and evaluate examples of how empirical research is actually conducted rather than just commenting on “the classics” or reading pure theory.
• To help students initiate one or more of their own empirical research projects, and give them practical experience in elaborating a theoretical argument, drawing out testable implications, assembling and analyzing relevant evidence, and presenting the work in stages before colleagues. For some students this may entail producing a first draft of a field paper.

The research-related goals 2 and 3 necessarily constrain the instructors’ ability to provide a thorough survey of IR literature over the three quarters of 243 A, B, and C. We expect that students taking the IR field exam will have read in the literature of IR theory, security studies, and international political economy beyond the specific materials assigned for these classes. To assist with this task the instructors will provide suggestions of recommended “classics” that IR students should most likely be familiar with before taking the exam. We also strongly recommend that students DO NOT take the IR exam in the Spring quarter of the year they take the 243 A-C sequence – wait until the following Fall, to give yourself the opportunity to read, think, and assimilate over the Summer.

PS 243A focused on general theories of international relations, research topics in international security, and basic research methods. 243 B continues with a few more international security topics but focuses more on questions of international political economy.

Course Requirements:

· Research proposals. Three times during the quarter, you must submit a research proposal that contains a clear and succinct statement of a theoretical argument on an important question that you extract from the literature or develop yourself, and a discussion of how you would assess the empirical validity of the argument. Indicate how you would measure your key dependent and independent variables, obtain a sample of cases, and use the data to test your argument. Research proposals should be short: around 5 double-spaced pages and in no case longer than 7 pages. Proposals are due in my physical or electronic mailbox at 4 p.m. on the following Fridays: February 1, February 22, and March 15. Each proposal is worth 25% of your final grade.

• Class participation. I have tried to keep the weekly reading to a manageable load of around six articles per week. Please do the readings in full and on time. Several times during the term, I will ask you to initiate the discussion by sharing your analysis of the readings. Class participation is 25% of your final grade.

• I will not allow incompletes in this class, so please plan accordingly.

Readings: All readings are on the course website and can be viewed with the Adobe Acrobat Reader. You may download and print one copy for academic use.

Sequence of Readings

January 8: Introduction

January 15: Democracy and International Relations

Zeev Maoz and Bruce Russett, “Normative and Structural Causes of the Democratic Peace,” American Political Science Review 87, no. 3 (September 1993): 624-38.

Henry S. Farber and Joanne Gowa, “Polities and Peace,” International Security 20, no. 2 (Autumn 1995): 123-46.

Christopher Lane, "Kant or Cant: The Myth of the Democratic Peace." International Security 19, no. 2 (Autumn 1994): 5-49.

James D. Fearon, “Domestic Political Audiences and the Escalation of International Disputes,” American Political Science Review 88, no. 3 (September 1994): 577-92.

Kenneth A. Schultz, “Do Democratic Institutions Constrain or Inform? Contrasting Two Institutional Perspectives on Democracy and War.” International Organization 53, no. 2 (Spring 1999): 233-66.

Kurt Taylor Gaubatz, “Democratic States and Commitment in International Relations,” International Organization 50, no. 1 (Winter 1996): 109-39.

January 22: Trade Policy – Domestic Influences

James E. Alt and Michael Gilligan, "The Political Economy of Trading States: Factor Specificity, Collective Action Problems, and Domestic Political Institutions," Journal of Political Philosophy 2, no. 2 (1994), 165-192.

Ronald Rogowski, “Political Cleavages and Changing Exposure to International Trade,” American Political Science Review 81, no. 4 (December 1987): 1121-37.

Kenneth Scheve and Matthew Slaughter. 2001. "What Determines Individual Trade-Policy Preferences?" Journal of International Economics 54, no. 2 (August): 267-292.

Edward D. Mansfield, Helen Milner, and B. Peter Rosendorff, “Free to Trade: Democracies, Autocracies, and International Trade,” American Political Science Review 94, no. 2 (June 2000): 305-22.

Michael Bailey, Judith Goldstein, and Barry R. Weingast, "The Institutional Roots of American Trade Policy: Politics, Coalitions, and International Trade," World Politics 49, no. 3 (April 1997): 309-338.

