The Endogeneity of Exchange-Rate Regimes

BARRY EICHENGREEN

The international monetary system has passed through a succession of phases characterized by the dominance of alternatively fixed or flexible exchange rates. Indeed, one of the more remarkable features of the last hundred years of international monetary experience is the regularity with which one regime has superseded another. The quarter century leading up to World War I was the heyday of the classical gold standard, when exchange rates were pegged to gold and to one another over an increasing portion of the industrial and developing world. The war provoked the breakdown of the gold standard and was followed by an interlude of floating rates. Countries returned to gold in the second half of the 1920s, only to see their laboriously constructed fixed-rate system give way to renewed floating in the 1930s. The Bretton Woods Agreement of 1944 inaugurated another quarter century of exchange-rate stability. The next episode of floating began in the early 1970s and now seems to be in the process of being supplanted, mainly in Europe, by a move back toward fixed rates.

How are these repeated shifts between fixed and flexible exchange rates to be understood? Although the literature contains many illuminating studies of particular episodes in the history of the international monetary system (the rise of the gold standard or the breakdown of Bretton Woods, for example), it shows few attempts to develop general explanations for shifts between fixed-

This paper develops further some ideas sketched in an article contributed to a forthcoming festschrift in honor of Luigi De Rosa, edited by Elio D’Auria, Ennio Di Nolfo, and Renato Grispo. It draws on an ongoing collaboration with Beth Simmons of Duke University. I thank Luisa Lambertini, Graham Schindler, David Takaichi, and Pablo Vasquez for research assistance, and Jeffrey Frieden, Stanley Black, and Jacob Frenkel for comments. Financial support was provided by the Center for German and European Studies and the Center for International and Development Economics Research of the University of California at Berkeley. Much of the research for this paper was completed during a visit to the Wissenschaftskolleg zu Berlin, the hospitality and support of which are acknowledged with thanks.

1 Readers dissatisfied by this capsule account will find remarkably few histories of this century of international monetary experience. Yeager (1966) gives a now dated, but still useful, account: Eichengreen (1985) provides a very brief overview that brings the story up to the early 1980s; and Bordo (1993) presents a more recent survey, focusing mainly on the macroeconomic characteristics of these different regimes.
and flexible-rate regimes. Similarly, although the discipline of international economics contains many models of the collapse of fixed-rate regimes and of the transition from floating to pegged rates, few of the models attempt to endogenize the factors responsible for these shifts. That is my goal here. I advance six hypotheses with the capacity to explain the alternating phases of fixed and flexible exchange rates into which the last century can be partitioned.

Before proceeding, some caveats are in order. First, I shall limit my attention to the dominant exchange-rate regime prevailing in the industrial countries at a given time. Thus, I treat the 1950s and 1960s as a period of fixed rates and the 1970s and 1980s as a period of floating, despite the fact that certain countries allowed their exchange rates to float in the first period or pegged them in the second. The hypotheses considered here are designed to shed light on changes over time in the dominant exchange-rate regime, not to illuminate cross-country variations.

Second, I make no claim for the novelty of the hypotheses considered here. All of them may be found in the literatures that have grown up around particular episodes in the history of international money and finance. The contribution of this discussion is rather to show how these hypotheses might be developed into a unified framework for studying the endogeneity of exchange-rate regimes.

Third, I make no pretense of systematically testing theory against evidence. Doing so would require more space than is afforded by one essay. But an important property of a satisfactory explanation for the endogeneity of exchange-rate regimes is that it can be empirically validated or rejected. The evidence presented here is intended to illustrate whether—and if so how—subsequent investigations might go about this task.

Fourth and finally, there is nothing necessarily incompatible about the six perspectives considered. It will be clear as we proceed that the overlap among competing hypotheses is considerable. An adequate account of the endogeneity of exchange-rate regimes will have to incorporate several explanations.

---

2 For examples of episodic studies, see Gowa (1983), Cairncross and Eichengreen (1983), and Kunz (1987).

3 The now-classic model of the collapse of fixed-exchange-rate regimes, building on Salant and Henderson (1978), is Krugman (1979). In most of this literature, switches from fixed to flexible rates are modeled as the consequence of incompatible monetary-fiscal and exchange-rate policies, with no attempt to endogenize the policies responsible for this outcome (a few important, if isolated, exceptions to this generalization are mentioned below). Similar statements apply to models of switches from flexible to fixed rates (Smith and Smith, 1990; Miller and Sutherland, 1990).
able validity. In 1992, for example, Argentina stabilized its exchange rate against the dollar. Is it not accurate to say that essentially all the benefits of this action accrued to the Argentine Republic? Similarly, the members of the European Monetary System (EMS) have pegged their currencies to one another without the support of the world’s leading economic power, the United States. Is it not also accurate to say that the benefits accrue to EMS participants and not to other countries, including the United States?

Second, the association of hegemony with international monetary stability may be a misreading of the evidence. As I have argued elsewhere (Eichengreen, 1989, 1992), the picture of Britain’s having single-handedly operated the classical gold standard tends to be overdrawn. London may have been the leading international financial center prior to World War I, but it had significant rivals, notably Paris and Berlin, both of which possessed their own spheres of influence. The prewar gold standard was a decentralized, multipolar system, the smooth operation of which was hardly attributable to stabilizing intervention by a dominant economic power. Similarly, given the perspective afforded by distance, neither the design nor the maintenance of the Bretton Woods system seems solely attributable to the stabilizing influence exercised by the United States. Great Britain succeeded in securing extensive concessions in the design of Bretton Woods, notably the right to maintain exchange controls on capital-account transactions (for a transitional period of perhaps five years) and current-account transactions (for an indefinite period) and to alter the exchange-rate peg unilaterally in the event of fundamental disequilibrium. When exchange-rate stability was threatened in the 1960s, rescue operations were mounted not by the United States but collectively by the Group of 7 (G-7). Effective leadership by a dominant economic power may have been absent in the 1930s and following the collapse of Bretton Woods, but it is far from clear that the surrounding intervals of exchange-rate stability were predicated on its presence.

How might one test more systematically for differences over time in the prevalence of international economic leadership that are sufficient to explain changes in the adequacy with which different fixed-exchange-rate regimes worked? Kindleberger (1986) has sought to operationalize the concept of economic leadership by suggesting five functions that the hegemon must undertake to stabilize the operation of the international economic system: it must (1) maintain a relatively open market for distress goods, (2) provide countercyclical, or at least stable, long-term lending, (3) police a relatively stable system of exchange rates, (4) ensure the coordination of macroeconomic policies, and (5) act as lender of last resort by discounting or otherwise providing liquidity in financial crisis. The extent to which the presumptive leader has carried out these functions in different periods might be studied by measuring, for example, the openness of its market to distress goods, or fluctuations in the time profile of its long-term lending.

A problem in this approach is that a stable “international economic system,” the dependent variable with which Kindleberger is concerned, is not the same as a stable system of (fixed) exchange rates. Whether the latter is a necessary condition for the former is unclear. Conversely, it is questionable whether functions (1), (2), (4), and (5) are necessary conditions for carrying out function (3). Might not a hegemon support a system of fixed exchange rates without at the same time, for example, engaging in stable long-term lending? Even if countercyclical lending by the leading creditor country contributes positively to the maintenance of fixed rates, it need not be essential.

Our discussion has skipped glibly over the difficulty of measuring the concepts associated with this view. How open must a market be to be “relatively open” to distress goods? How does one distinguish “distress goods” from other exports? Only in the financial realm has some progress been made in operationalizing such notions. Eichengreen (1987) used time-series methods to investigate whether the Bank of England’s discount rate exercised a disproportionate influence over discount rates worldwide under the gold standard. Employing Granger causality tests to investigate the bivariate relation between the Bank of England’s discount rate and rates of the Bank of France and the German Reichsbank, he found that changes in the Bank of England’s rate had a strong tendency to provoke subsequent adjustments in the other rates, although evidence of reverse causality was weaker. For the EMS period, Giovannini (1989) and Cohen and Wyplosz (1989) report similarly that changes in German interest rates have had a much stronger tendency to prompt changes in interest rates in other EMS countries than is conversely true.5

Even for those inclined to uncritically accept this evidence, inferring the validity of the leadership hypothesis from the timing of interest-rate changes nonetheless remains problematic. Even if changes in the Bank of England’s rate led (and led to) changes in the rates of other central banks during the gold-standard years, and, even if changes in German rates have done the same under the EMS, this speaks only obliquely to the importance of leadership—as the concept is formulated above—in the operation of these systems. It says nothing about the willingness of Britain or Germany to bear a disproportionate share of the burden of stabilizing the system or to compel other countries to contribute their fair shares to regime maintenance. And it fails to distinguish an alternative hypothesis: that the discount rates of these so-called “center


5 Fratianni and von Hagen (1992) dispute this conclusion. To capture the “German dominance hypothesis,” they specify and reject a stronger null hypothesis, that is, that the monetary policies of the EMS countries other than Germany do not respond to monetary-policy changes outside the EMS, and that Germany makes absolutely no response to monetary-policy changes in other EMS countries.
countries were only serving as focal points for the international cooperation that really was critical for regime maintenance.

2 Cooperation

Thus, a second explanation, formulated in reaction to the first, emphasizes international cooperation. In this view, international monetary stability, of which fixed exchange rates are one aspect, requires collective management. The stability of exchange rates under the classical gold standard, in the second half of the 1920s, for a quarter of a century after World War II, and in Europe in the 1980s, is attributed in this view to systematic and regular cooperation among countries and their central banks. This hypothesis does not question the public-good character of international monetary stability, only the contention that its provision has required hegemonic dominance.

Under the classical gold standard, minor problems were dispatched by tacit cooperation, generally achieved without open communication among the parties involved. When global credit conditions were overly restrictive and a loosening was required, the requisite adjustments had to be undertaken simultaneously by several central banks. Unilateral action was risky; if one central bank reduced its discount rate but others failed to follow, that bank would suffer reserve losses and might be forced to reverse course. Under such circumstances, the most prominent central bank, the Bank of England, signaled the need for cooperative action by lowering its discount rate, and other central banks responded in kind. By playing follow-the-leader, the central banks of different countries coordinated the necessary adjustments.

Balance-of-payments crises, in contrast, required different responses of different countries. With the central bank experiencing the crisis having to stem its loss of reserves, other central banks could help the most by encouraging reserves to flow out of their coffers. Contrary movements in discount rates were needed. Because the follow-the-leader approach did not suffice, overt, conscious cooperation was required. Foreign central banks and governments also discounted bills on behalf of the weak-currency country and lent gold to its central bank. Consequently, the resources on which any one country could draw when its gold parity was under attack far exceeded its own reserves; they included the resources of the other gold-standard countries. This provided countries with additional ammunition for defending their gold parities, a form of cooperation that was crucial to the maintenance of the gold-standard system.

In advancing this view, my own work (Eichengreen, 1992) has relied on narrative evidence. For example, I described the response of European central banks to the Baring Crisis of 1890. The solvency of the House of Baring, which had borrowed to purchase Argentine central and local government bonds, was threatened by the collapse of the market in these securities following the arrival in London of news of the Argentine revolution. Confidence in other British financial institutions was disturbed, especially those from which Baring Brothers had borrowed. Foreign deposits were liquidated, and gold drained from the Bank of England as residents shifted out of deposits. In November 1890, at the height of the crisis, the bank's reserve fell to less than £11 million. Baring Brothers alone required an infusion of £4 million to avoid having to close its doors.

Committing such a large share of the Bank of England's remaining reserve to domestic uses threatened to undermine confidence in the convertibility of sterling. Fortunately, the dilemma was resolved through international cooperation. The Bank of England solicited a loan of £2 million in gold from the Bank of France and obtained £1.5 million in gold coin from Russia. Within days, the Bank of France made another £1 million in gold available. The news, as much as the fact, of these loans did much to restore confidence; it was not even necessary for the second tranche of French gold to cross the English channel.

Like the Baring Crisis, the 1907 financial crisis culminated more than a year of financial turbulence. In 1906, frantic expansion in the United States led to extensive American borrowing in London and to a drain of coin and bullion from the Bank of England. The bank responded by raising its discount rate repeatedly. But, with interest rates also high on the Continent, the measure attracted little gold. As in 1890, the threat to sterling was contained through international cooperation. The Bank of France repeatedly offered a loan to the Bank of England. The latter preferred instead, however, to have the Bank of France purchase sterling bills. The entry for foreign bills on the asset side of the balance sheet of the Bank of France rose from zero at the beginning of December 1906 to more than F65 million in November 1907 (roughly £3 million). Gold flowed out from the Bank of France, relieving the pressure on the Bank of England.

In addition to taking these steps, the Bank of England made clear to British investors holding American paper that their excessive holdings of such bills threatened the stability of the London market. In response to this pressure, British investors allowed 90 percent of this paper to run off in the early months of 1907. Credit conditions tightened in the United States, bursting the financial bubble.