Michael J. Hiscox, "The Magic Bullet? The RTAA, Institutional Reform, and Trade Liberalization," International Organization 53, no. 4 (Autumn 1999), 669-698.

January 29: Trade Policy – International Influences

Joanne Gowa, “Bipolarity, Multipolarity and Free Trade,” American Political Science Review 83 (1989): 1245-56.

Edward D. Mansfield and Helen V. Milner, "The New Wave of Regionalism," International Organization 53, no. 3 (Summer 1999), 589-626.

Robert W. Staiger and Guido Tabellini, “Do GATT Rules Help Governments Make Domestic Commitments?” Economics and Politics 11, no. 2 (July 1999): 109-44.

Paul R. Milgrom, Douglas C. North, and Barry Weingast, “The Role of Institutions in the Revival of Trade: The Law Merchant, Private Judges, and the Champagne Fairs.” Economics and Politics 2, no. 1 (1990): 1-23.

Judith Goldstein and Lisa Martin, “Legalization, Trade Liberalization, and Domestic Politics: A Cautionary Note” International Organization 54, no. 3 (Summer 2000).

Marc L. Busch, “Democracy, Consultation, and the Paneling of Disputes under GATT,” Journal of Conflict Resolution 44, no. 4 (August 2000): 425-46.

* research proposal #1 due on February 1 at 4 p.m.

February 5: Capital Mobility

Maurice Obstfeld and Alan M Taylor, “The Great Depression as a Watershed: International Capital Mobility over the Long Run.” In The Defining Moment, edited by Michael Bordo, Claudia Goldin, and Eugene N. White (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1998): 353-402.

Christopher J. Neely, "An Introduction to Capital Controls," Review – Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis 81, no. 6 (Nov/Dec 1999): 13-30.

John B. Goodman and Louis W. Pauly, "The Obsolescence of Capital Controls? Economic Management in an Age of Global Markets," World Politics 46, no. 1 (October 1993), 50-82.

Beth A. Simmons, “International Law and State Behavior: Commitment and Compliance in International Monetary Affairs,” American Political Science Review 94, no. 4 (December 2000).

William Roberts Clark and Mark Hallerberg, “Mobile Capital, Domestic Institutions, and Electorally Induced Monetary and Fiscal Policy” American Political Science Review 94, no. 2 (June 2000): 323-46.

Layna Mosley, “Room to Move: International Financial Markets and National Welfare States,” International Organization 54, no. 4 (Autumn 2000): 737-73.

February 12: Exchange Rates

J. Lawrence Broz and Jeffry A. Frieden, “The Political Economy of International Monetary Relations,” Annual Review of Political Science 4 (2001): 317-43.

Barry Eichengreen, "The Endogeneity of Exchange-Rate Regimes." In Understanding Interdependence: The Macroeconomics of the Open Economy. Edited by Peter B. Kenen, pp. 3-33 (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1995).

Jeffry Frieden, "Invested Interests: The Politics of National Economic Policies in a World of Global Finance," International Organization 45, no. 4 (Autumn 1991), 425-451.

Beth Simmons, Who Adjusts: Domestic Sources of Foreign Economic Policy During the Interwar Years (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1994), chap. 4.

William Bernhard and David Leblang, “Democratic Institutions and Exchange Rate Commitments.” International Organization 53, 1 (1999): 71-97.

Michael Bordo and Hugh Rockoff, “The Gold Standard as a Good Housekeeping Seal of Approval,” Journal of Economic History 56, no. 3 (l996): 389-428.

February 19: Organizational Approaches to IR (Scott Sagan)

Scott D. Sagan, “The Perils of Proliferation in South Asia,” working paper, Stanford University (July 2001)

Dana P. Eyre and Marc C. Suchman, "Status, Norms, and the Proliferation of Conventional Weapons," in Peter Katzenstein (ed.) The Culture of National Security: Norms and Identity in World Politics (New York: Columbia University Press, 1996): 79-113.

Barry Posen, The Sources of Military Doctrine (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1984): 34-81 and 105-40.