As business in the United States turned down, nonperforming loans turned up, and a wave of bank failures broke out. These provoked a shift out of deposits and into currency, a surge in the demand for gold in the United States, and a drain from the Bank of England. Again, the key to containing the crisis was international cooperation. Both the Bank of France and the Reichsbank allowed their reserves to decline and transferred gold to England to finance England's transfer of gold to the United States. This willingness of
other countries to part with gold was indispensable to the defense of the sterling parity.

The techniques developed in response to the difficulties of 1906 and 1907 were used regularly in subsequent years. In 1909 and 1910 the Bank of France again discounted sterling bills to ease seasonal strain on the Bank of England. The Italian financial expert Luigi Luzzatti recommended institutionalizing the practice through the establishment of an agency on the order of the Bank for International Settlements.

The reconstructed gold standard of the 1920s was similarly predicated on extensive international cooperation. Virtually every country that pegged its exchange rate in the mid-1920s received stabilization loans from the League of Nations or from foreign governments and central banks. American, British, French, and German central bankers consulted one another regularly and in July of 1927 held a summit on Long Island to coordinate adjustments in their discount rates. Prior to the death in 1928 of Benjamin Strong, the governor of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, the record of international cooperation had shown "considerable merit." Thereafter, declining cooperation coincided with the growing difficulties of operating the fixed-rate system. The collective support operations and coordinated adjustments in domestic policies needed to sustain the system in 1931 were not sufficiently forthcoming.

This hypothesis also fits post-World War II experience with Bretton Woods. Monetary cooperation in Europe was extensive, starting with the European Payments Union, which provided balance-of-payments financing and a venue for ongoing consultation. New institutions, such as the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) and the International Monetary Fund (IMF), were constructed to mobilize and monitor cooperative ventures over a wider area. Countries as prominent as the United Kingdom borrowed from the IMF to support their fixed exchange rates. As the period drew to a close, the IMF gave promise of becoming an important source of international liquidity in its role as the creator of Special Drawing Rights.

Finally, the hypothesis is consistent with one interpretation of the success of the EMS. The EMS is seen as a symmetric agreement sustained by, and in turn sustaining, reciprocal cooperation among the participating countries (Fratianni and von Hagen, 1992). The system is supported by institutional arrangements to systematize international cooperation. The EMS Act of Foundation explicitly requires strong-currency countries to provide unlimited support to their weak-currency counterparts. Participating central banks may also draw on the system's Very Short Term Credit Facility for up to seventy-five days. At the same time, the 1992 EMS crisis is a reminder that, even

---

6 The quotation is from Clarke (1967, p. 20), who provides the definitive account of central-bank cooperation in the 1920s.

7 I return in the next section to the inadequacies of international cooperation in the 1920s and consider explanations for the reason why it was not forthcoming.

---

endogeneity of exchange-rate regimes

when institutionalized—in this case by a European Council resolution—international cooperation cannot be taken for granted: an interpretation of the different fates of the Italian lira and British pound (both of which were forcibly devalued) and the French franc and Danish krone (which were successfully defended) is that the principal strong-currency country, Germany, cooperated more extensively with the first set of countries than with the second (Eichengreen and Wyplosz, 1993).

A limitation of this general approach, implied by the conclusion to the preceding section, is the difficulty of drawing the line between leadership and cooperation. A leader is often required to organize cooperative ventures. Much of the evidence consistent with international cooperation is also consistent with one country's taking a leadership role in cooperative arrangements. 8 A second limitation is the difficulty of measuring the actual extent of international cooperation. Econometric models have been widely used to assess the advantages and prevalence of cooperation. Broadberry (1989) calibrated a simple two-country model of monetary policy that can be used to estimate the advantages of cooperative monetary-policy responses between the wars. Foreman-Peck, Hughes Hallett, and Ma (1992) estimated an even more ambitious monthly econometric model of the transmission of the Great Depression among the principal industrial countries and applied it to this same question. Fratianni and von Hagen (1992) similarly used an empirical model of the EMS countries to demonstrate that monetary-policy cooperation is welfare enhancing relative to noncooperative policies and that an exchange-rate rule can in some cases move countries toward the cooperative solution. In all these simulations, cooperative solutions differ from observed outcomes, indicating that, in practice, international cooperation remains incomplete. This does not imply, however, that cooperation is absent or unimportant. Moreover, cooperative and noncooperative policies are typically judged in terms of their ability to stabilize output and prices, not their success in maintaining a fixed-rate regime. Although policies that stabilize output and prices are often compatible with maintenance of a fixed-exchange-rate regime, this need not be the case.

3 Intellectual Consensus

A third explanation emphasizes intellectual consensus as a prerequisite for fixed-rate regimes. This explanation is directly related to the preceding perspective stressing international cooperation. If collaboration among countries

8 This observation is implicit in the preceding discussion of day-to-day cooperation under the classical gold standard, which was organized on a follow-the-leader basis. In recognition of the importance of leadership to cooperative regimes, Keohane (1984) has suggested the concept of "hegemonic cooperation."

9 A conflict is likely to arise when the incidence of macroeconomic disturbances differs across countries. This, of course, is the classic point of Mundell (1961). I return to it in the next section.
is required for the maintenance of a fixed-rate system, policymakers must be able to agree on the measures to be taken collaboratively. As Frankel and Rackett (1988) show, it is only by the sheerest coincidence that national policymakers who subscribe to different models of the economy will agree on what policy adjustments are needed to respond to economic problems threatening the stability of the exchange-rate system. A common model thus facilitates "regime-preserving cooperation." 10

An illustration of this point is the troubled efforts at cooperation that plagued the interwar gold standard. 11 Before World War I, the acquisition of foreign currencies had provided a framework conducive to international monetary cooperation. But different national experiences with inflation and deflation after the war and differences across countries in the severity of the early phases of the depression shattered this consensus and disrupted cooperation between countries such as Britain and France. 12 In Britain, deflation was recognized as a persistent problem even before the depression struck. Britain's slump resulted, in the dominant view, from a deflationary shock imported from abroad. World prices had started to collapse with the onset of the global depression, and the decline in international prices had not reduced domestic prices commensurately. Instead, rigidities in the domestic wage-price structure had priced British goods out of international markets, producing the macroeconomic slump. This interpretation of the crisis pointed to a policy response, that is, that monetary policy should be used to stabilize prices and to restore them to 1929 levels.

This conceptual framework had direct implications for the international monetary system. If the exchange rate was fixed, it was impossible for any central bank to pursue deflationary initiatives. Unless deflationary policies were coordinated internationally, currency depreciation was a necessary concomitant. Absent a French commitment to deflate, the British saw themselves with no choice but to abandon the fixed-rate system.

The French refused to support British efforts to reconcile regime maintenance with monetary reflation because they subscribed to a different conceptual model. 13 French policymakers looking backward from the vantage point of the 1930s saw inflation as the real and present danger, even when prices had already begun to collapse as the global slump spread. French policymakers attributed the crisis not to deflation and the passivity of policymakers but to monetary instability. In the prevailing French view, growing reliance on foreign-exchange reserves had fatally loosened the gold-standard constraints. Central banks had willingly accumulated sterling and dollar balances over the second half of the 1920s, allowing the Bank of England and the Federal Reserve System to pursue excessively expansionary policies. Between 1913 and 1929, productive capacity worldwide had expanded more rapidly than the supply of monetary gold. Because the demand for money rose with the level of activity, lower prices were necessary to provide a matching increase in the supply of real balances. Under the gold standard, a smooth deflation, such as that from 1873 to 1893, was the normal response. But in the 1920s, central banks used their discretionary power to block the downward adjustment of prices. They pyramided domestic credit on foreign-exchange reserves. Liberal supplies of credit had fueled speculation, raising asset prices to unsustainable heights and setting the stage for the stock market crash. Following that shock, central banks rushed to liquidate exchange reserves and prices fell abruptly. The consequent insufficiency of investment was the immediate cause of the slump.

In France, then, the crisis of the 1930s was seen as an inevitable consequence of the unrealistic policies pursued by central banks in the 1920s. To prevent deflation at that point from running its course would inaugurating another era of speculative excess and, ultimately, another depression. It was better to allow excess liquidity to be purged and prices to drop to sustainable levels. Only then would investor confidence be restored and sustainable recovery commence.

For the French, nothing more dramatically symbolized the problem of financial instability than disarray in the international monetary sphere. Exchange-rate instability discouraged investment and international trade. Maintaining the gold standard and respecting the constraints it imposed on inflation were regarded as the most important steps policymakers could take to promote confidence and recovery.

Thus, disagreement over the appropriate model of the economy prevented policymakers in different countries from agreeing on a coordinated response. Where unemployment was quickest to scale high levels, policymakers came

---

10 The phrase in quotation marks paraphrases Kenen (1990). The relevance of these considerations to the recent evolution of Europe's exchange-rate regime should be obvious. It can be argued, for example, that the stagnation of the 1970s led to the emergence of a consensus that discretionary monetary policy is a blunt instrument for addressing problems of unemployment and is best directed toward price stability; this was a precondition for the establishment of the EMS. Similarly, the solidification of this view facilitated the successful negotiation in 1991 of the Maastricht Treaty on Economic and Monetary Union (although continued resistance to the Treaty's provisions in Britain and other countries indicates that consensus remains incomplete).

11 The paragraphs that follow summarize the argument of Eichengreen and Uzan (1993).

12 Although the brief summary here emphasizes the scope for cooperation between Britain and France, the complete story, as recounted in Eichengreen and Uzan (1993), must consider also cooperation between those countries and the United States.

13 To minimize confusion, I should emphasize that the remainder of this paragraph is entirely a characterization of the dominant French perspective in the 1930s. There is an intriguing parallel here with the 1960s, when the French again subscribed to a model of the international monetary economy different from the one followed by other leading countries. This again created problems for the organization of a collective response to systemic strains. On the French model and policy objectives, see Bordo, Simard, and White (1995).
under pressure to resist deflationary impulses imported from abroad and to initiate reflation. But the expansion of domestic credit was compatible with the maintenance of fixed exchange rates only if it was coordinated internationally. The British were forced to pursue monetary reflation unilaterally, and the fixed-exchange-rate system was an immediate casualty. Thus, the absence of a common conceptual framework was ultimately responsible for the collapse of the fixed-rate system.

Another variant of this hypothesis is concerned with regime design rather than regime maintenance. Although early fixed-rate systems, such as the classical gold standard, seem to have sprung up spontaneously, more recent regimes, such as Bretton Woods and the European Monetary System, are products of international negotiations. Here, an international consensus on the design of such a system can be a critical precondition for success. Ikenberry (1993, p. 157) emphasizes the importance of transnational consensus for the successful conclusion and ratification of the Bretton Woods Agreement. A set of policy ideas inspired by the Keynesian revolution and embraced by prominent British and American economists and policymakers was crucial, he argues, for “defining government conceptions of postwar interests, building coalitions in support of the postwar settlement, and legitimating the exercise of American power.”

At the outset of negotiations, divergent views within and between the British and American political establishments posed obstacles to reaching a transnational agreement on how to structure the postwar international economic order. State Department officials in particular and American policymakers in general attributed the severity of the depression of the 1930s to the collapse of international transactions. Hence, they attached priority to the restoration of free trade. Britain’s wartime cabinet, by contrast, identified the crisis of the 1930s with deflationary pressures imported from abroad. They thus sought to structure international monetary institutions so as to free Britain from external constraints and to temper trade arrangements with measures that would allow the government to maintain a high pressure of domestic demand as a way of guaranteeing full employment. Reinforcing this disagreement over trade was the British desire to continue cultivating commercial ties with its Commonwealth through the extension of tariff preferences versus the desire of American policymakers to obtain equal access to Commonwealth markets through the global adoption of policies of nondiscrimination.

A community of economic and policy specialists in both governments played a critical role in shifting the focus of discussions from these contentious issues of trade to the monetary arena. There, emerging Keynesian ideas had already begun to define a common ground on which officials from both countries could agree. Experts from the two countries were heavily influenced by Keynesian ideas and shared a common model of the role of monetary policy in economic management. This led them to compatible views about the way international monetary arrangements should be structured to facilitate the pursuit of stabilizing domestic policies. Compared to their disagreements over trade, differences of opinion in the monetary arena were minor. Negotiators differed only over how much international liquidity should be provided by the newly created IMF, not over whether such liquidity should be provided at all. They disagreed only over the extent to which capital controls could be used to reconcile domestic monetary autonomy with exchange-rate stability, not over whether such controls were permissible. The degree of consensus is attributable, in this view, to agreement over the role for monetary management in the postwar world.

In 1933, by contrast, an absence of consensus blocked the successful conclusion of negotiations on reform and reconstruction of the international monetary system. The French wanted the British and, after April 1933, the Americans to restore fixed exchange rates on a basis that would have severely limited the options available to policymakers. The British, in contrast, would accept exchange-rate stabilization only if it were coupled with an agreement for coordinated monetary reflations. Disagreements over the appropriate conceptual model of the economy thus proved to be an insurmountable obstacle to regime design as well as regime maintenance.