Elizabeth Kier, "Culture and French Military Doctrine Before the World War II," in Peter J. Katzenstein (ed.) The Culture of National Security: Norms and Identity in World Politics (New York: Columbia University Press, 1996): 186-215.

Martha Crenshaw, "Theories of Terrorism: Instrumental and Organizational Approaches," in David C. Rapoport (ed.), Inside Terrorist Organizations (NY: Columbia University Press, 1988): 13-31.

Sun-Ki Chai, "An Organizational Economics Theory of Antigovernment Violence," Comparative Politics 26, no. 1 (October 1993): 99-110.

* research proposal #2 due on February 22 at 4 p.m.

February 26: Sovereign Debt

Barry Eichengreen, “Historical Research on International Lending an Debt,” Journal of Economic Perspectives 5, No. 2. (Spring, 1991), pp. 149-169.

Kenneth A. Schultz and Barry R. Weingast, “Limited Governments, Powerful States,” in Strategic Politicians, Institutions, and Foreign Policy, pp. 15-49. Edited by R. M. Siverson (Ann Arbor, University of Michigan Press, 1998).

Charles Lipson, “Bankers' Dilemmas: Private Cooperation in Rescheduling Sovereign Debts.” World Politics 38, no. 1 (1985): 200-25.

Michael Tomz, “How Do Reputations Form? New and Seasoned Borrowers in International Capital Markets,” Working Paper, Department of Political Science, Stanford University, 2001.

Jeffry A. Frieden, “Winners and Losers in the Latin America Debt Crisis: The Political Implications,” in Debt and Democracy in Latin America, pp. 23-37. Edited by B. Stallings and R. Kaufman. (Boulder: Westview Press, 1989).

Martha Finnemore, “Sovereign Default and Military Intervention,” Working Paper, Department of Political Science, George Washington University, 1996.

March 5: Financial Institutions and Foreign Aid

Dani Rodrik, “Why is there Multilateral Lending?” in Proceedings of the Annual World Bank Conference in Development Economics 1995, edited by Michael Bruno and Boris Bleskovic (Washington, DC: World Bank, 1996): 167-93.

Strom Thacker, “The High Politics of IMF Lending,” World Politics 52 (October 1999): 38-75.

James Raymond Vreeland, “Institutional Determinants of IMF Agreements.” Working Paper, Department of Political Science, Yale University, September 2001.

J. Lawrence Broz, “The Political Economy of International Bailouts: Congressional Voting on Bailout Legislation in the 1990s,” Working Paper,

David Halloran Lumsdaine, Moral Vision in International Politics: The Foreign Aid Regime, 1949-1989. (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1993), chaps 1-2.

Peter J. Schraeder, Steven W. Hook, and Bruce Taylor. “Clarifying the Foreign Aid Puzzle: A Comparison of American, Japanese, French, and Swedish Aid Flows,” World Politics 50, no. 2 (January 1998): 294-323.

March 12: Environment, Human Rights, Immigration

Paul Wapner, “Politics Beyond the State: Environmental Activism and World Civic Politics,” World Politics 47, no. 3 (April 1995): 311-340.

Peter M. Haas, “Banning Chloroflurocarbons: Epistemic Community Efforts to Protect Stratospheric Ozone,” International Organization 46, no. 1 (Winter 1992): 187-224.

David G. Victor, “Enforcing International Law: Implications for an Effective Global Warming Regime,” Duke Environmental Law and Policy Forum 10, no. 1 (Fall 1999): 147-184.

Margaret E. Keck and Kathryn Sikkink, Activists Beyond Borders (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1998), chaps. 1 and 3.

Andrew Moravscik, “The Origins of Human Rights Regimes: Democratic Delegation in Postwar Europe,” International Organization 54, no. 2 (Spring 2000): 217-52.

Kenneth F. Scheve and Matthew J. Slaughter, “Labor Market Competition and Individual Preferences over Immigration Policy,” Review of Economics and Statistics 83, no. 1 (February 2001): 133-45.

* research proposal #3 due on March 15 at 4 p.m.