4 Behavior of the Macroeconomy

A fourth explanation for differences over time in the prevalence of fixed-rate systems is the stability of the macroeconomy. When macroeconomic disturbances are large, countries find it costly to maintain stable exchange rates. Draconian adjustments in domestic policies may be required to defend the exchange-rate peg, exacerbating already serious problems of unemployment. From this perspective, it is no coincidence that the interwar gold standard collapsed following the onset of the depression of the 1930s, or that the final demise of the Bretton Woods system in 1973 coincided with the first OPEC oil-price shock.

Yet, systematic comparisons of fixed- and flexible-exchange-rate regimes fail to confirm that output is less volatile in fixed-rate periods. Using data for various samples of countries, Bordo (1993) and Eichengreen (1994) show that the standard deviation of detrended national output was more volatile during

---

14 On this view of the 1933 London Economic Conference, see O’Dell (1988) and Eichengreen and Uzan (1993).

15 See, for example, Giovannini (1993) for an instance of this argument. Statements like this obviously raise important issues of simultaneity (of how the exchange-rate regime affects the nature of the shocks), to which I return below.
played on the horizontal axis; the floating years (1973 to 1990), on the vertical one. The observations in the top left-hand panel, where the first-difference filter is used, cluster around the 45 degree line, suggesting little change in output volatility at business-cycle frequencies. The unweighted average across countries of standard deviations indicates that output volatility rose slightly following the shift from fixed to floating rates (from 1.72 to 1.98), but that this change is statistically insignificant at standard confidence levels. The bottom left-hand panel, where the linear filter is used, suggests, if anything, a slight reduction in output volatility at lower frequencies in the post-Bretton Woods period.

The conclusion that output volatility was no greater under floating than under fixed rates is reinforced by the right-hand side of the figure, which compares Bretton Woods, again on the horizontal axis, with the classical gold-standard years (1880 to 1913) on the vertical axis. The simple arithmetic average of standard deviations of detrended GDP is some 50 percent larger under the gold standard than under Bretton Woods (or than under the post-Bretton Woods float). This is true regardless of which filter is used.\footnote{This also remains true when Romer’s (1989) cyclical corrected estimates of U.S. output are substituted for the standard series.}

Output variability is an imperfect measure of the magnitude of disturbances, of course, because it conflates impulses and responses. Bayoumi and Eichengreen (1992) have therefore used time-series methods to estimate the magnitude of the disturbances themselves. They apply to data on output and prices a procedure proposed by Blanchard and Quah (1989) for distinguishing temporary from permanent disturbances. Temporary disturbances are those that have only a transitory effect on output but that permanently alter prices. Insofar as they have a positive impact on prices, they are interpretable as demand shocks. Permanent disturbances alter both output and long- and short-run prices. Insofar as they have a negative impact on prices, it is tempting to interpret them as supply shocks.

Bayoumi and Eichengreen find that supply-and-demand shocks were essentially the same size following the collapse of Bretton Woods as during it. (Supply shocks in these respective regimes are shown in the left panel of Figure 1.2; demand shocks, in the right panel.) In contrast, the average magnitude of supply shocks was three times as large under the classical gold standard as under either Bretton Woods or the post–Bretton Woods float, whereas demand shocks were roughly twice as large under the classical gold standard. Thus, it is not possible to explain the smooth operation of the pre-1914 gold standard or the permanence of the post-1972 transition to floating on the basis of differences in the stability of the economic environment.

What may matter more than the magnitude of disturbances is their correlation across countries. If countries experience common disturbances, a

\[16\] The data underlying these figures are described in detail in Eichengreen (1994).
A common policy response may suffice, and no threat will be posed to a fixed-rate system. Only when different disturbances impinge on different countries will different policy responses be called for and fixed exchange rates be threatened.

With this insight in mind, Floyd (1985) examined the behavior of countries’ terms of trade as an indicator of the asymmetry of disturbances. His assumption was that when the terms of trade are highly variable (demand and supply disturbances in different countries cause the relative prices of the goods they produce to move in different directions), fixed rates will be difficult to maintain. He found that relative national price levels were much more stable under the classical gold standard and Bretton Woods than between the wars or after 1971.

Figure 1.3 looks at the cross-country correlation of output movements directly (with output first detrended as described above). The results for the post–World War II period, for which the correlation of output in each country with output in the United States is computed, are sensitive to the choice of filter: first-differencing indicates a rise in the correlation after 1972, although the linear filter shows little evidence of change. The results for the pre–World War I gold standard show a lower correlation than during either the Bretton Woods years or the post–Bretton Woods float. Thus, there does not appear to be a direct correlation between the cross-country dispersion of output movements and the exchange-rate regime.

Output and terms-of-trade fluctuations are imperfect indicators for the asymmetry of disturbances, reflecting as they do both shocks and macroeconomic responses. Bayoumi and Eichengreen (1992) have therefore examined the covariation across countries of estimated supply-and-demand disturbances. They find no clear ordering of fixed- and flexible-rate regimes. For example, the dispersion of supply-and-demand shocks across countries was larger under the gold standard than under the post–Bretton Woods float. It hardly seems possible, therefore, to explain the successful maintenance of fixed-rate regimes such as the classical gold standard on the basis of an unusually symmetrical distribution of shocks. Similarly, the share of the variance in both supply-and-demand shocks to the G-7 countries explained by the first principal component actually rises between the Bretton Woods years from 1955 to 1970 and the floating-rate years from 1973 to 1988. Again, it does not seem possible to explain the transition from fixed to flexible exchange rates after 1971 on the basis of a greater cross-country dispersion of shocks.
5 Fiscal Policy and Monetary Rules

A fifth explanation emphasizes the role of a fixed-rate regime as an anti-inflationary rule or commitment mechanism. Shifts between fixed and flexible rates then reflect changes in the balance of costs and benefits of adhering to such a rule.

The literature in which this approach is discussed sees fixed exchange rates as a solution to the time-consistency problem analyzed by Kydland and Prescott (1977). A government with complete discretion over the formulation of monetary policy will have an incentive to engineer a surprise inflation as a way of imposing a levy on money balances. Agents will reduce their money holdings to protect themselves. In the resulting equilibrium, as Barro and Gordon (1983) show, money holdings will be inefficiently low and inflation inefficiently high.

Fixing the exchange rate against a country committed to the maintenance of price stability can be viewed as a pledge not to use the seigniorage tax. This enables policymakers to reduce actual and expected inflation to zero and to raise real-money balances to socially efficient levels at the cost of relinquishing seigniorage altogether.

From this perspective, it is not possible to say in general whether fixed or flexible exchange rates will be preferred. Flexibility will be more attractive the lower is the government expenditure share of GNP (because high average spending implies high expected inflation under floating rates and hence greater gains from fixity) and the more variable is government spending (because the authorities will want to smooth the time profile of distorting taxation, and one way of doing so is through the use of seigniorage).

Table 1.1 compares the level and variability of government spending in the G-7 countries under alternative exchange-rate regimes. The Bretton Woods period stands out as an era of unusual stability in government spending, whether measured by the standard deviation or the coefficient of variation of the public expenditure-to-GNP ratio. This is consistent with the notion that the absence of a need to resort to seigniorage to smooth the time profile of distortional taxes was associated with the maintenance of fixed rates. The rise of both measures of variability following the transition to the post-Bretton Woods float is similarly consistent with this view, as is the relatively high level of both ratios during the period of exchange-rate instability between the wars.

In other respects, however, the results in the table are more difficult to reconcile with the tax-smoothing theory. Rather than varying in concert with the exchange-rate regime, government spending ratios rise steadily with time.

Table 1.1

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Mean</th>
<th>Standard Deviation</th>
<th>Coefficient of Variation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Gold standard (1881-1913)</td>
<td>9.1</td>
<td>2.4</td>
<td>.2115</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interwar period (1919-38)</td>
<td>16.6</td>
<td>4.1</td>
<td>.3181</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bretton Woods (1945-70)</td>
<td>22.9</td>
<td>1.7</td>
<td>.0758</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Post-Bretton Woods float (1974-89)</td>
<td>27.6</td>
<td>2.5</td>
<td>.1130</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Sources: Government-spending data are from Eichengreen, 1993; GNP estimates are from Bordo, 1993.

Note: All figures are arithmetic averages of annual data for Canada, France, Germany, Japan, the United Kingdom, and the United States.

The gold-standard era is particularly problematic for the theory. Spending ratios were historically low but relatively variable during the gold-standard years, but both conditions should have been associated with floating rates. These findings do not imply that the tax-smoothing theory is necessarily wrong, only that, as an explanation for shifts between exchange-rate regimes, it is incomplete and sometimes dominated by other factors.

More generally, both fixed and flexible exchange rates can be seen as elements of a single contingent rule under which governments refrain from engaging in inflationary finance except in the event of well-defined contingencies, such as wars and financial crises (see de Kock and Grilli, 1989; Bordo and Kydland, 1991). If certain conditions are met, the public will regard their governments' commitments as credible; in normal times, expected and actual inflation are zero, and, in exceptional circumstances, the government is permitted to resort to the inflation tax without undermining the credibility of its subsequent commitment to price stability.

Empirical testing of this explanation against historical evidence has scarcely begun. Using more than a hundred years of data for Britain, de Kock and Grilli (1989) show that shifts from fixed to flexible exchange rates have typically coincided with sudden increases in government spending and in the magnitude of seigniorage revenues, whereas the restoration of fixed rates has coincided with the return of expenditure to normal levels. Their data are re-produced as Figure 1.4.20 Government spending on goods and services and seigniorage are both expressed as shares of GDP. The two pronounced peaks in both series occur at the same time, and in each instance, they coincide with

---

19 In addition, de Kock and Grilli (1989) show that floating is more desirable the greater the revenue from fully anticipated inflation, the smaller the liquidity cost of inflation, and the greater the revenue from surprise inflation.

20 Actually, I have measured seigniorage slightly differently, as the change in the money base expressed as a ratio to GDP. Data are from Mitchell (1988) and Capie and Webber (1985).
the suspension of fixed-rate systems. The temporal coincidence of the breakdown of the interwar gold standard with the budgetary difficulties of the depression is also consistent with this view—Figure 1.4 shows a noticeable rise in the seigniorage share of GDP coincident with these events. So is the concurrence of growing U.S. fiscal deficits with the breakdown of Bretton Woods, although these trends find no echo in analogous series for the United Kingdom.

Fixed exchange rates have been interpreted as a commitment technology in the literature on the EMS as well. But, as contributors to that literature have pointed out, it is not clear why an indirect commitment to stabilize the price level by stabilizing the exchange rate should be more credible than a direct commitment to stabilize prices.21 Neither is it clear what enables some governments but not others to commit credibly to an exchange-rate rule. Perhaps rules can be sustained only by governments that care enough about the future to value their reputation for respecting them. Governments with a low probability of survival care relatively little about the future and may therefore have little interest in cultivating the credibility of their commitment to a fixed-rate rule. Political stability may thus influence the choice of an exchange-rate regime. There has been some research documenting the positive association of government turnover with inflation (Grilli et al., 1991), but no historical work has as yet been done tracing the association between political stability and the exchange-rate regime.

Table 1.2 relates one measure of government instability to the percentage change in dollar exchange rates in the first half of the 1920s. The 1920s would seem to be a fertile testing ground for theories that relate the choice of exchange-rate regime to government durability and consequent incentives, for government stability and exchange-rate policy varied widely across countries in the aftermath of World War I. Some countries, led by Britain, forced their exchange rates to appreciate until the prewar gold-standard parity against the dollar had been restored. Others, such as Germany, saw their exchange rates collapse as a result of hyperinflation. Still others, such as France and Belgium, followed a middle course, permitting depreciation to persist before restoring a fixed exchange rate at a depreciated value against the dollar. The question is whether differing degrees of government stability help to explain these choices.

Table 1.2

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Explanatory Variable</th>
<th>(1)</th>
<th>(2)</th>
<th>(3)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>-0.97</td>
<td>-1.11</td>
<td>2.04</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(4.36)</td>
<td>(4.59)</td>
<td>(5.00)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Government instability</td>
<td>-0.07</td>
<td>-0.07</td>
<td>-0.10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(2.12)</td>
<td>(1.85)</td>
<td>(2.57)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Central-bank independence</td>
<td>0.12</td>
<td>0.12</td>
<td>0.15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(5.22)</td>
<td>(5.31)</td>
<td>(5.94)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Governing majority</td>
<td>0.01</td>
<td>0.01</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(1.13)</td>
<td>(0.67)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percent Left</td>
<td>0.02</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(2.51)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lagged output growth</td>
<td>0.30</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(1.90)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(N)</td>
<td>103</td>
<td>93</td>
<td>76</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Standard error</td>
<td>0.199</td>
<td>0.196</td>
<td>0.184</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: For details on data sources, see Eichengreen and Simmons, 1993.

Note: \(t\)-statistics are in parentheses. All equations include dummy variables for country and year.
Results of a pooled time-series cross-section analysis for the countries of Europe, plus the United States and Japan, are shown in Table 1.2. Because exchange rates are measured in domestic currency units per U.S. dollar, a negative sign indicates that a factor is associated with depreciation. The first column shows that exchange rates depreciated more quickly in countries with unstable governments (measured as the number of cabinet changes per year), consistent with the view that such governments have less reason to value their reputations and are hence more inclined to follow policies leading to depreciation (and, in this context, less likely to value the reputational advantages of restoring the prewar parity). In addition, countries with more politically independent central banks were more successful at resisting these pressures.

The next column adds an additional political variable: the share of parliamentary seats held by the governing party or coalition. If the rate of cabinet turnover is a measure of the current durability of the government, the size of its majority might be regarded as a leading indicator of its expected future durability. Larger majorities seem to have been associated with policies of exchange-rate stability, although this coefficient does not differ significantly from zero at standard confidence levels.

The final column adds a measure of the political orientation of elected representatives (share of parliamentary seats held by left-wing parties) and a measure of economic conditions (the rate of growth of industrial production lagged one year). It shows that faster-growing countries succeeded in maintaining stronger exchange rates. Political orientation also enters as a significant determinant of exchange-rate policy, although, in this period, the presumption that left-wing governments are more inflation prone is not supported. Perhaps left-wing governments entered office with inferior financial reputations and stood to gain more from maintenance of the gold standard. This is consistent with Simmons’s (1991) finding for the post-1925 period that countries with greater left representation in parliament stayed on the gold standard longer.

Simmons (1991) provides a more comprehensive analysis of these issues using data for the 1930s, when countries once again chose between the gold standard and floating rates. Her regressions control for a wider variety of political and economic correlates of the exchange rate. She, too, finds that

more unstable governments had a greater tendency to leave the gold standard and to depreciate their currencies.

This line of research is not without limitations. In particular, there is the danger that empirical results are significantly contaminated by simultaneity bias. In addition to the tendency for unstable governments to pursue policies associated with exchange-rate instability, disturbances that destabilize exchange rates and other related variables may heighten dissatisfaction with domestic policy, thereby leading to the fall of the government. Properly sorting out cause and effect will require estimation of a full structural model of these relationships.

6 Distributional Politics

Neither explanations emphasizing interactions between domestic and foreign governments nor those concerned with interactions between government and the private sector explicitly disaggregate the polity into competing interest groups. A sixth explanation for shifts between fixed- and flexible-exchange-rate regimes therefore focuses on the changing balance of political power between interest groups favoring a particular regime and those opposed to it.

Consider the decision of whether to devalue or revalue the currency. Devaluation increases the prices of traded goods relative to those of nontraded goods and services, enhancing profitability in sectors producing tradables and raising the incomes of factors of production employed there. We should expect devaluation to be favored by producers of tradables and opposed by producers of nontradables. The intensity with which these groups lobby should increase with the extent of their competitive difficulties.

Frieden (1991) has shown how several critical episodes in the history of American exchange-rate policy can be interpreted in this light. Dollar devaluation was championed in the 1890s by farmers and other producers of traded goods who suffered from slumping prices in the face of an expansion of foreign supplies. In 1933, devaluation was favored by farmers, silver miners, and other producers of traded goods whose prices had collapsed after 1929 but was opposed by the service sector. In 1971, pressure for devaluation from the sector producing traded goods was intensified by the fact that nontradables prices increased more than twice as fast as tradables prices between 1967 and 1970.

The level of the exchange rate is not the same thing, of course, as the choice of an exchange-rate regime. Producers of tradables and nontradables may agree on the desirability of either fixed or floating rates but disagree about the appropriate level for those rates. Conversely, other distributional interests may care more about the stability or flexibility of the exchange rate than about its average level. Frieden argues, for example, that those heavily involved in
international trade, finance, and investment favor fixed-rate regimes that minimize the uncertainties associated with transacting across borders and that thereby promote the expansion of international commerce. These groups may thus care more about the stability of the exchange rate than about its average level.25

The strength of this approach is that it injects domestic politics into the history of international money and finance. A limitation is the difficulty of testing this explanation against the alternatives. Although it is always possible to identify interest groups or coalitions favoring and opposing the exchange-rate regime that is adopted, it need not follow that lobbying by special-interest groups was central to the choice of regime. Ikenberry’s (1993) work on the importance of expert opinion reminds us that the general public often regards decisions over exchange-rate policy as abstruse, leaving officials considerable leeway for independent action motivated on other grounds.

Thus, the question is whether it is possible empirically to identify the effect of interest-group pressure on the choice of exchange-rate regime. Remarkably little literature actually addresses this issue, which takes as its dependent variable either electoral outcomes of campaigns in which the exchange-rate regime was prominent or voting outcomes of parliamentary or congressional debates in which the issue figured.

To illustrate the point, I consider voting patterns in the 1896 U.S. presidential election. In this more than any other nationwide election, the exchange-rate regime was the central issue (see Jones, 1964, p. 6). On one side was William McKinley, who supported the existing gold standard. On the other was William Jennings Bryan, who proposed supplementing gold coinage with that of silver, raising the price level, and allowing the dollar to depreciate against foreign currencies if necessary to achieve his other aims. Bryan and the Democrats rejected as impractical international bimetallism (which would have maintained the dollar’s stability against foreign currencies through an agreement under which all gold-standard countries would coin gold and silver in common proportions); thus, the Democrats’ position would have committed the United States to silver monometallism and a fluctuating exchange rate.

Standard accounts of the campaign (Williams, 1936) argue that free silver was the dominant issue. Next in importance was the tariff, which protected eastern manufacturers against import competition, and to which the Republican candidate, William McKinley, had “devoted his career . . . with a singular concentration” (Jones, 1964, p. 105). This suggests that the election should be seen as a conflict between export interests (mainly agriculture), who would have benefited from depreciation, and producers of importables (mainly manufactures), who benefited more from the tariff. In addition, it can be thought of as setting debtors, who suffered from deflation and high interest rates, and silver producers, who suffered from the slump in silver prices,

---

25 Note that producers of tradables and exporters may, but need not, be one and the same.

---

against the railways and financial interests, who benefited from U.S. adherence to the gold standard.

Table 1.3 reports logit estimates of the determinants of Bryan’s share of the vote by state in the 1896 election (logit estimates are reported because the dependent variable is bounded by zero and one). The first column shows the

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TABLE 1.3</th>
<th>Determinants of Bryan’s Share of the 1896 Presidential Vote (dependent variable is Bryan’s share of the vote)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Explanatory Variable</td>
<td>(1)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>−0.05</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.23)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Employment in agriculture</td>
<td>1.23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(1.75)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Employment in manufacturing</td>
<td>−1.02</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(1.77)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Density of rail lines</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inverse of density of banks</td>
<td>0.04</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(3.72)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Silver output per capita</td>
<td>0.01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(3.87)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mortgage debt per acre</td>
<td>0.07</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(2.11)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Employment in mining</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Urbanization</td>
<td>−1.55</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(1.95)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Average value of farms</td>
<td>0.01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(1.42)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Employment in railroads</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

R²: 0.19 0.46 0.10 0.64 0.62

Sources: All explanatory variables are drawn from the 1896 U.S. Statistical Abstract, the 1890 Census, and the report of the National Monetary Commission (Andrew, 1910). Votes for the Populist party are added to Bryan’s votes on the grounds that the two parties’ positions on international economic issues were essentially the same. The results are virtually identical when Bryan’s votes alone are considered.

Note: All equations are estimated by logit methods; t-statistics are in parentheses. All employment numbers are expressed as a share of the gainfully employed.
results of estimating the simplest model, in which the explanatory variables are the shares of gainful employees in the export- and import-competing sectors (agriculture and manufacturing, respectively). Both variables have their expected signs and differ significantly from zero at the 90 percent confidence level; Bryan’s vote increased with employment in agriculture but fell with employment in manufacturing.

An alternative is to model the incidence of specific grievances that gave rise to dissatisfaction with the prevailing economic and monetary order. Farmers complained about exorbitant railroad rates; debtors, about exorbitant mortgage interest rates; and miners, about slumping silver prices. The second equation therefore regresses the electoral outcome on average railroad mileage per square acre as a measure of the competitiveness of the transportation-services industry, the number of inhabitants per commercial bank as a measure of the competitiveness of the financial-services industry, the per capita silver production in 1895, and the value of mortgage debt per acre. Again, all variables have the expected sign and differ significantly from zero at the 90 percent confidence level or better. States where banking was more concentrated, where there were fewest competing railway lines, where silver production was most important, and where the burden of agricultural mortgage debt was heaviest tended to go with Bryan.

Hollingsworth (1963) and other historians emphasize still a third set of factors, arguing that the fundamental electoral cleavage in 1896 ran along urban/rural lines. Whereas farmers embraced the devaluationist cause, urban workers were unsympathetic. The intensity with which farmers opposed deflation depended on the value of their farms and, hence, the burden of mortgage debts. In addition, these historians emphasize that the railroads lobbied their employees intensively to vote against Bryan, a fact that may have played a role in the outcome (Jones, 1964, p. 334). The third equation therefore regresses the voting pattern on the share of urban population (the share living in cities with at least eight thousand residents), the share of the gainfully employed working on the railroads, and the average value of owned and encumbered farms. Urbanization has its expected negative sign and differs from zero at the 90 percent level. The other two variables, although correctly signed, are statistically insignificant.

The final two columns report hybrid equations that include employment shares in agriculture and manufacturing, two measures of mining as a special-interest group (employment in mining and per capita silver output), urbanization, mortgage debt, and inhabitants per bank. The coefficients on all variables but the last differ from zero at the 90 percent level or better.

The only surprising sign is that on urbanization. Upon controlling for the sectoral composition of employment, one finds that urbanization is positively, not negatively, related to Bryan’s share of the vote. In the final equation, I therefore exclude this variable. The remaining coefficients all now display their expected signs and differ significantly from zero at the 90 percent level.

7 Conclusion

Scholars attempting to account for changes over time in the structure of the international monetary system suffer from an embarrassment of riches. The historical record shows a profusion of potential explanations for the shifts between fixed- and flexible-exchange-rate regimes. The problem is not to frame hypotheses, of which there are an abundance, but to gauge the explanatory power of the hypotheses against the evidence. Case studies of particular historical junctures in which the international monetary system was transformed should be supplemented with quantitative studies using data over time and across countries to analyze the choice of exchange-rate regime. One cannot help but be struck by how little progress has yet been made in pursuit of this agenda.

The evidence reported here supports a number of the different hypotheses considered. In this sense, it confirms that monicausal explanations are unlikely to provide an adequate account of the endogeneity of exchange-rate regimes. Blending the competing theories thus becomes an important task for subsequent research. For example, external pressures to adapt policies to facilitate international cooperation could be imported into approaches emphasizing the primacy of domestic politics. Interactions between governmental stability and distributional outcomes need to be explicitly recognized, as do the distributional consequences of the fiscal shocks seemingly associated with shifts from fixed to floating rates.

Finally, a comprehensively endogenous approach to the choice of exchange-rate regime would have to explain how the evolution of the regime in place can itself alter the balance of costs and benefits and lead to a shift to alternative arrangements. An example of endogenous regime dynamics is the Triffin...
paradox. Triffin (1960) argued that under a gold-exchange standard, the system's demand for international liquidity tends to be met by an increase in the supply of foreign-exchange reserves relative to gold, thereby reducing confidence in the reserve currency and ultimately provoking a shift to floating rates. Another example, under an adjustable peg system, such as Bretton Woods or the EMS, is the desire of policymakers to convince the markets of their commitment to that peg by resisting exchange-rate changes at all cost, and thereby leading to rigidity, crisis, and ultimately to a shift to flexible rates. Finally, there is the notion that fixed-rate regimes based on hegemonic dominance so heighten the burden on the hegemon that they lead to hegemonic decline and to a shift away from the regime superintended by the hegemon (Cowhey and Long, 1983). A truly satisfactory approach would have to follow these pioneering efforts by endogenizing the costs and benefits of alternative regimes along with the choice of the regime itself.

References


Foreman-Peck, James, Andrew Hughes Hallett, and Yue Ma, "A Monthly Econometric Model of the Transmission of the Great Depression between the Principal Indus-


Melitz, Jacques, “Monetary Discipline, Germany, and the European Monetary System:}$
UNDERSTANDING INTERDEPENDENCE

THE MACROECONOMICS
OF THE OPEN ECONOMY

Peter B. Kenen, Editor

Papers Presented at a Conference Honoring the
Fiftieth Anniversary of Essays in International Finance

PRINCETON UNIVERSITY PRESS  PRINCETON, NEW JERSEY